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"My spirit will remain in Afghanistan, 
even though my soul will go to Allah 
(God). My last words to you, my son and 
successor arc: Never trust the Russians. " 
Abdur Rahman Khan 
Amir of Afghanistan (1880-1901) 
Mil. rn o rrui 
Afghanistan and the Region 
I 
Introduction 
.... Afghanistan would leave a legacy of distrust and resentment which, in 
retrospect was to make many quarrels of the past look like a series of 
minor family squabbles. 1 
-Josef Joffe, 1987 
The alliance between Pakistan and the United States during the Afghan crisis (1979-1988) 
was an excellent example of an opportunistic partnership between two unequal powers. 
The United States as a great power with global responsibilities and commitments took 
advantage of Pakistan's desperate need for military and economic assistance and its search 
for powerful friends to achieve some kind of parity with India, since Pakistan is 
unwilling to accept the role of an Indian satellite and sees military developments in India 
as potential threats. Pakistan's defence planners realised its economic and military 
weakness and sought external support in order to strengthen its bargaining position vis- 
ä-vis India. In exchange for military and economic assistance, the US was given access 
to Pakistani bases and other vital facilities to expand the scope of its policy of 
containment of communism. Pakistan, as a weak state with regional interests, seized 
upon the opportunity offered by the US search for anti-Communist allies in Asia in 
order to achieve four major objectives: 
> to receive US military assistance to bolster defence against Afghanistan and the 
perceived thrcat of its non-Communist neighbour, India; 
D through US military power and political support, to strengthen its bargaining 
position over the Soviet-Kabul and Soviet-New Delhi axes which sought to isolate 
Pakistan; 
> to receive massive cconomic aid from the US to accelerate its economic 
devclopmcnt; 
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to secure the US guarantee of protection against a possible attack by the Soviet- 
backed Marxist government in Kabul and by India. 
The joint Pakistan-US desire to strengthen Pakistan's economic and defence position, 
primarily against communism from the US point of view and principally against 
Afghanistan and India from the Pakistani point of view, produced seemingly 
complementary interests which facilitated a new alignment between the two countries. 
In the early 1980s over the crucial question of Pakistan's security, Islamabad's defence 
planners felt threatened by the Soviet Union or Afghanistan, the two countries against 
which the partnership was ostensibly directed to contain communism. Its leaders 
remembered Soviet encouragement and support for India's detaching the former East 
Pakistan in 1971 and setting it up as independent Bangladesh, as well as Soviet 
collusion with Afghanistan in helping nationalist Baluchis who sought more autonomy 
or even independence for Pakistani Baluchistan. At that time, Pakistan's policy makers 
`repeated their request for much more substantial assistance and requested that the US 
assurances to Pakistan be interpreted to include a possible Indian attack'3 vis-ä-vis the 
Soviet Union. However, the United States, as the leader of the free world and champion 
of the containment policy, "expressed more tangibly" that the US would protect 
Pakistan's security against the Soviet threat under 1959 agreement and "its security 
interest would be better served by a broad understanding with the United States. "4 
In order to trace the transformation of the partnership between the United States and 
Pakistan, the present study will review how the Afghan crisis created disturbance and 
complications, which posed a threat to Pakistan's internal and external security 
environment. Moreover, the study concerns itself with international crises because it 
I Josef Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burdens of Alliance 
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), p. 2. 2 Henry S. Bradshcr, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, new and expanded ed., (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1985), p. 221. 3 Zia ul-I laq was not satisfied with the mutual security agreement between the US and Pakistan, signed in 
1959. l Ie demanded a guarantee of Pakistan's security from India. The US however, made it plain that 
this could not be the case and that the US commitment involved the Soviet Union only. Sec Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981(New York: Farrier 
Strauss and Giroux, 1983), p. 449. 
4Ibid. 
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begins with the premise that an international crisis derives from the dynamics of 
perception, action and interaction of actors in the external sphere. Therefore, the manner in 
which global actors perceive and interpret a crisis-situation and the subsequent actions and 
interactions that follow have a critical bearing on the initiation and the outcome of an 
international crisis. The study will show that the decade of the 1980s started disastrously 
for international and regional security and for the global political system, because it 
changed the shape of regional and global politics. It also seriously jeopardised the 
security of a weak state. 
The study describes and analyses Pakistan's security problems in the wake of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan because, for the first time since its formation in 1947, Pakistan 
came to perceive a grave security threat from the northwest. A basic purpose of the 
research is to uncover ideas and " viewpoints about Pakistan's security within this 
landscape. Thus, the main research goal is to explore systematically Pakistan's 
perception of the security dilemma that confronted it during 1979-88. The research 
examines the multi-pronged threat to Pakistan's security, including projections of 
complete emulsification, internal instability and erosion of its economic and political 
vitality in the face of the on-going Afghan crisis. The study explains the internal 
vulnerabilities of Pakistan's security and describes Pakistan's perception that the Soviet- 
India axis desired to use the Afghanistan crisis to destabilise Pakistan, because Moscow 
believed that Pakistan was giving substantial support to the Afghan mujahideen. India's 
intention was perceived as being to destroy the structure of Pakistan's armed forces or 
capture a sizeable portion of terrain for the achievement of dominant power status in the 
region. 5 The Soviet Union's goal was perceived as the achievement of access to the 
Persian Gulf and the complete encirclement of China. 
1. A Critical Review and Appraisal of the Debate 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the subsequent withdrawal 
obviously offers itself as a paradigmatic example of an international crisis. In the 
nineteenth century, Afghanistan, a landlocked and mountainous country in the mouth of 
South and Southwest Asia, had been a focal point for nearly a century of Anglo-Russian 
s Francis Fukuyama, The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 
1980), p. 19. 
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competition in what Rudyard Kipling had called the "Great Game. " Britain and Russia 
had vied with each other for the strategic prize of the gateway to the fertile plains of 
South Asia and the Indian Ocean. None of the powers succeeded in subjugating 
Afghanistan. 
The latter half of the twentieth century saw Afghanistan capture centre-stage again as 
the epicentre of an international crisis, which erupted when the Soviet Union as a 
superpower became locked in a Cold War directly with the United States. Soviet 
intervention of Afghanistan in 1979 introduced a grim dimension to the power structure 
between Moscow and Washington. The Soviet Union's perception of the situation in 
Afghanistan underwent a fundamental transformation. Its involvement began as a 
reaction to the domestic developments in Afghanistan and later expanded into a 
geopolitical offensive. The Kremlin leaders were influenced by the fate of the Afghan 
revolution and, later, the desire to protect global and national security interests. The 
Soviet Union chose to explain its actions in terms of proletarian internationalism and the 
Brezhnev doctrine. Its decisions to use force and the coercive-defensive bargaining 
strategies that followed were responsible for initiating the international crisis. Thus, the 
Afghanistan crisis was symptomatic of the beginning of the end of the US-Soviet 
detente. 
The Soviet incursion into Afghanistan triggered a wave of responses across the globe 
and particularly affected the security and foreign policy postures of the United States 
and Pakistan. These countries emerged as the key actors in the unfolding situation 
whose perceptions, actions and interactions would determine the contours of the crisis. 
This was a struggle for global influence between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Both superpowers employed a variety of methods to maintain their hegemony. It 
precipitated the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving Soviet communism to be 
remembered largely as the twentieth century's most extraordinary political and 
intellectual aberration. 
A crisis actor may be defined as any independent entity which is an active participant in 
the crisis and contributes to the crisis process directly through actions and interactions 
with the other crisis-actors. The United States, Soviet Union and Pakistan were the 
important players of the Afghanistan crisis. The United States was the major actor to 
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contain Soviet expansion whose main ambitions were believed to be the overthrow of 
capitalism and democracy and the control of the Persian Gulf, the `oil jugular"6 of the 
West. In the case of Pakistan, significant changes were brought about by the 
development of the Afghanistan crisis. Pakistan emerged as a "front-line" state and 
found herself uncomfortably placed in the emerging Moscow-Kabul threat scenario. 
Thus, Pakistan was the smaller player in the game although it was the principal channel 
through which assistance was provided to Afghan freedom fighters. At that time, history 
seemed to be repeating itself because, thirty years previously, the Eisenhower 
administration had entered into a mutual security arrangement with Pakistan and 
provided sophisticated military hardware and economic assistance. In the same vein, the 
Reagan administration also entered into a new alignment with Pakistan and showed its 
willingness to break with the unhappy past and supply ultra sophisticated military 
equipment to boost the security of Pakistan against the Communist threat. 
In between these two peaks of US interest stretched a valley of reduced American 
strategic interest in Pakistan. During the period of the Carter Administration in 
particular US policies toward the Soviet Union were ambivalent and Afghanistan was 
on the lowest level of US priorities. Moreover, Carter's response to Afghanistan was too 
late as a whole. His policies were intended to restore real communication, using 
concrete actions and not just words to send strong signals of US disapproval. However, 
the situation completely changed when Ronald Reagan came into power, with tough and 
harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric, and the Afghanistan issue came to be seen as a serious 
challenge to United States power. Reagan frequently asserted that Afghanistan was a 
major source of friction in US-Soviet relations. His administration sharply criticised the 
Soviets for their conduct of the war and levelled widely publicised charges against them 
of using chemical weapons. The Reagan administration made it clear in general terms 
that the US had to do more militarily to protect the Persian Gulf region. In the Reagan 
era, the Soviet Union came to be seen as a greater threat to peace and Afghanistan was 
kept on the top of the agenda. Reagan did not fail to heed the dire and desperate 
interpretations of the Soviet action nor to treat Afghanistan as a strategic challenge and a 
turning point in the superpower relationship. Reagan did not take Carter's "wait and 
see" approach, but adopted a harsh policy towards the Soviet Union. Actually, Reagan's 
6 Richard Nixon, Victory Without War 1999 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. 115. 
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policies of military support to the Afghan mujahideen were better suited to the 
uncertainties and ambiguous nature of the Soviet threat. 
On the whole, Reagan was more successful than Carter in defending the Gulf and 
augmenting American capabilities to fight against the Soviet Union. More broadly, the 
United States was willing to pay a price, especially since the political and economic 
costs were much lower for the US than the Soviet Union. Globally, however, the Soviet 
Union was clearly not a status quo power-except in those areas where its influence had 
already grown. It may or may not have been what Henry Kissinger called a 
"revolutionary" power, but it was certainly a revisionist one. Thus, it was clear that the 
support and provision of weapons to the mujahideen by the United States changed the 
face of world history. The war proved that Afghanistan was an unachievable political 
and military target for the Soviets and subsequently Afghanistan became a bleeding 
wound for the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, continued military stagnation, domestic pressure and political instability 
within Afghanistan compelled the Soviets to move in the direction of accommodation. 
The ideological content of their rhetoric was considerably muted and the emphasis 
shifted to pragmatism and flexibility. The perception of threat or imminent danger was 
replaced by an awareness of dysfunctional consequences. In this regard, the mujahideen, 
the Marxist government in Kabul and the United Nations contributed to the crisis 
process in a secondary capacity. While the mujahideen and the Kabul government acted 
at the behest of their respective mentors (Pakistan and the Soviet Union), the United 
Nations offered itself as an instrument in the final peace negotiations. Therefore the 
present project analyses the Afghan crisis from the perspective of the Pakistan-US 
partnership within the overall context of the crisis process. 
2. Thesis Objectives and Justification 
The basic purpose and objective of this part of the study is to explain why the research is 
structured in the way it is and to explain the goals that this study sought to achieve. This 
is not a theoretical dissertation and I have no specific theoretical model to explain the 
empirical study. I do not pretend to claim that my research provides a path-breaking 
response to larger questions that other students of international politics have left 
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unresolved. Rather, I was drawn to analyse the crisis-situation when East-West relations 
were at the heart of international politics and the Afghanistan crisis was intrinsically 
important to bolster the American containment policy against the Soviet Union. 
Although the crisis time has passed, case studies of allied controversies still have a place 
in the scholarly literature and I will be content if the analysis provides insight into how 
and why the Afghanistan crisis was played out in the context of Pakistan-US alliance 
relations. 
My endeavours have not been entirely atheoretical. I have been attentive to the kinds of 
theoretical questions explored in similar studies and my thinking about the Afghanistan 
crisis has to some extent been informed by insights drawn from some of the theoretical 
literature. In addition, I was drawn to this case because it had significance beyond the 
narrow controversy that, for the most part, was played out in the early days of the 1980s. 
It also confirmed to a large extent the slowness of the Carter administration over 
definitions and response to threat outside the NATO area. Although the Afghanistan 
crisis was rooted in the particularities of divergent stakes in East-West relationships, it 
was also rooted in the contrasting power, roles and responsibilities of allies. The 
initiation of the crisis-situation in 1980-81 is analysed by examining the varying 
perceptions of the USA and Pakistan and their subsequent actions and pattern of 
interactions. The period of crisis dissolution serves as the second focal point of inquiry. 
The following important research questions are explained within the frame of reference 
provided by the Afghanistan crisis: 
" How did the United States and Pakistan perceive the Afghanistan crisis-situation 
during 1979-1988? 
f What were the factors and compulsions to the convergence of the policies of 
Pakistan and the United States to contain communism? 
f Why did the US and Pakistan perceive the crisis-situation in the specific way 
they did? 
f How did the United States and Pakistan react in the international arena in each of 
these time periods? 
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f Did the United States and Pakistan achieve their objectives? 
f What was the impact of the Afghan war on Pakistan society at the macro level? 
3. Contribution of this Research 
I attempt to answer these questions through a methodology which combines empirical 
analysis and historical illustration. The study seeks to present a detailed analysis of the 
Afghanistan crisis to illustrate broader dynamics within the national security framework 
of Pakistan and the United States. In thinking about the initial causes of the crisis and 
the divergent responses of the crisis actors to it, I frequently focused on the levels-of- 
analysis question (though more implicitly than explicitly), specifically on the interplay 
between narrow particularities and idiosyncratic factors on the one side and the broader, 
systemic ones that pushed the US in different directions. For the United States the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was most threatening because of its implications for the 
Persian Gulf and oil supplies. If the Soviets had long term designs in the region, or if 
their presence in Afghanistan created opportunities independent of their immediate 
motives for going into Afghanistan, the vital interests of the US and its allies were at 
stake. 
I explain the Afghan war from Pakistan's perspective as its policy makers perceived and 
handled the crisis. My analysis indicates that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the architect of the 
Afghan policy and Zia ul-Haq maintained Bhutto's legacy to defend Pakistan's interests. 
I argue that the Afghan crisis was unusually promising because it provided an 
opportunity to the United States and Pakistan to engage each other in partnership, based 
on common concerns to stop Soviet expansionism. I also evaluate Carter's thoughts, 
showing how he tried to practise detente without deterrence, as he tended to 
underestimate the Soviets' military power and the wider significance of the intervention 
in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had gradually strengthened its position and credibility 
and the Carter administration was divided in its realisation of the serious consequences 
of the Soviet invasion. I illustrate Pakistan's "front-line" position and its threat scenario 
from Soviet-backed communist government in Kabul. I also describe how Pakistan 
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became a partner of the major actor in the unfolding game of the Southwest Asian 
power politics. 
I point out that after the Pakistan-US partnership, Pakistan improved its relative power 
position and acted as a principal channel to provide military assistance to Afghan 
mujahideen. Pakistan devoted its resources against the Soviet Union and cooperated 
with the United States to contain communism. The US also used Pakistani military 
bases and its forces to help the Afghan mujahideen against Soviet expansionism. I 
illuminate two most important points which no other Asian and Western writer has 
discussed in relation to the Afghan crisis. I succinctly examine the circumstances under 
which Pakistan allowed the Israeli secret service to train hundreds of Afghan 
mujahideen and explain the intensity of the Soviet threat when US deployed medium 
range nuclear bombers and ground forces in Pakistan to protect its security. Moreover, I 
assert the costs and benefits of the decade long partnership and show how the Afghan 
war corrupted the Afghan commanders, Pakistan army officials and society. I assess the 
consequences of the war for Pakistan in the light of empirical evidence. 
In contrast to President Jimmy Carter's lack of response to the Soviet aggression in 
Afghanistan, the Reagan administration reacted more strongly. As Robert Rothstein 
theorised in 1968, great powers ally because of threats to the balance of power within 
the entire system, while small powers ally because of threats to the regional balance. It 
follows from that, that great powers would also be more sensitive to global threats. In 
large part, this is because great powers, who bear the primary responsibility for 
responding to threats, not only define their interests more expansively than lesser 
powers, but also tend to be more sensitive to ambiguous evidence and more averse to 
marginal losses. 7 Moreover, threat assessment is a complex process. It involves not 
merely perceptions of immediate threats to values that are intrinsically important, but 
also guesswork and fears about patterns of future conduct. It is a mosaic comprising 
factors that are both concrete and abstract, objective and psychological. As Raymond 
Cohen has defined, states view other states' actions through the lens of the written or 
unwritten `rules of the game' that obtain between them, rules that provide signposts of 
future behaviour. According to Cohen, "threat is not an invariant attribute of particular 
7 Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). pp. 14- 
17 and 19-25. 
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situations but a function of the particular bilateral rules of the game between the actors 
involved. "8 Thus, it is not surprising that Cohen finds a "significant correlation" 
between rule infringement and a resulting sense of threat -9 
In the same way, Edward McWhinney in 1964 identified three ground-rules in the 
`game' between the United States and the Soviet Union: (1) no surprises; (2) economy 
in the use of power; and (3) mutual self-restraint. 10 The Soviet invasion contravened all 
three and was clearly a "brutal infringement" of the rules, as far as the US officials were 
concerned. " President Jimmy Carter was very much concerned that the Soviets were 
changing the rules of the superpower relationship and he was looking for signposts of 
future Soviet behaviour. 12 Thus, despite his early weakness, Carter eventually acted very 
much as earlier presidents had, by responding in alarm to ominous signs, such as "firsts" 
or "precedents" in Soviet behaviour, or a Soviet willingness to cross lines, in either a 
geographical or a conceptual sense. 13 
The connection between threat and rules of the game is important because of the fact 
that the "rules" of the US-Soviet game were so very different from those of the regional 
allies of the United States. The regional powers were less troubled by the possible 
implications and the indirect threat posed by the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger 
distinguished this situation in terms of America's global interests and its allies' regional 
interests. 14 Thus, the US adopted a multilateral approach to counter the Soviet 
aggression and moved to augment its position and defence capabilities in the Persian 
Gulf region. In the end, my reason for choosing this topic for my thesis is not only 
because I have found it a very interesting and fascinating topic of study, but also my 
$ Raymond Cohen, International Politics: The Rules of the Game (New York: Longman, 198 1), p. 144. 9 Ibid., p. 141. 10 Edward McWhinney, The Pursuit of Power: Global Competition Between US-Soviet Union (New 
York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 34-36. 11 Ibid., p. 58. 12 As Raymond Cohen claims, statesmen often fear that rules, especially those that are more tacit than 
explicit, are "wasting assets" subject to "extinction. " As in Carter's case, this fear leads to 
demonstrative behaviour, designed to reinforce the message that rules continue to operate. Raymond 
Cohen, International Politics: The Rules of the Game, pp. 114-25. 13 See Thomas G. hart, "Perceiving Afghanistan: Some Questions About the Applicability of Theoretical 
Insights in Analysing Perceptions in a went Crisis, " in Christer Jonsons, Cognitive Dynamics and 
International Politics (New York: St. Ma'tin's, 1982), pp. 195-96. 14 Henry Kissinger, "A New Atlantic Charter, " Survival Vol. 15 (August 1973), pp. 188-92. 
11 
hope of bringing everything I have learnt in this research to a study about the complex 
issue of the Afghan crisis with special reference to Pakistan's security. 
At the beginning of the Afghan crisis there were divergencies of interests and Pakistan 
was unwilling to jeopardise its significant political and economic relations with both 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The Pakistani leadership was willing to maintain 
detente with Moscow, even at the expense of discord with United States, an uncertain 
ally in the 1970s. At this time, the threat posed by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan 
was too ambiguous and remote in the eyes of the Pakistani leadership. They were 
unwilling to make gestures toward solidarity with the United States because of a lack of 
trust in Carter's leadership and more broadly, due to past experience. 
The present research has two qualifying limitations to its explanation of the crisis- 
situation. These limitations were serious matters, particularly in dealing with the 
conjunction between a small state and great power. The first limitation is that I make no 
claim to having supplied all the details of answers to the questions raised in the research. 
This is not a high level insider's account, nor is it one sufficiently removed from events 
to profit from detailed documentary evidence. Thus, if the big picture is fairly clear, 
there are small gaps and uncertainties in places. As is typical in studies of Asian- 
American affairs, there are also asymmetries in the distribution of available information. 
In part, I am sure, this is my fault because I am more conversant with the US and 
Pakistani sources as compared to Soviet-Afghan literature. More importantly, though, 
the asymmetry is also a simple function of the availability of resources. Particularly on 
matters of foreign policy, Washington is more open than the Third World countries. The 
documentary stream is much wider than elsewhere, and in the media and elsewhere, 
information flows more freely. Even the universe of relevant secondary materials on 
foreign affairs and national security is vastly larger. I have drawn heavily from Pakistani 
and Afghan sources of materials and I have tried to surmount ethnocentrism. However, 
even so, I have also leaned heavily on United States sources. 
The second limitation is epistemological. In explanations of why individuals or states 
behave as they do, certainty is often a scarce commodity. On some questions here, 
something approximating certainty is easy to attain. In many instances, however, 
multiple causal factors were at work and it is impossible to weigh each with confidence. 
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Instead, I survey each and attempt to identify, at least very roughly, the relative 
importance of each. In a study such as this, it would be convenient if one causal factor 
were paramount. That would readily facilitate the approach of organising the research 
around a central hypothesis. In fact, if the evidence is viewed somewhat selectively, 
such an approach is possible. In explaining differences over the East-West dimensions 
of the issue, one could focus on divergent threat perceptions, or differing interests, or 
tactical disagreements, or even domestic politics and make a strong case. But as elegant 
as reductionist explanations may be for hypothesis-testing and theory-building, they do 
not always capture real-world complexities. 
4. Methodology and Structure of the Thesis 
The structure of the thesis is a traditional one because I employ straightforward analysis 
and both inductive and deductive reasoning. I have used a wide variety of primary and 
secondary sources of material and a small 'number of interviews. I also rely on 
government documents, newspapers, newsweekly accounts, statistical abstracts, 
transcripts of national radio broadcasting and news agency reports. I am reasonably 
confident that a convincing and comprehensive picture emerges. 
In addressing the various questions and assessing the factors that shaped the partners' 
behaviour, I faced certain organisational dilemmas. I wish I could say that after 
wrestling with these dilemmas I found the ideal organisational solution, but I did not. 
All of the obvious approaches, country-by-country, issue-by-issue, and organisation 
centred on explanatory factors (dependent variables), had major shortcomings, not the 
least of which is the inexact fit with material based on close narrative analysis. Thus, I 
have employed an organisational hybrid which, taken as a whole, is at times awkward 
but does present as complete a picture as I have been able to produce. 
This study has been divided into six chapters. Each is allowed to speak for itself and to 
present its own point of view without being subjected to a judgement afterwards. All the 
chapters present their material in an organised structure; where feasible the structure is 
similar from one chapter to another. More important, each chapter's discussion attempts 
to dissect issues in an analytical and systematic fashion. Ideas 'are developed and 
analysed and, where feasible, their current consequences or their likely consequences in 
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the future are traced. Thus, the study has been organised structurally as follows: The 
Introduction delineates the goals of the work, introduces and discusses the scope of the 
topic, and preferred modes of interpretation and puts forward the broad theses. 
Chapter One focuses on the study of the geopolitical environment of South Asia and 
deals with the superpowers' struggle for global influence in South Asia. It is shown that 
the United States employed a variety of methods to get access to South Asia which is a 
gateway to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Background material is provided 
to the general evolution of the USA's strategic and economic interests. 
Chapter Two is devoted to the elaboration of Pakistan's security dilemma and its 
hostile external security environment vis-ä-vis India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. 
The major portion of this chapter discusses Pakistan's threat perception in the wake of 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It is argued that this event was the most important 
turning point for Pakistan because this was the first time that the country had faced a 
two-front threat to its security, in the northwest from the Soviet Union and Afghanistan 
and in the east from the Soviet ally, India. 
Chapter Three focuses on Pakistan's response to Soviet invasion and its support to the 
Afghan mujahideen struggle. The discussion explores Pakistan's attitude and interests to 
support Afghan mujahideen groups in the struggle to find a durable, inter-regional 
solution to its security. In the arena of crisis, Pakistan adopted a pragmatic approach and 
its foreign policy was driven by cooperation rather than competitive notions of security. 
Pakistan provided sanctuary, training and shelter to Afghans and Pakistan's support to 
the Afghan mujahideen had a great affect on Soviet domestic politics, as shown when 
the Soviet subsequent reversed its foreign policy and decided to withdraw from 
Afghanistan. 
Chapter Four describes in detail the United States' reaction to the Soviet military 
invasion of Afghanistan. The US considered the Soviet move as a major geopolitical 
offensive outside its sphere of influence. The act was regarded as part of a grand design 
aimed at bringing the strategically vital Persian Gulf region within the political grasp of 
Moscow. The discussion highlights US methods to prevent the Soviet military 
adventurism, including unilateral sanctions and Carter's commitment to defend the 
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Persian Gulf from external threats. It is shown that it was Reagan's doctrine that pushed 
the Soviet into a defensive position, subsequent to which the Soviet empire crumpled. 
Chapter Five analyses the United States-Pakistan partnership to support the Afghan 
mujahideen against the Soviet Union. The study illustrates the fact that the US and 
Pakistan compromised with each other in order to contain the Soviet threat. It is shown 
how the US decision to give military aid to Pakistan and the Afghan mujahideen was 
dictated by strategic and political considerations. 
Chapter Six presents a balance sheet of the crisis-situation. It seeks to explain 
comprehensively the advantages and disadvantages of the Afghan war for Pakistan, 
describing and analysing the impact of the Afghan crisis and its cost and benefits. 
Attention is drawn to the alarming threat, political, economic, social and environmental 
posed to Pakistan's domestic security by the huge number of refugees. 
In the conclusion I sum up whole debate, I offer some final thoughts and provide 
something of an epilogue, summarising relevant assessments. I also comment briefly on 
why the Afghanistan crisis, like so many of the alliance's earlier crises, faded into 
irrelevance, and I return to a theme raised at the outset, the duality of stability and 
instability within the major actors, marked by enormous resilience and by its abiding 
vulnerability to shocks arising from serious disagreements over the handling of Afghan 
war and the management of relations between smaller actors. 
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one of the most vital centres of human affairs in the present world. Its vast expanse, 
roughly rectangular in shape, stretches from its mountain and sea boundaries with 
Southwest, Southeast Asia and the Chinese-Russian Far East southward to tropical lands 
washed by the Indian Ocean. Geopolitically, South Asia is a distinctive region; Stephen 
Cohen classifies it as an independent geopolitical region. 4 It is big enough to be a 
subcontinent in its own right, and it has been and is separated from the Eurasian power by 
the massive wall of the Himalayas, from the Middle East by the Iiindukush and other 
mountains of the Northwest frontier, and from Burma and Indo-China by lower but 
heavily-forested jagged mountain ranges s 
The evolution of the South Asian region has a long history of over 4,500 years, an even 
longer history than the Indus civilisation. Its early civilisation, revealed in the cities of the 
Indus basin, Mohenjodaro, and Harappa, and dating from 2,500 BC, had contacts with the 
Mesopotamian civilisation. The history of the region reveals an endless succession of 
invasions by various peoples, all contributing in some way to the cultural growth of the 
land, giving a complex character to its civilisation. The term "South Asia" has always 
been a little vague. Some scholars include Southeast Asia, others Southwest Asia and 
some refer to Southern Asia which includes all three. A recent vogue among historians 
has been the use of the term, `"Tropical Asia. " Cohen describes the term South Asia as a 
replacement of the terms "Indian Subcontinent"6 (or simply the Subcontinent), 
"Hindustan, " and "Bharat. " The word "India" is a European corruption of sindhu 
(meaning "river" in Sanskrit, whence also Indus) and was transmitted to Europe through 
Iranian usage and the writings of ancient Greek geographers. The term has been applied 
in the sense of Greater India to all of South and Southeast Asia since the fifteenth 
century. 7 The concept of India as a precise geographic and political entity dates from the 
nineteenth century, during the period of British rule in South Asia. In imperial days the 
region could have been referred to as `The Indian Empire. ' The term `Indian 
subcontinent, ' also used because of historical and geographical forces was itself a vivid 
reminder of regional imbalance. Since the partition of the Indian empire, the term has 
4 Stephen Philip Cohen, "Image of Peace and War in South Asia, " A Ford Foundation Project, New 
Delhi, (15 July 1992) (unpublished paper), pp. 1-9. s Graham Chapman, "Regional vs. Regional Determinism: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as Inheritors 
of Empire, " in David Arnold and Peter Robb (ed. )., Institutions and Ideologies (Surrey: Curzon 
Press, 1993), p. 7. 
The term Indian subcontinent was used for the whole geographical area of South Asia i. e., including 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. See Stephen Philip Cohen. "Image 
of Peace and War in South Asia, " pp. 4.7. 
Norton Ginsburg, The Pattern of Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Ilall, 1958), p. 458. 
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been apt to give offence to Pakistanis and to Bangladeshis, whereas 'South Asia' is 
neutral and inoffensive. 8 
However, the region of South Asia came into being with the British withdrawal from 
the region in 1947 and the term "South Asia" has come to be widely used since the 
1950s to describe the region and its present-day status, as the group of seven countries 
mentioned above. Although their status is disputed, 9Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma, 
despite their have important geographical, historical and cultural affinities with South 
Asia are best generally regarded as buffer zones between the great regional powers. 
2. Geopolitical Importance of South Asia 
In terms of geopolitics, the South Asian region has traditionally been looked at as a 
unified entity. The region is Indo-centric and all other six countries of South Asia arc 
located around India, without any mutual geographic contiguity. The location of South 
Asia is important to the West and to the growth of Japanese industrialisation. It is located 
between the energy-rich Persian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific, and borders both Russia and 
China. The air and sea routes that connect Europe and the Middle East with the Far East 
and Australiasia pass through or near the South Asian region. It also serves as a bridge 
between East Asia and West Asia, and Central Asia and East Asia. Moreover, 
strategically, South Asia is not only important in itself, but has the potential to affect 
developments in other areas of great significance as well. It is a peninsula, jutting into the 
Indian Ocean, 10 with the Bay of Bengal on the east and the Arabian Sea on the west. The 
renowned naval strategist Alfred Mahan described the strategic importance of the Indian 
Ocean in the following words: 
Whoever controls the Indian Ocean, dominates Asia. This ocean is the 
key to the seven seas. In the 21st century the destiny of the world would 
be decided on its waters. ' 1 
s B. 11. Farmer, An Introduction To South Asia (New York: Methuen & Co, 1983), p. 1. The author is a 
witness that during the South Asian Conference in Dhaka in 1976, one of the speakers used the term 
'Bangle-Pak Subcontinent' instead of Indian subcontinent. See complete details in his book chapter 1. 
Bhabani Sen Gupta puts Afghanistan into the South Asian region. See Bhabani Sen Gupta, South 
Asian Perspectives (New Delhi: B. R. Publishing Co, 1988), p. 5. to The Indian Ocean is the smallest ocean in the world with the area of around 28,400,000 square miles or 
73,600,000 square kilometres. See Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 9 (Chicago: William Benton 
Publishers, 1974), p. 307. 
This statement is commonly attributed to Alfred Thayer Mahan but it has proved difficult to find the 
original source. However, he is quoted in C. F. Monorajan Bezboruah, US Strategy In the Indian 
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In fact, Mahan's views about the Indian Ocean are valuable because the Indian Ocean 
enjoys an immense significance among the littoral states and against the background of 
superpower rivalry in the region. 12 Geographically, the ocean is surrounded by India, 
Pakistan and Iran to the north, the Arabian Peninsula and Africa to the west, Australia, the 
Sunda Islands of Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula to the east, and Antarctica to the 
south. In the southwest, it links to the Atlantic Ocean south of the southern tip of Africa 
and to the east and southeast it is connected with the Pacific Ocean. Its choke-points such 
as Cape of Good-Hope (Africa), Strait of Bab-cl-Mandeb (Red Sea), Strait of Hormuz 
(Gulf), Strait of Malacca (between Malaysia and Indonesia), and Strait of Sunda (between 
Java and Sumatra) have substantial strategic influence. This fact was well acknowledged 
by the famous Portuguese navigator Alfonso d' Albuquerque who spoke of "three keys" 
to the Indian Ocean: the strait of Malacca and Singapore in the cast, the strait of Hormuz 
at the entrance to the Gulf and the strait of Bab-el-Mandeb at the entrance to the Red Sea 
in the west. 13 Moreover, the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean is also linked with 
the concentration of many of the raw material resources of the world, such as, oil, rubber, 
manganese, copper, gold, tea, cotton, rice and jute in the various littoral states. Therefore, 
South Asia is a major supplier of export cargoes to the Indian Ocean and it is a junction 
between the western and eastern halves of the ocean. 
South Asia has been recognised as a geographical area of major strategic significance 
through which pass the routes connecting Europe, Africa and Asia. The region of 
South Asia is important because of its connection with the vital sea-lines of 
communication in the Indian Ocean and its being sandwiched between two politically 
volatile and economically critical regions, i. e., the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. 
Thus, South Asia forms an integral part of Mackindcr's "world Island, " that is, the 
Euro-African-Asiatic land mass, the most important single geographical unit in the 
world. 14 Moreover, the major actors of the region, India and Pakistan, were in the 
second half of the twentieth century divided in terms of polarisation between the 
Ocean (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 3; Amita Agarwal, Indian Ocean and World Peace (New Delhi: Kanishka Publishers, 2000), p. 1; Lt. General (Retd) Sardar F. S. Lodi, "Indian Ocean and our 
Security, " httpa(unvw. defencejoumal comý2000/mar/in djan-ocean htm; and see Ranjit 1) Rai, "India's 
Maritime Ambitions vis-a-vis the Afghan War, " http: //www. indiadefence. com/ambitions. htm. Chundra Kumar, "The Indian Ocean: Arc of Crisis or Zone of Peace?, " International Affairs, Vol. 60, 
No. 2 (Spring 1984), p. 234. is Burrell R. M. and Cottrell Alvin (cd. )., The Indian Ocean: Its Political, Economic and Military 
Importance (London: Praeger, 1972), p. 1. 
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United States, the Soviet Union and China. In this context, India functioned as an 
important ally of the Soviet Union and Pakistan functioned as a broker for the West in 
relation to moderate Muslim countries in the Middle East and the Gulf areas and in 
relation to China. 
3. US Involvement and Interest in South Asia Since 1945 
Despite the inherent geopolitical importance of South Asia the United States' 
involvement in the region has fluctuated, depending upon its intensity and style of 
competition with other great powers at the global level. Historically, South Asia is an 
area about which Americans know little, where they have a restricted set of interests, 
and which has thus often been given little attention in the scale of the US priorities. 's 
American strategic interests and perspectives regarding South Asia, from the very 
beginning, were strongly influenced by the British, who sought to guide the US to lead 
the world and control the strategic zones previously dominated by London. Olaf Caroc, 
the British diplomat, admitted that the British advised the US about the protection of 
Western interests in the Gulf and South Asia. 16 In fact, the United States is not a 
natural Asian power. It is geopolitically distant and its trading and investment 
involvement in the region was negligible during the Cold War period. The principal 
determinant of US policy towards South Asia has been the US perception of the 
region's relevance to the pursuit of its wider global geopolitical and strategic goals. 
Moreover, the US policy in South Asia has been shaped not so much with reference to 
the interests of the states of the region but based on US interests vis-a-vis the Soviet 
Union and China. The major American interest was to prevent the absorption of the 
area into the Communist orbit. 
The political involvement of the United States in South Asia is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. It started only after World War 11, from which the United States emerged 
as a leading world power. Before that time, there had been only limited commercial 
and cultural links dating back to the nineteenth century. The American Tobacco 
14 See W. 11. Parker, Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 
pp. 185 and 223. ts Thomas P. 'Thornton, `? he United States and South Asia, " Survival, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1993), 
pp. 110; and see S. D. Muni, "The United States and South Asia: The Strategic Dimension, " in Shelton 
U. Kodikara (ed. )., External Compulsions of South Asian Politics (London: Sage Publications, 
1993), p. 58. 
16 Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power (London: Macmillan, 1931), p. 112. 
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Company (ATC) engaged in tobacco trade with the South Asian states, and a number 
of American archaeologists, anthropologists, students of ancient history, educators and 
missionaries were attracted by the region's unique cultural, religious and historical 
aspects. '7 These socio-cultural, religious and academic groups were the main contacts 
between the United States and South Asia in the early modem period. The end of the 
British rule over the world, especially the withdrawal from South Asia to a reduced 
position East of Suez brought the United States into the region to help its embattled 
ally, Great Britain, and the area ceased to be under their sphere of influence. " The 
eclipse of the British marked a corresponding rise in status for the United States and 
the Soviet Union and the materialization of a bipolar global power configuration. 
US policy toward South Asia has, however, been basically confused, inconsistent and 
reactive rather than calculated and long term. The continued absence of direct material 
interest has helped to limit American involvement in the region. Instead, the United 
States has been guided in its South Asian policy by its global interests and has 
therefore tended to view regional conflicts largely from a global perspective. 
19 The 
resulting periodic modification of US regional policy to suit its global pursuits 
appeared to local states as a confused policy, lacking clarity and coherence both in its 
declaratory and operational dimensions. The primary objective of the next sections is 
to analyse the different US interests in South Asia, and its preparedness to undertake a 
serious political, economic and military action, irrespective of the cost involved. The 
dimensions of the superpower interests in South Asia can be defined in various 
categories such as political, economic and strategic, to achieve specific goals 
calculated to serve vital interests. 
3-1. US Political Interests in South Asia 
The US entered the subcontinent principally by way of the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia to protect the interests of the industrialised nations. A degree of natural affinity 
17 Mahmud A. Faksh, "US Policy in the Middle East: Incongruity in Political Strategy and Action, " 
American Arab Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 1987-88), p. 38. 11 Joseph J. Malone, "American and the Arabian Peninsula: The First Two Hundred Years, " Middle East 
Journal (Summer 1976), pp. 406-24. 19 See for more study about the US policy toward the countries of South Asia Norman D. Palmer, South 
Asia and United States Foreign Policy (New York: I Ioughton Mifflin, 1966); pp. 28-46; W. Norman 
Brown, The United States and India, Pakistan. Bangladesh, (3rd ed. )., (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1972); p. 57; and Werner Levi, The Challenge of World Politics In South and 
Southeast Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-I lall, 1968), p. 118. 
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between Pakistan and its Western neighbours was part of the reason; more important, 
however, was Washington's mechanical concept of containment that required a chain 
of contiguous allies around the perimeter of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Moreover, the US 
policy of strategic distance from India was based on the US assessment of India's 
prospective role and capabilities that were seen as incompatible with the overall 
Western requirements in the region. India's image in the eyes of US future planners 
was that it was not capable of providing leadership to Southeast Asia in the struggle 
against communism. Pakistan, in their perceptions, appeared better placed to deal with 
its problems. In this context, the policy makers of the State Department on 3 April 
1950 said: 
... it may in time become desirable critically to review our concept that Pakistan's destiny is or should be bound with India ... the schism that 
led 
to the break-up of the old India was very deep... The development of a 
Pakistan-India entente cordiale appears remote. Moreover, the vigour 
and methods which have characterised India's execution of its policy of 
consolidating the princely states and its inflexible attitude with regard to 
Kashmir may indicate national traits which in time, if not controlled, 
could make India Japan's successor in Asiatic imperialism. In such a 
circumstance a strong Muslim block under the leadership of Pakistan 
and friendly to the US might afford a desirable balance of power in 
Asia. 20 
It was clear that a policy of containment of communism in Southeast and Southwest 
Asia predominated in the US approach and they found Pakistan more comfortable for 
US strategic interests as compared to India. Pakistan's assets, such as its religious 
identity with the Muslim countries of the Middle East, its geographical proximity to the 
oil-rich Persian Gulf and to Communist adversaries like the Soviet Union and China, 
and above all its potential and willingness to act as a regional balancer to India, were 
indeed tempting 21 There was also general feeling by the American policy makers that 
by extending military assistance, Pakistan's friendship could be won and its opposition 
to the Communist nations strengthened. Olaf Caroc, a former Governor of the 
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan and Foreign Secretary of the British- 
Indian government, openly indicated to the Americans in his book, Wells of Power, 
that Western defence of the Middle East should be based on Pakistan, just as British 
20 Report by the Foreign Relation Committee to South, Southeast and West Asia about the emerging 
situation of India, Pakistan and Iran. See The State Department Bulletin, 3 April 1950 (Washington, 
D. C: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 134-35; and sec also It. K. Jain, US-South Asia 
Relations 1947-1982, Vol. II, (New Delhi: Radiant, 1983), p. 16. 
21 S. D. Muni, "The United States and South Asia, " p. 61. 
23 
defence of the Middle East had previously been based upon control of the 
subcontinent 22 The United States also realised that with Pakistan the Middle East 
could be defended and without Pakistan it would be difficult to do so. 23 
Thus, Pakistan is the only country in South Asia and within the Muslim world which 
developed a close bilateral and multilateral relationship with the West in the 1950s. 
This was a time when Pakistan was becoming increasingly anxious to obtain US 
military and economic assistance without antagonising the Soviet Union and China. In 
general, Pakistan's purpose in joining the alliances was not to contain communism but 
to strengthen its defence and bargaining position vis-ä-vis India, its arch adversary. 24 
Therefore, Pakistan became an ally of the West in May 1954, when the Mutual 
Defence Assistance Agreement with the United States was signed. In 1954-55 Pakistan 
became a member of SEATO25 and the Baghdad Pact (later known as CENTO) '26 
which led to a close military relationship with the US. Washington had a chance to 
establish military bases in order to protect the oil areas of the Middle East. 27 In 1959, 
Pakistan also signed a bilateral "Agreement of Co-operation" with the United States 
and Pakistan was associated with the US through not one, but four mutual security 
a rangements 28 The New York Times stated that discussions on a military alliance were 
to begin on the condition that Pakistan "was willing to consider an exchange of air 
bases for military equipment. "29 Moreover, the Pakistan military elites, especially 
General Ayub Khan, constantly pressed for larger allotments of arms and economic 
aid. His arguments were supported by many US officials who, convinced that Pakistan 
had adopted a firm anti-Communist policy, argued that it could only play a role in 
regional defence if it were given more arms than originally planned. 30 Policy makers 
seemingly believed that Pakistan assessed the Soviet military pressure as a significant 
22 Sir Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power, pp. 179-180. 23 Rekha Datta, "US Security Policy in India and Pakistan and the Question of Nuclear Proliferation. " 
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (Winter 1998), p. 29. 24 S. D. Muni, "Defence and Development in South Asia, " in Bhabani Sen Gupta (ed. )., Regional 
Cooperation and Development In South Asia (Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1986), pp. 18-36. =f SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation) There were following members: Australia, France, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States. Official 
machinery disbanded in 1975, but obligations under the treaty remain in force. France maintains an 
inactive status. 
26 CENTO (the Central Treaty Organisation) was formed in 1959 after Iraq had withdrawn from the 
Baghdad Pact. I lis members were the UK, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey. The USA was also a member of 
CENTO committees but not of the organisation as a whole. This treaty ceased to be effective after the 
1980s. 
27 R. K. Jain, US-South Asia Relations 1947-82, Vol. II (New Delhi: Radiant, 1983), p. 16. 
_' Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 130. 
t° The New York Times (2 November 1953). 
30 The New York Times (15 October 1955). 
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danger, which made cooperation with the West desirable. In fact, some important 
officials apparently thought that Pakistan regarded the Soviet threat as a close second 
to that posed by India. Thus, Pakistan did become a member of Western military pacts 
and was sometimes regarded as `America's most allied ally in Asia' and managed the 
problem of survival from the implacable hostility of India. Political analyst Nirad 
Chaudhuri quite logically argued that "India held the pistol at the head of Pakistan, 
until, in 1954, the American alliance delivered the country from the nightmare. "31 
Under the influence of the alliance policy, Pakistan felt it had clearly come off better 
32 than India. 
Therefore, military alliances with Pakistan became a strategic necessity and the US 
acquired an image in India "as a friend of Pakistan and opposed to India. "33 Some 
Indian scholars have argued that the US attitude towards India has allowed India to 
believe that the US patronisation of Pakistan meant denial of proper status to India. 34 
Moreover, the US military aid to Pakistan alienated India and pushed it toward the 
Soviet Union. Subsequently, India's willingness to expand relations with the 
Communist countries enhanced their international stature and made other Asian 
countries more receptive to Soviet overtures. The Soviet Union backing of India vis-a- 
vis Pakistan strengthened New Delhi's resolve to stand firm on Kashmir rather than 
seek a compromise, just as the alliance with the United States encouraged Pakistan to 
think it might succeed in pressuring India to be more accommodating. Thus, within a 
decade of independence, the two major nations of the region were caught up in the 
Cold War and their involvement in great-power politics enabled them to extract 
material benefits. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States almost withdrew from South Asian 
affairs. The US adopted a neutral stance between the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and 
1971 and terminated military aid to both countries, which hurt Pakistan more than 
India. The US neutrality made the Pakistani elites painfully aware that their "long 
nourished American equaliser" would not be available in time of crisis. 35 Greater 
" Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Continent of Circe (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), pp. 243-244. 32 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 103. 
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Annpurna Nautiyal, "Pakistan Factor in the Post-Cold War Indo-US Relations, " Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (Summer 1999), p. 34. 
Thomas P. Thornton, "South Asia and the Great Powers, " World Affairs, Vol. 132 (March 1970), p. 
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challenges to the US neutrality occurred during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 because 
the Soviet-India partnership and treaty of 1971 successfully neutralised the US and 
China. The US strategic stand off in South Asia changed the regional scenario and 
upset the `balance of power' and left India "unchecked" to impose its will upon the 
other countries of the region. 36 This was a time when Pakistan was helping the Nixon 
administration's moves to improve relations with China, including the secret 
arrangements for Henry Kissinger's visit to Beijing via Pakistan in 1971. The US and 
China gave verbal support to Pakistan but both were helpless to defend Pakistan's 
territorial integrity. State Department and American public opinion were unfavourable 
to Pakistan and its army's action in the eastern wing. 37 In addition, the US showed their 
tilt to Pakistan but it was simply to avoid war in the region; they accepted the 
inevitability of Bangladesh, and only acted to save West Pakistan's anticipated 
disintegration. 38 The US conveyed to the Soviets that if they were not going to restrain 
India, the US might have to undertake tougher action. 39 
Practically, the US was not involved in South Asia until the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979. In general, the United States came to accept India as a regional 
power to assure peace and security in the region. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger acknowledged that "the size and position of India give it a special role of 
leadership in South Asia and world affairs"40 It was hoped that, ultimately, Pakistan 
and Afghanistan would also come under this collaboration. However, the Indian 
nuclear explosion in May 1974 and Pakistan's intention to go nuclear forced the US 
administration to take an interest in the region to prevent nuclear proliferation. The 
Carter administration took a strong stand against Pakistan's nuclear development, 
cutting off economic and military assistance. 41 However, the advent of the Iranian 
revolution and the Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan fuelled the long-standing 
Western fear of Soviet expansionism and gave an acute sense of urgency to the need to 
retaliate and stop the advancement of the Communists. US regional and global interests 
M The US interest in and Policies toward South Asia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Near 
East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, March 12, 
15,20 and 27,1973 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 167-182. sr See Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), p. 864; sec also Seymour 
M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger In the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 
1983), p. 449. 
3t Ibid. 
Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Warner Books, 1978), p. 528. 40 US Department of State Bulletin (2$ November 1974), p. 16. 
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compelled it to reestablish relations with Pakistan, which had become a "front-line 
state" as Zbigniew Brzezinski (National Security Adviser) mentioned in early 1980: 
Pakistan has become, through a combination of circumstances and 
geography, a vital strategic area in the world. Its strategic location can be 
a bridge between South and Southwest Asia which is a physical barrier 
to the southward expansion of the Soviet Union and it will be an 
adequate counterweight to an expansionist USSR. 42 
3-2. Nestern Economic Interests in the Indian Ocean Region 
The Gulf is a part of the world where almost every sector is linked, directly or indirectly, 
to the oil business. Oil, as Henry Kissinger noted, is "the world's most strategic 
commodity. "43 A central goal of US policy in the Persian Gulf had been to keep oil in the 
hands of states of a very particular sort, and out of the hands of other sorts of states. Nixon 
called the Persian Gulf the `oil jugular" of the West and noted that Western dependence 
on imported oil was certain to grow, not diminish, for the rest of the twentieth century. 44 
In the industrial age, energy is the lifeblood of the economic system, and economic power 
is the foundation of military power. The age of coal gave way to the age of oil and in the 
contemporary world, "oil is as necessary as blood" because it is the lifeline of twentieth- 
century warfare and industries-and access to supplies of oil have become a military 
nccessity. 4S As early as the First World War Marshal Foch stated that "we must have oil 
or we shall lose the war: '46 Lord Curzon later claimed that "the allies floated to victory on 
a wave of oil: , 47 In this regard, the Middle East had long been the crossroads where Asia, 
Africa, and Europe meet. Its oil is the lifeblood of modern industry, the Persian Gulf 
region is the heart that pumps it and the sea routes around the Gulf arc the arteries through 
which that lifeblood passes 48 Moreover, Gulf oil could also be used either as an incentive 
41 See full detail of sections 699 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in 
Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1981 (Washington: US. Government Printing office, 
1982), pp. 177-181. 42 Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Pakistan and US Strategic Interests in the Gulf, " US News & World Report 
4) 
(October/November 1980), pp. 35-36. 
I lenry Kissinger, "Energy Crisis: Strategy for Cooperation Action, " Speech delivered on 14 November 
1974 in Chicago, pp. 1-5; and see Roy A. Werner, "Oil and US Security Policies, " Orbis (Fall 1977), 
p. 651. 4 Richard Nixon, Victory Without War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. 115. 4 Ibid. p. 116; and see Walid Khadduri, "Oil and Politics in the Middle East, " Security Dialogue, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1996). pp. 155-166. 
Ibid. 
47 Lord Curzon, Frontiers (London: Clarendon Press, 1908), pp. 4.18. 
The US oil production will continue to decline, and the United States oil consumption will continue to 
increase as its economy grows. Since coal, natural gas, or nuclear power can not makeup the shortfall 
between supply and demand, then there will be no way to import more oil. The US Energy Department 
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or as a weapon to placate or coerce restive client states, and to procure new clients in 
strategically important areas of the world. Above all, the Soviets could use their control of 
Persian Gulf oil to exploit the divisions within the Western alliance. 
Europe's shift of its basic energy source from coal to imported oil dramatically changed 
the geopolitical structure of the modern world. Japan relics on a bridge of oil 
tankers-one every 100 miles from the Gulf each day of the year. Moreover, the Gulf 
supplies 70 percent of Japan's oil needs as well as over half of European countries. The 
possibility that the Soviets might be interested in expanding their access to Gulf oil 
seemed quite real in light of the 1977 CIA report that warned the Soviet production would 
peak by the mid-1980s and decline thereafter. 49 Brent Scowcroft (National Security 
Adviser) warned that it would probably be "easier to defeat Europe at the Straits of 
Hormuz" than on the Central Front. 50 Four months before the Soviets entered 
Afghanistan, departing energy Secretary James Schlesinger warned darkly, "Soviet 
control of the oil tap in the Middle East would mean the end of the world as we have 
known it since 1945 and of the association of free nations"s' 
Moreover, the economic importance of the Indian Ocean area as a whole is linked with 
the concentration of many of the raw material resources of the world, such as oil, 
rubber, manganese, copper, tea, cotton, rice, jute and gold in the various littoral 
states. 52 Stalin highlighted the economic vulnerability of the West to resource 
interdiction back in 1921 when he argued: "If Europe and America may be called the 
front, the non-sovereign nations and colonies, with their raw materials, fuel, food and 
vast stores of human material, should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of 
imperialism. In order to win a war one must not only triumph at the front but also 
revolutionise the enemy's rear, his reserves. 53 In the same way, the Soviet president 
estimated that in 1995 the United States would import about 50 percent of its oil, while Western 
Europe would import about 70 percent and Japan 100 percent. Since the countries of the Persian Gulf hold 66 percent of the free world's proven oil reserves, they will supply the lion's share of oil imports 
of the industrialized democracies in the future. See Shahram Chubin, "Soviet Policy Toward Iran and 
the Gulf, " Adelphi Paper, No. 157 (London IISS, 1980), p. 6; and Richard Nixon, The Real War. 
Paperback (New York: Warner Books, 1981), p. 81. 49 Central Intelligence Agency, Prospects for Soviet oil production (Washington, D. C.: USGPO, April 
1977; see also "Soviet as Oil-Independent Through 1980s, " New York Times (19 May 1981), p. 1. 31 Quoted in Ronald J. Lieber, Will Europe Fight for Oil? (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 2. s Amos A. Jordan, "Energy and the Future of NATO, " in Kenneth A. Myers (ed. ).. NATO: The Next 
Thirty Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), p. 285. $2 Ashok Kapur, Indian Ocean: Regional and International Politics (New York: Praeger Press, 1983), 
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Leonid I. Brezhnev explained to Somalian President Said Barre, that "aim is to gain 
control of the two great treasure houses on which the West dcpcnds-the energy 
treasure of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern 
Africa. "S4 Thus, a Soviet presence in Afghanistan posed a formidable threat to Europe 
in the west, China and Japan in the cast and the countries of Central Asia, the Persian 
Gulf, the Middle East and Africa to the south. By 1979-80 the Western industrialized 
economies as a whole, including Australia and Japan, came to be absolutely dependent 
on the Gulf's oil resources; it accounted for 35 percent of France's oil, 32 percent of 
Italy's, 35 percent of Germany's and 100 percent of Japan's. 55 
Minor interruptions of imports that could be the cause of inconvenience and annoyance 
in the United States might create panic to its industrial allies. Thus, the Western 
anxiety and concern about the Soviet drive toward the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean 
was quite logical. In the same vein, the US had some stakes of its own in the area as a 
whole because of its dependence on oil and strategic materials. Nixon was one who 
really understood the Soviets and he argued that "the Soviet leaders have their eyes on 
the economic underpinnings of modern society. Their aim is to pull the plug on the 
Western industrial machine. The Western industrial nations dependence on foreign 
sources of vital raw materials is one of our main vulnerabilities"56 In the 
circumstances, the US recognised that ensuring Persian Gulf security and stability as a 
vital US interest. This had implications for South Asia should the American position in 
the Gulf region itself be potentially outflanked by a thrust southwards through 
Afghanistan towards the Indian Ocean. 
3-3. US Strategic Interests 
The principal strategic interests of the USA in the region were and are maintenance of 
ability to keep the high seas open for navigation both for itself and its allies. As early as 
1948, Harry Hodson had described a wider Gulf region as a borderland where great 
54 Ibid. 
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interests meet and clash. The area stretched in a rough, dangerous arc from Kashmir to the 
Northwest Frontier province of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Egypt. For Hodson, this 
was the Arc of Danger. " The United States regarded the area of the Middle East as vital 
for her global interests and in any circumstances the US had to possess the capability to 
go anywhere and meet any potential challenge to friend or ally. 
Before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the USSR base at Marv" was its closest to 
the Straits of Hormuz. The Russians had first moved into the area in 1884 and Britain 
became concerned over Russian ambitions. The Russian ambassador in London argued 
that it was difficult "for a civilised power to stop in the extension of its territory where 
uncivilised tribes were its immediate neighbours. "" The Russians eventually halted at the 
area along the Amu Darya (River) which formed the border with Afghanistan until 
Russian troops crashed across it in late 1979. There arc no natural barriers separating 
Afghanistan from the Arabian Sea and the Straits of Hormuz if the Soviets succeeded in 
taking effective control of the Persian Gulf, then Europe and Japan would be at the mercy 
of the Soviet Union. Moreover, by the 1970s from Turkey to Pakistan, the countries of the 
"northern tier" that once held the Soviets in check were either in turmoil or gravely 
weakened. As Robert Thompson noted in 1974 "the Soviet Union had three fronts: "a 
Western Europe front, an eastern front facing China and Japan and a southern front facing 
the countries between Turkey and Afghanistan. The third front has been breached after the 
invasion in Afghanistan and the Soviet is moving southward toward to the Persian Gulf, 
the centre of the aspirations of the Soviet Union. "60 Harold Brown, the Secretary of 
Defence, highlighted the dependence of the West and the industrialised nations on the oil 
reserves in the region. The Soviet threat was the more ominous because, while the 
Western world was left extremely vulnerable due to its need for oil, the Soviet Union 
enjoyed relative selfsufficiency. 61 According to one assessment, "if every oil field in the 
Middle East were to cease production, the Soviet Union would be almost totally 
unaffected, while the West would face economic and social disruption of catastrophic 
proportions"62 
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4. US Policy Towards Afghanistan 
Despite its enormous potential importance, Afghanistan was neither the subject of, nor 
the catalyst for security debates in the post-World War 11 period. Even Britain, with its 
historic interests in the area, was a mere onlooker in Afghanistan. Europeans also spent 
little time worrying about Soviet encroachments in Afghanistan. The US government 
had recognised an independent Afghanistan in 1919 and formal relations were 
strengthened in 1934 when President Roosevelt, in response to a letter from King Zahir 
Shah, agreed to limited diplomatic representation in Kabul. The strategic significance 
of Afghanistan was realised by the Western powers during World War 11 and the US 
granted permission to the Afghan government to open its mission in Washington in 
1943. In 1944 the Afghan government first sought American military assistance and 
training, but this request was ignored by Washington, largely because Afghanistan was 
perceived as a "backward" country existing in "isolation" which seemed to be under no 
threat of immediate Soviet expansion. 63 
Post World War II, the Afghan leader again requested American security assistance and 
according to the US State Department, the Afghans were willing to act as a base for 
"delaying action in the passes of the Ilindukush" against the Russians, with US 
backing. "TM The Afghan desire to obtain US arms proved unsuccessful but both 
countries upgraded to fully-fledged embassies in 1948.65 US economic assistance for 
Afghanistan was positively niggardly and the US under both Truman and Eisenhower 
rebuffed several attempts by the Afghans to balance their close ties with Moscow with 
improved relations with the United States. " The US indifference toward Afghanistan 
was the product of several not entirely consistent assumptions: Afghanistan was 
unthreatened, indefensible and, at the time, strategically less important. In addition, the 
°s Muhammed R. Azmi, "Soviet Politico-Military Penetration in Afghanistan 1955-19790" Armed Forces 
and Society, Vol. 12 (Spring 1986), p. 332. 
US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. 5, the Near East, South 
Asia and Africa, Part. 1(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 490. °f "The United States and Afghanistan, " Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 82 (March 1982), pp. 1-5. 64 The Afghans requested military aid from the US in 1948,1951 and 1954 and each time were refused. In 
1949 at the time of Truman's Point Four technical assistance programme, the Afghans received an 
Export-Import Bank loan of $21 million, barely one-sixth of the $118 million requested. In April 1951 
when an Afghan envoy expressed fears of Afghanistan's giant northern (Russia) neighbour, the State 
Department advised Truman to tell the Afghans to rely on the UN's collective security mechanisms. 
Presumably, the Afghans were aware of UN procedures and the existence of the Soviet veto. See more 
details Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham: Duke University Press, 
1985), pp. 18-20. 
31 
US ignorance and reticence was a product of the fear that to extend influence towards 
Afghanistan might be considered provocative by Moscow. Leon J. Polluda attributes the 
failure by the US administration to grasp the strategic importance of Afghanistan, to 
ignorance of local conditions and to the fear of Soviet reaction to US overtures in a 
region contiguous to the Soviet Union. 67 However, the lack of Western interest in 
landlocked Afghanistan left no option for Afghan rulers but to remain unhealthily 
dependent on one foreign state, the Soviet Union, in key areas, notably military and 
economic development 68 Thus, the US did not rate highly Afghanistan's strategic 
relevance to its global concern and it was not enthusiastic about a relationship with 
Afghanistan. A 1949 study for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) warned that: 
overt Western-sponsored opposition to Communism in Afghanistan 
might precipitate Soviet moves to take control of the country. 
Provocation would have been imprudent given that Afghanistan is of 
little or no strategic importance to the United States .... Its geographic location coupled with the realisation by Afghan leaders of Soviet 
capabilities presages Soviet control of the country whenever the 
international situation so dictates 69 
In the early 1950s the Afghan government headed by Shah Mahmud Khan, embarked 
upon a programme of modernisaing the Afghan armed forces which were "ill-equipped" 
and "antiquated . 9970 For this purpose, Shah Mahmud visited 
Washington to seek military 
assistance but his request was turned down. 7' On 13 August 1951 Mohammad Daoud 
Khan, the war minister, made a formal request along with a list of weapons handed to 
the US State Department. The US reply, conveyed on 27 November 1951, was that "the 
$25 million cost would have to be paid in cash. The State Department also informed that 
"Kabul would have to arrange transit through Pakistan, and the sale would be made 
public. " Afghanistan found these terms too harsh and called it a "political rcfusal. " 
In 1953, when Daoud Khan became prime minister, Kabul renewed its quest for 
weapons to the United States. In October 1954, Daoud sent Mohammad Naim (brother 
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32 
and foreign minister) to Washington to make a personal appeal to the US Secretary of 
State, John Foster Dulles. The US government informed the Afghan and Pakistani 
ambassadors that "after careful consideration, extending military aid to Afghanistan 
would create problems not offset by the strength it would generate. Instead of asking for 
arms, Afghanistan should established friendly relations with Pakistan. i73 The Afghans 
found it "frustrating that their confidential demarche to the US was revealed to the 
Pakistanis" and that they had been proffered the unsolicited advice "to abandon dispute 
unilaterally. "74 Robert G. Neuman (American Ambassador of Afghanistan 1966-73), 
commenting on the situation, said "John Foster Dulles had turned down the Afghan 
request for military aid because of fears of escalating the Cold War and of provoking a 
Soviet move against Afghanistanas The US felt itself to be too far away and then its 
own security relationship with Pakistan created disappointment in the minds of Afghan 
rulers. Zalmay Khalilzad suggests that the US reluctance to provide military assistance 
was prompted by the fear that it might threaten Pakistan's security or undermine US 
relations with Pakistan, which was also a regional ally. 76 There was also confusion as to 
the exact strategic significance of Afghanistan and the impossibility of projecting 
military power to protect a distant country. 77 
In this regard, Western scholars give diverse interpretations and reasons to account for 
the American indifference towards Afghanistan. Joseph Collins argues that the main 
reason for refusal was the American perception of Afghanistan as an "economy of force 
area" whose importance, unlike that of Iran and Pakistan, was a derivative of more focal 
US strategic objectives in the region. 78 Raymond Garthoff points out that "the US 
ideological and political commitment with military pacts and its objections to 
neutralism"79 kept it from closer relations with Afghanistan. In the same vein, Robert G. 
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Neuman indicates that "the United States turned down Afghan requests for military and 
economic aid because of its location and poor communications, as enormous logistical 
efforts would have had to be undertaken by the US where the risk of escalating the Cold 
War would have been high. "80 Neuman's successor, Theodore L. Eliot, Jr, argued that 
the United States close relations with Pakistan were the main reason not to support 
Afghanistan. "8' Moreover, "sending military equipment to Afghanistan would so alarm 
the Soviets that they would make some kind of move against Afghanistan. "82 
Kabul's difficulties with Washington were further compounded when it refused to 
participate in the collective security system embodied in the Baghdad Pact of 1955 
without an adequate security guarantee from the US, primarily because of Pakistan's 
participation. In the circumstances, Afghanistan turned towards the Soviet Union for 
military and economic assistance. The Soviet Union endorsed Afghanistan's stand on 
the Pakhtunistan issue and provided some military and economic assistance and transit 
rights through its territory at a time when Pakistan had scaled off its trade routc. 83 Leon 
J. Polluda contends that "flawed US perceptions and inadequate diplomacy contributed 
substantially to the unwise Afghan policies which in turn provided an opportunity to the 
Soviets to absorb Afghanistan, " eventually. 84 Daoud, spurned by the United States in his 
quest for military support, signed an agreement with the Soviet Union which would 
make the Afghan army entirely dependent on its northern neighbour for arms, training 
and financing. With Soviet encouragement, Daoud reversed the post-war trend towards 
capitalistic - albeit monopolistio-development in Afghanistan and embarked the 
nation on a series of ambitious economic programmes. 85 The effect of Daoud's policies 
was to give the Soviet Union not only a great strategic stake in the country but also an 
ideological commitment to making Afghanistan's development work. 
86 Afghan leaders 
insisted that their need to attain higher standards of living was more important than their 
10 Neumann quoted in Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan (Boulder. Westview Press, 
1984), p. 26; Quoted in Leon B. Poullada, 'The Road to Crisis 1919-1980: American Failures, Afghan 
Errors and Soviet Successes, " in Rosanne Klass (ed. )., Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited 
(New York. Freedom House, 1987), p. 43; see also Bhabani Sen Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, 
Economics and Society, Revolution, Resistance Intervention (Boulder. Westview Press, 1986), p. 
15. 
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political predilections. 87 Daoud used the leverage of financial and technical assistance to 
seek to transform Afghanistan's rural economy into a model of Soviet-style centralised 
development. 
In the 1970s, Afghanistan remained constantly in the lowest priority of the United 
States. The US policy was "flying blind" and was characterised by an absence of 
overtures toward the government in Kabul. 88 The State Department recognised that 
Afghanistan had little choice but to lean towards the Soviet Union given its 
geographical location, its desire to transform the economy and its concomitant need for 
economic assistance, defence requirements and its dispute with Pakistan. 89 The Nixon 
and Ford Administration became somewhat more attentive as a result of a 1973 coup 
that deposed the monarchy and brought the pro-Soviet Daoud back to power. Daoud 
brought members of the Parcham faction of the Afghan Communist Party (the PDPA) 
into his government and they adopted an aggressive stance on the issue of 
Pakhtunistan. At that time, the US advised Iran, Saudia Arabia and Kuwait to give 
economic assistance to Afghanistan, to encourage it to pursue a conciliatory policy 
towards its neighbours, especially Pakistan. The US objectives, up until the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, were defined as preservation of Afghanistan's independence 
and territorial integrity, creation of a viable political and economic system, prevention 
of such strong Soviet influence that Afghanistan would lose its freedom of action and 
improvement of Afghanistan's tics with Pakistan and Iran. 90 Thus, viewed through the 
prism of bilateral superpower relations, Afghanistan was outside the orbit of US vital 
interests and it had limited political communication because Afghanistan was in an 
area of Soviet strategic influence. 
17 Peter G. Frank, "Economic Progress in an Encircled Land, " Middle East Journal, No. 10 (Winter 
1956), p. 58. Is US aid to Afghanistan declined every year during the 1963-73 period, with one exception Afghan 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Pakistan's Security Dilemma 
"I believe... that a people must never value anything higher than the 
dignity and freedom of its existence... under most circumstances, a 
people is unconquerable if it fights a spirited struggle for its liberty... " 
-Karl von Clauscwitz 1780-1831 
Security is a multidimensional concept and its nature obviously differs from state to state. 
It involves the capabilities, desires and fears of the state and of the other states with which 
it interacts. The term security, like national interest, is well enough established in the 
discourse of international relations to designate an objective of policy distinguishable 
from others. The fundamental objective of the state, George Kcnnan asserted, is: "to 
protect the security of the nation, by which is meant the continued ability of the country to 
pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of 
interference, from foreign powers. "Security relates not only to the ultimate desire that 
the state should survive, but also to the desire that it should live without serious cxtcrnal 
threat to its interests or values that are regarded as important or vital. 
This study advances a conceptualisation of security based on several levels of abstraction. 
At the generic level, security is defined as the protection and enhancement of values that 
the authoritative decision makers deem vital for the survival and well-being of a 
community. 4 This inclusive definition identifies the essence of security and the criteria for 
classification of an issue as a security concern, but it is of limited analytical usefulness. 
However, a hierarchic conception of security has both more internal coherence and 
greater external relevance, and, in many ways, security continues to rank high on national 
agendas everywhere. It may command enormous resources, including the sacrifice of life, 
liberty and property, the protection of which justifies the state in the first place. In general, 
"security" is a status of feeling free from fear, threats and danger. It is a main concern of 
I Carl von Clausewitz, On War edited and translated by Michael Iloward and Peter Paret (New Jersey: 
2 
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University Press, 1998), p. xi. 
36 
individuals, groups, communities and states, since, by definition, it has an invaluable and 
irreplaceable role of maintaining survival. 
1. The Perception of Threat to Pakistan's Security 
The security of a state depends largely on a vigilant frontier policy. Historically, many 
mighty empires have collapsed because of wrong frontier policies; either by not 
keeping their frontiers intact from incursions or by allowing border skirmishes to 
develop into major conflagrations with neighbours. It is most tragic that Pakistan has 
been locked, ever since independence, in disputes with its neighbours, India and 
Afghanistan, over boundary delimitation and demarcation. In this context, India and 
Afghanistan have been the pivot of Pakistan's foreign policy and the main aim of 
Pakistan has been to obtain a shield against a possible attack from India and 
Afghanistan to maintain its territorial integrity, repeatedly threatened from the cast and 
north-west. 
1-1. The Indian Threat to Pakistan's Security 
Since achieving independence in 1947, Pakistan has judged India its primary enemy. 
Afghanistan was seldom friendly but problems between the two countries were 
considered more irritants than threats. Pakistan has outstanding differences on 
territorial boundaries with India and Afghanistan. It is unfortunate that Pakistan is the 
product of a uniquely large redrawing, redefinition and relegitimatizing of boundaries. 
Not only were its border problems complicated, but the inherited borders constituted a 
major source of security problems. Pakistan as a successor state has long, unnatural 
and vulnerable borders. 5 It has tried to rectify and to legitimize the imperial legacy by 
making border agreements with all its neighbouring states, in order to obtain a clear 
delimitation of its territorial sovereignty. Further, Pakistan's strategic environment has 
been largely conditioned by its perception of a security threat from India, and India 
is still perceived as a major threat to Pakistan's continuation as an independent state; 
whereas India remains sensitive to any sign of improvement in Pakistan's 
military position .6 Thus, as a natural balance 
has not existed between the two nations, 
Pakistan's formula has been to secure outside assistance to ensure guarantees for 
5 Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontier of Pakistan (Karachi: National Publishing Ilouse L. td, 197I)ß p. 47. 
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security and this basic goal has remained unchanged, though the method for its 
accomplishment has shifted considerably during the past fifty years. Initially, Pakistan 
preferred to wait and see if any nation would choose to help to ensure its desire for 
security. This attitude was revealed in 1946 by Firoz All Khan: 
If the Hindus give us Pakistan and freedom, then the Hindus are our 
best friends. If the British give it to us then the British are our best 
friends. But if neither will give it to us, then Russia is our best friend. 
Moreover, the creation of Pakistan was a result of conflicting Hindu and Muslim 
nationalistic movements. The polarisation occurred between India and Pakistan not so 
much because of irreconcilable incongruities or any deep-seated animosities but 
because of their separate identity and culture. ' However, the bloody events at the time 
of partition created certain problems for Pakistan which played a significant role in the 
development of its defence and security policies. Thus, trouble began with the hasty 
departure of the British empire from the subcontinent. The desperate surgery carried 
out by the British left many serious issues unsettled. India refused to give Pakistan its 
due share of financial and military assets. There were other issues which exacerbated 
the mutual distrust between the two countries, like refugee rehabilitation and evacuees' 
property problems, the threat of diversion and stoppage of the waters of the river Indus, 
minority problems and the integration of the princely states like Junagadh, Hyderabad 
and Kashmir. From the beginning, India was determined to make things difficult for 
Pakistan. Moreover, many doubted the viability of Pakistan and expected that once the 
passion subsided, Pakistan would come back into the fold of India. 9 
Expressions of such sentiment, privately or publicly, were further strengthened by 
threatening statements and remarks made by important Congress leaders regarding the 
desire to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite. The Indian leaders made no secret 
of their ambitious designs for Pakistan. Mr. Achary Kripalani, who was President of 
6 Lawrence Ziring, "South Asian Tangles and Triangles, " in Lawrence Ziring (ed. )., The Subcontinent in 
World Politics: India: Its Neighbours and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 29. 
Firoz All Khan, as quoted in A. B. Rajput, The Muslim League Yesterday and Today (Lahore: Sheikh 
Ghlum Ali & Sons, 1958), p. 109. 
After a thousand years in India, the Muslims still bear Arabic or Persian, rather than traditional Indian 
names. For this reason there is a vague but deeply held belief among the Muslims of the subcontinent 
that Southwest Asia is the repository of spiritual and cultural values. See for more details A. Roy, The 
Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 63- 
67. 
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the Indian National Congress in 1947, declared, "Neither the Congress nor the nation 
has given up its claim of a United India. " He described the day of Pakistan's creation 
as "a day of sorrow and destruction for India. "10 Sardar V. B. Patcl, the first Indian 
Home Minister, incessantly emphasised that sooner or later, , we shall again be united 
in common allegiance to our country. "" In later years, Congress leaders openly 
conceded that they had accepted Pakistan with mental reservations. Jawaharlal Nehru 
blurted out: "Pakistan is a medieval state with an impossible theocratic concept. It 
should not have been created, and it would never have happened had the British not 
stood behind the foolish idea of Jinnah"12 Nehru, for instance, further told United 
Nations representative Joseph Korbel: "We want to cooperate and work towards 
cooperation, and one day integration will inevitably come. If it will be in four, five, ten 
years-I do not know. "13 Similarly, some years later, a former Congress President, 
Maulana Abu Kalam Azad, revealed that among others Sardar Patel, was "convinced 
that the new state of Pakistan was not viable and could not last. He thought that the 
acceptance of Pakistan would teach the Muslim League a bitter lesson. " 
14 Even 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi said at the time of partition: "We Muslims and Hindus 
arc interdependent on one another: we cannot get along without each other. The 
Muslim League will ask to come back to Hindustan. They will ask Nehru to come 
back, and he will take them back. "15 
In this regard, relations with India have been very complicated and Pakistan has been 
described as having an obsessive "antipathy" toward India. As C. A. Salahuddin has 
observed, there are "a complex of social, religious, historical, political and 
psychological forces all tending in a sinister combination to antagonise the two 
states"16 This matter has also been explained by Arshad Hussain, (Foreign Minister of 
Pakistan), who said, "I am not exaggerating when I say that in the whole range of 
Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1967), pp. 115-116; and see Ehsan Ahrari, "South Asia's Power Balance, " Far 
Eastern Economic Review (4 October 2001), p. 40. 10 Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 116. 11 Ibid. 
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14 Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1959), p. 207. 
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Pakistan's international relations, those with India constitute the important sphere. "7 
Soon after independence, Pakistan's policy of non-commitment developed some 
resentment over western powers' preferential treatment to India, as reflected in the 
Commonwealth's decision to let India remain a member, regardless of its republican 
character, and Truman's invitation to Nehru. However, Pakistan was desirous of 
enhancing her importance for the Western world and the Soviet Union intended to 
exploit this situation to bring Pakistan out of the Western orbit. 
To achieve its basic foreign policy objectives, Pakistan began a desperate search to 
make fast and firm friends. Keith Callard described this situation as "... a tendency to 
look for blood brothers rather than plain fricnds. "'a It first turned to Britain and other 
members of the Commonwealth, hoping that these might be particularly helpful in 
pressuring India to settle Kashmir and other outstanding disputes with Pakistan. But 
this hope was sadly short lived and disappointed. 19 Callard pointed out: 
Britain and the other members of the Commonwealth ... avoided the 
discussion of matters in dispute between member countries. No one 
wished to give offence to India, especially as the Commonwealth had 
no machinery for enforcing its actions. The main dispute, Kashmir, 
had been referred to the UN and there was little indication that the 
Commonwealth would be more successful in finding a solution. None 
of these arguments was satisfactory to Pakistan, which felt that 
Commonwealth policy was unduly cautious in its attempt to avoid 
offending India. 2 
The desire for allies was not easily fulfilled because relations with India were strained 
almost to breaking point. Pakistan moved to the nations of the Muslim world in a belief 
that it would be supported because it had always opposed the establishment of Israel 
and its support for Islamic causes strong and vocal. 1 In 1949, an International 
Economic Conference of Muslim countries was convened in Karachi and the Pakistani 
Finance Minister urged Muslim countries to develop a system of "collective security 
17 Arshad Hussain, Pakistan Affairs Supplement (Karachi: Pakistan Council of Foreign Affairs, June 
1968), p. 9. ts Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Interpretation (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 
1957), p. 12. 19 Pakistan requested the Commonwealth to solve the partition riots after the departure of the British but 
no response was forthcoming. A further rift came due to the refusal to discuss the Kashmir issue in the 
Commonwealth conference and unfavourable reaction to the request for arms to make up the 
deficiency of military stores. See more details in Chaudhury and Hassan, Pakistan's External 
Relations (Karachi: Institute of International Affairs, 1968). p. 8. 20 Keith Callard, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Interpretation, p. 15. 
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bargaining" and to "form a group of nations that by natural cooperation in the 
economic field are able to help themselves by assisting each other. "u He also added 
that "we do not want to be dragged into the whirlpool of power politics and we have no 
implicit faith in the western democratic system nor can we commit ourselves to 
communism. "23 They established a secretariat for economic cooperation and allocated 
a considerable amount of resources to it, but failed to achieve any real practical 
results. 4 On the diplomatic level, Pakistan also exploited spiritual and moral affinities 
to attract the Islamic world but reciprocation was not always forthcoming. Many of the 
Muslim countries seemed more interested in cultivating the friendship of India rather 
than of Pakistan. It was a bitter disappointment that no Islamic country offered 
overwhelming support to Pakistan's stand on Kashmir to act as a counterweight to 
India. Some Arab countries were resentful and suspicious of Pakistan's campaign for 
Pan-Islamic unity, regarding it as a bid for the leadership of the Muslim world. Such 
feeling was particularly deep in Egypt, which had its own concept of a Pan-Arab bloc 
and its claim for Muslim leadership. 
During Prime Minister Liaquat All Khan's visit to Tehran [Iran] on 2 June 1949, a 
Soviet invitation to visit Moscow was extended to him and Liaquat Ali accepted it. 
Earlier, the two countries had agreed to establish diplomatic relations but Liaquat All 
Khan's scheduled visit to Moscow was first postponed to some later date and 
subsequently for an indefinite period, so that it never materialised at all. Liaquat All 
ultimately accepted an invitation to the United States, where he created considerable 
good-will for Pakistan and laid the basis for future economic assistance. Liaquat Ali 
succeeded in the United States but actually Pakistan was willing to initiate friendship 
wherever an opportunity presented itself. In this regard, the principal objectives of 
Pakistan's foreign policy were security and development. As Prime Minister Liaquat 
All Khan told the National Press Club in Washington during his official visit to the 
United States in May 1950, "Our strongest interests, therefore, arc firstly the integrity 
of Pakistan. "25 The inevitable first object of foreign policy, wrote Callard, "had to be to 
show the world that Pakistan was a reality and was capable of maintaining its 
21 See the United Nations General Assembly Official Records 1950-1960 (New York: The UN Library 
Documents, 1961). 
u The New York Times (26 November 1949), p. 1. _) Ibid. 
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25 Quoted in Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan: The Heart of Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1950), p. 11. 
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independence. i26 President Ayub Khan also commented that the principal objectives of 
Pakistan's foreign policy were security and development, because the consideration of 
security embraced the defence of Pakistan and the preservation of its ideology. He 
fu ther wrote in his book, Friends Not Masters, that "the cause of our major problems 
is India's inability to reconcile herself to our existence as a sovereign, independent 
state. ' , 27 Ayub Khan also argued that "we have an enemy, an implacable enemy (sic) 
India and it has ambitions to absorb Pakistan and turn her into a satellite. i28 Former 
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also said: 
On a number of occasions, the Prime Minister of India, his cabinet 
colleagues, the Ministers of Provincial Governments in India and the 
leaders of political parties in that country have made statements 
naming Pakistan as India's enemy number one. This declaration of 
enmity was repeated even by other responsible officials and 
spokesman of the government of India. 29 
Since its inception, Pakistan's dilemma was how to strengthen its security and 
modernize its armed forces and yet be able to continue with its development 
programmes. As a weak state, it could not physically coerce India to fulfil its 
commitments on Kashmir. Pakistan's basic aim was to offset India's military 
superiority and mobilize world opinion in order to compel India to hold a plebiscite in 
Kashmir. Realising its inability to coerce India, Pakistan's emphasis was upon the 
employment of all available diplomatic channels, in order to seek redress in the 
Kashmir dispute. For Pakistan, the acquisition of Kashmir is important to justify the 
two nation theory and its creation as an Islamic state. The two nation theory was based 
on the philosophy that Hindus and Muslims constitute two separate entities and that 
Muslims in the contiguous Muslim areas should be granted the right of self- 
determination. Kashmir was one of these contiguous Muslim areas, and the two nation 
theory in Kashmir was thwarted by India's refusal to abide by its promise to hold a 
plebiscite in the area. Pakistanis generally regard Kashmir as the test of the validity of 
the two nation theory - the basis of Pakistan's legitimate and separate existence. 
Pakistan's policy makers were engaged in a military confrontation with India over 
Kashmir shortly after the partition. Moreover, economically, Kashmir contains the 
26 Keith Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study, p. 225. 27 Mohanunad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 114. 21 Ibid. p. 115. "Zulfkar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Policy of Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 
1964), p. 70. 
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headwaters of the three major rivers-the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab-upon 
which Pakistan's agriculture and hence, very survival depend. Because of all these 
factors, Kashmir became the touchstone of Pakistan's security parameters and Pakistan 
tended to judge its international "friends" and "enemies" against the measuring rod of 
the Kashmir issue. Thus, it was not possible for Pakistan to get firm commitments from 
external sources to assist its battle for territorial security and assistance against possible 
Indian threats. President Ayub Khan suggested that the reasons for this were: 
There is a tremendous upsurge in all the new independent countries of 
Asia and Africa, including the Muslim countries. But let us be quite 
clear that the upsurge in other Muslim countries is, by and large, 
social, linguistic, territorial, anti-imperialist and anti-colonial. It is not 
to any large extent religious. Because of that, when we expect other 
Muslim countries to agree with us entirely in a matters of principle, 
we are sometimes disappointed. I believe it is our fault in not judging 
their situation correctly. . At times when we 
find that other Muslim 
countries do not see things as we do, we ought to realise that their 
circumstances are different from ours. 30 
During the 1965 war East Pakistan was virtually defencclcss and lay at the mercy of 
India. But India, in what proved to be a most adroit diplomatic stroke, left East 
Pakistan alone, thereby driving home the point that the conflict was with Pakistan and 
its military leaders and by implication that the Bengalis had nothing to fear from 
India. 31 In 1971, Pakistan's security was again under a perceived Indian threat and 
Indo-Soviet cooperation32 converted East Pakistan into an independent state of 
Bangladesh. India played its cards dexterously and on the other hand, the military 
leadership in Pakistan mishandled the autonomy question in such a way so as to make 
secession inevitable. 33 
The outcome of the war was never in doubt. Pakistan's calculations had gone wrong on 
all counts and its proud military forces suffered a crushing and humiliating defeat by 
India. The dismemberment of Pakistan reduced the country in size, population and 
significant economic strength. The war of 1971 showed that Pakistan was unable to 
control the onset of war with India; nor could it deter India from attacking, and its own 
30 Ayub Khan, "Essentials of Pakistan's Foreign Policy" Pakistan Horizon (Fourth Quarter 1961), pp. 
264-265. 
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attack from West Pakistan achieved no significant political or military objectives. 
Pakistan emerged as a state which, though powerful in absolute terms, lacked military 
capacity, compared to its chief antagonists. 34 No Muslim country and close ally helped 
to defend its soil. The Muslim nations lacked the power, coherence and will necessary 
to intercede on Pakistan's behalf. There was virtually no material support from 
Pakistan's principal alliance partners. The Chinese gave some vocal support but 
China's role as a `balancer' in the region had been effectively checked by the Indo- 
Soviet treaty and it turned out to be a paper tiger. 35 Pakistan's defence in East Pakistan 
collapsed without much resistance and in West Pakistan the Israeli style preemptive 
strike failed to cripple the Indian air force. On the ground the forward thrust was halted 
very early in the war. 36 
Nixon and Kissinger only `tilted' toward Pakistan for fear of offending the Chinese. 
37 
Kissinger had pointed out that if the US could not support Pakistan, the Soviet Union 
would not respect them for it, the Chinese would despise them and the other countries 
would draw their own conclusions. 38 Kissinger thought that India had acted at the 
instigation of the Soviets, who supposedly hoped the world would sec the US and 
China stand idly by while their friend, Pakistan, was attacked. He believed that it was a 
proxy war between the Soviet Union and the United States, and that the Soviet client, 
India, intended to invade and dismember the American client, Pakistan 
39 The US 
deployment of the Enterprise Carrier battle group in the Bay of Bengal was seen in 
Pakistan as nothing more than a symbolic gesture; it could not prevent the 
dismemberment of Pakistan. The American move fell far below Pakistan's 
expectations; apart from adopting a relatively hard posture with regard to India, the 
Americans had decided to settle on a policy geared not to prevent the dismemberment 
of Pakistan but to save West Pakistan's anticipated disintegration-40 This convinced the 
Pakistanis that they were no more than a pawn in a chess game - and the loss of a 
single pawn never amounts to the loss of the game. 
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Thus, Pakistan gained little from its alignment policy with the United States which had 
no intention of putting pressure on India. The Pakistanis were convinced that India was 
never really reconciled to the division of the subcontinent and favoured unity, if 
necessary by force. In this regard, India's role in the dismemberment of Pakistan in the 
1971 Indo-Pakistan war further consolidated their beliefs. Similarly, Indian strategic 
planners have always accorded a high priority to the Pakistan factor. The renowned 
Indian scholar, Ved Mehta, explained this perception in his article in the International 
Herald Tribune, saying that "India's real enemy has always been Pakistan because the 
conflict between India and Pakistan is rooted in religion and not in economic 
systems. "4 
After the loss of the eastern part of Pakistan, its policy makers learned the lesson that 
they should not think about war with India without an appropriate defence system and 
they should not rely on foreign assistance. The dismemberment of Pakistan produced an 
inadvertent improvement to its security situation in the sense that it now had a 
geographically more compact location to defend. The lurking suspicions about Indian 
intentions vis-i -vis Pakistan were further strengthened in the minds of many Pakistanis 
when India conducted nuclear tests in 1974 and Pakistan was understandably cynical. 
Pakistan, unlike India, depends almost entirely on external sources for sophisticated 
weapons and it cannot match India's spending power. Thus, Pakistan was not willing to 
depend on so-called foreign guarantees for its security and it saw nuclear weapons not 
as a choice but as a necessity for its survival against a much powerful rival, India. 
1-2. The Soviet Threat to Pakistan's Security 
Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union have undergone several changes since the 
Soviet Union accorded official recognition to Pakistan in 1948. The Soviet Union was 
the first of the great powers to offer Pakistan the hand of friendship and it invited the 
first Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat All Khan, to visit Moscow. As we have seen 
this visit never materialised and Pakistan adopted a pro-western policy. The interests of 
the United States and Pakistan coincided and in the late 1950s Pakistan joined the 
41 Ved Mehta, "Focus on the Spectre of a Religious Nuclear War, " International Herald Tribune, 
Wednesday, (20 May 1998). 
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western defence alliance system (SEATO-CENTO) and gained the dubious distinction 
of being America's "most allied ally" in Asia. Pakistan received the economic 
assistance and sophisticated arms thought necessary to secure its defence and US 
support in the UN for its stand on Kashmir. This was a time when Soviet-Pakistan 
relations were neither close nor warm. The Soviet Union did not take any interest in the 
Kashmir discussions in the UN Security Council and even once its representatives did 
express an opinion, it was not favourable to Pakistan. The flow of uncomplimentary 42 
remarks in the Soviet press was a result of the fact that the Soviet Union was not 
satisfied with Pakistan's alliance policy and it warned Pakistan on 30 November 1953 
that: 
... the Soviet Government could not regard with 
indifference reports of 
negotiations between the United States and Pakistan concerning the 
establishment of American Air bases in Pakistan nor the reports that 
Pakistan and the US were negotiating on the question of Pakistan 
joining in plans to set up a military aggressive bloc in the Middle 
East ° 
Pakistan rejected the Soviet protest, contending that the military alliance was for 
Pakistan's own security rather than an indication of any aggressive designs against the 
Soviet Union. These explanations were not enough to satisfy the Soviet Union, whose 
leadership perceived Pakistan to be an ally of the West and hostile to the Soviet Union. 
Thus, alliance with the West brought Soviet wrath on Pakistan and the Soviet Union 
penalised Pakistan by taking a partial position on the Kashmir issue. During the visit of 
Nikita S. Khrushchcv and Nikolai Bulganin to India and Afghanistan in November 
1955-56, they declared that the Soviet Union considered Kashmir an integral part of 
India and the people of Kashmir had themselves decided to become a part of that 
country. 44 Bulganin also referred to Kashmir as "the northern part of India" and the 
people of Kashmir as "part of the Indian people. "4s Statements such as this were 
followed by the repeated exercise of the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council 
blocking a solution to the Kashmir issue. Khruschev also condemned the Pakistan 
government for joining the Baghadad Pact (later CENTO) and stated: 
42 G. W. Choudhury and Parvez Iiasan, Pakistan's External Relations (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of 
External Affairs, 1958), p. 25. 41 Chaudhri Mohammad Ahsen, "Pakistan the Soviet Bloc, " Pakistan Horizon (June 1956), p. 73; and 
Morning News (Dakha: 4 December 1953). 
45 CDSP, Vol. VII, No. 50 Pravda and Izvestia (10 December 1955). 
45 Dawn (11 December 1955). 
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The government of Pakistan allowed the United States to use military 
bases on its territory and all this in an area very close to the Soviet 
Union. We are saying frankly that the building of American military 
bases on the territory of Pakistan cannot but worry us. 46 
Bulganin and Khruschev also visited Kabul and stated that part of Pakistan's strategic 
north-west should be cut-off and given the right of independence. The Soviet leaders 
showed their sympathy for Afghanistan's attitude to the Pakhtunistan problem and 
indicated that the Pakhtuns47 should be consulted on the solution of the problem. ' As On 
10 December 1955 Bulganin declared in Kabul: 
We sympathise with Afghanistan's policy on the question of 
Pakhtunistan. The Soviet Union stands for an equitable solution to this 
problem, which cannot be scttled correctly without taking into account 
the vital interests of the people inhabiting Pakhtunistan. 4 
In 1956 the chequered relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan were more 
affected by the issue of the Hungarian crisis. This time, Pakistan co-sponsored a 
resolution condemning the Soviet invasion. A year later, in 1957, the Kashmir issue 
was under debate in the Security Council and the Soviet representative Arkady Sobolev 
took the position that: 
The Kashmir question has in actual fact been settled in essence by the 
people of Kashmir themselves, who consider their territory an integral 
part of the Republic of India. 50 
The Soviet efforts were not limited to verbal support for India. After denouncing the 
idea of any change in the status of Kashmir, the Soviet Union exercised its 79th veto in 
the Security Council to defeat a resolution which called for a temporary United Nations 
force to supervise demilitarisation in Kashmir. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
continued to indicate its willingness to give Pakistan technical and economic assistance 
`6 Kabul Times (8 December 1955); Dawn (11 December 1955); and Morning News (11 & 12 
December 1955). 
`1 In my thesis I use the word "Pakhtun" which is common in North West Frontier society, instead of 
traditional commonly used word "Pathan" which was easier for the British to pronounce. See details in 
Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah, Ethnicity, Islam and Nationalism: Muslim Politics In the North West 
Frontier Province 193747 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 1; and Olaf Caroe, The 
Pathan (London: Macmillan, 1958). 
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Aid (Washington, D. C.: Communication Services Company, 1969), pp. 53-54. 30 SCOR, 12th Year, Supplement for January through March 1957, Document S/3779, p. 38. 
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with the hope of preventing Pakistan from falling completely under the domination of 
the United States. Z. A. Bhutto commented on Pakistan-Soviet relations that: 
In its anxiety to give constant proof of its fidelity to the United States' 
global policies, Pakistan followed at times an immoderate line, with 
the result that the Soviet Union retaliated by supporting India over 
Jammu and Kashmir. The differences were skillfully exploited by 
Prime Minister Nehru to worsen the state of Pakistan-Soviet 
rclations. 5 
Premier Khrushchev paid his second visit to Afghanistan in March 1960. During this 
visit, he hailed the relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan as an "excellent 
example of peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between countries with different 
political and social systems. " He discussed the Pakhtunistan issue with the Afghan 
government and declared: "Historically as you know, Pakhtunistan has always been 
part of Afghanistan. "52 Pravda, the Communist Party newspaper, also repeated 
Khrushchev's stand on the Pakhtunistan issue. The Soviet pro-Afghan pronouncements 
on the Pakhtunistan issue turned into a dramatic display of Soviet support for Kabul 
during the third and most serious eruption of the Pakhtunistan issue in the 1960s. 
On 25 March 1961 a Pravda article by O. Skalkin, expressed full support to the 
Afghan government and called Pakistan's proposal for a plebiscite on the Pakhtunistan 
issue a "provocational Plan" which had originated in the CENTO military alliance. 
This was a time when Soviet-Pakistan relations reached their lowest cbb and an 
American U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over the Soviet Union. The aircraft 
had taken off from Badabare air base in Peshawar (West Pakistan) where the Pakistani 
authorities had allowed the US to establish "listening posts" and allowed the flights of 
spy planes over the Soviet Union. The Soviets warned Pakistan that it risked Soviet 
nuclear retaliation if flights of this kind were again authorised to take place from 
Pakistan territory. 33 The Soviet government newspaper, Investla warned Pakistan that 
"it would be a serious mistake on Pakistan's part to hope that the Soviet Union will 
remain indifferent to a military conflict"54 in South Asia. 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: The Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 
126. 
n The Current Digest of Soviet Press, Vol. XlI (6 April 1960), pp. 6-7. 31 The U-2 incident took a bizarre turn when the US at first refused to acknowledge the shooting of the 
plane and Pakistan only face the wrath of the Soviet Union alone. See Barry ßuzan and Gowhcr Rizvi, 
South Asian Insecurity and the Great Power, p. 184. 54 Izvestia (26 March 1962); and see Dawn (13 July 1962). 
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In contrast to the deterioration in the political field, Soviet-Pakistan relations continued 
to develop in the field of economic and technical cooperation. In the late 1960s, the 
international outlook of Pakistan's foreign policy changed and it normalised its 
relations with the Soviet Union and China. In April 1965 President Ayub Khan visited 
Moscow, the first visit paid by a Pakistani head of state to the Soviet Union. This visit 
was in pursuit of a more independent and vigorous foreign policy, Pakistan was 
attempting to normalise its relations with all major powers. The Soviet Union decided 
to establish better ties with Pakistan and its leadership also changed from its traditional 
stand of supporting the Indian position on Kashmir. 
During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the US not only failed to give assistance to resist 
Indian aggression but even stopped the normal flow of arms and equipment, while the 
Soviet Union continued to supply India with military aid without any so-called treaty of 
mutual security and defence. However, the Soviet Union played a vital role to normalise 
relations between India and Pakistan. At that time, the Soviet concern for a peaceful 
Indo-Pakistan subcontinent was primarily due to the fact that it was alarmed by the 
Chinese ultimatum to India in 1965. This ultimatum was probably nothing more than an 
attempt to "win friends and influence people" on the part of China. But the Soviet 
leadership did not want Chinese influence in Pakistan to increase and they jumped into 
the crisis to settle the matter between the two neighbouring countries of South Asia. 
Bhutto stated that: "So great was its (Soviet Union's) concern to terminate hostilities 
that for the second time only in history as a Socialist state, it offered its good offices, 
this time for the resolution of the Indo-Pakistan disputes "ss 
The Soviet Union thus played the important role of mediator between India and 
Pakistan and persuaded both countries' leaderships to meet at Tashkent to resolve their 
differences. The Tashkent Conference took place on 4 January 1966 and India and 
Pakistan signed an agreement to settle their problems without the use of force. The 
Soviet Union sought to develop peaceful and amicable relations with India and 
Pakistan and contain the influence of the US and China. However, the Soviet ambition 
to minimise Chinese influence in Pakistan was to prove more problematic because the 
Sino-Pakistan alliance to contain Indian hegemony in the region seemed more stable 
and durable. As Bhutto stated, an Indian attack on Pakistan "would also involve the 
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security and territorial integrity of the largest state in Asia. "56 For Beijing, on the other 
hand, Pakistan could provide the breach in an arc of hostile powers surrounding China; 
an ally that could prevent the consolidation of Soviet power in an area of vulnerability. 
Beijing emerged as a trusted ally of Pakistan. The Chinese overwhelmingly supported 
Pakistan's stand on Kashmir and expressed the hope that the Kashmir dispute would be 
resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by 
India and Pakistan, a stance which China maintained until the end of Cold War. 
During 1969-71 Pakistan was in serious political turmoil because the people of the 
eastern wing were demanding autonomy and Pakistan's elites considered that the 
demand of rights from the eastern wing was a challenge to the country's solidarity. The 
inability to manage the political situation led to the outbreak of civil war in March 1971. 
At that time the Soviet Union was the only major power to intervene openly in the 
internal affairs of Pakistan. On 3 April 1971, Nikolai Podgorny sent a message to 
President Yahya Khan in which he expressed concern at the suffering and privations of 
the people of Bangladesh and urged an immediate stoppage of the bloodshed and a 
"peaceful political settlement with the elected leaders of the people. "" Yahya Khan 
ignored the Kremlin's warning and was hopeful of receiving US help in setting up a 
civilian regime in East Pakistan, under Awami League leadership. Soviet leaders also 
felt disturbed when Pakistan facilitated a secret trip by Henry Kissinger, to Beijing in 
July 1971. Ultimately, this dramatic shift raised serious doubts in New Delhi and 
Moscow about the spectre of a Sino-US and Pakistani alignment. 
Kissinger's visit to China changed the strategic situation of the region. India and the 
Soviet Union thought that an emerging alliance between the US and China would be 
directly against the Soviet Union and India. As Neville Maxwell has written, India 
moved from non-alignment to a kind of bi-alignment with the Soviet Union against 
China. " The Soviet Union and India signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation on 9 August 1971,59 in order to reduce the possibility of China's 
$5 Zulrkar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence, p. 139. 56 National Assembly of Pakistan Debate, Official Reports, No. 2 (17 July 1963), p. 1665. $7 Pravda (9 April 1971); and see also G. W. Choudhry, The Last Days of United Pakistan 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p. 203. sý Neville Maxwell, India's China War (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p. 434. 
See full text of Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 in S. Mansingh. India's Search for Power (New Delhi: 
Longfellow, 1984). pp. 213-2$; J. P. Chiddick. "Indo-Sovict Relations 1966-1971, " Millennium, Vol. 
3, No. 1 (1974), pp. 17-36; S. Nihal Singh, The Yogi and the Bear (London: Mansell, 1986), ch. 5; 
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intervention in future subcontinental wars. According to T. N. Kaul, "it was one of the 
few closely guarded secret negotiations that India has ever conducted. On one side, 
hardly half a dozen people were aware of it, including the prime minister and the 
foreign minister. The media got no scent of it "60 The significance of the treaty cannot 
be over-estimated. The Soviet Union guaranteed to meet the security needs of India in 
the event of aggression or threat of aggression. Under the treaty, India was able to rely 
on Soviet diplomatic support and arms supplies in the war against Pakistan which was 
already in the offing. 61 The Soviet military forces massed on China's northern border 
served as a clear warning to Beijing not to render more than verbal assistance to 
Pakistan. In that year, the USSR sided unequivocally with India and reaffirmed its 
commitment to support it militarily to counter Sino-US influence in South Asia. 
Furthermore, China's ultimatum to India was a highly visible form of political support 
to Pakistan and served to solidify their alliance. 
In 1971, China continued to give Pakistan public support at a time when international 
public opinion was highly critical over West Pakistan's military action against Bengalis 
and despite the damage caused to China's image as a supporter of national liberation 
movements. In private however, China was more ambivalent believing that Yahya Khan 
should negotiate an end to the struggle rather than seek a military solution and privately 
warning Pakistan that the flight of refugees into India would spread the conflict and give 
India "a reason or excuse" for open involvement. 62 Although the Chinese leaders openly 
supported Pakistan in its struggle to defend national independence and state sovereignty 
(The day that General Amir Abdullah Niazi surrendered in East Pakistan, China 
protested to India over the violation of Pakistani territory) China issued no ultimatum. 
While the Americans and Chinese in the first test of the new "anti-Soviet axis, " had 
both lined up on the side of the clear loser, the Soviet Union stood firmly with India and 
it emerged unchallenged as the top ranking external power in South Asia. A Soviet 
diplomat at the United Nations exulted: "This is the first time in history that the United 
States and China have been defeated together. "" The Soviet Union used its veto against 
and Robert C. horn, Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and influence (New York: Praeger, 1982), chs. 
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a cease-lire resolution in the Security Council and made sure that no cease-lire would 
take away victory from India's clutches. 
According to the Anderson Papers, the Soviet niilitarY attache contacted his ('hincsc 
counterpart in Nepal and warned of a Soviet reaction O' China intervened in the Ind0- 
Pakistan war. "' "There was tear that Moscow might have moved its ground and air forces 
into position along the Xinjiang border and trained missiles on ('hincsr targets. In 
addition, the Soviet amhassadlcn- in New Delhi reportedly told Indian officials not to he 
worried about a Chinese attack because the Soviets were also prepared fier diversionary 
action in Xiarijiang. "' 'I he Soviet IJnion also encourage(] India to provide hast. % and 
arms to Bengali fighters in their struggle against the Pakistani anny. Soviet military 
experts guided Indian military commanders to make deep inroads into Pakistani 
territory which could then he used bargaining mounters for the evacuation of Indian 
forces. Both countries built uh work] opinion against Pakistan's atrocities and thereby 
isolated it diplomatically. Thus, the outcome of' the war of' 1971 was disastrous for 
Pakistan. The I mite(] States, a major ally of' Pakistan, avoided getting involved in a 
South Asian embrogliºr and ('hing turned out to be a paper tiger. "" the Indo-Soviet 
alliance collapsed Pakistan's dcI ncc in its eastern and western zones. India proved its 
military might and Successful diplomacy and that legal and moral arguments are not the 
crucial determinants in international politics. 
Pakistan could not forget the role ot'the soviet I Inion during the Indo-Pakistan war of' 
1971 but Prieme Minister Zulfikar Ali I hutto went tu Moscow in 1972 to nonnalisc 
relations hctwccn the two countries. I'hr I `Still also promised to help in dept 
rrraymcnt anal ,, (i hrcýjrrts ; rnci rrsurnrdi Ir; using. I Io, \vrver-, (luring the official talks, the 
Soviet I'rinrer- Ko svgm did not hrsit; itc to tell I'riinr Mini`trr /ultik; rr Ah I3I1uttu that: 
"ff history were to repeat itself we would again take the same posh! n. "t This was a 
clear warning toi Pakistan to cease cooperating with the I !S and China. Moscow 
"4 lark Andcr. on. T hr Anderson Papers ( New York Random I loos, I')7 11, hh 260-261. 
Ihtd 
"h 
'r,! 
Ihtd 
Dunn), I hulk s visit t Mosco in March 1Q72 Kosvgin went out t' his way to 111slit'Y Ills 
gO%crnmc"nt's policv toward Pakistan (IUi iii the e entS of 1071 and delivered it warning I he "ircenl 
crisl%-, he said. had in\Ived ac Inch between the "fi, Ice" of national liberaU, m" and an . 11111 popular 
military dictatorship that had joined ranked c+ oh c\tcrnal aggressi\r circles hostile tu the people of 
India, including the I'aknt; tun people. If(- added that "ii history were to repeat itself. we uvuld again 
take the saine position. because we arc rnc rnrcd it uas correct. " See Aii at If weds "Pakistan's 
Security Problem: A Bill of Constraint. " ()URIS (Winter IQ71). h ('ti, I'r*s(IM (IS March 1972). 
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provided huge economic and military assistance to India to strengthen its position in 
the region. Its primary objective was to confirm India's dominance in the region and 
that other states of the region would have to stay subordinate. This was a critical 
situation for Pakistan and its allies, particularly China. Tics with Beijing remained the 
cornerstone of Islamabad's policy and China continued as a major aid donor to 
Pakistan. The US also announced that it would lift its embargo on arms sales to South 
Asia, thereby providing Pakistan with a dual source of supply denied to it in earlier 
years. Furthermore, the Chinese took a decision to channel their aid to the neglected 
areas of the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, showing an interest in 
maintaining the territorial integrity of Pakistan. 
Post-1971 developments in South Asia proved that no South Asian state would accept 
India's regional supremacy. The Soviets also continued to press Indian leaders for the 
support of a collective security system in Asia. For this purpose, Brczhnev visited New 
Delhi in November 1972 and discussed the matter of collective security but Indira 
Gandhi resisted the idea and refused to give support to the Soviet Union. However, 
India successfully used the China card to gain Soviet military and economic assistance 
and did not cooperate with the Soviet Union to encircle China. A dramatic change 
occurred in the region when India and China both established diplomatic relations in 
1976 and made efforts to solve their problem with bilateral means. On the other hand, 
China continued to help Pakistan through military and economic assistance. In 1978 
both countries inaugurated the strategic Karakoram highway. Both India and the Soviet 
Union assumed that the road could be used as a defence line between Pakistan and 
6s China. 
1-3. The Afghan Threat to Pakistan's Security: The Issue of the Durand Line 
and Pakhtunistan 
Since Pakistan's inception as an independent statt in 1947, its relations with 
Afghanistan had been characterised by mutual antagonism and they had never really 
enjoyed friendly relations. The Afghan rulers showed their hostility when Pakistan's 
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Diplomacy of an Entente Cordial (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 171; 
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application I 'Or mcmhcrshih of the I Jnited Nations cane uh for discussion in the tN 
General Asscmhly on 30 September 1947 and cast the only opposition vote against 
Pakistan's nmcº»hcrship. Aficr the defeat in the L nited Nations, the Afghan 
representati\-c, Abdul IIussain Khan Aziz, argued that "Afghanistan cannot recognise 
the NWI: I' as part of Pakistan so long as the people of the NWIT have not been given 
an opportunity, tree from any kind o1 intluenrr, to determine tor themselves whether 
they wish to he independent or to become a hart of Pakistan. ' " 
the sturcc of friction was the conflicting position Of, the two states On the issue of' 
Pakhtunistan (Map-3). This was a legacy uf the deal madc by Sir Mortimer Durand. 
I"Orcign Secretary toi the (iu vcrnmrnt of' India and Amir Abdur Rahman cif' Afghanistan 
who unified Afghanistan aller 1880) signed a boundary demarcation treaty between 
British India and Afghanistan on 12 November I893. 
") It was recognised by the 
Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman and his successors, I Iahihull; ºh (19(15), Amanullah 
(I921 ), Nadir Shah (I93(1), " with the continued %; IIiciity oI' I tic treaty reaffirmed by an 
exchange of' letters between the British Secretary ol'State fier Foreign Afläirs and the 
Afghan Minister in 1948-I949 Despite this, there has persisted a dreh-seated Afghan 
irredcntist view about the Durand I. inc. 'Ihr Afghans never completely recognisc(l its 
validity as an international tiro, ntier. 11 
IN I he people of NWI I' deeided their fu(tnc through :º referendum held on h July 1947 ºn favour of 
accession to Pakistan and tribes themselves resented Afghan interference and reaffirmed their loyalty 
to Pakistan, I ))c rote wa. r as follows: total number entitled 1,1 vote S72.7Q)9. \utc fitr 
Pakistan 
I1t9,244. for India 2 X74. I lie referendum \%,; I% rurnluctcd under the (io\crnrship of (icncral 
I eckhart who, was the (it, v, crnur of the NWI I' till his appointment its ('otnmander to ('hºcf of the 
Indian Army on 15 August I947 See I Intlcd Nation (. encral Assembly ( )Rectal 
Records. Q)'" 
Mcn: ºry Meeting, (30 September I0.1? ). and see K. ilttn liahatw. "I'aktaan'5 Policv I award. 
Afghanistan, " in K P. Mira (ed. ).. tightºniglan in (li%i% (N' t Yolk Adhcnt Books [tic, I')xI ). pp 
02 Qt 
Sec details in Sin A1)'. crnnn I)urand, I lit, Making of a I'runlicr (I undon 
Pall Mall. IR')')). 11 I, 
Parliamentary Taper, North \\'(., t I t, gnu, "t Is')(,. ( soll, No 
'. (' II Aitchison. A Collection of 
111. Treaties F: n); xt; ctncntý jilt 1tºnadý 1: \I). h; tnt. tanl \'., I XIII. No 
XII. ((': ºIrutta I Ili, tt Hook. 11) 
PI, . 
'St, 'S-. Anur : \htlur IZ&"hnt; tn. (c, I) Moe 
Mun. ht Sultan Muhanun, id. I he I ife ul Abdul 
ilehmrto, \'1, I II. (I'111loll John \1utt%. I0t111I 11 160, and sec (' 
II I'htltlps. I he Fsoluliun of India 
and I'akisttºn IX58 1944: selected I)uº"utncntc(I ndn Wund I! nnrrsit liess, Ivn"1t. I) 4.10 
Ja-t1 Iitnl. t, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making II ondon l 
W, ittl I nt\crat\ t'ees'.. I, INN, and 
5rt" t1; 111n; ti / I. I,; tltant. knack will Ilisel%: I Ili. Political 
l'scs of Access in file RurdcrINnd% cif ." %lM 
(Itlta alý rncll Ilnncratý I'tr'... I'ºý'r). I, 'ýý 
c Olaf l ; u(w, 'I'hr 11 atlt)uºs (I tndun, ri; trnttll. ttt. I'ýýý 
& sucmc ti, rntulatu, n of the Al ph; tn position on the 
I)urand I inc we Abdul Rahman Pailtuak. 
I'trkhtunislan II umtun A6,11ant<IVt )nt(ltntauun Iiutr; iu. 
IV 7). anti tot a balance opinion about the 
1-IR . cc I eon li I'ullula. "I'u. httill ut, tn : \t)ghan Ihtntrsuc 
Taltara. and Relation% tst(h I': tkist: ºn " to 
\'-hr II rnhrec fed ). 1'tºkislan'% \\e%tcrit Rurderlmnd%: I It(- I rans(urmation of " 
Political 
(h-der (Durham: Carolina Aratlcnttr Pecs., PC"). mid sir Ilcnr\ ti ttrudshcr. Afkhanl. tan till(] the 
So%lct I Ilion. new and expanded ed (I)whvn I )ukc I Inncral\ 
Pies., I'1kS). 1p1p I1", 
Sotuus: i\i. haniman 'T'erritorial ('hums for I'akhtim scan. Scv Anis 
(Afghan Nmspnl(r, I')51), h. I; anti Mahnas %. Ishnhani, Roads 
and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the Borderlands of 
Asia (Ithaca: Cornell Unºvtrsuv Pn s, 1989), p. I07. 
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Since the time of Amir Abdur Rahman, the rulers of Afghanistan have recognized the 
economic, political, and military vulnerabilities inherent in their country's land locked 
location. British control of the NWFP and Baluchistan provided little scope for the 
southward penetration of Afghan influence. The Afghans were aware of the desirability 
of the acquisition of southern access routes. Abdur Rahman was concerned about the 
economic opportunities of Afghanistan and he wrote: 
Afghanistan ought to secure a footing upon the ocean....... the south 
Western corner of Afghanistan is very close to the corner of the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian ocean, and from this only a small plain 
Plateau of ground between Kandahar, Baluchistan, Persia, and Part of 
Karachi...... I always had a great fancy for a little piece of this sandy 
desert..... of great value if annexed to Afghanistan in order to bring the 
country in touch with the ocean...... If Afghanistan had access to the 
ocean there is no doubt that the country would soon grow rich and 
prosperous ..... 
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In 1944 when the British departure from India appeared inevitable, the Afghan 
government had informed the British Indian government that it hoped to be consulted 
should a change occur affecting the fate of the Pakhtuns living East and South of the 
Dumad Line. However, the British replied that "the Durand Line was an international 
boundary, and, therefore, Afghan interest stopped at the end" In 1947, King Zahir 
Shah's government refused to accept the Durand Line and made a formal 
representation to the Interim Government of India, demanding restoration of a large 
area of the subcontinent, on the ground that after the departure of the British, the 1893 
treaty would lapse automatically. In June 1947 the Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad 
Iiashim Khan stated publicly that as "an independent Pakhtunistan cannot be set up, 
the (North West] Frontier Province should join Afghanistan. " He made it clear that 
Afghanistan's concern was not limited to the well-being of ethnic Pakhtuns across the 
border since `bur country, with its population and trade, needs an outlet to the sea, 
which is very essential. "76 The Afghan government tried to persuade the British to 
renegotiate the boundary but they failed and the rulers in Kabul denounced the 
Partition Plan and demanded that the Pakhtuns cast of the Durand Line be given the 
'4 Mor Munshi Sultan Muhammad, The Life of Abdul Rehman, Vol. 11, p. 212. 75 Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account (Washington, D. C.: Pcrgamon- 
Brasseys, 1988), p. 66. 
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choice of independence. The British, however, announced a referendum for the 
Pakhtuns of NWFP on union either with Muslim Pakistan or with Hindu India. This 
left no choice for the Afghan rulers but to embark upon their campaign for the creation 
of Pakhtunistan and to appeal for Pakhtun self-determination on the ground that the 
Pakhtu-speaking people inhabiting Pakistan had been denied the opportunity to 
exercise the option of independence or merger with Afghanistan. '? 
The concept of Pakhtunistan in its innocuous form amounted to little more than 
renaming of the Pakhtun-majority NWFP and local autonomy within Pakistan. 78 In its 
more extreme case, however, it envisioned a fully independent Pakhtun state between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The primary objective was to limit the boundaries of the 
NWFP or embrace all of Pakistan west of the Indus River and south to the Arabian 
Sea. 79 This was the unconcealed ambition of Afghanistan's rulers, who felt that 
Pakistan would be an easy prey to the evil designs of India and that the denunciation of 
the Durand Line was an essential preliminary in the prosecution of Afghan 
irredentism. 80 It is also significant that King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, before the 
announcement of the 3 June Partition Plan 1947, mentioned that his government was 
considering the revision of the Soviet-Afghan boundary agreement. " In November 
1947 the Afghan envoy in Pakistan demanded of the new state that Pakhtun tribal areas 
must form a "free, sovereign province, " and Afghanistan must be given access to the 
sea through the provision of either "an Afghan corridor in west Baluchistan" or a free 
76 Statesman (Delhi) 22 June 1947; Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan, p. 145; and we also 
Dorothea S. Frank, "Pakhtunistan-Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land, " Middle East Journal, No. 
6 (Winter 1952), pp. 49-68. 
J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation (Washington: National 
Defence University, 1986), p. 352. 
For background on the Pakhtunistan issue, see Mahnaa Z. Ispahani, Roads and Rivals: The Political 
Uses of Access In the Borderlands of Asia, pp. 83-144; Leon B. Poullada, "Pushtunistan: Afghan 
Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan, " in Ainslie T. Embree Pakistan's V1'estern 
Borderlands (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977), pp. 126-151; Louis Dupree, Afghanistan 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 485494 and 538-54; S. M. M. Qureshi, 
"Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan, '' Pacific Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 
1.2 (Spring/Summer 1966), pp. 99-114; Khalid B. Sayced, "Pathan Regionalism, " The South Atlantic 
Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 478-506; Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan, pp. 143- 
165; and S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An historical Analysis (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1973), pp. 68-90. to Ispahani, Roads and Rivals, pp. 106-108. to Afghan newspaper, Anis (Kabul) published a front-page article demanding the amalgamation with 
Afghanistan of the entire 600-mile territory of Pakistan from the Durand Line of the Indus river. The 
Newspaper also produced a map of the proposed new state. It included Chitral, the North West Frontier 
Province and the Pakhtun areas of Baluchistan north west of the Indus River, See also The Hindu 
(Madras) 12 June 1948; Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 310. 
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Afghan zone in Karachi. 82 In early 1948, Kabul's envoy, Sardar Najibullah Khan, met 
the Governor General of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam), who 
listened to his demands politely and made it clear to the Afghan envoy that the 
boundary would not be readjusted. 83 Later, the Afghan government sponsored a 
Pakhtunistan government in exile led by Haji Mirza Ali Khan (Fakir of Ipi) near to 
Tirah on the border. 84 This was a time when, Pakistan was engaged on the one side 
with India on the issues of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir and on the other side 
with Afghanistan on the issue of Durand line. As Birdwood described it: "If India was 
to reach Hunza, Nagar and Gilgit, there would in fact be established a common Indo- 
Afghanistan frontier of 50 miles... Thus, there has been an understanding between India 
and Afghanistan for the encouragement of a tribal autonomous state on the North-West 
Frontier at the expense of Pakistan. The actual plan was based on the physical contact 
between Afghanistan and India through Kashmir and then Pakistan would be the victim 
of a "pincer" operation. "85 
On June 1949, Afghanistan's Parliament cancelled all the treaties which former Afghan 
Governments had signed with the British-India Government, including the Durand 
Treaty and thus proclaimed that the Afghan government did not recognise the Durand 
line as a legal boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan 86 In the same year, a few 
hundred supporters of the Afghan government inside Pakistan declared an independent 
state of Pakhtunistan, but they never gained the support of the majority of the Pakhtun 
population. 87 However, on various occasions the Afghan rulers demanded that those 
tribal areas inhabited by the Pakhtun speaking ethnic groups from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan become an independent Pakhtunistan state-88 In fact, the Durand Line 
'= See The Stateman (Delhi: 3 July 1947); and Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan, p. 146. 13 TP 1942-1947 Document Vol. 12, No. 385 (8 August 1947), Viceroy's Persoanl Report No. 16, p. 599. ý4 Mujtaba Rizvi, "Pak-Afghan Relations Since 1947: An Analysis, " p. 38. °$ Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (London: Robert IIale, 1966), p. 95. 46 See more details, Ludwig W. Adamec, Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions and Insurgencies 
(London: The Scarecrow Press, 1996), pp. 88-89; George Arney, Afghanistan (London: Mandarin, 
1990), pp. 34-39; Mujtaba Rizvi, Frontiers of Pakistan, pp. 140-148; Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 
379,426, and 425-445; and S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Anslysis, pp. 68- 
90. 
87 Aslam Khattak, "Pathan Needs Pakistan not Paktunistan, " Dawn (14 August 1949); and Sabecn Khan, "The Politics of Frontier Region, " Khyber Mail (18 August 1950). to Pashtunistan means "Land of the Pashtuns" (or Afghans). Neither name actually existed in history; they 
were given by Afghan nationalists to the North West Frontier Province and parts of Baluchistan in 
present Pakistan. This area was part of the Persian empire and it was included when the state of 
Afghanistan was founded in 1747 but soon came under the control of the Sikh ruler, Ranjit Singh, and 
later the British Indian government. The British empire separated this area from Afghanistan in 1893 because it was difficult, mountainous and inaccessable. In 1901 the British government created the 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and later included all tribal areas in Pakistan in 1947 under the 
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conformed to little geographical logic: it divides tribal lands and even individual 
tribes. 89 There is no natural barrier between the two countries and the tribes continue to 
move freely across the boundary. The Pakhtun tribes were consulted on the decision 
and the majority expressed their desire to stay with Pakistan. The tribal maliks, 
likewise, expressed allegiance to Pakistan through various Jirgas held by the Governor 
of the North West Frontier Province. 90 Thus, Pakistan refused to subscribe to the 
theory that the Pakhtuns comprised a separate nation. However, the Afghans never 
relinquished their desire to reunify Pakhtun tribal territories and to expand the 
territorial limits of Pakhtun rule southward to the sea. In 1951 the Afghan journal, 
Anis, printed a map of Pakhtunistan which included Chitral, the NWFP, and the 
Pakhtun-occupied area of Baluchistan stretching to the Indus. 91 In the same year, 
Afghan government supporters carried out raids in the frontier region and the Afghan 
King and Prime Minister made provocative speeches in the wake of Jashan in Kabul, 
where they hoisted "Pakhtunistan" flags and distributed anti-Pakistan literature. The 
Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, told the Parliament that "the Afghan 
raiders have been driven back" and "there is nothing more heinous than that a Muslim 
should shed the blood of another Muslim: " He added that he would avoid this as long 
as possible, "but not where the soil of Pakistan was at stake. "92 In 1952 the Afghan 
Information Bureau in London published a long tract detailing the territory, resources, 
and potential of a Pakhtunistan that incorporated the areas between the Afghan- 
autonomous set up governed by the tribal councils. Afghan rulers on various occasions demanded that 
those tribal areas inhabited by the Pakhtu-speaking ethnic groups from Afghanistan and Pakistan 
become an independent Pakhtunistan state. However, since 1990, the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan 
are no longer hot issues in the region and now Pakhtun nationalists struggle to rename the province 
Pakhtunkhwa, by analogy with the other provinces of Pakistan (Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan). This 
issue is one that has caused considerable friction between the two neighbouring states since 1947. For 
more detail, see Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, p. 185; S. M. Burk, 
Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis; Peter King, Afghanistan: Cockpit In High Asia 
(London: Geoffrey Bles, 1966); and Aineslee T. Embree (ed. )., Pakistan's Western Borderlands 
(Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1977). t9 See Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers: Studies in a Continuing Problem (London: Pall Press, 1968), 
pp. 86-93. 90 Sir George Cunningham, Governor of the North West Frontier Province after Partition, has recorded 
that he held an Afridi Jirga at Khyber House, Peshawar, on 1 November 1947; Jirgas of the North 
Waziristan tribes at Miranshah of the Ahmadzat Wazirs at Wana and of the Afahsuds at Parachinar on I 
December 1947, and a Jirga of the lower Kurrum tribes at Shabqadar on 7 December 1947. The 
Orakzai and 'pass' Afridi Jirgas were held by the Political Resident on 1 November 1947. All these 
tribes swore allegiance to Pakistan and stated that they wished exactly the same relations to subsist between them and Pakistan as had existed between them and the British empire. Cf. Sirdar Ikbal Ali 
Shah, "The North West Frontier Today, " The British Survey (October 1960), Main Series, No. 139, 
pp. 1-24. 
91 See Mujtaba Razvi, "Pak-Afghan Relations Since 1947: An Analysis, " Pakistan Horizon, No. 32 
(June 1980), p. 86; see also Aslam Siddiqui, Pakistan Seeks Security (Lahore: Longmans, Green 
&Co, 1960), pp. 44-47. 92 Manchester Guardian (5 October 1950); see also Observer (London: 8 October 1950); and The New 
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Pakistan border and Indus river, which is the natural and historical border of the Indian 
subcontinent. It noted that the lands from Chitral in the north to Baluchistan in the 
south connected with the Arabian Sea, have always been considered one of the most 
fertile regions of the world. According to the tract, the new state would have significant 
economic advantages because the Pakhtun area has access to the sea in Baluchistan 
which is obviously a factor of great importance in the future trade of the country. 93 
In 1955, relations between the two countries reached a new low when Afghanistan 
opposed the scheme of the government of Pakistan to merge the four provinces of 
Pakistan into a single unit. At this juncture the Soviet Union and India intervened to 
provide necessary support to Afghanistan's stand on the Pakhtun issue, thereby laying 
the foundation of a long lasting alliance. 94 Afghan-Pakistan relations further 
deteriorated when Ayub Khan came to power in Pakistan in October 1958 and the 
Pakhtunistan issue was the bone of contention between the two countries. Diplomatic 
relations were severed in 1961 when Pakistan imposing an economic embargo and 
blocked Afghan transit trade through Karachi. 95 Irritated by the persistent Afghan 
irredentism, and in order to rebuff the Afghan rulers, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, 
Manzur Qadir, made this suggestion to his Afghan counterpart early in 1961: 
It is reasonable to assume that Pakhtuns, whether they live in Pakistan 
or in Afghanistan, belonging to the same stock, want to be together 
and under the same flag of Afghanistan or Pakistan. . . since a 
referendum has already been held among the Pakhtuns of Pakistan and 
they have by an overwhelming majority decided to be in Pakistan, 
now it is logical that we should ask the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan what 
their wishes are. 96 
The government of Pakistan, in a white paper issued on 3 September 1961, pointed out: 
"If the Frontier of a country has to be predetermined on linguistic and ethnic bases as 
claimed by the Afghans, it will result in the disintegration of Afghanistan. "97 This was 
because, within the total 15 million population of Afghanistan, only 3.5 million speak 
Pakhtu, and the rest of the people are Persian, Turkish, Tajik and Uzbek. All these non- 
Pakhtu speaking populations would be integrated with neighbouring states. The 
majority of Pakhtuns, around 8 million, lived in Pakistan and had a better position as 
93 Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, Roads and Rivals, p. 106. 94 Kalim IIahadur, "Pakistan's Policy Towards Afghanistan, " pp. 90-91- 93 Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
96 The Times (9 March 1961). 
97 See White Paper "The Reality of Pakhtun Issue, " (Rawalpindi: Press and Publication, 1962), p. 18. 
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compared to those in Afghanistan. In this regard, Olaf Caroe once warned that 
"Peshawar would absorb Kabul, not Kabul absorb Peshawar. "98 It was also improbable 
that a majority of the Pakhtuns inhabiting Pakistani territory had any wish to become 
Afghan subjects and on ethnic grounds, Pakistan could perhaps raise strong arguments 
for the acqusition of the Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan 99 
The international community supported Pakistan's stance on the Durand Line and 
refused to accept the Pukhtunistan claim. Noel Baker, the British Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations reiterated that "His Majesty's Government's view is that 
Pakistan is, in international law, the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old 
Government of India and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, in 
these territories and that Durand Line is the international frontier. "10° The British 
government's view was that, with the transfer of sovereignty from British India to 
Pakistan over the North-Western region, the restransit cum suo onerl (treaties of the 
extinct state concerning boundary lines) remained valid and all rights and duties arising 
from such treaties of the extinct state devolved on the absorbing states. 101 In a similar 
vein, the United States' special envoy, Philip C. Jessup, visited Kabul and the Afghan 
government presented to him a long list of Afghan claims but the US envoy refused to 
consider them, due to their vague and confused nature. 102 India and the Soviet Union 
were the only countries who supported the Afghan government claim of Pakhtunistan. 
In 1965, the Indian Deputy Minister of External Affairs, Dinesh Singh, promised 
India's full support for the "legitimate aspirations" of the Pakhtun people. 103 
Nevertheless, Afghanistan, landlocked, encircled and dependent upon southern routes 
previously controlled by the British empire, sought an outlet from its historical 
dilemma. It continued to clamour against the Durand Line and there was continued 
Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, 550 B. C. -A. D. 1957 (London: Macmillan, 1958), p. 437. Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontier: Studies in a Continuing Problem (London: Pall Press, 1968), p. 92. 10° Afghan government more than five times consulted to British government about the future of Durand 
Line and every time the British government reply that "this an international recognise boundary 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan" and it was repeated in the British Parliament by the British Foreign 
Secretary, Lord Home, on 3 November 1955 and by the British Prime Ministers, Sir Anthony Eden, on 
1 March 1956; Harold MacMillan, on 20 May 1960; S. M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy, p. 85; 
101 
and see "The North West Frontier Today, " The British Survey (October 1960), pp. 1-24. 
Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1(London, 1957), p. 159. 102 The Afghan government alleged that Britain was using Pakistan to push up towards the Ilindukush 
Mountains and therefore it was contended that a buffer "Pakhtunistan" should be set up to block the 
Soviet move. Afghanistan also argued that it could serve as a barrier to Soviet expansion only if a free 
"Pakhtunistan" existed. See Mujtaba Razvi, "Pak-Afghan Relations Since 1947: An Analysis, " p. 39. 101 See Staff Article, "The Soviet Attitude to Pashtunistan", Central Asian Review, No. 8 (1960), pp. 
310-315; and Ilabibur Rahman, "British Post-Second World War Military Planning for the Middle 
East, " Journal of Strategic Studies, No. 5 (December 1982), p. 51. 
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controversy between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the creation of Pakhtunistan. 
Afghan governments undoubtedly sought to gain political and diplomatic benefits from 
the Soviet Union and its allies by exploitation of the Pakhtunistan issue in international 
and regional fora but the issue never had much appeal to Western countries. 
In the late 1970s, the situation in Afghanistan radically changed because the political, 
social and economic reforms initiated by the Marxist government began a civil war. 
The Zia government provided moral and material assistance to Islamic resistance 
groups opposing the imposition of communism and thus alienated the leftist 
government in Kabul. 104 Pakistan was concerned about the growing Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan and its Marxist government's provocative activities and irredentist claims, 
particularly in view of the signature of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the 
USSR and Afghanistan in November 1978. It was also reported that the Foreign 
Minister of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin, had proposed a secret pact to India in 1978 
to dismember Pakistan. los The government of Pakistan was sensitive to the possible 
repercussions on its security of the on-going changes in Afghanistan with the 
installation of a Marxist regime, Soviet activism in its vicinity and its own role in the 
growing civil war between Islamic groups and the Marxist government. 
Thus, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan created a serious conventional threat to 
Pakistan's northwestern borders. The Soviets were in a position to: (1) back a forcible 
effort by Kabul to revise the Durand Line and re-open Pakhtunistan issue; (2) extend 
hostilities into Pakistan because of the presence of Afghan refugees and guerrillas 
using Pakistani territory as a sanctuary, (3) foster the separatist efforts of the Baluchis, 
Pakhtun or Sindhis whose territorial areas comprised more than 70 percent of Pakistan 
territory; and (4) play "anvil to India's hammer" in the event of another war on the sub- 
continent. 106 Soon after the Soviet invasion, US diplomats were quoted in the press as 
fearing an imminent blow-up in Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan saw the invasion as a part of 
a grand design to establish Soviet hegemony in South Asia, which posed a threat to the 
security of all regional countries, including Pakistan-107 Pakistan was extremely 
104 Dawn (18 May 1979), p. 1. ios See J. Bruce Amstutz, Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation, (Washington: 
National Defence University Press, 1986), p. 353. 106 Edward N. Lutwak, "After Afghanistan, What?, " Commentary 70 (April 1980): p. 48; and see David 
Winder, "Worry Grows Over Pakistan After Soviets Afghan Foray, " Christian Science Monitor (14 
January 1980), p. 1. 107 i habani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome: ]low to Live with Soviet Power (New Delhi: Vikas, 
1982), pp. 18-19. 
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alarmed over developments in Afghanistan. A high level Pakistani delegation led by 
Foreign Minister Agha Shahi told US officials that Pakistan's security had been 
profoundly affected by the loss of Afghanistan's buffer status and by the ever stronger 
Soviet grip on Afghanistan. Thus, Pakistan was deeply concerned over the long-tens 
potential for cross-border subversion on the part of a regime that posed the double 
threat of "Pakhtun chauvinism and ideological missionary zeal. °8 
2. The Baluch Nationalism Factor 
Historically, in the first quarter of 1948, immediately after the emergence of Pakistan, 
Mir Ahmad Yar Khan [Khan of Kalat], wrote that one of the dangers facing Pakistan 
came from Russia, "pressing its demand of access to the port of Gwadar" on 
Baluchistan's Makran coast. 109 The coastline of Baluchistan runs along the edge of the 
Persian Gulf and along the land routes linking the Middle East, Central Asia, and South 
Asia. Baluchistan has 750 miles of strategic shoreline along the Arabian Sea, reaching 
almost to the straits of Hormuz ý. Control of Pakistan or the creation of a 
subservient independent Baluchistan would give the Soviet Union direct access to the 
Arabian Sea. ' 10 
The port of Gwadar, in particular, began to loom large in the perceptions of local and 
foreign statesmen. The Soviets had long been interested in building a port at Gwadar 
on the Baluchistan coast, and in a north-south route leading to it, but in the 1960s they 
cancelled the idea due to Indian pressure. In 1969 the Soviets asked permission to build 
a highway from Chaman on the Afghan-Pakistan border to the Makran Coast. The 
Soviets further suggested they would be happy to assist Pakistan in a five-year project 
for the expansion and improvement of Gwadar. ' 11 A correspondent for The Times of 
London said: "the Soviet ambition to construct road link between Kandahar 
(Afghanistan) and Karachi (Pakistan) is likely to be used not only as a terminal to a 
naval base, but also for the delivery of food, naval stores or fuel to Soviet units cruising 
the Indian Ocean, or possibly for the discrete replacement of submarine crews or 
101 See Secretary of State, Washington, D. C., "US-Pakistan Talks: Regional Issues, " Cable to Islamabad, 
No. 7781 (24 October 1979). 
109 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan: A Political Autobiography (Karachi: Royal 
Book, 1975), p. 161. 10 Francis Fukuyama, The Security of Pakistan, p. 31. 
T. B. Miller, Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area (Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 1970), p. 16; and Syed Abdul Quddus, Afghanistan and Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons, 
1982), 
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marine commandos. "' 12 
In the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan there was fear that the Soviet and 
Kabul governments would exploit Baluch nationalism to create political instability in 
Pakistan. The Baluch people live in contiguous areas of Iran and Pakistan. They have a 
strong sense of ethnic identity and lack of economic development, which converged to 
produce a confrontation with the federal government. In the late 1970s, Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto's government dismissed the provincial government in Baluchistan on charges 
of harbouring separatist ambitions. Bhutto ordered direct military action to eliminate 
the nascent separatist elements who were supported by New Delhi, Kabul and the 
Moscow. 113 Islamabad accused Kabul of training up to 15,000 Baluch and Pakhtun 
guerrillas for a "people's war. "' 14 At that time, the Shah of Iran also provided 
substantial military aid to Pakistan to help the Bhutto government to deal with a bitter 
and powerful Baluchi insurgency. 115 Pakistan was apprehensive that Moscow would 
decide to play its "Baluch card" to divert attention from its problem in Afghanistan. 
116 
After 1979, the proto-nationalist sentiments that inspired the Baluchis to seek 
autonomy within Pakistan in the first place predisposed them against becoming a 
Soviet puppet in the manner of Babrak Karmal and the Percham. Those concerned 
about ethnic tensions in Pakistan were wary of Soviet and Afghan efforts to organize 
Baluch dissidents and were resentful that Baluchistan was not being given its due 
recognition as a fully-fledged province of Pakistan. In this regard, the statements and 
speeches of the Marxist government in Kabul further strengthened the belief of 
Pakistan that the Afghan rulers were cooperating with the Soviets in the search for 
112 London Times (17 November 1969); Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan: A Political 
Autobiography (Karachi: Royal Book, 1975), p. 161; and Norman D. Palmer, "South Asia and the 
Indian Ocean, " in (ed. )., Alvin J. Cottrell and Robert M. Burrell, The Indian Ocean: Its Political, 
Economic and Military Importance (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 246-247. 113 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (New 
York. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), pp. 80 and 204; and Dawn (5 March 
1973), p. 3. 11' Selig H. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan, " Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall 1978), pp. 136-60. 
11$ An estimated 55,000 Baluchis were fighting war for independence. The 200,000 square miles of 
Baluchi territory stradding Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan and it is strategically valuable because of the 
750 miles of front on the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman. While the Soviets had periodically 
flirted 
with the Baluchis by Afghanistan and India. There was considerable fear inside and outside the region 
that Soviet hesitance might evaporate if the military situation turned to the advantage of the Baluchis. 
See for more details Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan, " Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall 
1978), pp. 136-60. 116 Selig Harrison, "Baluch Nationalism and superpower Rivalry, " International Security (Winter 1980- 
81), pp. 152-153; and see for detailed analysis Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: 
Baluch 
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access to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea for the trade, transit and migratory routes 
that run through Pakistan. ' 17 Hafizullah Amin, the President of Afghanistan, speaking 
to a large gathering in August 1979, reasserted its ties to the Baluch coastline. "Our 
revolution is revered and welcomed, " he said, "from the Oxus to the Abasin, from the 
mountains of Pamir to the beaches of Gwadar in Pakistan. i118 Babrak Karmal himself 
later said that "Afghanistan principally advocates the right of fraternal Pakhtun and 
Baluchi peoples to express their free will: they should themselves take decisions on 
their future. "' 19 The Karmal regime called upon the ethnic groups, including Pakistani 
Pakhtuns, to build a new "anti-imperialist" Pakistan. 120 
A CIA report on Baluchistan on 10 January 1980 noted past Soviet restraint, described 
Baluchi ports and their potential strategic value and noted that the Soviet move into 
Afghanistan had revived speculation about "the century old quest for a warm water 
port. "121 The same report began with the observation that the Pakistanis and Iranians 
had "long believed that the USSR hopes someday to win control of Baluchistan and 
thereby gain warm water ports"122 The proximity of Afghanistan to strategically 
valuable ports located near the Gulf of Oman and straits of Hormuz, especially Gwadar 
in Pakistan and Cha Bahar in Iran, increased the seriousness of the invasion in the view 
of the Carter administration. In fact, the fear that the Soviets might have been inclined 
to meddle in Baluchistan, either for the purpose of bringing Soviet influence to the 
shores of the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, or as a punitive lever vis-A-vis 
Pakistan, was hardly far-fetched. In the autumn of 1981 General Fazal Haq, the then 
governor of the Northwest Frontier, pronounced the long-term goal of the Soviet Union 
as a warm water port on the shores of Pakistan: "They will make a strategic thrust to 
get access to a warm water port in our Baluchistan province. 
123 The acquisition of land 
routes could serve purposes beyond the exercise of influence in or control over, 
Baluchistan. 124 They might give the Soviets access to sea routes, expanding their reach 
across the sea lanes of the straits of Hormuz and the northern Indian Ocean. In this 
1 17 Mahnaz Z. Ispahani, Roads and Rivals, p. 114. 11: Ibid., p. 57. 119 Ibid. 
120 Chitra K. Tiwari, Security in South Asia: Internal and External Dimensions (New York: 
University Press of America, 1989). pp. 94-95. 121 Central Intelligence Agency, "National Foreign Assessment Centre, Baluchistan: A Primer, " No. 10 
(January 1980), pp. 6-8. u Ibid., p. 1. 
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regard, the Afghan government showed its ambition when in September 1985, I3ahrak 
Kannal, declared that "the unity of' Pakhtuns and ßaluchis is also a guarantor of 
trccdom, progress, unification and national maturity 1iºr the Pakhtuns and 13aluchis. "'25 
In the same year when Zia ul-f lay went to Moscow für Konstantin ('hcrncnko's 
funeral, Soviet leaders reportedly warned him that it' Pakistan persisted in aiding the 
mujuhid(vit, the Soviet Union would hack the l3aluchis in a move to detach 
Baluchistan from Pakistan. 126 
The Soviets trained and supplied subversive groups in the region, relying in 
Baluchistan on left-leaning local political groups and tribal leaders. 
' 2-7 Afghanistan 
made no secret of its support tier the concept of an independent People's Republic of 
Baluchistan. It provided assistance to lRaluch refugees and permitted safe havens to 
Raluch leaders and fighters crossing into Afghanistan. 
12S In addition, Baluchistan was 
"instinctively a province of the radical Icit, '' as all but right-wing parties were outlawed 
by Zia's policies. The danger of externally supported subversion in Baluchistan was 
acknowledged by General Zia when he asserted that "tlhe ground is ripe für seeds of 
subversion. "1- 
. 
I. Pakistan as a Frontline State 
The Afghan crisis dramatically transformed Pakistan's geostratcgic environment ands it 
emerged as a "frontline" state. '['he threat to Pakistan's security was immediate and 
immense. Its strategic importance was further enhanced by the tact that the state of 
Pakistan was at the cross-roads of superpower politics and h\ its strategic location as 
gateway toi Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf region. (Map-5) In this regard, the 
manner in which Pakistan reacted to the Soviet incursion and its eventual role in the 
Afghan crisis were preordained to a great extent by the extant state of Pakistan-AtEhan 
bilateral relations. The Soviet military invasion in Afghanistan changed the strategic 
situation of the region. The Soviet action had grave implications for the security of 
AI's See Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow ßaluch tinlionalism and Smict 1'cmptatim1% 
(New York: Carnegie Fndownien( fier International Peace. P)K I ), 1) 140. 
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Pakistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf region. The Soviet move into Afghanistan showed 
that superpower rivalry and the possibility of confrontation was not confined to Europe 
but extended to other parts of the world, including the Persian Gulf region. Pakistan 
came to be described as the "centre of gravity" of the world, and the "third central 
strategic zone" in a potential armed confrontation between the superpowers. 130 
It was not possible for Pakistan to remain unconcerned and somnolent about the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Shortly afterwards, Stephen Cohen stated that Pakistan was 
facing "one of the most complex and multilayered strategic threats in the world"13' 
Pakistan found itself thrust into the unwelcome status of facing a strategic quandary 
notable even by the turbulent standards of its national and regional history. The 
invasion itself generated fears and apprehensions among many Pakistanis that their 
country would be the next target. 13' There was a perception that after having 
consolidated its position in Afghanistan, Moscow would try to extend its influence 
beyond the Afghan border or that the Soviets might use Afghanistan as a springboard 
for destabilizing Pakistan. India's traditionally warm relationship with Kabul and close 
military and political bilateralism with Moscow increased Pakistan's worries of a 
strengthened Kabul-Delhi-Moscow axis. Many scholars admitted that Pakistan was 
seen to be sandwiched between two highly threatening, if not malevolent, forces-an 
expansionist Soviet Union to the north and hegemony-driven India to the cast. Such 
anxieties, therefore, did not seem too far fetched. 133 In reality, the Sovict-Afghan-Indo 
axis sought out Pakistan's zones of vulnerability and mounted subversion within them. 
The survival of none of these three countries was in any jeopardy from Pakistan, but 
the survival of Pakistan, on the other hand, was plausibly threatened by all of them. 
134 
The Soviet move showed that they had acquired an unprecedented capability for 
influencing events in an area of the world that was of unquestionable importance to the 
political integrity and economic health of the industrialised nations. Pakistan, by its 
geographical proximity to the Gulf and by its historical and cultural ties to the people 
170 Agha Shahi, "Afghanistan Crisis, " The Concept (Islamabad: July 1982), p. 13. 
131 Stephen P. Cohen, "Pakistan, " in Edward A. Koloziej and Robert B. Ilarkavy (eds. )., Security Policies 
of Developing Countries (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982), p. 97. $32 Perviaz Iqbal Cheema, "Security problems 11 - Pakistanis Security Problems, " in Karl J. Newman, 
Pakistan: 35 Years After Independence (hamburg: Deutsch Pakistanische's Forume, 1983), p. 193. 
133 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia 1977-1988: The Policy Imperatives of a 
Peripheral Asian State, p. 18; and see Iftikhar If. Malik, "The Pakistan-US Security Relationship: 
Testing Bilateralism, " Asian Survey Vol. XXX, No. 3 (3 March 1990), p. 288. 
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of Afghanistan, had unwittingly become an important factor affecting Moscow's policy 
in the area. 
Thus, from this perspective, the extraordinarily hostile gcostrategic conditions severely 
limited Pakistan's security options in order to assure its territorial integrity or even 
national survival. As Anthony Arnold argued in 1986, "the Soviet threat to Pakistan is 
in inverse proportion to the vigour and success of the Afghan resistance. As long as the 
Soviet is unable to turn Afghanistan into a firm and stable stepping stone, Pakistan will 
enjoy a measure of security. "135 Moreover, Pakistan was also essentially a pawn in a 
superpower game, a victim of its own weakness in a rivalry over which it had virtually 
no control. The superpower rivalry overshadowed Pakistan's regional rivalry with 
India and indeed magnified it by destabilising the regional arms balance, that is, by 
provoking and subsidising a dangerous and open-ended arms race in the region. In 
these circumstances, the regional rivalry was seriously exacerbated by the global 
strategic competition. The Soviet alliance with India and the US partnership with 
Pakistan stemmed from super power strategic expediency, not from the compulsions of 
regional actors. Thus, the dominant threat to Pakistan security was both international 
and regional. It stemmed from the gross inequality in power between Pakistan and 
India and the Soviet-backed Kabul regime. Moreover, the differences with both India 
and the Kabul Marxist regime over territory, ideology and strategic objectives, were 
essentially irreconcilable. 
134 Rodney W. Jones, "The Military and Security in Pakistan, " in Craig Baxter (ed. ).. Zia's Pakistan: 
Politics and Stability In a Frontline State (Lahore: Vanguard, 1985), p. 79. 13$ Anthony Arnold, "The Soviet Threat to Pakistan, " in Eliot and Pfaltzgraff (eds. )., The Red Army on 
Pakistan's Border: Policy Implications for the United States (Washington, D. C.: Pergamon- 
Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1986), pp. 46-47. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Pakistan's Response to the Growing Soviet Take-Over of Afghanistan 
We (Pakistanis and Afghans) are brothers. No power on earth can 
separate us. ' 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, 1948 
The main purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss the implications for 
Pakistan of Marxist rule in Afghanistan and subsequently of the Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan. This was a period of political turmoil and upheaval in 
South and Southwest Asia. Pakistan's leaders and policy makers felt threatened, not 
only because of Kabul's hostility with Pakistan but also because the presence of the 
Soviet military on the Pakistan border posed a serious and alarming security threat to 
the country. The chapter explains that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the architect of Afghan 
policy and General Zia -ul Haq successfully implemented Bhutto's policies to counter 
the Kabul-Soviet security challenge to Pakistan. The distinction is also helpful in 
understanding Pakistan's role in supporting the Afghan mujahideen and its efforts to 
play a role as a pivotal regional actor to contain communism. 
1. Bhutto's Afghan Policy 
Bhutto knew that Pakistan had one of the most complex security environments in the 
world. To its east was India, a state with vastly superior industrial resources and a 
much larger population base; to the west lay Afghanistan-never friendly and the only 
Muslim country with which Pakistan was unable to develop even formal neighbourly 
ties and from which it had experienced continuous hostility. Moreover, two of 
Pakistan's provinces had important populations with strong ethnic and tribal tics across 
the border in Afghanistan; even on the Indian frontier, a long standing dispute existed 
over the status of Jammu and Kashmir. In the circumstances, Pakistan was vulnerable 
and its strategic environment was marked by conditions of strategic asymmetry, 
dependence and ambivalence, all presenting major obstacles to Pakistan's policy 
Mohammad All Jinnah (Quaid-i-Azam) passed this comment during a visit to the Pak-Afghan border 
on 14 April 1948 and the same words are also written on one of the pillars of the Pak-Afghan border 
(Torkham) gate. See also Mohammad All Jinnah, Speeches and Statements (Islamabad: Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, 1968). 
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development. 2 At the same time, Pakistan was unstable domestically because the 
government was also incapable of mobilising its own people for the support of the 
country's security. It was thus the more vulnerable to its enemies. Furthermore, on the 
external front, Pakistan was facing malicious propaganda, disinformation campaigns 
for political subversion and other clandestine operations such as domestic disorder and 
violence, in particular ethnic violence. With growth in the amount and intensity of 
political dissidence and disaffection in the country, Pakistan's vulnerability with regard 
to destabilisation tactics had increased. In this situation, Bhutto adopted an aggressive 
policy towards Afghanistan and increased internal and external pressure for Afghan 
rulers to meet his conditions for settling disputes. 
Sardar Daoud seized power in Afghanistan in 1973, two years after Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto's government was established in Pakistan. He not only proceeded to revive the 
Pakhtunistan issue but also lent support to the nascent separatist movement that had 
just emerged in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan. In his first address to the nation 
on 17 July 1973, Daoud singled out Pakistan as the only country with which 
Afghanistan had differences. A few days later, in his first press conference, Daoud 
explained the Afghan-Pakistani differences and expressed the hope that, "in grasping 
the reality of the existence of an Afghan-Pakistan dispute with regard to the legitimate 
rights of the Pakhtuns and the Baluch people... Afghanistan and Pakistan would be able 
to find an amicable, peaceful and honourable solution to this problem"3 On August 
1973, the Afghan government celebrated "Pakhtunistan Day" in Kabul with a "strident 
display of support for "Pakhtun and Baluch brothers. "4 In November 1973, Kabul 
declared that "Afghanistan does not recognise the Durand Line as an official border 
line between the two countries since it separates almost 2.5 million Pakhtuns from 
Afghanistan"5 
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the architect of Afghan policy. He carefully 
evaluated the Pak-Afghan situation and tried to persuade Daoud to accept the Durand 
Line as the legitimate international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and to 
2 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia 1977-88: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral 
Asian State (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 16. 
Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account (Washington, D. C.: Pergamon- 
13rassey's International Defence Publishers, 1988), p. 107. 4 Anthony Arnold, Afghanistan's Two Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq (Stanford: Hoover 
Institute Press, 1983), p. 45. s Iiafizullah Emadi, State, Revolution and Superpower in Afghanistan (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 
72. 
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put pressure on the Kabul government to withdraw support for the separatist elements 
of Baluchistan and Pakhtun nationalists. In July 1973 Bhutto established an "Afghan 
Cell" in the Foreign Office to counter propaganda from Kabul, whose claims for a 
greater "Pukhtunistan" worried the Pakistanis. Bhutto's advisor, Major General (Rctd) 
Nasirullah Babar, 6 was the head of Afghan affairs. The Afghan Cell met regularly for 
the next four years, under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Bhutto and gave out 
policy guidelines. The Inspector General Frontier Constabulary and the Inter Services 
Intelligence (ISI) worked in concert to conduct intelligence missions inside 
Afghanistan. The IST kept communication channels open with the deposed king, Zahir 
Shah, who was in exile in Italy. 
Bhutto reacted with an enterprising set of border policies to mobilise the covert Afghan 
anti-government guerrilla force, drawn largely from Afghanistan's growing Islamic 
fundamentalist movement, to conduct military operations inside Afghanistan. General 
Babar found many Afghan Islamists who were useful as a counterweight to the pro- 
Indian and relatively pro-Soviet policies of Daoud's government brought from 
Afghanistan to Pakistan in October 1973. At that time, Gulbuddin Ilikmatyar, 7 who 
was facing criminal charges in Afghanistan as the result of his involvement in an 
incident between his group and the rival Burhanuddin Rabbanig group, fled to Pakistan 
and Islamabad provided shelter and assistance against the Afghan government 9 The 
Islamists, including Rabbani and Gulbuddin, did not accept King Zahir Shah and 
Daoud's regimes, notwithstanding the designation of their dynastic predecessors as 
Commander of the Faithful (Amir al-Muminin). The Islamists were intent on remaking 
Afghan society in the image of a better Islam. 1° 
The Islamists in Afghanistan organised a movement against Daoud's govcrnmcnt due 
to its pro-Communist policies. Its first centres were the Panjshcr Valley, Herat and 
6 Major General Nasirullah Babar was former Governor of the North West Frontier Province and 
inspector general of the Frontier Corps when the Afghan policy was formulated. General Babar was 
also appointed Special Assistant to Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 1988 and he was the 
founding father of the "Taliban" movement in Afghanistan. 7 Initially, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani originally formed a single political 
movement and both were president and secretary respectively. Rabbani, who had been educated at Cairo's Al-Azhar University and teaching Islamic studies at the 
University of Kabul in the 1960s. 9 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988 (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 300. 10 The clergy of Sunni Afghanistan have never played a dominant political role, as compared to those of 
Persian speaking Shi'a. The Islamists wanted to make Islam more a matter of preoccupation for the 
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Jalalabad. Pakistan gave full political, diplomatic and material support to the Afghan 
Islamists. Pakistan trained and armed the Islamists to exert short-term pressure but also 
began a more long-term programme that included building roads to the Afghan border- 
lands that later allowed Pakistan's military trucks to supply arms to the mujahideen. 11 
According to Nasirullah Babar: "We wanted a party through which we could influence 
events in Afghanistan. There had been some explosions in the NWFP of Pakistan. My 
advice to Bhutto was that Pakistan should take some countermeasures. "12 Bhutto's 
government, which saw the Islamists as a way of countering Daoud's pressure on the 
Pukhtunistan issue, provided military and financial assistance to counter the Kabul 
government's moves against Pakistan. Bhutto allowed General Nasirullah Babar to 
bring hundreds and thousands of Islamists for military training to counter Daoud and 
Marxist influence in Afghanistan. Babar integrated the Afghan Islamists with the ISI to 
counter the Afghan government and also provided aid for covert actions. In fact, 
Bhutto used the Pakhtun cross-border ethnic relationship to stabilise Pakistan's future 
security concerns because since the dismemberment of the country in 1971, the 
Pakistani leaders had perceived that further threats to Pakistan's territorial integrity 
would come via the Baluchis and Pakhtuns. 13 
In 1975, the Bhutto government kept in readiness near the Karmra (Punjab) and Kohat 
(NWFP) airbases a mujahideen-manned armed force for surprise guerrilla attacks 
against targets inside Afghanistan. According to General Babar, Pakistan trained 
mujahideen to attack Afghan military barracks and government buildings and police 
posts in the major areas of Afghanistan. All the major military operations were 
successful and disastrous for the Daoud government. 14 Moreover, Bhutto's government 
made Hikmatyar, the leading Pukhtun among the exiled Islamists, the "contact person" 
for Afghan Islamists seeking assistance. The Pakistan authorities thus elevated 
Hikmatyar to a de facto leadership position; his leadership becoming official when he 
broke away from Jamiat and founded Hizb-i-Islami. Pakistan, in response to Daoud's 
Afghan government and they wanted, at least in theory, to transcend the barriers of tribe and ethnic 
group. 
tý Henry Kamm, "Pakistanis Report Ordering Attacks by Afghan Rebels, " The New York Times (23 
April 1989), p. Al. 12 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia 1977-88, p. 31. 13 M. Emdad-ul Tiaq, Drugs in South Asia: From the opium Trade to the Present Day (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), p. 186. 14 General Babar's efforts to incite a popular uprising in the masses and to provoke mutiny in Afghan 
army were not successful. Some mujahideen were captured and executed by the Daoud government, 
but most returned to Pakistan. See Henry Kamm, "Pakistanis Report Ordering Attacks by Afghan 
Rebels, " The New York Times (23 April 1989), p. Al. 
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actions on Baluchistan, also supported a Hazara separatist group, called Tanzim-i-Nasl- 
i-Mughul (group of the New Mughul Generations). " Bhutto's government patronised 
the Islamist guerrillas more for political than ideological reasons. His government 
provided funds and equipment and imparted training to the exiles, who later emerged 
as very important and successful liberation fighters against Soviet forces. 
The Bhutto government's mobilisation of an Afghan resistance force was part of its 
efforts to accelerate the integration into Pakistan of its own Pakhtun tribal areas. For 
this purpose, Bhutto involved the federal and provincial governments in building roads, 
hospitals, and education institutions, extended voting rights and made sharp increases 
in government allocations for economic development. Bhutto took a personal interest 
in the developmental projects and himself paid a number of well-publicised visits to the 
tribal areas to reduce the tribesmen's dependency on Afghanistan. Bhutto also 
extended federal government rules to these areas and eliminated the traditional tribal 
autonomy. 16 Bhutto's hawkish policies were successful in pressurising the Afghan 
government and Robert Wirsing claims that "Bhutto's policies helped to stimulate 
Kabul's government toward accommodation. "17 Abdul Samad Ghaus (Deputy Foreign 
Minister of Afghanistan under Daoud) also indicated that "before coming to a 
compromise position, Kabul's involvement in the Baluch and Pakhtun areas of 
Pakistan was as flagrant as was alleged by the Islamabad government. " He writes that 
tribal leaders and representatives were continuous visitors to Kabul to seek help, 
guidance and material assistance. The Afghan government made clear to the tribal 
leaders that Afghanistan would support their stand for complete autonomy or 
independence. 18 The government of Afghanistan, however, totally failed to gain 
support from Islamic countries for the supposed rights of the Pakhtuns. Afghanistan's 
pro-Soviet policy was the main hurdle to securing political and economic support from 
the anti-Soviet Muslim countries who remained friendly towards Pakistan and 
antagonistic towards Afghanistan. 19 
IS See Inayatullah Baluch, "Afghanistan-Pushtunistan-Baluchistan, " Aussenpolitik, No. 31 (Third quarter 
1980), p. 300; and Inayatullah Baluch and Hans Frey, .. Pakistan and the Problems of Sub- 
Nationalism, " Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, No. 5 (Spring 1982), p. 67. 's Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia 1977-88, p. 31. 17 Ibid. 
Iý Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan, pp. 110-134. 19 Ibid., pp. 123-125; see also Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1985), p. 63. 
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Bhutto adopted a more harsh attitude and talked of possible war with Afghanistan20 and 
ultimately the Afghan government realised that de-escalation was desirable. Bhutto's 
government appeared to regard the unrest in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan as 
being to his advantage. Thus, it was Bhutto's aggressive policy which forced Daoud to 
adopt a flexible attitude with Pakistan and ultimately Daoud agreed to abandon the 
traditional Pakhtunistan claim and expressed willingness to accept the Durand Line. 21 
On 7-10 June 1976 Daoud invited Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to visit 
Afghanistan. President Daoud recognised the need to ease the tension with Pakistan for 
the well-being of the two countries and in the interest of regional stability. Daoud 
appealed to Bhutto to end Pakistani army operations in Baluchistan and to release 
regionalist opposition leaders. According to Abdul Samad Ghaus, Bhutto replied, "We 
in Pakistan have to be careful about the mood of our generals. But I am sure that in due 
time I will be able to get around this difficulty. "22 
In 1976 Daoud paid a five day visit to Pakistan. Bhutto used all his charm to enchant 
his honoured guest and both leaders discussed some serious matters. Hafeez Malik 
claimed that `Bhutto and Daoud made progress for the simultaneous reaffirmation of 
the Durand Line as an international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and 
the release of National Awami Party (ANP) leaders, including Abdul Wali Khan. 
23 As 
a gesture of goodwill toward Kabul, Pakistan allowed the shipment of wheat from 
India to Afghanistan in March 197724 Bhutto and Daoud's desire was never 
manifested in a firm agreement because the Marxists in Kabul opposed Daoud's 
rapprochement policy towards Pakistan and on the other hand, the Bhutto government 
was overthrown by General Zia ul-Haq in July 1977. However, Zia continued Bhutto's 
policy and took the initiative of establishing high level contact with Afghanistan. On 
10 October 1977 Zia arrived in Kabul for a two day "goodwill mission. " Daoud 
expressed the hope that the both countries would rise above the bitterness of the past 
and take the initiatives for a new era of peace and friendship. He also hoped that a way 
would be found to settle the problems with Pakistan on a fair and honourable basis. Zia 
20 Ibid. 
21 Daoud noted in 1974 that "we do not like [the plan's] emphasis on inviolability of frontiers. That will 
means accepting Pakistan's present frontiers, which are the doing of the British. " Henry S. Bradsher, 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, new and expanded ed., (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), 
p. 63 and see more details in IIafeez Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics 
u 
(London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 258-259. 
Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan, p. 130. 23 Ilafeez Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics, p. 258. 24 Ibid. 
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replied that pragmatism demanded the removal of the hurdles which had obstructed 
this path. 5 
2. Pakistan-Afghan Relations in the 1970s 
In the 1970s the Persian Gulf region was on the edge of crisis and profound transition. 
The Iranian revolution gathered momentum at the end of 1978 and, ultimately, Islamic 
forces overthrew the monarchy and their spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, 
successfully changed the structure of imperial Iran. The downfall of the Pahlavi 
dynasty removed from Pakistan's western flank a like-minded regime that had joined 
with Pakistan in the Western sponsored military alliance and that had directly provided 
assistance to Pakistan, both in its wars with India and to handle the domestic 
insurrection in Baluchistan in the late 1970s26 
The country's unenviable security predicament was the subject of robust debate among 
General Zia ul-Haq's colleagues, his policy makers and defence planners. Never before 
had Pakistan felt quite so isolated and so threatened at the same time. Defence 
planners, intellectuals, diplomats and bureaucratic establishments solemnly declared 
"national survival" to be the core problem of future planning. Pakistan felt threatened 
both from abroad and from within and the military government led by General Zia ul- 
Haq decided to play a vital role as an international actor to contain the ambitious 
designs of the Soviet Union and its allies (Afghanistan and India) and also to protect its 
privileged elites and the domestic status quo. 
Zia adopted Bhutto's hawkish policy towards Afghanistan which left no option for 
Daoud but to change the traditional Afghan stand on "Pakhtunistan" and the "Durand 
Line" and to agree to close the Baluch guerrilla camps in Afghan territory. 
27 At the 
invitation of Zia ul-Haq, President Daoud visited Pakistan from 5-8 March 1978. lie 
declared that "Afghanistan desired better ties with its Muslim neighbours, in its own 
u Ibid., pp. 302-309. 26 Most observers agreed that in the 1970s, during the Baluch tribal insurrection, the Soviet and Indian aid 
to the rebellious Baluch tribesmen amounted to little. See for details Shirin Tahir-Kheli, "Iran and 
Pakistan: Cooperation in an Area of Conflict, " Asian Survey, Vol. 17, No. 5 (May 1977), pp. 474- 
490; and Selig II. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan, " Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall 1978), p. 159. 27 Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account, p. 147; Marvin G. Weinbaum, 
Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 6; 
and Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, new and expanded ed. ( Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1985), p. 221. 
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national interest. " He also disclosed that "The emerging thaw between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan was not to the liking of' some countries. " I)aouc1 apprehended the risk of 
"this region being destahiIised, " adding, "our bilateral friendship is thus cif' mutual 
advantage. -28 During his visit to Lahore in I978, in a prepared SpCCCIº. I)aouci niadC the 
crucial point that "the security of Pakistan is the security of Afghanistan ""President 
Daoud congratulated Zia uI-I I, ({ liar taking a hold decision in relea,, ing the Pakhtun and 
Baluch leaders, Ile appreciated Pakistan's gesture and hoped that the leaders, now f'rcc, 
would play their part in the political Iifc of'their country.. difficult job had been Whole 
easier, he said, and it would assist the development uf'cordial mutual relations. (ieneral 
Zia thanked President I)aoud fier sharing his vice's, with which he agreed. I Ic was keen 
on reaching a final settlement to the mutual benefit oH)uth countries. 
General Zia arranged a banquet in the honour o1' President I)auud and invited 
prominent Pakistani politicians, including the freshly released political leaders: Khan 
Abdul Wall Khan, Ataullah Mengal, Khair 13akhsh M, ri and (. haus 13akhsh 13i1cºnjo. 
President I)aoud mixed with the guests freely and talked toi them in a ileasant manner. 
In his speech, Daoud noted with satistäction the opening of a new chapter of 
understanding and goodwill with Pakistan and stated that his talks "had proved 
extremely useful and productive. '' l3ctiorc his departure tir0111 Pakistan. ('resident 
I)aoud extended his hand tier a warm handshake and told (lcneral %ia: "Fltis is the hand 
of a Pakhtun and I promise to establish friendly relations with Pakistan on a firm and 
durable basis. In the past thirty years, we have taken a stance On an issue. (li\ e nºr it 
little time to mould public opinion in niv country to ct, tict a Change. I intend tu 
convene the Afghan Iowa 
. 
lirga ('Tribal (rand Asseinhlyl to take ;º decision Io 
normalise relations with Pakistan. "iý 
On the other hand, the close association of II)aýýuc1's regime with Pakistan ww as criticised 
by Marxists elements of' People's I)cniucratic Party of' Afghanistan (1'1)PA) which 
became a matter of concern tier Moscow. `' Moreover, the I)aoud regime's policy of 
mending fences with Pakistan was interrupted hý the Saar Revolution, which brought 
Ihid., p. 302. 
Sec Tull text 01' I)aºrud's speech in Pakistan limes (10 M; irrh I't7S): and sec also M siddliy \1'ahidi 
Wardak, "1": vcnts I c; uiing uh Io Ihr'OVirt In\; º, iom of AI ihanistan, " in I %%an Auder. on and Naar. 
I1atch l)upree (cd. )., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Natiunººlisºn (I ondon 1'uucr Publisher 19911), h. 
Asian Recorder (26 Mauch and I . April 107X), h. 1-121' 
Kh; tI Rf Nlahmu(1 : 1rit,, Working Willi '/in: Pakistan's I'oiser Politics 1977-I')88,1). 
101. 
Pra%da (') 1 ehru; uy 197S); KabulI'imcs (. 11 I\lar. h I't7s). and I)aºsn (IS April I'º'S) 
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the Marxists to power in Kabul in 1978. After this radical change of policy vis-a-vis 
Pakistan, the Communist coup of 1978 killed Daoud, destroyed his regime and adopted 
an extremely hostile attitude to Pakistan. The Moscow-backed Kabul Communist 
regime of the PDPA revived the issues of Pakhtunistan and the Durand Line. 33 Pakistan 
felt a great shock because the process of reconciliation was abruptly shattered. 
Moreover, the growing increase in the number of Soviet advisors in Afghanistan 
seemed bound to complicate relations between Kabul and Islamabad. General Zia, who 
had established personal relations with Daoud, was worried when he received news of 
trouble in Afghanistan. The news reported an armed coup against the government and 
the situation was unclear. General Zia was willing to help Daoud when the President 
made a request for assistance. Zia told General Arif, "I will not hesitate to provide help 
to Daoud but I have to wait his reply. s34 Later, news appeared that President Nur 
Mohammad Taraki, had replaced the assassinated Daoud and his family members. The 
pro-fundamentalist Zia-ul-Haq government in Pakistan and pro-Marxist government in 
Kabul were in sharp contrast. Noor Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin equally 
reiterated Afghanistan's commitment to the nationalist aspirations of the Pakhtun and 
the Baluchis in Pakistan. In an interview published in the Kabul Times, Foreign 
Minister Hafizullah Amin declared: 
We sincerely desire full friendship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The only difference which remains is the national issue of Pakhtun 
and the Baluchi people, which should be peacefully solved through 
friendly negotiations. S 
The Baluch and Pakhtun movements extended recognition to the Saur Revolution. 
Attempts to resolve the traditional dispute on the occasion of General Zia's post 
revolution visit to Afghanistan in 1978 failed. Afghanistan proceeded to revive the 
question of Baluch and Pakhtun autonomy at the 1978 session of the UN General 
33 Taraki at his first press conference on 6 May 1978 called Pakistan and Iran 'brothers' and then 
reiterated his government's dedication to Islam, the common religion of all three states. General Zia 
was impressed by this statement, recognised the PDPA's regime and assured Taraki that Pakistan 
regarded the Afghan revolution as an 'internal affair' of that country. Zia conveyed Pakistan's 
'sentiments of goodwill towards their Afghan brothers', and indicated that internationally recognised 
principles of peaceful co-existence formed the basis of bilateral relations. See more details in Ilafeez 
Malik, "Memorandum of Conversations with Mr. Shah Mohammad Dost, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of Afghanistan, 30 September 1981, " Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. V, 
No. 2 (Winter 1981), p. 72. 
Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia, p. 304. 35 Kabul Times (5 October 1978), p. 1. 
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Assembly. 36 In return, on 2 May 1978 the Afghan Cell was reactivated by the order of 
President Zia ul-Haq in the Foreign Office to counter Marxist propaganda. Zia was the 
head of the Afghan Cell and briefed the meetings about future plans. Frequent 
meetings of the cell were held, in which policy options were considered and taken 
about Afghanistan. Its task was to analyse the available information and suggest policy 
options. The meetings were invariably presided over by the President and were 
attended by the Governor of the NWFP, the Director of ISI, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, the Federal Interior Minister and concerned officials from the defence 
ministry. From January to March 1979, the Soviet government blamed Pakistan for the 
troubles in Afghanistan, and gave several warnings to the government of Pakistan 
about intervening in the conflict. 37 The Soviet leaders paid very serious attention to the 
understanding of the causal factors for Afghanistan's rapid denouement, and attributed 
blame primarily to Pakistan as an agent of hostile countries. They claimed that counter- 
revolutionaries had fled to Pakistan and were receiving political, financial and military 
aid and "support from imperialist forces. s38 In the last days of 1979, Amin contacted 
Zia ul-Haq and offered him a deal: acceptance of the Durand Line by Afghanistan as its 
international frontier, in return for an end to Pakistan's support for the Amin regime's 
enemies. Zia, however, rejected this offer. 39 
2-1. Pakistan's Security After the Soviet Invasion 
On the day when the first Soviet airborne and commando units landed at Kabul airport 
on December 1979, the Soviet threat to Pakistan's northern border emerged. There was 
evidence that after the military intervention in Afghanistan the Soviets would extend 
their influence and would be able to use Afghanistan as a base from which to 
destabilise Pakistan. Thus, the Soviet invasion presented Zia and his colleagues with 
Pakistan's most complicated and complex foreign policy problem, because the invasion 
increased Pakistan's enmity with the Soviet Union and its traditional Afghan 
adversary. On the other hand, the Afghan crisis placed the armed struggle of the 
superpowers on Pakistan's doorstep and its human impact and political consequences 
were more than devastating. 
36 Bhabani Sengupta, The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power (New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House, 1982), p. 142. 37 The New York Times (13 April 1979). 
3' IIafeez Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post Soviet Dynamics (London: Macmillan, 1994), P. 
262. 
39 See Raja Anwar, The Tragedy of Afghanistan (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 6-8 
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For Pakistan, the Soviet Union was an aggressive superpower, potentially willing to 
threaten Pakistan's security in the NWFP and Baluchistan. The lowest-level 
contingency that Pakistan faced as a consequence of the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan was the threat of Soviet-Afghan support to the insurgency and terrorism of 
extremist Pakhtuns or Baluchis against Pakistan. Many Pakistanis believed that their 
country would be the next target and Moscow would try to extend its influence beyond 
Afghanistan's borders. Pakistan's security came under enhanced threat. Its eastern 
border with India had seldom been tension-free and turmoil in Afghanistan made its 
western border also insecure. Rodney W. Jones described Pakistan as a "security 
deficit" state with inherent problems of defending itself militarily, should an outside 
attack be launched against it 4° The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed a security 
problem of almost insuperable proportions for strategic planners in Islamabad. It meant 
that the country recognised as a buffer between the Soviet state and South Asia for 
nearly a century had disappeared. Pakistan was now confronted with the prospect of 
having to defend a 1400 miles long frontier against a superpower with superior military 
capability. 41 There was a possibility of Soviet aggression against Pakistan and 
consequent Soviet domination in Pakistan that would enable the Soviets to break the 
"capitalist encirclement" of its southern flank, give it access to the open ocean, 
liquidate an ally of both the US and China at one stroke and complete the link in the 
chain of pro-Soviet countries surrounding China. 42 
From the Pakistani perspective, after the Soviet invasion, Pakistan was facing a real 
threat to its security from its communist neighbour Afghanistan. In fact, Pakistan 
suffered a serious security setback and felt isolated in the region and deprived of the 
support of the stable, conservative and well-equipped Shah of Iran regime which had 
committed itself to assist Pakistan in case the latter's security was in jeopardy. In 
addition, there was the problem of a weak economy and critical defence needs if 
40 See Emirate News (22 January 1980), p. 6; and Rodney W. Jones, "The Military and Security in 
Pakistan, " in Craig Baxter (ed. )., Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 78. ýý See The Times (31 December 1979), p. 1; see also Worbert Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Foreign 
Policy after Afghanistan", in Stephen P. Cohen, The Security of South Asia: American and Asian 
Perspectives (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), p. 61. 42 Anthony Arnold, "The Soviet Threat to Pakistan, " in Theodore L. Eliot and Robert L. Pfaltzgaff Jr 
(ed. )., The Red Army on Pakistan's Border: Policy Implication for the United States 
(Washington: Pergammon-Brassey's Ltd., 1986), pp. 12-13. 
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Pakistan was to meet the Soviet challenge with a degree of confidence. 43 This security 
situation confronting Pakistan was captured by the Pakistan Times in the following 
words: 
Firstly, a contiguous and non-aligned country has been over-run. 
Secondly, while a traditionally buffer state has disappeared, a 
superpower has emerged our next door neighbour. Viewed against the 
background of India's Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union to the 
total disregard of the subcontinent's integrity and security, the 
proximity is portentous. We are physically sandwiched» 
In this context, the military presence of a superpower in an adjoining state vitally 
affected Pakistan's national security interests. The US was also concerned about the 
possible consequences of the Soviet action on its security interests in the Persian Gulf 
region. Thus, the threats to Pakistan's geo-political and geo-strategic interests were, 
therefore, immediate and grave and found expression in its vigorous opposition to 
Soviet action. There was also the fear that India, as a Soviet proxy, would attack 
Pakistan with the objective of the destruction of Pakistan's armed forces or the seizure 
of a sizeable portion of its territory. Its political goal appeared to be the assertion of 
hegemony over South Asia and the achievement of dominant power status in the 
region. 5 There were chances that the Soviet Union could push together India and 
Afghanistan to mount a coordinated attack from the east and the west, with the purpose 
of dismembering Pakistan on ethnic lines. For this purpose, Moscow's aim was to 
cultivate insurgency and terrorism in the border provinces, achieve access to the sea 
and control Afghanistan's southern border, while India's goal was to undo partition 
once and for all. 46 As Peter Duncan, the Soviet expert on South Asian affairs remarked: 
India's hostility to Pakistan provided Moscow with a potential 
advantage. At times when the Soviet Union wished to put pressure on 
Pakistan to prevent it from aiding the Afghan resistance, it could hold 
out the threat of joint Soviet-Indian pressure on Pakistan on two 
fronts. However, difficult this would have been in practice, given 
India's jealous preservation of its independence, the threat of such 
43 Richard P. Cronin, "Pakistan's Capabilities to Meet the Soviet Threat From Afghanistan, " in Theodore 
L. Eliot, Jr and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr (ed. )., The Red Army on Pakistan's Border: Policy 
Implications for the US (Washington: Pergammon-Brassey's Ltd., 1986), p. 21. 
45 "Kabul and After, " (Editorial) Pakistan Times (25 February 1980), p. 4. 46 Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 
1986), p. 149. 46 Francis Fukuyama, The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report, Rand Report N- 1584RC (Santa 
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pressure may have been a factor constraining Pakistan's actions in 
relations to Afghanistan. 47 
On 12 February 1980, the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, warned Pakistan 
that it would jeopardise its sovereignty if it continued acting as a "springboard" for US 
interests 48 He told Zia, "you must understand that the Soviet Union will stand by 
Afghanistan. "49 The Soviet Union accused Pakistan of providing training and other 
facilities to the Afghan mujahideen and warned her of "unpredictable consequences! '" 
Moscow condemned Islamabad in harsh terms, indicating that Pakistan was "hurting 
Soviet interests in the region. 01 In June 1980, the Taraki regime initiated the 
celebration of Pakhtunistan Day, recognised the Baluchistan People's Liberation Front 
(BPLF) and declared that the Pakistani Baluch ethnic community constitued a separate 
nation. 52 The PDPA regime lost its credibility in Islamabad, brought to an end relations 
between Islamabad and Kabul and destroyed the hope of settlement of the long- 
standing border dispute. 53 Moreover, the rapid increase in Soviet assistance to the 
Kabul government and in the number of Soviet military advisors assigned to the 
Afghan armed forces deepened anxieties in the minds of Pakistan policy makers 
because the Marxist regime once again started to exploit the Pakhtunistan issue. 
From Pakistan's perspective, the Soviet seizures of the Wakhan Corridor in 1980 and 
the Indian move to the Siachen Glacier in northern Kashmir in 1984 were clear 
indications and practical evidence of the potential Indo-Sovict collaboration to 
dismember Pakistan. 54 The bigger danger Pakistan saw flowing from the Soviet 
invasion was a nibbling away in its tribal areas--an inflow of arms and money, 
particularly into Baluchistan-combined with "subversion of the mind. " President Zia 
also acknowledged that in Baluchistan, for example, "the ground was ripe for seeds of 
47 Peter J. S. Duncan, The Soviet Union and India (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
1989), p. 110. 4$ Pravda (12 February 1980); Dawn (13 February 1980); and Boston Globe (13 February 1980). 9 The Soviet News Agency Tass, (13 February 1980); The New York Times (14 February 1980); and 
also quoted in Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that 
Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 129. 30 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988, p. 315. 51 Ibid. 
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subversion, because of deprivation and lack of resources. " He perceived the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan as a great danger to Pakistan's overall geopolitical 
environment. 56 Pakistan was option-less and needed international material and moral 
support for the protection of Afghanistan's neutrality and to maintain its buffer status. 
2-2. Zia's Response to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 
Zia's and his colleagues took the decision to get involved in the war because they saw 
it as militarily and economically profitable to Pakistan. For this purpose, Zia followed 
in the foot-steps of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Afghan policy was a continuation of 
Bhutto's policy. He used Bhutto's government-established guerrilla training camps and 
supply routes into Afghanistan to help the Islamists against the Communist rcgime. 57 In 
general, Pakistan's conception of the Soviet threat differed very significantly from the 
conception of the United States. It was realised that the Afghanistan war was a gravely 
threatening development for Pakistan and could have "far-reaching negative 
consequences. s58 However, the policy makers saw the Afghan war as exclusively 
Pakistan's war, founded first and foremost on a prudent regard for its own security and 
thought that "strong resistance would benefit Pakistan. "59 The leaders accepted the 
costs and the risk of hosting millions of Afghan refugees and their heavily armed 
resistance groups on the soil of Pakistan. For this purpose, Pakistan successfully 
bargained with the United States for support and assistance for its Afghan policy and 
eventually the US gave tangible assurance of its commitment to the Afghan 
mujahideen and to Pakistan's own national security. Thus, Pakistan adopted an 
independent approach towards the Afghan war and this policy differed from that of 
Washington, which sometimes delayed humanitarian aid to the Afghan mujahideen 
because of Pakistan's full control over the strategy and planning of the war. 60 It 
established a separate command and control system for combat planning, overt 
operations and arms supply. At the same time, Pakistan's policy makers used their 
diplomatic skills to maintain at least the appearance of non-alignment and avoided 
unnecessary provocation of the Sovicts. 
55 The Economist (26 January 1980), p. 46. 4 Ibid. 
57 Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 221. D1 Ibid., p. 198. 
39 Ibid., p. 221. 
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The appearance of an unfriendly superpower at its doorstep created grave security 
concerns for the sovereignty of the country. In fact, many high-ranking military and 
foreign affairs officials privately told the US officials about Russia's expansionist 
ambitions. But the Carter Administration considered those alarms to be exaggerated, 
even though they were echoed by other regional leaders, notably in Egypt, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia and Oman. Whether out of genuine fear, or from a more cynical desire to 
exploit American fears, or most likely both, Zia repeatedly warned in the days and 
months after the Soviet invasion that in the absence of adequate aid and guarantees by 
the United States, Pakistan would accommodate itself to the new power equation in 
South Asia. 61 Interestingly, General Zia had kept President Carter informed about the 
serious situation in Afghanistan. Soon after the assassination of President Daoud, Zia 
wrote a letter to Carter conveying his deep concern to America about the danger in 
Afghanistan and its implications for the region. But the Carter administration dismissed 
Pakistan's apprehensions as overreaction. 2 In reality, since the 1978 Saur Revolution, 
Pakistani officials had been warning, in sometimes apocalyptic terms, that the Soviets 
were seeking hegemony in South Asia and were a direct threat to Pakistan and other 
states in the region. 63 Evidence from CIA Archives in the Tehran embassy proved 
Pakistan's anxiety and disclosed that the Carter administration had deliberately avoided 
reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan because Carter did not wish to disturb 
the detente process. 64 An article, "Secret From CIA, " claimed that the Afghanistan 
invasion might have been averted but it was low in the priorities of the Carter 
administration and only gained importance because domestic political pressures for a 
hard line against the Soviet Union were far stronger than the Carter's detente policy. 
The article noted that five months before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Moscow 
had used diplomatic contacts to convey its intentions to the United States to test its 
63 reaction. It also mentioned that the Carter administration did not react publicly to the 
60 David B. Ottaway, "Pakistan is Said to Delay US Aid to Afghan Rebels, " The Washington Post (7 
October 1986), p. Alb. 61 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, p. 317. 62 Ibid. 
63 Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 73-76; and see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome: llow to Live with Soviet Power (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982), pp. 18-20. a The archives of the CIA and the State Department documents held in the US Embassy in Tehran (Iran) 
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Ilamshahri (13 February and 24 March 1980); Iran-e-Varzeshi (8 July to 22 September 1980); and 
Tehran Times (4 March to 16 June 1980); and see Khalid Mahmud Aril, Working With Zia: 
Pakistan's Power Politics, p. 317. 63 Ibid. 
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Soviet military invasion and Washington's silence was presumably taken by Moscow 
as a sign that the US had accepted Afghanistan as part of Moscow's "legitimate" 
sphere of influence in the region. The soft US reaction was seen as a green signal for 
Soviet military action to prevent the breakdown of law and order in its client state. 66 
One senior military officer told an American friend after the Soviet invasion, "You see, 
this is what I have been telling you and now it's come true. You Americans do not 
seem to understand the world anymore. Next comes the Finlandisation of Pakistan, and 
subversion of our country by the Russians, but your people in Washington do not 
care. , 67 In January 1980 Zia told an American reporter, "If you live in the sea you have 
to learn to swim with the whales . "68 Four months 
later, he warned that Pakistan would 
adopt a position of non-alignment between the superpowers unless the US 
demonstrated that it was "genuinely committed" to blocking further expression in the 
area. The US Administration was subjected to withering criticism from Pakistani media 
and intellectuals for its soft and isolated policy. 69 
Domestically, Zia's government faced criticism for its hesitancy to deal with the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan. 70 The majority of the people supported Zia's Afghan 
policy because they disliked the Soviet Union's Godless ideology and its friendship 
with India. In this regard, the religious parties were at the forefront of the support for 
their Islamic coreligionists across the border. Many scholars and experts throughout the 
Afghan war viewed Zia's Afghan policy as convincing, purposeful and achievement 
oriented. 7' Moreover, senior Pakistani bureaucrats remarked that the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan was unprecedented, vastly increasing the threat to Pakistan, 
although hopes were also expressed that Pakistan might avoid involvement in 
66 See Globe (London) May 1988; and K. M. Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, p. 
317. 
67 Richard Nixon, The Real War, paperback, (New York. Warner Books, 1981), p. 12. 61 See Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan, p. 101; and Michael Howard, "Return to the Cold War?, " Foreign Affairs, No. 59 (America and the World, 1980), pp. 464-466. 69 The media and scholars criticised the US Administration's "wait and see" policy and perceived that 
America had compromised with the Soviet Union to keep out of the Afghan situation and Pakistan 
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superpower conflict. 72 Strategists agreed that the region was entering a period of 
turmoil and this situation would increase Pakistan's security problems. Some argued 
that after capturing Afghanistan, the Soviets would move to the Iranian port of Chah 
Bahar on the Arabian Sea and then around Pakistan's own Baluchistan coast of 
Gwader. 73 The US observers also invoked the frightening spectre of an aggressive and 
expansionist Soviet Union bent on extending its influence to the warm waters of the 
Persian Gulf region. 74 On the other hand, Pakistan wanted to become just strong 
enough to make the Soviet Union think twice about the cost of an invasion-and to 
hold them off long enough for its allies to come to its aid. 
In the circumstances, there were limited choices for Pakistan to formulate a pragmatic 
Afghan policy. General Zia assigned responsibility to five civilian and military 
officers: Agha Shahi (Foreign Minister), Lieutenant General (Rctd) Shahbzada Yaqub 
Khan, Qazi Hamyun (Ambassador in Afghanistan), Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdur 
Rahman (Director ISI), and General Khalid Mahmud Arif (Chief of Army Staff) to 
prepare a draft Afghan policy in consultation with other senior officials, intellectuals, 
scholars, academics, practitioners and strategists, highlighting the options available to 
Pakistan. 7s Four possibilities were identified: 
to counter the Soviet military adventurism by open and full support to the Afghan 
mujahideen, despite the risks involved; 
%º to accept the fait accompli, as Pakistan lacked the capacity to challenge the Soviet 
Union; 
72 In the 1980s Pakistan announced its four-point Afghan policy: (1) unconditional and immediate 
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; (2) the restoration of Afghanistan's independence and 
nonaligned status; (3) the right of government for their own choice; and (4) the creation of the 
necessary conditions to enable the Afghan refugees to return to their homes with honour and dignity. 
Pakistan's position was supported by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and on the 7'" 
plenary session of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in support of the Afghan people and demanded a permanent solution of the Afghanistan problem. 73 Francis Fukuyama, The Security of Pakistan: A Trip Report (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 
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to gain international support against the Soviet action in the United Nations, the 
Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement without aligning Pakistan on 
either side in the superpower balance; 
> to provide overt political, diplomatic and humanitarian support to the refugees with 
covert assistance to the mujahideen through United States military and economic 
76 aid. 
In fact, no option was cost-free. Meanwhile, the situation in Afghanistan was becoming 
worse day by day, and the battle around the borders had already begun. Some policy 
makers considered that if the Soviet Union succeeded in consolidating its control over 
Afghanistan, it would put itself into a perfect position from which to threaten 
Pakistan's vital interests. There was a chance that India and the Soviet Union would 
use Afghanistan as a base to destabilise Pakistan. It was perceived that this situation 
would give the Soviets total dominance over the maritime approaches to Karachi and 
Gwader (Baluchistan). 
The doves and anti-American elements (nationalists and pro-Moscow Communists) in 
Pakistan argued that it was dangerous for Pakistan to risk its own security for the sake 
of America, or even a Muslim country. They argued that any type of reaction from 
Pakistan would provoke the Soviet Union and its allies, Afghanistan and India, to 
attack Pakistan. They also argued that the United States was an unreliable friend 
because it had done nothing for Pakistan in the past and always provided strategic 
advantages to India. These were sound arguments which it was difficult to ignore, but 
nor was it possible to escape the realisation that the danger posed to Pakistan's national 
security could not be averted by a policy of appeasement. 
Pakistan refused to accept the inevitability of the emerging Afghan situation. The 
doves' approach of "wait and see" seemed dangerous and likely to damage the 
country's vital interest. On the other hand, any mistake could transcend territorial 
frontiers and engulf Pakistan. Moreover, it was unethical to acquiesce in an unjust and 
76 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zla: Pakistan's Power Politics, p. 314; and we Agha Shahi, 
Pakistan's Security and Foreign Policy (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1988), p. 30. 
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unprincipled action. The option of seeking diplomatic support from the international 
community and the United Nations without alignment with the great powers seemed 
attractive, but was thought to be not enough to prevent Soviet pressure. Thus, hawks in 
Pakistan suggested that Pakistan must treat the Soviet invasion not as a peripheral 
conflict in a faraway place but as a crucial battle in the competition with Moscow. This 
was the best available chance for Pakistan to meet the emerging geopolitical 
environment of the region. Agha Shahi claimed that: 
The emotional urge to demonstrate Islamic solidarity in full measure 
had to be restrained as a military solution to the problem was out of 
the question. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces lay in mobilising the 
force of international public opinion and conccrting political and 
diplomatic pressure against the Soviet military intervention. It was not 
possible without the constructive help of the supcrpower which was 
committed to prevent the spread of communism. 7 
As a matter of fact, the last option was Pakistan's ultimate choice and the best way to 
serve its foreign policy interests, because neither the Muslim countries nor China were 
in a position to provide a full guarantee of its security and protection. The only hope 
left for Pakistan was the United States. Although relations between the US and 
Pakistan were at first not very satisfactory, later, the Pakistani leadership formed a 
strong partnership with the Reagan administration which demonstrated its commitment 
by vastly expanding its economic and military assistance to Pakistan. Zia consistently 
maintained this option as a successful instrument of diplomacy to counter Soviet 
pressure. His government exploited Pakistan's geopolitical significance and decided 
that it was in the interest of Pakistan to gain benefits from Afghan crisis. Zia became an 
international statesman as he led Pakistan from diplomatic isolation to the international 
arena. Zia expressed Pakistan's "gravest concern" over the Soviet intervention and he 
was quoted in early 1980 in remarkably direct terms: 
If Pakistan cannot defend itself, then Pakistan has no bloody right to 
exist. Short of getting foreign troops on Pakistani soil, the allies and 
friends of Pakistan must help us to stand on our own feet, 
economically and militarily. 78 
Ibid., pp. 50-51. 71 The Economist (26 January 1980), p. 45. 
89 
The Pakistani leader was quoted elsewhere as saying that he viewed the invasion as a 
"direct threat" to the security of Pakistan and others in the region and as "part of a 
grand Soviet design to establish hegemony in South Asia. i79 Such fears, which the 
Pakistanis had been expressing for some time, gained credibility and engendered a 
newly sympathetic American response after fears for Pakistan's security were 
deepened by the invasion of Afghanistan, which seemed to give retrospective credence 
to the litany of alarums that had been issuing from Islamabad. Moreover, Pakistan was 
not in a position to oppose the Soviet Union single-handedly because of its limited 
capabilities and resources. Pakistan found itself in a state of relative isolation and 
therefore, was dependent on both the US and China to meet the challenge. The fear of 
provoking the Soviet Union prevented the decision-makers in Pakistan from 
undertaking any action unilaterally that would attract reprisals. Pakistan was alone 
successful in mobilising the support of the international community. At the sixth 
emergency special session of the UN General Assembly on 11 January 1980, Pakistan 
urged the world body to issue a unanimous call for "the immediate, unconditional and 
total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan. "" The resolution indicting the 
Soviet Union was passed by an overwhelming majority of the member states. Pakistan 
also used its credentials as an Islamic state to gain support from the Muslim world. 
Pakistan scored a remarkable victory at the extraordinary session of the foreign 
ministers of thirty-seven Islamic countries held at Islamabad in January 1980. Zia -ul 
Ilaq urged the Islamic countries to send an "unequivocal message to the Soviet Union 
conveying the grave concern of the Islamic world at the presence of the Soviet troops 
in Afghanistan and call on it to reverse the course of its military invasion. " He also 
suggested that the Muslim Ummah must devise ways and means for "collective 
defence" of the Muslim nations. 81 Pakistan was successful in transforming Afghanistan 
into a pan-Islamic issue and skilfully used its strength in the Muslim countries to put 
pressure on the Soviet Union. President Zia highlighted the gravity of the situation for 
the entire region. He stated: 
It is not a regional matter. It is now a global problem. The Soviet 
Union is a superpower and to any action or reaction of a superpower 
there must be a global response. 82 
'9 Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome, p. 19. 10 See Pakistan Times (14 January 1980), p. 5. 11 Pakistan Times (28 January 1980), p. 1. 12 The Hindu (7 February 1980), p. I. 
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2-3. The Islamic Factor 
Pakistan played the Islamic card to counter the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and 
viewed its occupation of Afghanistan as an ideological confrontation between 
resurgent Islam and a Godless creed. The Zia government described the Soviet action 
as being "to crush the Muslim rebels, who stood unbent in defiance of the Communist 
polity. "83 Thus, the Afghan crisis was juxtaposed within the larger context of an attack 
on the Islamic Ummah. Islam was the issue and the fear of an Islamic revolt in the 
republics of the Soviet Central Asia bordering Afghanistan was widely argued to be the 
motivating force behind the Soviet intervention. The Islamic underpinnings of 
Pakistani national identity were evident in its assistance to the mujahideen groups. 
Their anti-Marxist ideological orientation and adherence to Islam attracted the support 
and sympathy of Zia's government. Peshawar based mujahideen groups in Pakistan 
were the largest and were granted recognition by the government of Pakistan. 84 In fact, 
the hospitality extended to the Afghan refugees was also defined in terms of Islamic 
brotherhood. Pakistan was duty bound to extend shelter and support to the masses 
fleeing persecution for their stand against communism. Pakistan also saw the 
imposition of communism as an assault on Afghanistan's Islamic creed and the elites 
of Pakistan feared that if the Soviets succeeded in Afghanistan, the next target would 
be Pakistan. Referring to the question of the Palestine, Afghanistan and Somalia- 
Ethiopia disputes, President Zia asked, "why was it that all these disputes involved 
Muslim countries? "85 
2-4. Violation of the Non-Alignment Principle 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a total violation of the latter's non-aligned and 
independent status. For Pakistan, the Soviet military occupation in Afghanistan was 
tantamount to the absorption of a small, defenceless and non-aligned country by a great 
power. Soviet military adventurism was considered a violation of the norms of peaceful 
co-existence and the principle of sovereignty of states and non-interference in their 
13 Z. A. Suleri, "Islam is the Issue, " Pakistan Times (26 January 1980), p. 4; and sec also Martin 
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internal affairs integral to non-alignment. 86 In refuting the Soviet argument that the 
action was justified because it could not allow Afghanistan to be turned into a beach- 
head for aggression against itself, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Agha Shahi, stated: 
On this pretext any country, even the most exemplary of non-aligned 
nations, could become a victim of armed intervention from a powerful 
neighbour. What confidence can be placed by the non-aligned world 
in assurance by great powers to respect their sovereignty, national 
independence and territorial integrity and to eschew aggression, 
military invasion and armed intervention in the pursuit of their 
competition and rivalry for spheres of influence and strategic gains? 87 
The principle of non-alignment was used as an instrument against the Soviet military 
action and to justify Pakistan's opposition to the Soviet invasion. Afghanistan had not 
only been outside the Soviet bloc but had maintained its non-aligned credentials, 
despite its close relations with the Soviet Union. In this circumstance, Pakistan felt 
compelled to protest, not only as a matter of principle but out of concern for its 
immediate national interests. Pakistan felt threatened by the Soviet invasion and this 
threat was operationalised with respect to its geo-strategic interests and matters of 
domestic security. Thus, for Pakistan, the Soviet action was a question not only of 
external threat but of its vulnerability to attempts at destabilisation from within, that 
were taken into account at the time of crisis initiation. The unavoidable burden 
imposed by the Afghan refugees magnified the threat factor propelling Pakistan 
towards a position of unremitting opposition. Pakistan exploited the Islamic dimension 
of the issue and non-alignment as an instrument to bolster its position and to contain 
the Soviet military action. 
3. Zia's Support to Afghan Mujahideen 
Zia's government decided to take an active role to counter the Soviet military invasion 
of Afghanistan. The regime's actions seem to have been motivated increasingly by 
concern for the motives of Moscow. Before the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan had never 
been capable of putting the Durand Line in serious jeopardy but the Soviet military 
adventurism showed its expansionist ambitions and Pakistan's dispute with 
Afghanistan immediately turned into a major security threat to its territorial 
16 A. W. Singharn and S. Ilune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments (London: Zed Books Ltd, 
1986), pp. 14-15. 87 Statement by Agha Shahi before the General Assembly, Pakistan Times (14 January 1980). p. 4. 
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sovereignty. The Soviet threat to Pakistan clearly jeopardised not only Western but also 
Pakistani interests in the Gulf region. 
Initially, Pakistan decided to counter the Soviet threat by its own limited resources and 
it provided modest levels of covert assistance to the mujahideen resistance movement 
to fight against the Communist regime in Afghanistan. For this purpose, Zia's regime 
had to exert pressure without attracting direct military action against itself. Pakistan 
provided sanctuaries to Afghan mujahideen at the risk of possible Soviet retaliation. 
Later, Pakistan served as a pipeline for arms to the Afghan mujahideen groups 
operating inside Afghanistan. 88 Pakistan's clandestine aid to the mujahideen eventually 
grew so massive that it became virtually impossible to conceal. 89 The ISI not only 
served as the conduit for arms to mujahideen groups but also operated training camps, 
provided logistical support and orchestrated the Afghan war. It provided unrestricted 
access to the refugee camps for recruitment and almost complete freedom of movement 
across the international border. In this way, Pakistan was potentially able to transform 
its reputation from international rogue to "Good Samaritan. "90 The mujahideen served 
as the instrument of Pakistan's confrontational strategy against the Soviet Union and 
the Kabul regime. Moreover, Afghan mujahideen groups enjoyed intensified covert 
material and moral assistance from Pakistan, to continue the insurgency in 
Afghanistan. 
Zia ul"Haq successfully mobiliscd the international community against the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and showed willingness to act as the principal conduit for arms 
supplies from Egypt, Israel, China, Britain and the United States to the muJahidccn 91 
Initially, the CIA established its biggest facilities in Egypt for Afghan rebels and most 
of the weapons to the Afghan resistance flowed through Cairo. Egypt was a key 
supplier, with Pakistan as the principal conduit. This connection was revealed when 
" Mahanaz Z. Isaphani, Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecuirty (London: Prassey's Ltd., 1989), pp. 74-76. 10 The Soviets claimed that Islamabad was the backbone of the Afghan rebels and providing military 
support to them. Pakistan denied those charges but continued its help for the guerrilla struggle till the 
Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. See Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under 
Zia 1977-1988, p. 54. 90 The term "Good Samaritan" stands today as a symbol of the great community spirit of Knox County 
citizens. It is a living tribute to the efforts of countless men and women who, through the years, have 
given of themselves for relief of human suffering. Thus, Good Samaritan Hospital first opened its 
doors in February 1908, to humble beginnings as a 25-bed facility. It is now considered to be a well 
respected, regional referral medical complex with an operating complement of over 260 beds, serving 
southwestern Indiana and southeastern Illinois in the United States. 
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President Anwar Sadat [shortly before his death 6 October 1981] made known to a 
foreign correspondent that Egypt was funnelling Soviet type light weapons by way of 
Pakistan to aid the mujahideen and also provided training to thousands Afghan 
mujahideen in Cairo and Aswan military academies in the use of Soviet weapons 92 
The anti-Soviet-Kabul forces operations were under the command of Lieutenant 
General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan (Director General of the ISI) who was the right 
hand of Zia ul-Haq and was the key figure in the formulation of the country's Afghan 
policy. 93 The ISI acquired vast new powers from its role in funnelling as much as $2.5 
billion worth of US arms and equipment to the Afghan mujahideen to use against 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The CIA transported weapons to Pakistan, mostly by sea 
to the port of Karachi and then the ISI loaded the cargo onto heavily guarded trains, 
which carried it to Islamabad, Peshawar and the border town of Quetta. Peshawar, the 
provincial capital of Pakistan's NWFP was the principal conduit for external weapons, 
especially small arms and ammunition. Once the weapons had arrived in Pakistan, the 
ISI took custody. It transported most of the containers to warehouses near Rawalpindi 
(Ojhri camp, the headquarter of the ISI's Afghanistan unit); others went to the areas 
which were near to Afghanistan border. From there, the weapons were trucked to 
depots controlled by mujahideen groups in the border region. The ISI established 
"more than 100 depots" for weapons in Afghanistan and Pakistan and used "more than 
two hundred different routes" to supply weapons to the mujahideen groups-94 The CIA 
paid for these transport expenses through monthly deposits into special accounts in 
Pakistan. Thus, most of the weapons were distributed to the Afghan mi Jahldecn 
through the ISI and they also provided transport facilities to supply arms to the relevant 
places. The ISI formed links with private businessmen among both Afghans and 
Pakistani Pakhtuns for the distribution of weapons to Afghan rebels through the tribal 
91 See John G. Merriam, "Arms shipments to the Afghan Resistance, " in Grant M. Farr and John G. 
Merriam (eds. )., Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival (Boulder. Westview, 1987), pp. 71- 
101. 
92 The United States, UK, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and China were the potential suppliers of 
military assistance to Afghan mujahideen. See Milton Leitenberg, "United States Foreign Policy and 
the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, " Arms Control (December 1986), p. 280. 93 Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rahman Khan, in 1987 appointed Chairman of the Joint Chief Staff 
Committee, was among those who were killed with Zia in the crash of the C-130 aircraft in August 
1988. 
Izvestlya (4 October 1984), p. 54, in FBIS/SU (9 October 1985), pp. DI-3; Le Monde (11 May 1985), 
p. 5, in FBIS/SA (15 May 1985), p. C2; and see Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union, new and expanded ed., (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), p. 277. 
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territories. 95 The ISI also set percentage allocations for each party and approximately 
80 percent of the weapons were sent to the parties for distribution to the commanders. 
The rest continued to go directly to the commandos for special operations determined 
by the ISI or as rewards for participating in training, but these weapons still counted 
towards the party's total allocation. However, most of the weapons were distributed to 
the mujahideen groups on the basis of their performance in Afghanistan. 
In 1981 and 1982, General Akhtar and William Casey, the Director of the CIA, 
exchanged visits, approved the psychological warfare plans against the Soviet Union 
and established a direct "hotline" link between the CIA and the ISI to share 
information and intelligence data on the Soviet activities in Afghanistan. 
96 In this 
regard, General Zia set the policy guidelines and General Akhtar did the ground work. 
The CIA also provided technical and operational training to the ISI personals to 
effectively deal with the Afghan war. 97 Both the CIA and the ISI worked together 
closely on operational, logistical, intelligence and training in weapons for the 
insurgents and on coordinating Chinese, Saudi Arabian, Egyptian, Libyan and Kuwaiti 
aid 98 However, the CIA handed over management and lodging of covert programmes 
to the ISI to provide military support to the Afghan mujahideen. The resistance was 
divided into hundreds of groups, all of which were under the supervision of the ISI 
military command. 
During 1982-83, a KH-11 CIA spy satellite was diverted from its regular orbit to gather 
more intelligence on Afghanistan. The satellite intelligence came weekly, to keep the 
ISI aware of Soviet manoeuvres and operations. At the same time, other spy satellites 
had their gaze redirected as the US worldwide net of electronic intelligence was 
collectively shifted to gather information relevant to the Afghan war. The National 
Security Agency (NSA) was recasting its electronic eavesdropping assets to 
95 The transport of weapons was extremely expensive; in 1986 it cost $15-20 per kilogram to move 
supplies from Pakistan to north Afghanistan, amounting to about $1,100 for one mortar or $65 for one 
bomb. The total delivery costs ran to $1.5 million per month all these expenses were paid by the 
United States CIA and Saudi Red Crescent, both of which maintained offices near to the Pak-Afghan 
border area. 
Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics, p. 319. 97 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 152; The New York 
Times (25 & 27 November 1984), p. 1OA and 7A. 
See Leslie 11. Gelb, "US Aides Put 85 Arms supplies to Afghan Rebels at 280 million", The New York 
Times (27 November 1984); and Bob Woodward & Caries R. Babcock, "US Aid to Afghan 
Musgrooms: Questions Increase With Size of Covert Aid Plan, " The Washington Post (13 January 
1985). 
95 
concentrate for the first time on Afghanistan and Soviet Central Asia-99 The NSA 
technicians were monitoring military aircraft communications all around air bases in 
the Soviet Union. 1°° The NSA and the CIA supplied the ISI and the mujahideen with 
an array of advanced burst communicators-virtually impossible for the Soviet army to 
intercept. This new equipment helped greatly in the coordination of resistance 
operations. Moreover, the CIA deployed high powered electronic radar systems in 
Peshawar, Chitral (NWFP), Chagai and Quetta (Baluchistan) to monitor the Soviet 
activities inside Afghanistan. 1°' In addition, they used surveillance aircraft which were 
flown by American pilots to protect Pakistani airspace and to watch the Soviets' moves 
in the region. At the same time, the KGB planned to counter the US intelligence and 
strategic defence satellite system in Pakistan. For this purpose, the Soviets rapidly 
deployed SS-20 (Scud missiles), which have a range of 3,000 miles. These were 
stationed in underground missile bases in the strategic Wakhan Corridor. 102 This 
northeastern finger of Afghan territory was a few miles from the Karakoram highway 
connecting Pakistan and China. According to Western strategists, it was possible that 
the Soviets would attack Pakistan to destroy Afghan mujahideen bases and cut off the 
Karakoram highway, which was wide enough for heavy tank traffic. 
103 In the 
circumstances, Pakistan felt vulnerable to a Soviet missile threat. Thus, it became 
imperative for Pakistan's defence planners to activate openly the American strategic 
connection. Zia's government made an "urgent request for American military 
protection" and the US provided Airborne Early Warning Systems to Pakistan which 
helped it combat intrusions into its territory. The Americans also deployed some 
medium range nuclear bombers, ground troops and aircraft carriers104 supported from 
an American base at Mekran and Gwadar (Baluchistan) to enhance American 
capabilities against the Soviet Union. 105 The American military presence in Pakistan 
99 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union, p. 230. 100 Ibid., p. 231. 10' Washington Post (5 July 1989). 
102 Christina Dameyer, "The Myth of a Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, " Middle East Insight 
103 
(January/February 1988), pp. 38-39. 
Ibid. 
104 Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan: Anatomy of a Soviet Failure, " The National Interest No. 2 
(Summer 1988), pp. 102-109; and see Herbert L. Sawyer, Soviet Perception of the Oil Factor In US 
Foreign Policy: The Middle East Persian Gulf Region (Boulder. Westview Press, 1983), pp. 78.83. pos The Mekran coast holds a historical strategic position as the most direct route between the Perisan 
Gulf and the Indian ocean. Towards the beginning of the 16th century the Portuguese found their way 
to India via the coast. It was not until the 19th century, however, that the British got interested in this 
area, during the time of the First Afghan War in 1838. An expedition was sent into the area to pave 
the way for the building of the Indo-European telegraph line, which passed through Makran. On its 
completion in 1863, Major Goldsmith was posted to Gwadar as Assistant Political Agent. In 1872 a 
firm boundary between Persia and British Baluchistan was established and Makran became a part of 
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%%as sharply criticised by the SoVict l! niun, whose spokesman accusal the t'nitrd 
States of' socking to replace Iran with Pakistan as America's principal regional 
surrogate. 'I'hc Soviets expressed alarm over and warned against ctt'orts by the t Wiled 
States to acquire air facilities and ultimately to deploy medium range nuclear bombers 
and ground forces in Pakistan. 106 
During the Afghan war, Zia allowed the ('IA to f'unncl glowing anurunts of para- 
military support to the Atghanistan rebels through Pakistan. President Zia went out of 
his way to emphasise the importance ofI the Afghan ti'eeduni fighters to Pakistan',, mkn 
security and said: "Today it is Afghanistan, but tomorrow it may he Pakistan. They are 
buying time. for Pakistan. '"' " Zia allowed the ('IA ter build their clandestine station in 
Islamabad, which was one of' the biggest in the worltl. 
1" Zia had acquired I)OWC t'ul 
leverage in his dealing with the l Jnitcri States by agreeing in 1982 to permit the 
installation of (IS electronic monitoring facilities in northern border areas adjacent to 
Soviet Central Asian missile testing and anti-satellite launch sites. The ('IA also 
provided technical services and specialists fier the protection of Zia and his closest 
advisers. Agency officials were brought intro Islamabad to strengthen security and 
assess the hrucc(lurrs beint! used ter protect Zia. I"" I)uring 1984-1985, when the So tet 
army was becoming stronger against the At'ghan nnujalriclet ii. William Casey (('IA 
I)ircctºrr) asked Zia ter allow the ISI to use regular army soldiers to fight the war against 
the Soviet I )nion in Atghanistan. This was an extraordinarily shrewd move. as the ISI 
used more than 25,000 Pakistan army Soldiers to stell the Continual ad anrr (, t' the 
Soviet-Kabul tierces in At'ghanistan and to protect the nrnja/rrc/t" l sanctuarir' and 
targets inside Pakistan. ' Pakistan's infantry, tank, armoured unit, and SS( 
commandos carried out many military operations in the mountainous terrain of' 
Afghanistan to counter the Soviet moves against the mujuhich't'n. 
Ill As Henry Bradshcr 
mcnticrncdl, "special units ref' the Pakistani army had conducted operations inter 
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Afghanistan, and that in one case on 25 July 1984 a forty-man commando unit crossed 
the border to carry out sabotage and terrorist activities and provided assistance to the 
Afghan mujahideen. 112 In fact, it would not have been possible for the m1 jahidecn 
alone to beat the Soviet-Kabul forces and direct involvement by Pakistan's armed 
forces was an essential factor which gave confidence to the mujahideen. Thus, the 
Pakistan army improved the mujahideen's position against the Soviet military units and 
the mujahideen conducted successful guerrilla operations against Soviet and Afghan 
forces. ' 13 Although the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, warned Zia not to use 
Pakistani forces and not to allow the mujahideen sanctuary inside Pakistan, Zia's 
government remained steadfast in its support of the Afghan resistance forces. ' 14 They 
scored impressive victories throughout Afghanistan, ambushing enemy posts, attacking 
strategic positions, cutting off communication lines and blowing up ammunition 
dumps. Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, continued under repeated rocket fire, while 
large swathes of territory in the northern and the eastern part were controlled by the 
mujahideen. Prior to the Geneva Accords, speaking of the mujahideen role in the 
Afghan war, President Zia gave an assessment of the reasons behind the Soviet 
withdrawal and said: 
I believe it is getting very expensive for them, for given the loss of 
human lives and the losses among Soviet troops, we can say that the 
cost has become extraordinarily high. ' 5 
111 See Pravda (18 June 1984); Washington Post (7 August 1985); and LeMonde (23 November 1986). 112 Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 277; and Izvestlya (19 February 1985), 
quoted by Tass (19 February 1985); and Krasnaya Zvezda (28 November 1984), p. 3 in FBIS/SU (4 
December 1984), pp. D3-5. Its The Soviet sources confirmed that, indirectly, Pakistan's ground forces participated in the Afghan war 
to help the rebels and to prevent the Soviet advance. During the task they wore Afghan dress. The 
Soviets officials claim that Pakistani forces operated at night and the rebels took over position during 
the day time. The KGB's Directorate, throughout the war, gave its agents the task of catching 
Pakistani soldiers but it was difficult at midnight in the mountains. See Izvestiya (19 February 1985); 
Tass (19 February 1985); Krasnaya Zvezda (28 November 1984), p. 3, in FB1S/SU (4 December 
1984), pp. D3-5; Moscow Radio (24 February 1985), in FBIS/SU (25 February 1985), p. CC7. For an 
interview with Col. Mohammad Rahim (7'h Afghan Army Division) confirmed that Pakistan's ground 
and air force were helping the Afghan mujahideen; Maulvi Mohammad Siddiqullah (Ilizb-i-Islami 
(llakmatyar Group - Commander of Jalalabad), Peshawar on 11-12 April 2000; Allaladin (Jamiat-i- Islami -Rabbani Group -Commander of Ilerat); and see "Pakistan Army and AfghanWar, " 
Gulbudin 
Ilekmatyar interview in Indian Express (13 August 1991); Kabul Radio (7 March 1984); Toss (18 
August 1983); and Komsomolaya Pravda (26 February 1984). 114 Melinda Liu, "A Time of Terror: Kabul's Campaign to Crush the Afghan Resistance takes a toll on 
Pakistan, " Newsweek (13 April 1985), pp. 9-11. 11s Zia ul-IIaq on Afghan "Interim Government, " Mainz ZDF Television Network, (28 December 1987), 
reported in FBIS-NES"87-249, (29 December 1987), p. 63. 
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Zia's government allowed the US to use Pakistan Air Force facilities in Karachi and 
Quetta for US military intelligence aircraft engaged in submarine surveillance in the 
Gulf and the Indian Ocean, a theatre incidental to rebel requirements in the Afghan 
conflict. The regular use of Karachi's Mauripur airbase by P3 Orion aircraft, disclosed 
in 1986, was the first access allowed to the US military since Gary Powers' U2 spy 
plane was shot down over the Soviet Union after takeoff from Peshawar in 1962. 
According to the New York Times, the CIA provided technical services and specialists 
to train Pakistani armed forces personnel to use sensitive military instruments including 
the best automatic weapons, handguns, high-tech night vision equipment, advanced 
communication equipment, advanced techniques in perimeter defence of important 
places and intelligence services. 116 According to the Economist, the US assistance to 
the Afghanistan resistance increased from $75 million in 1983 to $470 million annually 
in 1986, and totalled about $947 million in these four years. 117 The Washington Post 
estimated that the US and Saudi Arabia ploughed $500 million a year, a total of $3.5 
billion, into the Afghan resistance between 1982-1989118 and about 65,000 tonnes of 
weapons were delivered to the ISI for operations against the Soviet Union. 119 
It is also interesting to note that during the Afghan war, around 125,000 volunteers 
from Arab and Muslim countries came to Pakistan for the fight against the Soviet 
forces. The Muslim Relief Agency based on the Islamic Development Fund (IDF) 
provided 25,000 Arab volunteers for the holy war against the Soviet Union. 120 All 
volunteers obtained training in Pakistani military camps. Some of these were 
established by Bhutto during 1974-76 in Kohat, Bunno and Waziristan but after 1977, 
Zia's government established more camps in different areas of Pakistan. 121 According 
to Henry Bradsher, "a network of camps inside the Pakistani frontier trained 
guerrillas, "122 where Pakistani soldiers were involved in the military training of 
116 "Covert Military Aid for Afghan Fighters, " The New York Times (3 May 1985), p. Al; Las Angles 
Times (22 October 1987); and Pravda (18 July 1987). 117 The Economist, "Foreign Report, " (London: 13 November 1986); and see William D. Harting. And 
Weapons for All (New York: IIarper Collins Publishers, 1994). p. 212. its Washington Post (21 December 1987 and 17 September 1990). 119 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 116. 120 Fazal-i-Subhan, "Muslims Volunteers for Afghan War, " Gulf News (24 May 1984); Ilasham Abdul 
Ilasam, "I [oily War for Islam, " AI-Jazzera (17 June 1984); Okaz (13 September 1985); and (I:. V. 
Krishnaswamy, "Paying for the Long Neglect, " The Ifind u (12 February 2000), p. 5. 
121 In 1981 Pakistani and foreign instructors tanned around 10,000 mujahideen. See Pravda (28 August 
1980); Moscow Times (13 October 1981); and The New York Times (24 January 1981). 122 Henry S. I3radsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 221. 
qq 
Afghans and were sent across the male of bonirr trails lo light inside Atghanistan. ''' 
In early 10x(1, the Washington /'us published an eyewitness report that at least 2. (N00 
Afghans were being trained at former Pakistani Army teases guarded by Pakistani 
patrcýIs. I the Soviet official news agency. lass, claimed that in the late I 980s. tile 
l1nitcd States. China, Britain, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, I'gvpt. I'Al'. Kumait, Israel and 
France gave training to thousands Afghan mujnhihlren and volunteers to tight against 
the Soviet I InionI c (Table-1). The Chinese government had established more than ten 
military camps in its Xinjiang pro ince to train thousands of Afghan Islamic militants 
in the use of Chinese and Soviet style weapons. 
I"" 13y the end of Ntit, the So in 
media claimed that the Pakistan army had established more than forts training camps 
(Table-2) on Pakistani soil and that American, British. Chinese and Israeli isst ructtrs 
had trained around 75,001) to 1{5,0(10 mujahideen. 
' ' In addition, them were cle en 
Pakistani trams of' three Wren each generally consisting of a major and two junior 
ot'ticers dressed like Afghans operating inside Afghanistan. 
1', Pakistan's arrººv, 
particularly the commandos of the Special Services Group (SS(l) gar special training 
and were assigned to mrmju/ºideen units fier operations inside Afghanistan. l'he SS(1 also 
Parlicipated directly in hundreds of reconnaissance. sabotage and combat operations 
against the Soviet and Afghan freers. 'Ihr I5I participated ºn and organised directly 
hundreds of' reconnaissance, sabotage. and romhart operations against S o\ rrt and 
Kabul Afghan for-Ces in urban areas of*Afghanistan. 
''" It is difficult Io "et an accurate 
figure on the total number of' nnijahitlt't'n who recei\cd training in Pakistan, but 
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sources claim it amounted to up to half a million or so. 130 According to one German 
study at the end of 1984 the full-time mujahideen were 120,000, with an additional 
130,000 to 150,000 part-time guerrillas. 131 In 1987, the London Times reported that 
there were 120,000 mujahideen, whereas a week later, it gave a figure of 200,000.132 
Thus, Pakistan supported the Islamists in Afghanistan and its main leaders such as 
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (Engineering Faculty of Kabul University), Burhanuddin 
Rabbani and Abdul Rabbal Rasul Sayycf (lecturer in the Sharia Faculty) who were 
close to the Zia government. However, Ilckmatyar very soon earned the whole-hearted 
support of General Zia because in mid-1980, IHckmatyar was the lone representative 
among the 7 dominant leaders, who signed a paper confirming that if he gained power 
in Afghanistan, he would respect the Durand Line. 133 According to Christina Lamb, to 
secure a maximum allocation in military hardware for Ilckmatyar, the ISI convinced 
the US to use him as "a worm to catch a fish" in the Afghan turmoil. 134 In pursuit of 
Pakistani strategic interests, the ISI funnelled most US arms shipments to Ilckmatyar, 
who had taken shelter in Pakistan long before the Afghan war broke out. The 
Washington Post in May 1990 reported that Ilckmatyar and his llczb-i"Islami group 
received the lion's share of the $ 2.8 billion in US military and economic support 
funnelled through the IS1.135 
Nevertheless, Zia's Afghan policy appeared to be ideologically and religiously 
motivated. Zia was sometimes a zealous promoter of a fundamentalist approach to 
Islam by religious parties in Pakistan and Afghan muJahldeen groups. He perceived 
that an Islamist Afghanistan would be the best ally against Pakistan's future security 
threats. 136 Zia's moral and material support to the mujahidccn was based on ideological 
rather than humanistic ground. Thus, Pakistan became the base for seven major 
130 General Jan Alam Masood and Col Fakhar All Shah told during the interview in Islamabad and 
Peshawar (28 April 1998 and 5 November 1999) with the scholar that Pakistan army trained around 
150,000 to 200,000 Afghan mujahideen to fight against the Soviet and Kabul forces. tat Ilaldhauser Nachrichten, Monthly Newspaper (19 November 1984); German News (5 December 
1984); and Dawn (18 December 1984). 13= London Times (29 September 1987), p. 7. 13313habani Sen Gupta, "CIA-IS[ Take Charge of Afghan Issue, " Dhaka Courier (13.19 April 1990), p. 
30; and see M. Emdad-ul Ilaq, Drugs In South Asia: From the Opium Trade to the Present Day 
(London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 188. tN Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy (New Delhi: Viking, 1991), 
p. 224. 
tos The Washington Post (13 May 1990), p. Al; and Diego Cordovcz and Selig Harrison, Out of 
Afghanistan, p. 228, see comments under the picture No. 13 (Reuters/ Dcttmann). 136 Charles It. Kennedy, "Islamisation and Legal Reform in Pakistan 1979.1989, " Pacific Affairs, Vol. 
63, No. 1(Spring 1990), pp. 62.77. 
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Table -1 
Number of ftfujahldeeii Trained by Different Countries 1973.1987 
Year Trained by Countrlca No. or Mu ah1down 
1973 Pakistan Undcr Z. A. Bhutto Govcmmcnt 5000 
1974 Pakistan 5750 
1975 Pakistan 7500 
1976 Pakistan 8000 
1977 Pakistan Undcr Zia ul-i l Govcrnmcnt 20,700 
1978 Pakistan 25.350 
1979 Pakistan 34,75R 
1980-81 Pakistan 59 000 
1982-R3 Pakistan - US CIA & ISI 220000 
1984-85 Pakistan - US 380,000 
1985-R6 Pakistan - US 440.000 
1987-RR Pakistan - US 574000 
1981-82 Et 7000 
1982-83 China 8000 
1982-83 Saudi Arabia 4000 
1982.83 France 2000 
1982-84 UAG 4500 
1983.84 Britain 2000 
1983-84 " Israel trained in Pakistan 4000 
Sources: * Lawrence Lifschultz, "The Contra Sideshow, " Far Eastern Economic Review 
(19 December 1991), p. 23; 1lenryS. thadshcr, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, new and 
expanded ed., (Durham: Duke University Press, 1983), p. 222; Washington Post (2 February 
1979), p. A23; New York Times (16 April 1979), p. 1; Pravda (25 June 1980), p. 5; 
lzvestiya (25 October 1981), p, 5; Lc Monde (18.19 May 1980), p. 3 in FBIS/SU (6 June 
1980), pp. C6-8; and A. Z. I lilali, "Afghanistan: The Decline of Soviet Military Strategy and 
Political Status, " The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 12, No. I (March 1999), p. 
104. 
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Tablc- 2 
Afghan Afujahideen Training Camps In Pakistan 
NWFP Baluchistan Punjab 
Name of Area Quantity Name of Area Quantity Name of Area Quantity 
ßannu 4 Chagai 4 Elsa Khel 4 
IIatgram/Batkhela 2 Zhob (Fort 
Sandeman) 
4 Gyjranwala Canit I 
Chitral 3 Nushki 5 Okara Cantt 5 
Chrat I Pishin 4 Attock 6 
Dir 4 Sibi 4 Jhelum Cantt 4 
Dera Adam Khail 3 Quetta 6 Kharian Cantt 2 
Tian 2 Mianwali Kalaba h 4 
Kohat 5 
Mardan 2 
Mastung 2 
Miranshah 2 
Nowshera 4 
Pabi 2 
Parachinar 1 
Waraak 2 
Wazistan 2 
Total 40 27 26 
Sources: Washington Post (2 February 1979), p. A23; New York Times (16 April 1979), p. 1; 
Pravda (25 June 1980), p. 5 in FUIS/SU (27 June 1980), pp. D1.2; livcstlya (2S October 1981), p. 
S in FI3IS/SU (30 October 1981), p. D1 (reprinting an article from the Nicosia Newspaper 
DbimoArarla); Diego Cordoves and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of 
the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 34; Shah Bazgar, The 
Afghanistan Resistance (Paris: Dcnocl, 1987), pp. 123-46; Tajwar Kakar, quoted in Doris Lessing, 
The Ind Blows Away Our Words: And Other Documents Relating to the Afghan Resistance 
(New York: Vintage, 1987), pp. 193.208; and Ch istopher Andrew & Oleg Gordicvsky, KGIB: The 
Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations From Lenin to Gorbachev (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1991). 
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resistance groups leading the struggle against Soviet domination in Afihanistan. I hest 
groups were based in the provinces of' North West Frontirr Pro\ ince and Baluchistan. 
close to the Pakistan and Afghan hegeirr. The 7-Part. \ alliance (Table-3) ot'the Af; tehan 
mºfjahidcen basal in Peshawar, also known as the Islamic I 'nit\ of Afghan ngalfiJ(vn 
(It IAM), was tin-mcd in early Ic)X5 to coordinate the political. military and diplomatic 
the nlºcJ(lhu/t fr activities ut'these groups and, hcncelinrth, weapons and aººintunitiun to 
inside At'; hanistan were tunnelled through this alliance. Ihr Afghan vv a hnu' iclecl 
further evidence of%ia's Islamist orientation to the wider world. Jama' at-i-Islaim. file 
largest Islamic party in Pakistan. ýý: ºs the main supporter of li: º's reginme. Zia allowed cº 
Saudi-based and funded organisation. llcfhitu-. -1lant al l.. lumr. (Muslim World 
I r: ºgue) to work in Pakistan fir the support of' Afghan mujaludeen Ihrs organisation 
collaborated closely with . 
lantaat-i-Islattii. who was the main beneficiary (it' Saudi 
Arabian aid and clistrihutecl millions cºt' dollars among the Afghan groups. Hills. hum 
paid particular attention tu the Islamist Afghan rnujahideen groups rather than 
tracliticmalists or Hockrates. I he Islamist groups eve more Succcs%ful than others ill 
securing outside assistance and some groups enjoyed the valuable patronage of' 
Pakistan's 
. lant: r'at i-Islams party. 
Moreover, the Afghan Islas lists enjoyed the hull, o1' 
weapons and supplies from the Pakistan army and the 151. It h: º', been noted that the 
Afghan right-wing groups were well organised and highil) ºnootn: ºtrcl as compared tu 
the left-wind; parties. 
4. I. racl's Support to . fghan . 
%Iujahidern 
During the Afghan war. the ('IA co ntitietrdi (111C tit 111CM01,1 
co verl operations in history. Arm` were bring purchased on the international market 
with Saudi Arahian niuttrv and the ('IA purchased weapons Iwunu a Nancty OI 
statt` China, I gypt. I'rºnc"c. I3 rit; ºirº and Israci. 
"', In this ieg ii 1. Israel also hn, ý i, 1cýl 
arms an(I training to the Afghan nruii, 1 Iee i against the Soviet I'Hiatt. 
1'' A shrrial 
intelligence unit ()I the Irrach I )rlinrr I urcc ( II )I I conihºned ww ith a military logistics 
and advisory tram was stationed secretly in I'akistan with the ; rl, hrý, ý: rl Of /i; º's 
Rt it. t-Alant II I. I: mtt (SautII : \taht: t h; t. ct1 IZcltcl A}t(-niN1 Ipr- ulcd 
hi inrial and mititan : rsa. tanrc 
prtnhilliv tlmvu)th the j: tm: tat 1 I. I"inu ul Pakistan, Milt h had at low Intl. 'salb IIchm: rt\: u. ls: n: r1. and 
IiuiI inuddin I(ahhant 
I'ctcr tiihýýrvrt. VictorIii Itcal; rrn ýdminkIIHtiun'ý Sccrel titratcg% Ihsrt Ilnocncd 
Uu" 
('1111311m. of Ilu" So%ii"I I niun 11 I P, 
I1cni\ ti Iir: ulnhci. \Igh: rrtisl: rn : rnd the smiel I Ilion. ticu expanded (d. (I>uthniu 1 tuk, 
I nnm i 
104 
government, in order to train Afghan mujahidecn in the use of Israeli weapons. 140 IDF 
military advisers functioned on a full-time basis in Pakistan and worked jointly with 
ISI and the Pakistan army to train the mujahideen in military tactics and the use of 
sophisticated weapons. The National Logistics Cell (NLC), under the command of the 
ISI and Pakistan army, was the main carrier and supplier of weapons to the 
mujahideen. Israeli instructors and advisors trained thousands of mujahtdeen, in 
particular the Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Iiekmatyar. 141 
From 1983, Ari Ben-Menashe, 142 a former Israeli intelligence official, frequently 
travelled to Pakistan to supervise the transhipment of a substantial consignment of 
weapons to both Iran and Afghan mujahideen. He was also one of a six"mcmbcr Joint 
Committee set up to organise the systematic but clandestine provision of Iran in its war 
with Iraq and to help the Afghan mujahideen. According to western sources, the Israeli 
government helped Iran and the Afghans, irrespective of whether they were Islamist or 
royalist, since both were Tel Aviv's allies against Iraq and the Soviet Union's regional 
ambitions. Thus, it was the Joint Committee's responsibility to secure whatever 
military equipment was deemed necessary to support Iranian and Afghan resistance. 
For this purpose, hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons were supplied to the 
Afghan mujahideen and Iran from a network of Israeli-controlled corporations which 
operated under the authority and direction of the committee in every corner of the 
globe. In this regard, several IDF members and ISI special force unit soldiers died in 
Afghanistan during operations against the Soviet Union. 143 It was IDF and ISI units 
that provided a stable and strong basis for the Afghan muJahidecn to move against 
Najibullah's government and the Soviet forces. 
140 Lawrence Lifschultz, "The Contra Sideshow, " Far Eastern Economic Re%lew (19 December 1991), 
p. 23; The Guardian (8 February 1986); The New York Times (22 August 1985.13 December 1986 
and 24 January 1991). 14' Israeli military advisors and technicians were deployed to train Iranian solidcrs against Iraq and also to 
train Afghan mujahideen for use against the Soviet Union. Israel Defence Force (IDF) trained more 
than 3,000 Afghan and 1,500 Iranians. All shipments and training camps were situated in different 
parts of Pakistan territory. Pakistani officials could not put an exact value on the shipments but it is 
estimated that more than $300 million worth of weapons were shipped to Iran and the Afghan 
mujahideen. On 18 August 1995 I personally spoke with one of Pakistani military officers in Chitral 
about the matter of Israeli soliders' presence in Pakistan to train Afghan mujahideen and he confirmed 
the news; See Far Estern Economic Review (19 December 1991), p. 23; Dally Telegraph (13 
September 1986); and Izvestia (29 November 1989). 14= An Ben-Menashe grew up in Iran and was fluent in Farsi (Persian), Arabic, English and Hebrew. Ile 
was a senior officer in IDF's External Relations Department and he participated in one of Israeli's 
most sensitive inter-agency intelligence committee during the 1980s. Ile also served as adviser to the 
Israeli Prime Minister Yizhak Shamir. See Far Estern Economic Reficw (19 December 1991), p. 23; 
Tel Aviv Times (18 April 1986); and Krasnaya Zvezda (23 January 1991). 43 See Tel Aviv Times (8 October 1991); The New York Times (11 February 1992); and Far Eastern 
Economic Review (19 December 1991), p. 23. 
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General Fazal Huq (a leading figure in General Zia -ul Haq's military regime, and later 
Governor of NWFP), a dominant military figure in Pakistan, was in charge of 
operations linked to Pakistani support for the Afghan resistance and the supply of 
weapons to Iran. In 1984, Ben Menashe several times met General Fazal Huq, in 
London and Peshawar, in connection with working out the logistics for a huge 
shipment of weapons to Iran and the Afghan resistance. 144 From 1983, several million 
dollars worth of weapons had to go through Peshawar because it was the official 
destination in Pakistan. On arrival, they were transferred to various parts of the North 
West Frontier Province, under the eyes of an Israeli logistics team and then handed 
over to different mujahideen groups. The weapons included artillery, TOW anti-tank 
missiles, ammunition and a wide range of spare parts. Ben-Menashe claims that the 
arms were paid for twice, generating an "off-the-book" surplus of $300 million. '45 In 
August 1985, the Iranian government deposited $300 million into Israeli-controlled 
accounts in Luxembourg. Within two months, the shipment for the rebels had been 
diverted via Peshawar and by October 1985, the entire consignment had crossed 
Pakistan's border into Iran under the eyes of an Israeli logistics team. 1'6 On 5 March 
1987 the American magazine Review reported that it was agreed that of the $1.09 
billion paid by the Iranian government, the commission amounting to $390 million 
would be spent through the CIA to purchase Israeli weapons for the mi jahideen. ''7 
Nevertheless, Pakistan's covert and overt role in the Afghan war never gained 
appropriate appreciation and recognition from the West. The military aid to the 
mujahideen had the potential to prolong the suffering of the Afghan people in a conflict 
that, in the view of many, was certain to end in Soviet victory whatever the United 
States did, but it also increased the likelihood that Pakistan would become a lightning 
rod for Soviet moves against sanctuaries and for Soviet revenge. The Soviet expert 
144 In the autumn of 1985 I3en-Menashe arrived in Peshawar on behalf of the Joint Committee to 
coordinate an arms shipment to Iran and Afghans. Ile claimed that along with other members of an 
IDF logistic team, he stayed at the Park Hotel in Peshawar using false passports. Ills visits were fully 
coordinated with the Pakistani and other concerned governments (Iran). See For Eastern Economic 
Review, p. 23.1 personally met I3en-Menashe through Nancy, Director USIS, Islamabad, in July 1989 
and later I met him many times at the USIS Peshawar Centre with Dr. Jay P. Gurian, Assistant Branch 
Public Affairs Officer. Den-Menashe changed his Jewish name on the advice of Gurian and adopted 
the name "Zakria" (a common Muslim-Jewish name) and stayed at die Park hotel. The third time I 
saw Zakria (Ben-Menashe) was in Chitral (north of Pakistan) with Afghan mu/ahideen. It is interesting to note that Chitral was one of the biggest arms supply centres for Afghan mujahldecn. 145 According to Ben-Menashe, in August 1985 Teheran deposited $300 million into an Israeli controlled 
account in Luxemboug. Within two months the shipment for the rebels had been diverted via 
Peshawar and by October 1985 the entire consignment had crossed Pakistan's border into Iran under 
the supervision of Israeli officers. See The Guardian (27 September 1985). ' See Tel Aviv Times (25 December 1991). 
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Krasnaya Zvezda admitted that "it was Pakistan who eroded Soviet control on 
Afghanistan by giving the opportunity to the United States to use Afghan rebels against 
the Soviet Union"148 John Erickson, one of the foremost authorities on the Soviet 
military, has argued that "the several Soviet efforts to drive the rebels from strategic 
areas of Afghanistan, failed, and Soviet forces were under heavy fire and the Soviet 
military might was withered away by the Pakistan army and Afghan rebels, through a 
combination of desertion, wounds and death. "149 Vladimir Alexander Mortin, who 
spent four years (1981-85) in Afghanistan, admitted that the "Russians were fed up 
with Pakistan support and strength to the rebels, although the Soviet forces' 
performance was better compared to that of the Afghan Islamists, but the Soviets were 
worried that the Americans were backing the rebels through Pakistan, who provided 
shelter, space for weapons and training to the rebels. The Soviets used all possible 
tactics to demoralise Pakistan, but their efforts were useless. "'so 
Thus, the US and mujahideen alone were not in a position to defeat the Soviet Union 
without Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan provided its land, bases and skilled manpower and 
gave enormous support to the Afghan mujahideen which enabled them to defeat the 
Soviet Union. The US backed Pakistan defence policy was offensive and this approach 
developed out of the history of the Pakistan military, which had never accepted civilian 
control. Pakistani generals had always been reluctant to accept orders from the political 
elites, to whom the military conceded no legitimate role in security issues, let alone 
war. In this respect, the Pakistan army's and ISI's view of the relationship between 
politics and war differed from the views of such strategists as Clauscwitz and Mao 
Zedung. However, there was no doubt about the quality of Pakistan's contribution to 
the mujahideen's war-fighting abilities. There was evidence that the Soviets posed a 
threat to Islamabad and retaliated but they failed to disrupt its support to the Afghan 
147 The New York Times (27 November 1985). 
"° Krasnaya Zvezda, Afghan War and the Soviet Union (Moscow: Vocnizdat, 1987), pp. 87.134. t" John Erickson, "Pakistan Support to Afghan Rebels and the Soviet Military Losses, " Krasnaya 
Zvezda (17 May 1986). 
1S0 I met Vladimir Alexander Mortin in Hotel Konigshof Bonn (Germany) on 14 August 1998. lit was on 
a private visit to Germany. According to Mortin. he was originally from Georgia and worked for the 
Soviet army as a Media Officer. Ile gained a Masters in Journalism and Management from Moscow 
University. lie went to Afghanistan in June 1981 and left in August 1985. His duty was to control 
Radio Kabul and Television transmission to boost the image of the Soviet Union among the local 
population and counter Pakistan, Western and rebel propaganda. See also Henry S. Bradsher, 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, pp. 222 and 277; Pravda (16 December 1982), in FBIS/SU (16 
December 1982), pp. D14; Department of Defence, "Soviet Military Power, " p. 129. The diplomatic 
demarche was foreshadowed by a Pravda editorial attack on Pakistan (29 June 1984), p. 4, in 
FBIS/SU (29 June 1984), pp. Dl-3; and sec Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan 
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mujahideen. 151 According to Robert G. Wirsing, "after all, no other outside power 
involved itself so long, so fully, and so directly in the resistance effort or took greater 
risks on its behalf than did Pakistan. "IS2 It is evident that Pakistan was by and large 
successful in achieving its objective or in its strategy of resistance and survival. At the 
time of the intervention, Pakistan lacked the economic and military capacity to meet 
the challenge to its security and integrity. Later, Pakistan was able to cam the support 
of the United States, attract military and economic assistance from diverse sources and 
convince the international community to cooperate against the Soviet Union. Thus, 
Pakistan's policy toward the war was founded first and foremost on a prudent regard 
for its own security. In return for the risks and obligations Pakistan claimed to have 
incurred in its unwavering support for the Afghan resistance, it received generous 
financial and military assistance from the United States. 
Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994). 152 The New York Times (23 August 1985). p. Al. 152 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia 1977-88, pp. 62-63. 
109 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The US Response to the Growing Soviet Take-Over of Afghanistan 
The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: Too 
late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential 
enemy; too late in realising the mortal dangcr; too late in 
preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too 
late in standing with one's friends. ' 
- General Douglas MacArthur, 1952-1954 
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine critically the core factors of 
Carter's initial reluctance to understand the Soviet motives for intervention in 
Afghanistan. It evaluates the reasons for Carter's ambiguous policy and failure to 
respond sharply to Soviet military invasion. It also assesses Carter's intention to 
continue the spirit of detente with the Soviet Union and analytically discusses the 
circumstances in which he changed his soft policy towards the Soviet Union, made a 
gesture of solidarity with the Afghan people and adopted some diplomatic measures 
against the Soviet Union, although these were an insufficient response to the Soviet 
invasion. 
After Carter, Reagan emerged as a "super-hawk" and his administration decided to 
give an appropriate response to the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. At that time, the 
United States played a major role as an extra-regional actor in the Afghanistan crisis. 
Its contribution in terms of materials, resources, diplomatic initiatives and power 
projection was unsurpassed by other actors. In fact, the US was the main architect of 
the challenge to contain Soviet expansionism. The US involved itself in the Afghan 
crisis to protect the vital interests of the industrialised nations because the US was the 
lone gendarme of the Persian Gulf, even though the oil flowed primarily to Europe and 
Japan. In the context of unfolding Cold War politics, the US had to operate an adequate 
policy response towards Afghanistan and the entire Middle East region. 
1 Quoted in Richard Nixon, The Real War, Paperback (New York. Warner Books, 1981), p. 1. 
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1. Carter's Global Approach to Avoid Confrontation 
Jimmy Carter appeared to be the first American president in the post World War 11 
period to reject the globalist assumptions that had undergirdcd extended containment 
for thirty years. In the 1976 campaign he had spoken of the need to "replace balance 
of power politics with world-order politics. "3 The focus of Carter's policy was on 
human rights, North-South relations, Third World development, and the international 
economy, while the Soviet Union's pride of place in US policy diminished .4 Arms 
control and Soviet human rights practices were the two issues that were to be priority 
ones vis-h-vis the Soviet Union, even if US aims on the two worked somewhat at cross 
purposes. 5 
The dominant image of the Soviet Union was relatively benign in the first year of the 
Carter administration. According to one study, which employed a form of content 
analysis, administration evaluations of Soviet intentions and of the Soviets themselves 
were very positive. 6 While Carter did not have well developed or deeply held beliefs 
about the Soviets, his pronouncements reflected a benign view (or predisposition). 
Nixon and Kissinger had spoken of the imperative of coexistence in the nuclear age, 
but they certainly would not have subscribed to the following statement by Carter: 
2 For a systematic elaboration of the beliefs that Caner and his chief advisers held during the first year of 
the Carter administration, see Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for Global 
Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behaviour (Columbia, South Carolina: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1987), pp. 39-57. 
Quoted in Leslie If. Gelb, "Beyond the Carter Doctrine" New York Times Magazine No. 10 
4 
(February 1980), p. 18. 
On this point, it is noteworthy that Brzezinski shared with Carter the professed belief that preoccuption 
with the Cold War as a dominant concern in US foreign policy "no longer seems warranted by the 
complex realities within which we operate. Cited in Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for 
Global Community, p. 41. The Soviets were affronted by pronuncements of this kind, for they 
seemed to suggest that the Carter administration was implicitly denying the U. S. S. R's importance and 
hard-won status as an equal with the United States. The allies too were somewhat disconcerted. Vance 
was not so quick to put Soviet policy on the back burner. 
In June 1977, Carter acknowledged with surprise that his human rights policy "provided a greater 
obstacle to other friendly pursuits of common goals, like in SALT, than SALT I had anticipated. " See 
Jimmy Carter, "Interview with the President. " Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents No. 
13 (4 July 1977), p. 922. 
Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community, p. 53. Rosati identifies eleven 
relevant cases and identifies Carter administration assessments of Soviet behaviour along a continuum: 
expansionist (0 percent); opportunistic (9.1 percent); cooperative and cometitive (36.4 percent); and 
cooperative (54.5 percent). Similarly, Rosati finds the administration's evaluation of the Soviets 
positive in 71 percent of seven relevant cases, and negative in 29 percent. While he acknowledges that 
the small universe of cases make the findings valuable only as rough indications, he does not identify 
them or explain the basis for his findings. 
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Beyond all the disagreements between the United States and the 
Soviet Union-and beyond the cool calculations of mutual self-interest 
that our two countries bring to the negotiating table-is the invisible 
human reality that must bring us closest together. I mean the yearning 
for peace, real peace, that is in the very bones of us all... Mr. 
Brezhnev said something very interesting recently, and I quote from 
his speech: "it is our belief, our firm belief, " he said, "that realism in 
politics and the will for detente and progress will ultimately triumph 
and mankind will be able to step into the 21st century in conditions of 
peace stable as never before. " I see no hidden meaning in that. I credit 
its sincerity. And I express the same hope and belief that Mr. 
Brezhnev expressed. With all the difficulties, all the conflicts, I 
believe that our planet must finally obey the Biblical injunction to 
"follow after the things which make for peace. "7 
Carter professed his belief in detente, saying "To me, it means progress toward peace. " 
and according to Vance, both he and Carter down played Brzezinski's contention that 
there was "an overarching US-Soviet `geopolitical struggle' at the heart of US foreign 
policy. 8 Moreover, the dominant assumptions in the early Carter administration about 
global containment differed from those that had traditionally animated US policy. 
Initially, there was little talk of "credibility, " the importance of resolve or indivisible 
commitments, few references to the importance of geopolitical "momentum, " a balance 
of power that could be unsettled by an accretion of marginal changes, vulnerable sea 
lanes, choke points, or strategic minerals, and not much in the way of domino imagery. 
In May 1977, at the time of the Shaba incident, Carter proclaimed his "aversion to 
military involvement in foreign countries, " adding that "we arc suffering, or benefiting, 
from the experience we had in Vietnam. "9 lie was reluctant to engage in Cold War 
with the Soviet Union and expressed his views in his famous Notre Dame speech: 
.... Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any 
dictator who joined us in that fear. For too many years, we have been 
willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our 
adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We 
have fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched 
with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its 
intellectual and moral povcrty. 10 
7 Quoted in Ibid., p. 54. 1 Jimmy Carter, "University of Notre Dame: The President's Address at Commencement Exective at the 
University, 22 May 1977, " Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents No. 13 (30 May 1977), 
p. 777; and Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 26-28. ° Quoted in Samuel F. Wells, Jr., "Limits on the Use of American Militay Power, " The Wilson 
Quarterly (Winter 1983), P. 124. 10 Carter, "The President's Address at Commencement Exercises at the University, " p. 774. 
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Carter expressed the hope of persuading the Soviet Union that one country cannot 
impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or 
through the use of a client state's military force. " In contrast to the Notre Dame 
approach, Carter seemed to be less interested in talking about Cuban intervention in 
Angola and willing to countenance improved relations with such states; he intended 
opening diplomatic and economic ties with Vietnam and Cuba. He was relaxed about 
the threat to US interests posed by Moscow's Third World clients and friends. The 
worst situation emerged in 1979 when the Soviets intervened in Afghanistan to protect 
their own sphere of influence and it quickly became apparent that the US was boxed 
into a no-win situation. But the Carter administration was not interested in backing any 
anti-Communist movement, from Ethiopia to Afghanistan, both for reasons of principle 
and for sound reasons of regional interests. 
In large measure, the Soviet policy to capture Afghanistan was not mcrcly 
opportunistic, but motivated by strategic concerns as well. Bruce Porter notes the 
assiduous efforts by Moscow to preserve influence in the entire Persian Gulf and 
concludes that it "demonstrated Moscow's unflagging interest in establishing a Soviet 
sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean. "12 The spokesman for the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry Press Department said as much in a television interview in February 1978: 
The Indian Ocean is first and foremost of military, political and 
economic significance. The importance of this region is determined by 
its geographical situation at the juncture of two continents-Asia and 
Africa, by the presence of first-class ports in the Gulf of Aden in the 
Indian Ocean, and what is most important, by the fact that important 
sea-lanes such as the Persian Gulf, linking the oil producing countries 
with America and Europe, pass through the region. 3 
Regional complaints about US passivity confirmed Brzezinski's point that "more was 
at stake than a disputed piece of desert. To a great extent our credibility was under 
scrutiny by our allies in a region strategically important to us. "4 This was a time when 
the United States appeared to be paralysed, while the Soviets resisted US calls for 
restraint and reliance on local states for a negotiated solution to the conflict and 
tt Carter, 'The President's Address at Commencement Exercises at the University, " p. 777. 12 Bruce D. Porter, The USSR In Third World Conflict: Soviet Arms and I)Iplomacy In Local Wars 
1945-80 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 199. 14 Cited in Valenta, "Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, " p. 356. 14 Porter, The USSR In Third World Conflict, pp. 182-183. 
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demonstrated an impressive capability to engineer a decisive military victory at the 
expense of the US interests. 1s Brzezinski also "warned Carter on several occasions not 
to be passive or to underestimate the gravity of an entrenched military presence so 
close to weak and vulnerable allies. "16 
1-1. Carter's Low-Profile Approach 
In 1979, the Soviets completely isolated the United States from the region and its 
position became vulnerable but this situation did not affect the Carter administration. 
Carter's concern in the region was to solve the US embassy hostage crisis in Iran, and 
the Communist coup in Afghanistan seemed not such an important issue. According to 
Ronald Powaski, "Carter did not believe that on the Afghanistan issue the US-Soviet 
relationship should be permitted to deteriorate to the point of open hostility. " 17 
Brzezinski did not agree with Carter's opinion and he argued that the invasion of 
Afghanistan warranted a "stronger US reactions" in the event of a "Soviet military 
move toward the Persian Gulf'18 and to protect friends in the region. However, Carter 
attempted to find issues on which the US and the USSR could cooperate with each 
other. For this purpose, he approved a commercial deal with the Soviet Union and 
provided clearance certificates to US companies to sell technology and production 
equipment to the Soviet Union. One writer has claimed that these exports allowed the 
construction of "the $1.5 billion Kama River truck factory, which produced the 
military vehicles that carried the Soviet invaders into Afghanistan. "9 The same author 
also claims that the Carter administration also allowed the sale of IBM 360 and 370 
computer technology to the Soviets, who later produced the "Ryad" computer, a copy 
of the IBM version, and used it for military purposes. ° 
15 US standing in the region was certainly not helped by Carter's refusal to accede to Brzezinski's request 
to send a carrier task force to the Persian Gulf and the Guld of Aden in early 1978 when Somali forces 
were being routed and Communist came into power in Afghanistan, it appeared that the Cuban and 
Ethiopians might launch a counter-offensive into Somalia and the Soviet would move to Afghanistan, 
reassurances to the contrary notwithstanding. US officials did issue warnings against such a move. In 
part, Carter turned down Brzezinski's request because die US had received several assurances from the 
Soviets and Cubans that there would be no move into Somalia and Afghanistan. Sec Vance, Hard 
Choices, p. 87. t6 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 179. 17 Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917.1991(New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 225. Is See Brzezinski, interview to the Wall Street Journal (IS January 1980), p. 20; See also Brzczinski, 
Power and Principle, pp. 430 and 445. 19 John Barron, KGB Today: The Hidden (land (London & Toronto: Hodder & Stoughton, 1983), p. 
226. 
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It is also on record that after the April 1978 coup, the Iranian government considered 
the Afghan revolution as one more example of a Soviet grand design and of Moscow's 
intent to encircle Iran. 21 The Shah of Iran told the US Ambassador, William Sullivan, 
that he saw little to gain from "coddling" the Afghan rcgimc. 22 In the same way, the 
Saudis interpreted the coup as a Soviet-directed operation that was part of the Soviets' 
strategy to encircle the Persian Gulf and the Arabian peninsula and to develop a base 
from which to subvert Iran and Pakistan. 23 Moreover, in a preliminary assessment, on 
the day of the coup, Harold Saunders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East 
and South Asian Affairs, warned Vance that the Pakistanis and Iranians would 
probably see the Communist regime in Kabul as "little more than a proxy" for the 
Soviet Union, that both Pakistan and Iran would find confirmation of their fears of 
Soviet encirclement and that foreign and domestic audience would portray Afghanistan 
as another Horn of Africa or Soviet victory, creating pressures to do something about 
it 24 The US did not have to wait long to see that things were turning out rather badly in 
Afghanistan. Taraki's professions of nonalignment were purely fictional and the PDPA 
leaders demonstrated that they were indeed Communists and their country was closely 
aligned with the Soviet Union. 25 In June 1978, the US embassy in Kabul confirmed the 
pre-coup assessment, noted the degree of Afghan dependence on the Soviets and 
warned that the Soviets wanted to keep the Pakhtunistan and Baluchistan cards 
available for future use, with Afghanistan as their instrument. 26 
1-2. The Carter Administration and Afghanistan 
The US response to the Afghan Saur Revolution 1978 under the leadership of Nur 
Mohammad Taraki was restrained and isolated. Eight days later after the coup, the US 
extended diplomatic recognition to the new government and Vance sent the Under 
20 Ibid. 
21 Department of State Telegram, No. 04062, US Embassy, Tehran (30 April 1978). u Department of State Telegram, No. 09279, US Embassy, Tehran (25 September 1978), p. 2. 
According to some observers, the 1978 Afghan coup emerges as one of the more disastrous legacies of 
the Shah's ambitious effort to roll back Soviet influence in surrounding countries and create a modern 
version of the ancient Persian empire. See Jonathan Steele, World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy 
Under Brezhnev and Andropov (London: Michael Joseph, 1983), p. 122; and see also '? he Shah, 
Not Kremlin, Touched Off Afghan Coup, " Washington Post (13 May 1979). 23 Department of State, International Summary, No. 002774 (it October 1979). 24 Harold li. Saunders, Department of State Briefing Memorandum (28 April 1978). p. 1; and see Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, Debacle: The American Failure In Iran (New York: Alfred A. 
Knop, 1981). pp. 95-96. =s Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, The Soviet Invasion 
and the Consequences (Boulder: Westview, 1984), pp. 60-62. 26 Department of State, US Embassy, Kabul, No. 04801 (13 June 1978), p. 1. 
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Secretary of State for Political Affairs, David Newsom, to Kabul to discuss the 
continuation of American education and cultural programmes, peace corps projects and 
economic aid. Newsom returned pessimistic about the new government in Kabul but he 
also considered the situation highly fluid 27 Economic aid and other programmes or 
projects were continued and the Carter administration adopted a wait and sec policy. 
The Carter administration had reacted in a restrained manner to the Communist coup 
and continued to regard it as tangential to US interests. A policy of moderation was 
deemed to be the best possible course of action. It also seemed that the US lacked the 
wherewithal to undertake commitments in a region where its "vital interests were not 
involved. 1128 The Carter administration's response consisted only of private warnings to 
the Soviet leadership and there was no clear-cut public warning to the Soviets, despite 
intelligence reports of troop build-ups on the Soviet-Afghan border. According to 
Cyrus Vance, since the US was besieged with problems such as the Iranian hostage 
crisis, Kampuchea and South Africa, the accumulating intelligence on the Soviet 
operation did not receive the attention it descrved. 29 In fact, the State Department and 
Carter administration failed to evaluate the Afghan situation and were also reluctant to 
take steps against the Soviets because they believed that Moscow would not intervene 
and get involved in a Vietnam-like war. 30 However, the National Security Advisor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski's approach was different and he advocated a strong stance against 
the Soviets. He argued in favour of a clear-cut warning to the Soviet Union, mobilising 
the Islamic world and extending support to the Afghan freedom fightcrs. 3' 
Brzezinski was taking seriously the Communist take over in Afghanistan. At the same 
time, the American President's assessment of the invasion was likely to be influenced 
by the assessments of America's friends in the region. And, as Carter learned in the 
opening days of the crisis, countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Israel 
were deeply alarmed. The Carter administration was afraid that the mere display of 
power by the Soviets would have adverse political consequences in the region. The 
administration rightly feared that "key states of the Persian Gulf would conclude that 
they should accommodate to the rising wave of Soviet influence and power before they 
27 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years In America's Foreign Policy, p. 385. 
Ibid., p. 386. 
Ibid. , p. 387. 10 Thomas IIammod, Red Flag Over Afghanistan (Boulder: Westview, 1984), p. 107. 31 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, p. 428. 
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themselves were swept away' . 32 After the invasion, Carter publicly fretted that the bold 
and unprecedented exercise of Soviet power would be "unsettling to other peoples 
throughout the world" 33 It is also on record that before the invasion, Pakistani leaders 
had frequently informed the US officials about the growing sentiment in Pakistan in 
favour of "accommodating" the Soviets, due to the growth of the Soviet threat 
(especially the threat of cross-border subversion) and the absence of a reliable counter- 
weight. 34 
Thus, whatever the immediate Soviet objectives in Afghanistan, one consequence of 
the Soviet action might well have been increased regional deference to the Soviets and 
a corresponding decline in US influence unless the American response were 
sufficiently forceful to reassure local states that it was safe and prudent to pursue 
policies that would incur Soviet displeasure. Even in the Carter administration, those 
who shared similar concerns about American policy expressed some support for the 
"little-to-fear" argument. Carter was sensitive and defensive about this as indicated by 
his response when he was asked if his administration might have been guilty of sending 
mixed signals. Carter testily dismissed this as "completely fallacious" and a "ridiculous 
claim"35 In such circumstances, the Pakistanis, foreign audiences and the Americans 
looked to the president for a response. The reputation and reliability of the United 
States were at stake and the people of the free world would accuse it of "losing 
Afghanistan, " if an inadcquatc response was made. 
3= Gary Sick, "The Evolution of US Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region. " in 
Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed. )., The Great Game: Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia (New 
York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 70.71. 33 President Carter's remarks were made during his 4 January 1980 address to the nation. Sec WCPD, 
No. 16 (14 January 1980), p. 25. 
"US-Pakistan Talks: Regional Issues, " Confidential Cable From the Secretary of State to the Embassy 
in Islamabad, No. 277901,24 October 1979, pp. 1.2; President Zia himself suggested that 
accommodation might be the most prudent way to go for Pakistan. In as much as Zia wanted 
substantial US aid and a firm American commitment, he clearly used threats to appease the Soviets as 
a bargaining tactic. For an account that emphasises this factor, and the extent to which Zia, like other 
statesmen, was impelled to balancing behaviour regardless of US policy, see M. Walt, "Testing 
Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia, " International Organisation, No. 42, 
(Spring 1988), pp. 306-307. 
See WCPD, No. 16 (14 April 1980), pp. 641.42. During the press conference, the question was 
rephrased twice in order to reassure the President that the question did not imply that he was to blame 
for the Afghan invasion. Ile did lend indirect support to this thesis by acknowledging that the Soviets 
might have underestimated the likely American response. In this connection, he made clear his view 
that the proper response was to impress upon the Soviets how badly they had miscalculated. For 
similar remarks see Carter's "Meet the Press, " interview in Department of State Bulletin, No. 80 
(March 1980), p. 29. 
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The United States' policy towards Afghanistan was initially selective, isolated and 
unclear. This area was always in the lowest priority of the US administration and on 
the other hand, the US had long accepted that Afghanistan was part of the Soviet global 
sphere of interest. The consensus for a restrained response was a product of several 
factors: 
" There was the abiding perception that Afghanistan was not of vital importance to 
the United States. In general, only the "northern tier" countries, Grccce, Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Pakistan were valuable to US policy makers for the purpose of the 
containment of Soviet Communism. 
f The US administration had no evidence of direct Sovict instigation of or 
involvement in the coup. While it might have represented another Soviet gain, the 
Soviets could hardly be accused of breaking the rules by profiting from a 
development that to outward appearances was beyond their control. 36 
f There seemed to be little the US could do about events internal to Afghanistan and 
thus it seemed to make little sense to publicise and express alarm over matters 
beyond US control. There was also a danger that the Soviets would construe the 
relaxed US response as a sign of indifference to Soviet activities in Afghanistan. In 
turn, this might have encouraged the erroneous belief that the US response to direct 
armed intervention would be similarly muted. Vance, Brzczinski and Shulman 
acknowledged this and conceded that the failure to express concerns sooner and 
more forcefully was a mistake. 37 
f The US hoped that even if the Communists took power, Afghanistan would 
maintain its independence from Moscow. Geopolitical common sense indicated 
that a small nation on the periphery of a superpower should avoid its powerful 
gravitational pull, common ideology notwithstanding. The Carter administration 
thought that strong Afghan nationalism would almost invariably prove a stronger 
force than ideology. Thus, in order to preserve what influence the US had and to 
prevent the Afghans from lurching further into the Soviet orbit, Carter officials 
agreed that diplomatic relations and economic aid should continue. 
M Ibid., p, 384; and Hammond. Red Flag Over Afghanistan. p. 63. 37 Ibid. 
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f Finally, the US administration adopted the wait-and-sec approach because it was 
acceptable to at least some important friends of the United States. But Carter 
officials were worried about the destabilising effects on Afghanistan's neighbours, 
especially Pakistan and Iran. 38 However, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other 
Muslim countries decided to maintain relations with Afghanistan and tried to come 
to terms with the new Communist regime 39 
1-3. Carter's Illusions About Afghan Policy 
US concern only intensified with the killing of the US Ambassador to Kabul, Adolph 
Dubs, in February 1979. With the outbreak of major acts of insurgency, notably a large 
uprising in Herat, the US was compelled to address the question of Soviet influence in 
Afghanistan and its significance. 40 As the insurgency grew and the Soviet military was 
involved in crushing it, US concern and attentiveness also grew. It was reported that 
after Herat, the Soviets and Afghans began imputing responsibility for the mounting 
unrest to Pakistan, Egypt, China and Iran. 4 1 This drew the following warning from the 
State Department: 
We expect that the principle of non-interference will be respected by 
all parties in the area, including the Soviet Union. No useful purpose 
is served by false and provocative reports about outside intcrfcrence- 
especially when they occur at the same time as increased Sovict 
activity in Afghanistan. We can only wonder at their intent. We would 
regard external involvement in Afghanistan's internal problems as a 
serious matter with the potential of hciýhtcning tensions and 
destabilising the situation in the entire region. 4 
3 Vance, (lard Choices, p. 385. 79 As Hammond points out, humanitarian motives and a desire to preserve Intelligence-gathering 
capabilities were probably also at work. Sec Hammond, Red flag Over Afghanistan, p. 63; Vance, 
(lard Choices, p. 384 ý0 Full detail can be found in Henry S. ßradshcr, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union new and expanded 
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The impact of the warning was diluted somewhat because it was delivered, not by the 
Secretary of State, but by Hodding Carter, the administration's press spokesman, partly 
because of the president's preference for maintaining a fairly low profile and in part 
because he did not want Afghanistan to be a high-profile issue. However, "the 
administration was buffeted between Vance's scepticism and Brzczinski's 
enthusiasm. A3 Well before Vance's resignation, it was clear that Brzezinski's 
enthusiasm had prevailed. Brzezinski was more than willing to issue warnings but the 
State Department worked mightily to muzzle the National Security Advisor. This 
pattern would persist throughout 1979 as most warnings over Afghanistan were issued 
by officials of sub-Cabinet rank. 44 In the following months, there was a massive flow 
of cables from the embassy in Kabul about the flow of events in Afghanistan. The US 
embassy warned that the Afghan regime was in deep trouble and observed that the 
Soviets might be confronted with the dilemma of losing a Communist regime or 
interventing directly and walking into a Vietnam-like trap. While acknowledging 
Moscow's stake in the Khalq regime, the embassy believed that a direct intervention 
was unlikely, or that it would come only as a last resort if Soviet personnel were 
threatened. 
It seemed all the more unlikely that the Soviets would bear the costs of intervention 
since their security interests were not threatened, for just as past Afghan governments 
had been highly sensitive to Soviet security concerns, any conceivable alternative to 
the Communist regime would accommodate itself to geopolitical realities, as it was 
often politely phrased. Thus, the embassy noted that the leader of one of the principal 
guerrilla factions, Syed Ahmad Gailani, declared his willingness to be "practical" in 
shaping Afghanistan's posture toward the Soviet Union, a statement that was endorsed 
by other resistance leaders 45 However, if there was no realistic chance that a successor 
regime would threaten Soviet interests, then Moscow's stubborn defence of a 
discredited Communist regime would take on a more sinister meaning. A former 
ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert G. Neumann, wrote a letter to Brzezinski in June 
1979 and he tried to impress a very similar point on the Carter administration. The 
Soviets must have known about and approved of the coup, argued Neumann, and since 
a Communist regime did nothing to promote their already secure interests in 
" Stanfield Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (London: Sidwick & Jackson, 
1985), pp. 87-88. 44 Thomas Iiammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 106.111. 
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Afghanistan, Soviet approval of the coup must have been motivated by considerations 
beyond Afghanistan's borders. 46 In this regard, Brzczinski repeatedly informed Carter 
that the "Soviets are strengthening their position in Afghanistan and ultimately they 
will promote a separate Baluchistan, which would give them access to the Indian 
Ocean while dismembering Pakistan and Iran. " He also reminded the President of the 
Soviets' "traditional push to the south, " as typified by the abortive Nazi-Soviet 
protocols of November 1940 that defined Soviet interests as centering on the "area 
south of Baku and Datum in the general direction of the Persian Gulf. "47 
However, despite mounting concern, the State Department continued to favour a low- 
key approach and this changed little, even as signs multiplied indicating the likelihood 
of Soviet intervention. In early November 1979 the CIA had detected alarming large 
movements of Soviet troops toward Afghanistan and a mobilisation of reserves and 
other troops in Turkmenistan. For the first time, Vance warned Ambassador Dobrynin 
during a private discussion that a military intervention would be regarded by the 
United States as a very grave matter. " By contrast, Brzezinski had for some time been 
issuing more concrete warnings to Dobrynin and other Soviet officials, to the effect 
that even the Soviets' "growing intrusion would jeopardise the American-Soviet 
relationship. r49 However, the Soviets found Brzczinski's warning vague and, although 
several analysis and intelligence reports predicted an invasion, no options or 
contingency plans were developed and no warnings, public or private were issued by 
President Carter or Secretary of State Vance. As late as 21 December 30,000 Soviet 
troops were sitting on the Afghan border and three battalions of troops had already 
moved to an air base near Kabul, but Ilodding Carter and Vance refused to comment 
on the likelihood that the troops were part of an invasion force. It seems clear that the 
Carter administration was overwhelmingly preoccupied with the Iranian hostage crisis 
as compared to Soviet moves in Afghanistan. Whatever the reason, in fact, the Carter 
administration thus failed to convey adequately its concerns and to warn the Soviets of 
45 US Embassy in Kabul, "An Assessment of Soviet Influence and Involvement in Afghanistan, " Cable 
No. 6672 (6 September 1979). 
's See letter to Zbigniew Brzezinski, from Robert G. Neumann, 4 June 1979, from the National Security 
Archives file. 
47 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 427; and see Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 941.942. 48 Hammond, Red Flag Over Afghanistan, pp. 110.111. On 28 November 1979 the Soviets sent 
Lieutenant General Victor Paputin, a First Deputy Minister of the Interior and unidentified KGB 
General, apparently to engineer the ouster of Amin, which would have been followed by an invitation 
for Soviet fraternal assistance by the successor government. This was apparently also the point at 
which the Politburo decided to intervene. The Soviets' last chance to stage a "legitimate" intervention 
was missed on 17 December 1979, when an assassination attempt on Amin failed. 
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the adverse consequences of an intervention. This constituted a missed opportunity and 
undercut US efforts to forge a forceful, collective response to the invasion. In this 
regard, Brzezinski was the only major figure in the administration who was sensitive to 
Afghan developments and the Soviet military role in Afghanistan. 
1-4. Carter's Response to the Soviet Union 
Initially, within the Carter administration, Vance won the skimishcs over Afghanistan 
policy and the administration did not pursue an over assertive policy. But, after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Brzezinski's assessment of conflict prevailed, the 
National Security Adviser's image of Soviet activism in the Third World increasingly 
came to dominate administration thinking, even though Carter was not yet fully 
converted to the Brzezinski school of Sovictology. so Brzezinski argued that the 
"Soviets were well positioned to project power, to foster international "anarchy" and to 
"exploit global chaos, " in a world that was "experiencing a political awakening on a 
scale without precedent in human history. "s' He also reportedly registered "serious 
concern" about Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in conversations with Soviet 
Ambassador Dobrynin between March and July 1980 and warned against the Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan. 52 
Carter's turn to the right was evident in two speeches he delivered in the first half of 
1980. At Wake Forest in March, Carter, while reaffirming his desire to avoid American 
intervention in regional conflicts and his support for arms control, also stressed 
American opposition to "intervention by others" and he took the Soviets to task for 
their "excessive" military build up. Much of the speech was a protest against the 
Soviets breach of good faith: 
49 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 427. S0 In his study of the Carter administration's images of international affairs, Jercl A. Rosati argues that 
highly contrasting images were the hallmark of the administration's second year and that Carter was 
still in the same camp as Vance. The first point is certainly accurate because the divisions between 
Vance and Brzezinski were deep on a host of issues concerning Soviet policy, China policy and 
regional conflicts (Ilorn of Africa and Afghanistan). Rosati notes that Carter had not wavered in his 
fixation with the lessons of Vietnam and Carter did appear uncomfortable with the dissonance implicit 
in his desire to avoid Vietnam while standing up to the Russians. Rosati's case for putting Brzezinski 
image that he places in opposition to the Carter-Vance perspective and he mentions, merely in passing, 
that the administration's overall evaluation of the Soviet Union changed radically between 1977and 
1978. By his measurements, the administration's assessment was 71.4 percent positive in 1977 and 
65.4 percent negative in 1978. See Jere[ A. Rosati, The Carter Administration's Quest. pp. 58-69. st Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 148. 
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To the Soviet Union, detente seems to mean a continuing aggressive 
struggle for political advantage and increased influence in a variety of 
ways. The Soviet Union apparently sees military power and military 
assistance as the best means of expanding its influence abroad. 
Obviously, areas of instability in the world produce a tempting target 
for this effort and all too often they seem ready to exploit any such 
opportunities. 3 
Carter emphasised the global reach of American security interests, making special note 
of the Persian Gulf, and he made much of the administration's defence efforts, 
especially its improvement in forces that could be deployed quickly. One line in 
particular revealed both Carter's own growing concern about the Soviets and his 
sensitivity to criticism of his foreign policy from the right. He reiterated his willingness 
to cooperate with the Soviets, but warned: "if they fail to demonstrate restraint in 
missile programme and other force levels or in the projection of Soviet or proxy forces 
into other lands and continents, then popular support in the United States for such 
cooperation with the Soviet Union will certainly erode. "54 In the second speech, at the 
US Naval Academy in June 1980, Carter again defended foreign policy principles and 
repeated his determination to conclude a SALT treaty, and called detente "central to 
world peace. " He criticised the Soviet "excessive" military build up, calling it "far 
beyond any legitimate requirements" for defence. lie declared that detente had to be 
"broadly defined and truly reciprocal" and complained that "to the Soviet Union, 
detente seems to mean a continuing struggle for political advantage and increased 
influence in a variety of ways. " He took the Soviets to task, in fairly sharp terms, for a 
number of sins. He condemned their human rights abuses and their "attempts to export 
a totalitarian and repressive form of government. "" Carter denied a desire to link 
SALT to the USSR's global conduct, but warned that such linkage was unavoidable in 
a democracy "where public opinion is an integral factor" in the foreign policy process. 
He also identified the contours of the code of conduct or rules of the game that were 
the prerequisite for a constructive US-Soviet rclationship. 56 In his speech he reiterated 
the desire for cooperation but put it in terms of a choice that Moscow had to make it 
clear. 
s= Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 345-346. 31 Department of State Bulletin No. 78 (March 1980), p. 27. 34 See Jimmy Carter, "Addresses at Wake Forest University, 17 March 19800 11'eetrcly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents No. 14 (24 March 1980), pp. 529-539. °f Ibid., p. 1054. 56 ibid. 
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The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The 
United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice. We would 
prefer cooperation through a detente that increasingly involves similar 
restraint for both sides; similar readiness to solve disputes by 
negotiations, and not by violence; similar willingness to compete 
peacefully, and not militarily. Anything less than that is likely to 
undermine detente.... A competition without restraint and without 
shared rules will escalate into grave tensions, and our relationship as 
whole with the Soviet Union will suffer. " 
2. The Carter Doctrine 
The overt Soviet intervention in Afghanistan marked a fundamental and "long-lasting 
turning point" in relations between the US and the Soviet Union. ss US policy makers 
believed that national credibility was at stake if the United States did not respond 
properly. President Carter immediately stated that "the Soviet action is not only 
aggression" but a "blatant military interference in the internal affairs of an independent 
sovereign state. 1159 Carter further declared that "we are the other superpower on earth 
and it became my responsibility ..... to take action that would prevent the 
Soviet Union 
from (accomplishing) this invasion with impunity. "60 Carter condemned the invasion 
as a "blatant violation of accepted international rules of behaviour" and a grave threat 
to world peace. i61 He also protested against the move in a hot line message to 
Brczhnev, calling it a "clear threat to peace" and warning that his present course of 
action would inevitably jeopardise the course of United States-Soviet Union relations 
throughout the world. 62 President Carter claimed that "a Soviet occupied Afghanistan 
was a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies - 
including those of Iran. He stated that the "implications of the Soviet invasion could 
pose the most serious threat to peace since the World War Il. "63 His most substantial 
action was his proclamation of the "Carter Doctrine, " which revived the worst 
memories of the Cold War by warning the Soviets to halt their expansion into the 
» Ibid. 
ss Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 472. 79 Department of State Bulletin, No. 80 (February 1980), p. 65; and sce US International 
Communication Agency, Official Text (27 December 1979). 
60 Presidential Documents, No. 16 (28 January 1980), p. 111; see also Thomas Ilammond, Red Flag 
Over Afghanistan, pp. 121.122. 61 Quoted in Keesstng's Contemporary Archives, 9 May 1980, p. 30232; Mark Heller, The Soviet 
Invasion of Afghanistan: Motivations and Implications CSS Memorandum No. 2 (Tel Aviv: Centre 
for Strategic Studies, 1980), pp. 13.14. 6= Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 472. 63 Quoted in Kessing's Contemporary Archives (9 May 1980), p. 30233; aee also The Times (29 
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Middle East. In his State of the Union address of 23 January 1980, the president 
warned that: 
Any attempt by any outside force to wrest control of the Persian Gulf 
region oil fields from its chosen allies in the region will be regarded as 
an assault on the vital interests of the United States and such an 
assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary. including 
military force. " 
Carter's principal initiative, with its emphasis on the willingness of the United States to 
use force in defence of its vital interests, was dictated by the occurrence of two 
paramount developments in the Persian Gulf region, the stunning collapse of Iran as a 
bastion of regional stability and the growth and intrusion of Soviet power. Thus, in 
response to somewhat analogous circumstances-the development of what might crudely 
be called a power vacuum, the growth of Soviet power and influence and of Soviet 
related threats to regional stability and regional demands for reassurance-Carter 
responded with a "doctrine" strikingly similar to the Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines. 
He also responded with a pronouncement that was, as Gary Sick points out, very similar 
to Britain's response to growing Russian influence in Persia in 1903, when the Foreign 
Minister, Lord Lansdowne, stated that Britain would 'regard the establishment of a 
naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other power as a very grave 
menace to British interests, that would be resisted with all the means at our disposal . 
45 
Although the Carter Doctrine was defensive at the politico-strategic level it was 
decidedly offensive at the military level. The Carter doctrine involved an increased 
naval build-up and B-52 overflights and longer-tam steps such as the acquisition of 
access to regional facilities, increased political and military collaboration with states in 
the region, military exercises and especially the creation of the Rapid Deployment Joint 
Task-Force, all these initiatives threatened the Soviets by bringing US power closer to 
their southern frontiers. The Soviet officials accused the United States of turning the 
Gulf region into the most dangerous area on earth, and of intensifying the risk of nuclear 
a The Carter doctrine was a departure from the Nixon doctrine of relying on regional allies to secure 
American interests and a return to the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957. See 'Transcript of President's 
State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress, " New York TImes (24 January 1980), p. 
ds 
A12; and see also Department of State 13ulletln, No. 80 (February 1980), p. 13. 
Gary Sick, "An American Perspective, " in Paul Jabber et at., Great Power Interests In the Persian 
Gulf (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989), p. 31. For brief analysis of the circumstances 
prompting the Lansdowne statement, see Martin Sicker, The (tear and the Lion: So%let Imperialism 
and Iran (New York: Praeger, 1988), pp. 18.24. 
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war in the region. 66 At the 26th Party Congress in February 1981, Brczhnev himself 
warned that the US was turning the region into a "powdcrkes "67 
For the United States, the Soviet domination of the Gulf would have made "economic 
vassals" of America's allies and it would have been an "irreversible catastrophe. "68 The 
Persian Gulf was not only on a par with the other two strategically vital (Southwest Asia 
and Europe) areas, but as Brzezinski said, "die fates of these zones arc interdependent 
and a threat to the security and independence of one is a threat to the other two.... "69 
Brzezinski emphasised that the point of the Carter Doctrine was to impress upon the 
Soviets the fact that a Soviet incursion into the Gulf area would "precipitate an 
engagement with the United States, and that the US would then be free to choose the 
manner in which it would respond"70 The National Security Adviser also instructed the 
Defence Department to develop options for both horizontal and vertical escalation. 7 
Brezhncv responded to growing US hostility by claiming that "the direct Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan was requested by the Afghan government"n in order to 
combat externally sponsored aggression. As soon as the aggression was halted, said the 
Soviet leader, the "limited Soviet contingent" would leave. In an interview with ABC's 
Frank Reynolds, President Carter called the Soviet response "completely inadequate and 
completely misleading. s73 It was in the context of Brczhnev's less than candid response 
that Carter made the embarrassing confession that the Soviet action had 'made a more 
dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviets' ultimate goals arc than 
anything they have done in the previous time I have been in office. "74 About a week 
later, in a discussion with members of Congress, Carter characterised the invasion as 
'6 Ibid., pp. 119-120. ä Ibid., p. 121. 
Gary Sick, "An American Perspective, " in Paul Jabber et a!., Great Power Interests In the Persian 
Gulf (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 31.37. 
Brzczinski describes an SCC meeting in September 1980 (when Soviet troops were massing on the 
Iranian border), in which Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie opposed strong action by the US, 
arguing that Congress would not be willing to risk nuclear war over II percent of America's oil. 
Brzezinski then elicited Muskic'a reluctant agreement to the proposition that "the loss of the Persian 
Gulf might lead to the loss of Europe", and that the Soviet had to be deterred from moving against 
Iran. Echoing Brzezinski, Brown made much of the fact that the security of the US., Europe and Japan 
was "linked directly" to the security of the Gulf. See Department of Defence, Annual Report, Fiscal 
Year 1982 (Washington, D. C.: Government Official Printing, 1983), p. 63. 70 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 445. 71 Ibid. 
n Ibid., p. 429. 73 The New York Times (I January 1980 & 27 December 1981), p. I& A7. 74 See WCPD No. 16 (14 January 1980), pp. 404 1. 
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"the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War. "" In the eyes of Carter's 
critics, the remark about the President's changed opinion constituted a confession of 
extreme naivete, while the "greatest threat" comment betrayed a considerable 
overreaction. Carter publicly refuted Brczhnev's claim that "the Soviet forces had 
entered Kabul at the invitation of the Afghan government.... the person that he claimed 
invited him in, President Amin, was murdered or assassinated after the Sovicts pulled 
their coup. 06 
President Carter described the strategic threat in geopolitical terms, noting that the 
invasion, by bringing Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean 
and close to the Strait of Hormuz, posed a grave threat to the free movement of Middle 
East oil 71 Protecting the vital oil transport and communication lines was defined as a 
necessary US objective in the wake of the Soviet invasion. Throughout the seventies, 
the Soviets had been successfully exerting influence in India, Iraq, South Yemen and 
countries along the east coast of Africa for military rights and naval facilities 78 In this 
regard, control over Afghanistan was an important strategic gain for the Soviet Union. 
Further, the geostrategic threat was made . all the more credible by the actual 
demonstration of Soviet military capabilities. Nearly 85,000 troops were air-lifted into 
Kabul in an impressive display of the capacity to project power beyond the Soviet 
border. A comprehensive evaluation of power projection capabilities in the Persian 
Gulf region demonstrated apparent Soviet superiority in the region. A report prepared 
by the Pentagon prior to the invasion concluded that if the Soviets decided to invade 
Iran, the US would have no option but to take recourse to tactical nuclear weapons to 
prevent the aggression. The report observed that the Soviets could use their 
advantageous position to launch attacks on oil facilities located in the area of Ras 
Tanura, Juamayah and Kharg island. " 
75 Quoted in Kessing's Contemporary Archives, 9 May 1980, p. 30233. 76 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 471. " Howard Jones, The Course of American Diplomacy: From the Revolution of the Present (New 
York: Franklin Watts, 1985), p. 585. 78 Sec Clark Clifford, the former Secretary of Defence who was appointed as the special emissary to India 
by President Carter after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, US Security Requirements In the Near Fast and South Asia: Hearings before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations and Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
96th Cong.. 2nd seas (18 March 1980), p. 9. The Pentagon Report about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan entitled "Capabilities in the Persian 
Gulf, " see New York Times (2 February 1980), p. 1. 
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2-1. Regional Implications 
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan changed the strategic balance of power in South 
and Southwest Asia. The military balance favoured Moscow not only in terms of actual 
military capability but also because the Soviets were capable of deploying and 
mobilising forces in the region much more rapidly than the Unital States. Harold 
Drown, the Secretary of Defence, expressed the view of the US administration in the 
words: 
The full context of the Soviet invasion includes historical Russian 
ambitions in the region, a twenty year build up of Sovict military 
forces, the more recent development of Soviet power projection ao 
Brzezinski evaluated the Soviet move around the Indian Ocean region and coined the 
phrase "arc of instability" for countries situated along the Indian Ocean littoral where 
the ongoing process of change and fragmentation had exposed the region to hostile 
elements. 81 The regional situation placed Moscow in an advantageous position to 
promote destabilisation in the region through covert and overt operations. These 
apprehensions were clearly expressed in the policy statement made by Peter D. 
Constable, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, before the house Foreign Affairs Committee: 
It is an area vulnerable to direct Soviet aggression and to indirect 
Soviet subversion. This vulnerability has increased substantially over 
the past three years with the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran, the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continued instability caused by 
regional disputes. 82 
Thus, the chain of events across the globe confirmed Moscow's intentions to expand its 
influence by taking advantage of regional disputes and rivalrics. '3 The Soviet invasion 
convinced the US administration that the Soviet Union had no intention of observing 
SO Ilarold Brown, Secretary of Defence, briefing about the Soviet invasion and its implications for Persian 
Gulf region, Department of State Bulletin (July 1982), p. 19. 11 Fred Iialliday, Soviet Policy In the Arc of Crisis (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981), p. 19. 
Peter D. Constable, "US Policy Toward the Middle Gast and Persian Gulf Region, " Department of State Bulletin, No. 80 (June 1981), p. 43. 
In Angola the Soviet Union had helped a Marxist group to power in 1973; Ethiopia and South Yemen in 1976; and the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade numbering some 2,000-3,000 men in Cuba in August 1978 further damaged the process of detente between the US-Soviet relations. 
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the rules of detente because its aggressive actions had transgressed the limits. The 
Soviet Union and the United States had implicitly recognised the non-aligned status of 
those nations which were located outside the ambit of superpower competition. 
Although Afghanistan was in the Soviet security zone, its neutral and non-aligned 
status had been respected by both powers. Thus, in the US perspective, the occupation 
of Afghanistan was considered as unprecedented because it was a blatant and direct 
application of force against a neutral country outside the Soviet sphere of influence. 
This was repeatedly emphasised in all international fora. On 12 January 1980, the US 
ambassador Donald McHenry addressed the UN General Assembly and portrayed the 
Soviet action as an invasion of a non-aligned sovereign state which violated the 
international legal principle prohibiting intervention by force in the intcmal affairs of 
another state. 84 
2-2. International Implications 
The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was interpreted as an attempt to appropriate critical 
Persian Gulf oil reserves, to seize strategic waterways and to gain access to warm 
water ports. 85 It was feared and assumed that the Soviet control of the Gulf region 
would reduce the industrialised and the developing countries to a state of economic 
dcpendcncy. 86 The US also interpreted the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan as a gross 
violation of the tacit rules of the game governing the entire spectrum of relations 
between the USA and Soviet Union. Both countries had developed norms with 
concrete expression in concepts like "peaceful coexistence" and "detente. " They were 
embodied in documents such as the 1972 Agreement on Basic Principles of Relations 
between the US and the Soviet Union. 87 The Soviet Union, in invading Afghanistan, 
seemed to the Carter administration to have acted outrageously, and at the same time 
have made a "tragic miscalculation. " To Caner, "the worst disappointment was the 
immediate and automatic loss of any chance for early ratification of the SALT 11 
84 Ambassador Mcllenry, "General Assembly Acts on Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, " A statement 
before the General Assembly (12 January 1980), Department of State Bulletin, No. 80 (February 
1980), p. 72. ýi Zbigniew Brzezinski, "After the Carter Doctrine: Goostratcgie Stakes and Turbulent Crosscurrents in 
the Gulf, " in Richard II. Sindclar (cd. )., Crosscurrents In the Gulf: Arabs, Ileglonal and Global 
Interests (New York: Routledgc, 1987), pp. 1.8. 
"US Interests in the Persian Gulf Region, " Address by Harold Brown (Secretary of Defence to the 
Council on Foreign Relations) in New York on 6 March 1980, Department of State Bulletin, No. 80 
(May 1980), p. 63. 
Mark Ileller, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Motivations and Implications, CSS 
Memorandum, No. 2 (Tel Aviv: Centre For Strategic Studies, 1980), p. 4 8. 
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trcaty. 88 Brzezinski argued that the Afghanistan crisis was a major watershed in the 
American-Soviet relationship, and he led the creation of a "general consensus" that the 
US needed to respond with a "broad strategy. " America's objective had to be to 
"ostracise and condemn the Soviet and to reinforce regional confidence. id9 He hoped, 
however, that it might be turned to advantage as it would strengthen arguments with 
the Europeans over the installation of the Pershing II and ground launched cruise 
missiles. 0 
The cvcnts confirmed the worst fcars of Mcntc's critics in the West. Afghanistan, likc 
Vietnam, came to have associations in both East and Wcst far beyond its geographical 
meaning. Anthony Ilyman labels Carter's reaction to the Soviet invasion as one of 
`overreaction and bluff at the same time. "91 Carter accused the Soviets of a "blatant 
violation of the accepted rules of international bchaviour. i92 The US special envoy 
Clark Clifford told reporters in New Delhi that "T"he Soviet Union must understand 
that if they move toward the Persian Gulf, that means war. "93 Thus, in the US 
perspective the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was the worst example of 
Communist colonialism. The people of Afghanistan under the Soviet-backed Marxist 
regime had been systematically denied the right to self-determination. The 
independent, neutral and non-aligned status of Afghanistan had been violated. The act 
of intervention was described as a transgression of the Helsinki Final Act (197$) that 
upheld the basic international norms of sovereign equality of states, inviolability of 
frontiers, opposition to threat or use of force, non-intervention in internal affairs and 
equal rights and self-determination of pooplcs. 94 
The decision to defer the SALT 11 treaty was undertaken with considerable trepidation and was a 
personal disappointment for President Carter because it set back die process of detente and arms 
control. See Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 473. 19 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 429; see also Raymond Ganhoff. Detente and 
Confrontation, p. 828. 90 The New York Timer (7 August 1980), p. A2. f1 Washington Post (5 January 1980), p. I; see Presidential Documents, No. 16 (14 January 1980), pp. 
23.27. 
Quoted in Kessing's Contemporary Archives (9 May 1980), p. 30233. 
The Times of India (5 January 1980), p. 1. 
Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, So%let Violation of Iielsinkl 
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2-3. US Strategy of Sanctions 
The rationale behind the US sanctions was to provide the Soviets with incentives for 
leaving Afghanistan. According to Vance, getting Soviet forces out of Afghanistan was 
the administration's "fundamental objective! '" The punitive measures were to serve 
that objective by maximising the costs of their presence and by providing them with 
incentives for departing, i. e., the potential restoration of business as usual. The 
administration recognised, however, that there was little chance that sanctions would 
lead to an early withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. " As Kim Richard 
Nossal argued, there was little evidence that anyone in the Carter administration 
entertained a serious expectation that the Soviet Union would actually bow to the US 
sanctions and withdraw. i97 Thus, the more immediate objectives of the US sanctions 
were to punish the Soviets or to "make Soviet involvement as costly as possible, " and 
to deter them from committing other transgressions. 9° Similarly, Vance described the 
initial measures as "strong and calculated to make Moscow pay a price for its brutal 
invasion. "99 
The forceful response was intended to contribute to the deterrence of future 
"Afghanistans" by impressing on the Soviets that any subsequent event of the same 
kind would be subject to very severe penalties. In an interview with the Wall Street 
Journal in January 1980, Brzczinski made administration thinking on this point explicit 
by stating his belief that: 
.... there is going to be a great deal of turbulence in the course of the Eighties and that there will be a major temptation for our adversaries 
to exploit that turbulence and that therefore it behoves us to inakc it 
very clear in advance that there are also costs to succumbing to that 
tcmptation. 100 
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, (louse of Representatives and the Commission on Security 
sf and 
Cooperation In Europe, 97th Cong, Ist seas., (22 July 1981), pp. 1-3. 
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The Carter administration designed a forceful reaction to communicate to Moscow and 
it was intended to demonstrate the depth of the American conviction that the Soviets 
had crossed a line, broken the rules and thereby undermined the basis for a constructive 
relationship. The administration drew up a menu of options and President Carter chose 
most of those available to him, even outdoing his hard-line National Security Adviser 
in the process. This choice led one critic to denounce the administration for going 
"overboard in tossing almost everything movable onto the sacrificial bonfire of 
sanctions "101 However, in some respects, the positions taken by the key players in 
those deliberations marked a reversal of the usual roles. Except on the critical issue of 
relations with China, Vance favoured a more forceful response than did Brzezinski. 
According to Carters recollections: 
It was interesting that on these punitive measures, the State 
Department advocated stronger action than the NSC staff. a reversal 
of their usual attitudes. Brzczinski was remarkably sober, concerned 
about future relationships with the Soviet Union. I was sobered, too, 
by my conversation with Senator Fritz Hollings (about the political 
impact of a grain embargo in the Midwest) and by our strained 
relations with the Soviets, but I was determined to make them pay for 
their unwarranted aggression without yielding to political pressures at 
homc. 102 
Brzczinski advocated a much broader embargo of grain sales to the Soviet Union and 
reinstitution of selective service registration. 1°3 On the other hand, the administration 
was facing a challenge from Senator Kennedy, Vice-President Mondalc and Carter's 
domestic political advisers adamantly opposed to a grain embargo. However, initially 
President Carter cut off the sale of 17 million metric tons of grain which had been 
ordered by the Soviet Union and called on the other major grain exporting nations to 
stop their supplics. '04 The grain embargo was potentially the most powerful of 
sanctions, because the Soviet Union had suffered a series ofpoor harvests. The Soviets 
purchased 6 million tons, mostly from Argentina, to make up for the blocked American 
101 Quoted in Department of State Iiulletln No. 80 (March 1980), p. 38; and we Gar hoff, Detente and 
Confrontation, p. 956. 1°2 Caner, Keeping Faith, p. 476. 101 Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 431.432; see also Cyrus Vance. hard Choice, p. 391. 10" Mark Allen Heller, "The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, " in Nimrod Novik and Joyce Stan, 
Challenges In the Middle East: Regional Dynamics and Western Security (New York: Praeger, 
1981), p. 17; see also Presidential Documents, No. 16 (14 January 1980), p. 41. 
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tonnage, thus suffering a net loss of between ten and twelve million tons. "' Carter's 
modest expectations were clear in the following comments on the grain embargo: 
We do not anticipate that this withholding of grain to the Sovict Union 
will force them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. We 
understood this from the beginning. We don't think that economic 
pressure or even condemnation by the United Nations of the Soviet 
Union will cause them to withdraw their troops. But we hope that we 
have laid down a marker and let them know that they will indeed 
suffer, now and in the future, from this unwarranted invasion of a 
formerly independent, non-alig cd country. 106 
On 3 January 1980, Carter asked the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Byrd, not to bring 
SALT II to the floor for a vote but to leave it on the calendar for future action. "' While 
the move had the incidental of ect of adding to the list of punitive measures directed 
against the Soviet Union, it was taken entirely for defensive reasons. Carter feared that 
the Senate, then in the grips of a strongly anti-Sovict mood, would seize the 
opportunity to vote on, and defeat the treaty. Thus, Carter suggested that SALT would 
have to be indefinitely postponed. 'oa 
Carter cancelled the American athletes' participation in the 1980 summer Olympic 
Games in Moscow and prohibited sales of goods and technology for the Olympics-109 
He used his executive authority to ban sales of high technology or other strategic items 
(mostly computers, electronic devices and oil drilling equipment) pending a review of 
licensing policy. 110 Carter cancelled the US-Soviet export agreement of 1975 and 
for President Carter at a news conference. 19 April 1980. See American Foreign Policy Documents 449. 106 "1lostage in Iran, Invasion of Afghanistan, " Department of State Bulletin, No. 80 (March 1980), pp. 
34-35. 
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announced a cutback in Aeroflot flights to US to two pcr. wcck instead of the usual 
three stipulated in the US-Sovict Civil Aviation Agreement. At the same time the 
president received assurances from the leaders of major West European nations that 
their governments supported this important measure. 
The administration decided to curtail Soviet fishing privileges in US waters and 
imposed sanctions on fish sales to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, whose fleets of 
trawlers and giant factory ships had previously ravaged the fishing banks off New 
England, was allocated a small quota of fish of certain species which it could take from 
the American zone. Carter revoked all Soviet fishing rights. This reduced possible 
Soviet catches by 350,000 metric tons annually, cutting some 4 percent from the Soviet 
world-wide catch. Also the Carter administration imposed an embargo on the export to 
the Soviet Union of fertiliser and truck components. The administration also decided to 
delay the opening of new consular facilities in New York and Kiev. ' 11 On 21 January, 
after receiving reports that trucks produced in the Kama River truck plant (a plant 
supported by heavy American and other foreign investment) were being used in 
Afghanistan, Carter ordered the revocation of previously granted licences for spare 
computer parts for that plant. In early March 1980, Vance stated that the sanctions 
would remain in force until "all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan. "I 2 The 
suspension of high-level contacts was an exercise in signalling that was, paradoxically, 
designed to foster real communication precisely by the disruption of the normal modes 
of exchange. Carter's interest in this kind of signalling is at least implicit in a 
discussion of sanctions in his memoirs: 
We also nccd to have a wcll-conceived strategy for economic warfare 
against the Soviet Union if it should become necessary in order to 
restrain its aggressive tendencies-some expanded form of punitive 
action, like the grain embargo, which could be effective, but one 
major step short of war. A maximum effort should be made to include 
our allies in this planning, so that they will be firmly committed to 
111 This particular move was disheartening to Ukrainian nationalists, who believed that the opening of the 
consulate would enhance Ukrainian prestige and expand contacts between Ukrainian and foreigners. 
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take joint action, and the Soviet leaders will undcrstand clearly in 
advance the serious consequences to them of additional aggression. 113 
Carter bclicvcd that sanctions themselves could have compcllcnt power. I lc suggested 
that recourse to the grave step of economic warfare would be at least partially intended 
as a signal to the Soviet leaders that they should not be kept in the dark about the 
gravity of the situation. Thus, Afghanistan cpitomiscd a broader impasse in US-Soviet 
relations, an impasse that arose from a pattern of Soviet conduct that was 
fundamentally incompatible with a relationship previously characterised by such 
cooperative endeavours as expanding commerce, cultural tics, and even arms control. 
The superpowers were at a crossroads and from the United States' point of view, the 
Soviet Union had some profound choices to make which Carter articulated in his State 
of the Union address: 
The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: 
will it help promote a more stable international environment in which 
its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it 
continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security 
needs and use that power for colonial conquest? The Soviet Union 
must realise that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will 
be costly to every political and economic relationship in values. "4 
Carter also directed that various steps be taken to send clear warning signals to the 
Soviets and to enhance the ability of the United States to exercise military power in the 
Persian Gulf region. On 4 January the administration decided to maintain a permanent 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean and five days later, it was announced that the US 
would seek the regular use of facilities in Oman, Kenya and Somalia. At the same time, 
the Department of Defence ordered the nuclear-powcrcd aircraft carrier Nimiz to join 
two conventionally-powcrcd carriers, the Midway and the Kitty llawk, which had been 
dispatched to the area south of Iran for manocuvrcs. On 12 January, the US informed 
Britain that it planned to upgrade the facilities on Diego Garcia. ' is In the same move 
the US sent ß"52s to overfly Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, 
a move fraught with nuclear symbolism. 116 
11' Jimmy Caner, Keeping Faith: Memories of President, pp. 588-589. 114 WCPD, NO. 16 (28 January 1980), p. 196. "S ticiºing's Contemporary Archives (9 May 1980), p. 30233. Zia Richard Betts, Nuclear 1llackmatl and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D. C.: Brookings, 1987). p. 
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The Carter administration established the "Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force" 
(RDJTF) to enhance the US strategic position in the region. The RDF later became the 
US Central Command (CENTCOM), with responsibility for 19 countries spanning 
Southwest Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. Pakistan, with its strategic 
location near the Gulf, was accorded a critical allied role. Much of US aid to Pakistan 
at this time came from CENTCOM-linked aid. The US administration began 
production of long-range cruise missiles and allocated $14 billion to be spent on 
facilities which were to be linked to the rapid deployment force to the Indian Ocean 
region. 117 This force had the capacity to land upwards of 60,000 troops in the area 
under wartime conditions. The Rapid Deployment Force came into existence in 
October 1979.118 On 4 January 1980, after the Soviet invasion, the administration 
announced its decision to station the RDF on a permanent basis in the Indian Ocean. 
The administration proceeded to bolster its naval presence in the area by deploying two 
carrier task forces, and making available 800 aircraft for airlift. Oman, Kenya and 
Somalia agreed to provide access facilities to the US naval forces in the area. 119 The 
major objective of strengthening the US military position was to deter or prevent the 
Soviet Union from moving towards the Persian Gulf region and to overcome logistical 
difficulties faced by the US in the region, which hindered rapid mobilisation. 
2-4. Carter's Military Support to the Afghan Mujahideen 
Initially, the Carter administration was slow to go beyond economic coercion in its overt 
policy preferring to engage in covert operations. 120 During the first year of the Soviet 
invasion, CIA Director Stanfield Turner worried that supplying arms to the Afghan 
muJahideen resistance fighters would simply encourage them to commit suicide in a 
hopeless struggle against a much more powerful opponent. But later both Carter and 
Turner were convinced that the'nujahldccn were determined to fight on, whether or not 
they received outside help. It was, Turner remembers, "not a big struggle" to gain 
Carter's approval for covert support to the mujahtdccn: 
117 R. K. Ramazani, "Weapons Can't Replace Words" Newsweek (22 September 1980), p. 17. III Lewis C. Sowell, Base Development of the Rapid Deployment Force: A Mlodow to the Future 
(Washington, D. C.: National Defence University, 1980). P. I3. 
Gray Sick, 'The Evolution of US Strategy and the Indian Ocean. " in Alvin Z Rubinstcn (cd. )., The 
Great Came: Rivalry In the Persian Gulf and South Asia (New Yotic: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 
74. 
tm Carter administration allocated $30 million for Afghan resistance in the year of 1980 and about $50 
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The primary thing we discussed was how we were going to pull it off, 
and that meant getting Pakistani cooperation. I explained to him how we 
were going to send Sovict-madc weapons [through Pakistan) because we 
did not want knowledge of our own involvement to get out. "" 
Carter was determined to make the Russians pay a heavy price for the Afghan war. 
"Soviet involvement, " Carter directed, was to be made "as costly as possiblc. i122 Carter 
told a student audience in 1981 that covert action had been the best way to resist Soviet 
aggression in Afghanistan, short of "going to war, which was not possible. " 23 Turner 
also reported "that the Carter administration, despite its dedication to human rights and 
its considerable reservations about the morality of covert actions, turned easily to covert 
devices.... " Carter approved what Turner discreetly describes as "a wide variety of 
covert operations"124 and took a number of measures to begin a programme of aid to 
Afghan mujahldecn. 
At the 28 December NSC meeting in which reassurances to Pakistan were discussed, 
plans were made to "further enhance our cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
regarding Afghanistan, " a euphemism for covert aid to the m, ja/ddccn. 12S Subsequently, 
the Special Coordination Committee (SCC) of the National Security Council decided to 
supply light infantry weapons to Afghan rcbcls. 126 Carter also approved the dispatch of 
weapons to the mujahldecn and within two weeks of the invasion, CIA arms shipments 
began to arrive in Pakistan. In its modest beginning, the US covert programme involved 
$20-30 million in arms. 127 When Carter approved shipment of weapons to mu jahldeen, 
that shipment came from Egypt and according to President Anwar Sadat: "the first 
moment that the Afghan incident took place, the US contacted me about channelling 
Soviet-made arms to the mujahldecn from Cairo on US planes to Pakistan. "28 More 
III Soo Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American 
Presidency from Washington to hush (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), p. 448. t== Ibid. 
t: 4 The Washington Post (7 October 1982). 
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and South Yemen. See Admiral Stansficld Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition 
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modem American weapons replaced the Egyptian stocks-129 The Egyptian government 
also trained two thousand Afghan mujahidccn (mostly belonging to the Gulbuddin 
Kckmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani groups) in the use of Soviet weapons. For this 
purpose, the Afghan mujahideen received training in the military schools of Alexandria 
and Cairo (Abbasia). 130 Saudi Arabia also assumed a central role in financing arms 
flows to the guerrillas. Moreover, the Saudis, who provided substantial military aid to 
Pakistan, were instrumental in persuading President Zia to permit the weapons flow. 131 
The Carter administration made a gesture of support for the Afghan refugees by 
declaring the week of 17 July to 27 July 1980 as Afghanistan Relief Neck and 
proclaiming 21 March 1980 as Afghanistan Day. In his sanctions speech of 4 January 
1980, Carter referred to the "small nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which 
had hitherto not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union. "32 In the same speech, 
Carter condemned the Soviet invasion as the deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic 
government to subjugate an independent Islamic peoplc. '33 In a 20 January interview on 
Afect the Press, Carter asserted that "they [the Soviets) cannot invade an innocent 
country with impunity. "' 14 The Carter administration contributed SS million in 
emergency refugee funds for the Afghan relief programme of the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNIICR) and $300,000 in grant aid for voluntary agency 
efforts. 
Caricr's decision to approve aid to the mufahtdccn appears to have come after difficult 
domestic debate. Turner claims that "we had some moral dilemmas in the 
beginning. ""' Vance, too, may have had qualms'36 but opposition was minimal and 
Congress displayed not the least hesitation. In contrast to the bitter divisions that arose 
over covert aid to anti-Communist forces in Angola, Nicaragua and Kampuchea, the 
129 Tim Weiner, Black Check: The Pentagon's Black Budget (New York: Warner, 1990), pp. 146-48 
130 The Egyptian Islamic Brother-Hood Party had close association with Kekmatyar's party I leab-i"ialami 
and Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami. During 1980.81, the Islamic Brotherhood provided hospitality to 
Afghan ms/ahfdccn. The New York Times (8 August 1980); Gulf Nt s (17 March 1981); and see 
Al-Ahram (23 July 1984). 
IM Bernstein, "Arms for Afghanistan, " p. 9. 132 WCPD No. 16 (14 January 1980), p. 25. 134 Ibid., p. 26. 1.4 Quoted in Department of State Bullctln, No. 80 (March 1980), p. 29. týf The issue was morally troubling because of the strong possibility that covert aid to a losing cause 
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Iran and Afghanistan prompted die administration to turn "easily and quickly to covert devices to 
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issue of covert aid in Afghanistan engendered broad, bipartisan support and little 
debate. On 9 January 1980 members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
were briefed and according to press reports, none raised objcctions. 13' This was 
probably due to the modest size of the covert programme, which was little more than 
symbolic in its early stages and, of course, to the widespread and deep sympathy for 
the Afghans and the opprobrium attached to the Soviet intervention in the United 
States. However, it is interesting that the issue did not generate more controversy, 
either initially or later when it acquired greater military significance. The CIA acquired 
Soviet-made weapons from Egypt to transfer to the Afghan muJahidccn to prevent a 
direct revelation of the US connection. The operation began with a small budget of $30 
million in 1980 but expanded to $700 million within the first three years. '" The US 
provided assistance to Afghan mujahidecn with the hope that the Soviet forces would 
be defeated. 
At the beginning of 1980s, an election year, Jimmy Carter was certainly vulnerable to 
domestic political pressures. As a candidate for re-election, he seemed extraordinarily 
weak. Until the end of 1979, Carter's public approval rating was so low that "it seemed 
impossible that he could win the Democratic nomination, " much less the general 
election. 139 Carter was being challenged for his party's nomination by Edward 
Kennedy, heir and apparent vindicator of his brothers' unfulfilled destinies. In July 
1979, preference polls showed that Kennedy led Carter by 36 percentage points among 
Democrats. 140 
Kennedy's challenge proved brittle, in large part because of Afghanistan and the 
hostage issue. But in the political climate of 1980, Carter was highly vulnerable to a 
challenge from the right. The Republican hawks were assertive and Carter's 
Republican rival Ronald Reagan gleefully roasted Carter for his alleged naivete 
towards the Sovicts, 141 for having "lost" Nicaragua and Iran, and for giving away the 
tM According to Turner, Vance "was unenthusiastic about almost all covert actions and firmly opposed to 
all paramilitary ones, " Ibid., p. 88. III 1lenry S. Bradaher, Afghanistan and the Sovlct Union, p. 223. III See Tim Weiner, Black Check: The Pentagon's Black Budget (New York Warner Books, 1990), 
t)9Pp. 
144-147. 
Kathleen A. Frankovic, "Public Opinion Trends, " in Gerald Pompcr ct al, The Election of 1980: 
Reports and Interpretations (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1981), p. 99. 140 Paul R. Abramson, John 11. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 
Elections (Washington, D. C.: CQ Press. 1982), p. 20. tot During the election campaign Republican distributed photo of Carter kissing Brezhnev at Vienna and 
it created a negative Image in domestic politics. 
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Panama Canal. '42 Moreover, pressures for a tough response to Afghanistan were, of 
course, greatly magnified by the hostage crisis, which was nothing less than a national 
obsession. Indeed, the Afghanistan crisis produced an outpouring of anti-Soviet 
sentiment and even longshoremen refused to unload cargoes from Soviet ships, while 
angry citizens poured Russian Vodka down drains. t43 The President's responses to 
Afghanistan were enormously popular. Public approval for Carter's policies was as 
follows: the grain embargo 86 percent; the high-technology embargo 74 percent; 
increased defence spending 78 percent; reinstitution of draft registration 73 percent; 
and the Olympic boycott 67 percent. 144 Support for the use of force to preserve access 
to the Persian Gulf commanded a majority of 60 to 80 percent and a majority also 
favoured a commitment to the defence of Pakistan and provision of military equipment 
to China. 14s Even in Congress, Carter received overwhelming support for practically all 
of the measures adopted in response to Afghanistan and "it's almost as though they are 
giving him a blank check (sie). "116 
In both general and specific ways, there was something to the domestic-politics 
explanation of Carter's anti-Soviet moves. Given the mood of the country and the 
Republicans' scathing criticisms of Carter's leadership, there would have been a strong 
presumption in favour of responding forcefully to the Soviet invasion, whatever the 
administration's beliefs about the threat or about appropriate responses. Carter's 
foreign policy had appeared ineffective and incompetent to prevent the Soviets' 
aggression. His policy toward the Soviet Union seemed inconsistent, ambivalent, 
defensive and plagued with starts and stops. '47 , 
In addition, upcoming election cast long shadows and domestic pressures for a 
forceful reaction were matched by international expectations for assertive American 
leadership. In the case of Carter, such pressures were magnified by Carter's reputation 
142 Carter's sensitivity to the charge of appeasing the Russians was evident well before the presidential 
campaign. An incident that occurred when Carter travelled to Vienna to meet Brezhnev is both 
amusing and revealing. Mindful of scoop Jackson's comparison of Carter to Neville Chamberlin, the 
President ordered that no umbrellas be produced, even though it was raining when he arrived in 
Vienna. According to one account, Caner said, "I d' rather drown than carry an umbrella. " The 
account is taken from Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT 11 (New York: Harper 
Colophon, 1979), p. 7. 143 "Who Needs Their Vodka?, " Time (28 January 1980), p. 11. 144 "In a Fiercely Hawkish Mood, " Time (4 February 1980), p. 22. 145 5 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.. The Doctrine of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982), pp. 34243. t'º Quoted in "Drawing a Line Around the Persian Gulf, " Newsweek (4 February 1980), p. 23. ýýý IToward Jones, The Course of American Diplomacy, pp. 387.588. 
140 
for weakness and vacillation; a series of prior Soviet transgressions, real and perceived; 
and the humiliating display of American helplessness in Iran. I laving "lost" Nicaragua 
and Iran to unfriendly regimes, Carter might well have responded as Kennedy did in 
defence of his commitment to Vietnam in 1961: "there arc limits to the number of 
defeats I can defend in one twelve-month period. I have had the Day of Pigs and 
pulling out of Laos and I can't accept a third. "" Carter had to cope with what might 
be called the lost-country syndrome. Every president since Truman (Democratic 
presidents, especially), had been acutely aware of the harsh political fall-out that could 
ensue from "losing" countries to the Soviets (or, earlier, to Communism). There were, 
however, two manifest differences between, say, Johnson's deep-seated fear of being 
politically roasted for losing Vietnam and Carter's situation. Afghanistan was lost at 
the time of the Communist coup, when Carter was the prisoner of the hostage crisis. 
There was no question of preventing or reversing its loss through the direct use of 
Amcrican forms. 
The Soviet invasion also convinced the USA to establish close tics with China. The 
Carter administration had offered China non-lcthal military equipment and reaffirmed 
an earlier decision to sock special treatment for China on high technology transfers. 
Harold Drown, Carter's Secretary of Defence, talked publicly about the evolution to 
"potential partnership" between the United States and China1/9 and raised the issue of 
Washington and Beijing working "in parallel" to assist Pakistan. 130 Brown also 
confirmed the evolution of a military security relationship with China in the following 
words: 
We would deepen and broaden bilateral areas and bcgin to discuss the 
areas in which both sides had common strategic objectives. There arc 
a growing number of such areas and none more urgent than the area of 
South Asia. 'st 
141 Quoted in Robert Jervis, "Domino Beliefs and Strategic Behaviour, " in Robert Jervis and Jack Snydct 
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Although the Brown visit produced no formal accord, it initiated a series of discussions 
that intensified the strategic nature of the Sino-Amcrican relationship and specifically 
led to the subsequent conclusion of several economic and security agreements. This 
was an attempt to create a Beijing-Washington and Islamabad axis as a counterpoise to 
Soviet expansionism. The effort to establish a coordinated collective response to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a whole-hearted endorsement of the US policy 
approach. Brzezinski argued that geopolitical considerations could be given priority 
over diplomatic ones. He wanted to adopt an offensive policy to resist the Soviet 
aggression. He advised President Carter to take the military option to oppose the Soviet 
adventure. He indicated that the Soviet route was directed towards the Persian Gulf and 
warned that its expansionist ambitions must be rcpcllcd by any means, including the 
use of military force. 152 
3. Reagan's Grand Strategy 
The Soviet arms build-up and invasion of Afghanistan contributed to Ronald Reagan's 
landslide victory in 1980 and provided justification for his administration's massive 
arms spending and support of anti-Communist insurgencies in the Third World to 
prevent Soviet global advcnturism. Reagan's policy towards the Soviets was striking 
because it emphasised a much more proactive approach to countering the Soviet 
Union. When Reagan entered the White I louse, the position of the US appeared to be 
at an all-time low. But America under Reagan's leadership reasserted itself on the 
international stage and presided over a major shift in the global balance of power at 
Moscow's expense. Reagan believed the root of US foreign policy problems lay an 
unwillingness to stand up to a clearly expansionist enemy, a lack of political will to 
promote the political and economic values that distinguished the US and a refusal to 
use military power to secure US interests and valucs. 153 
In Rcagan's time, the American policy swung from "supcrdovcs" to "supcrbawks"154 
to maintenance of global prestige and strategic advantages. Supcrdovcs were looking 
for victory in the Cold War with the assumption that in the long run the Soviet Union 
would crumble in the face of American competition and pressure. Supcrhawks still 
'! = See Facts on File, No. 40 (8 February 1980), p. 80; and see Raymond Ganhofi Detente and 
Confrontation. pp. 154.164. '" David Mervin, Ronald Reagan and the American Presidency (London: Longman, 1990). pp. 165- 
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basically subscribed to the long-established strategy of containmcnt. 155 This was a 
time, when the Soviet Union expanded its domination in the Arabian Peninsula, in 
Southwest Asia, in Africa and in Latin America. However, its reversals started when 
the Reagan administration took extreme action to prevent Soviet military adventurism 
in Afghanistan. 
Reagan's supcrhawk advisers called for the total isolation of the Soviet Union. They 
argued that the Soviets were in deep trouble economically and militarily. They 
suggested that the United States should not only strive for military superiority but also 
cut Moscow off from all Western loans, credits and trade. U6 Reagan also realised that 
without strong defence, the US could not deter the Soviet aggression. Thus, weapons 
were used in supporting rather than front-lincs roles--apart from those which were 
supplied to "allies" in select areas outside the central fronts, such as Nicaragua and 
Afghanistan. Supcrhawks criticised the ostensibly principled human rights policies of 
the Carter administration on the basis of "double standards" Jeanc Kirkpatrick a 
political science professor, appointed as Reagan's UN ambassador strongly attacked 
Carter's policies and questioned "how morally defensible was it, to cut support for 
Somoza in Nicaragua and the Shah in Iran when the regimes that came to power in 
their wake (the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas, the Ayatollah Khomeini and Islamic 
fundamentalists) were not just authoritarian but totalitarian? While authoritarians were 
not democratic, at least they largely limited their repression to the political sphere; 
totalitarian regimes sought "total" domination of the personal as well as the political 
spheres of life. " Kirkpatrick claimed that Communists often were far more repressive 
than other leaders. She explains that this argument rcsquarcd the circle, casting 
principles and power as complementary once again. The contras were freedom fighters, 
nothing less than the "moral equal of our Founding Fathers. 157 
The Reagan administration showed its determination to increase the United States' 
nuclear and conventional capability, in order to extend its deters cc and so prevent 
Soviet agrcssion against the US and its allies. A problem had arisen when the 
supcrdovcs unilaterally cut back on US defence programmes and Moscow accelerated 
154 Richard Nixon, Victory Without War 1999 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 3988). pp. 58-62. 135 C. J. Bartlett, The Global Conflict: The International Rivalry of the Great Corers, p. 377. tM Ibid., p. 59. S7 Bruce W. Jentleson, "Discrepant Responses to Falling Dictators: Presidential Belief Systems and the 
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its arms build up, and moved from a position of strategic parity to decisive superiority 
in land-based ballistic missiles in the later 1970s. 158 The supcrhawks realised that the 
marginal Soviet nuclear superiority had challenged the credibility of the United States 
and there was no option except to increase the defence budget and to build up offensive 
strategic forces (land-based missiles). In this regard, the Reagan administration also 
decided to negotiate an arms control agreement with Moscow to create a stable and 
enduring balance of power. 
3-1. I'cacc Through Strength 
In fact, detente not only had failed to bring about peace, but as far as Reagan and his 
colleagues were concerned, it had been used by the Soviets "as a cover for their 
traditional and basic strategy of aggression. " Reagan stated in his rhetorical punches 
that "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they were not 
engaged in this game of dominoes, there would not be any hot spots in the world. ", 39 
The reference to the early Cold War domino theory16° was intentional but the Soviet 
had not changed one iota as far as Reagan was concerned. Democrats like Carter, and 
even Republicans like Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Henry Kissinger, had been 
deluding themselves, and endangering the country, to think the Soviets had changed. 
However, with Reagan, peace was not going to be achieved through negotiations. His 
administration set out to reassert America's international prestige with the notion of 
"peace through strength" against Third World revolutionaries as well as the Soviet 
Union and its allies. " 
In this regard, power considerations were the basis for the Reagan military build up. 
The Reagan administration set itself the task of reversing perceived deficiencies. The 
"window of vulnerability" that the Rcaganitcs bclicvcd had opened up because of the 
combined effects of the Soviet nuclear build up and the Carter "defensive neglect" 
15' Ibid. 
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needed to be closed. Reagan's national security advisers were anti-Soviet hardliners' 62 
drawn heavily from the "Committee on the Present Danger, " the nucleus of 
conservative opposition to the SALT 11 Treaty. The Committee on the Present Danger 
believed that the Soviet Union had not only acquired a first-strike capability, but was 
also prepared to use it. George Shultz, the US Secretary of State 1982-88, defined the 
new Reagan strategy by stating that while "it was once our goal to contain the Soviet 
presence within the limits of the immediate post-war reach, now our goal must be to 
advance our own objectives where possiblc. i163 The Reagan strategy, therefore, not 
only consisted of a renewed willingness to contain Soviet expansion but also envisaged 
an ambitious policy of confronting and perhaps even reversing Soviet gains on a world 
wide scale. This approach sought to explode the myth that history was on the side of an 
implacably hostile Soviet Union. Indeed, Reagan was also convinced that reinvigorated 
superpower competition would prove the Soviet Union was weak rather than strong. In 
a speech at Notre Dame University in May 1981, he asserted that "the West will not 
contain Communism; it will transcend Communism. "'" 
In practice, Reagan's 'containment plus' strategy consisted of two key elements. The 
first was the rearmament of America to a point where, in Reagan's own words, "no 
enemy will dare threaten the United States. "165 Reagan insisted that his administration 
had to increase the size of the US nuclear arsenal in order to close a "window of 
vulnerability, " that the alleged nuclear superiority of the Soviet Union had created for 
the United States. As a consequence, defence spending went up from S171 billion to 
$376 billion between 1981-1986, the greatest peacetime military build-up in US 
history. New nuclear weapons systems, such as the 13.1 bomber, the Trident Il D-5 
SLDM and the MX ICBM, the Pershing 11 IRBM were rapidly developed, along with 
an increase in naval ships from 454 to 600, including 15 aircraft carrier groups. '" A 
general weapons modernisation and ammunition replenishment started in the Navy, 
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Army, Air force and Marine Corps. 167 The go-ahead was given for deployment in 
Europe of the Pershing II and ground launched Cruise missiles. 
In addition, on 23 March 1983, Reagan announced the Strategic Defence Initiative 
(SDI), popularly known as "Star Wars, " the long-term military programme to defend 
the United States against ballistic missile attack. 168 This programme was to some 
extent balanced by the growing flexibility of the Reagan administration in its dealing 
with the Soviet Union from 1984-85. Moreover, Reagan's SDI was not only useful in 
forcing the Soviets to negotiate seriously but also created the possibility of deploying a 
limited defence. Nixon supported Reagan's SDI programme and indicated that, "if 
Reagan had not proposed SDI, the Soviets would not be negotiating arms control. "69 
In fact, the SDI provided diplomatic advantages to Washington to claim that it was in a 
position to negotiate from strength. Thus, Reagan's military build up created two main 
shifts in deterrence doctrine. First, the Reagan administration was much more sceptical 
of arms control than the Nixon and Carter administrations. Security had to be 
guaranteed principally by one's own defence capabilities to gain more bargaining chips 
to bring the Soviet to the table. Second, the Reagan administration doubted the security 
and stability of the MAD doctrine. The supcrhawks advocated replacing MAD with 
Nuclear Utlisation Targeting Strategy (NUTS) which constituted a nuclear war- 
fighting capability. 170 They believed that by having the capacity to fight a "limited" 
nuclear war, deterrence would be strengthened-and the United States would be in a 
position to "win" the imposed war. 
A resumption of arms talks took place in November 1985 at Geneva bctwecn Reagan 
and Gorbachev and they combined to call for a 50 percent cut (in broad terms) in the 
superpower strategic arsenals, for an interim agreement on intermediate range nuclear 
forces, and for steps to prevent an arms race in space. A second round of talks between 
Reagan and Gorbachev was held in December 1985 at Reykjavik and both leaders 
considered halving their strategic nuclear forces over five years. They also decided that 
INF weapons were to be removed entirely from Europe, with each power retaining 100 
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on its own territory (in Asia in the case of the USSR). '7 An impasse was reached over 
the future of SDI but Reagan refused to accept the Soviet demand that there should be 
no testing of space weapons outside the laboratory during the next ten ycars. 17 
Gorbachev consistently used his options to try to get the Reagan administration to 
abandon the SDI as part of a deal to cut strategic forces by 50 percent. The Reagan 
administration firmly took the stand that, without landmark concessions, there would 
be no compromise on SDI research, testing and development, because SDI was the real 
counter measure of Moscow's advantage in offensive land-bascd weapons. 
In spite of a strong political reaction by the peace movement in Europe, NATO stuck to 
its commitment to deploy 572 Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Western 
Europe after the Soviets refused to withdraw their SS-20 missiles. 173 In addition, the 
Reagan administration decided to develop a number of highly sophisticated weapons 
systems in order to stretch Soviet resources to the limit if the Soviets tried to compete. 
Its rearmament policy provided the United States with a much stronger position to 
negotiate with the Soviet Union. Conventional arms increases were planned to enable 
the United States to meet a crisis without early resort to nuclear threats. It was also 
hoped that an enemy challenge could, if necessary, be met by what was described as 
"horizontal" rather than "vertical [or nuclear]" escalation. Moreover, Reagan and his 
advisers wanted to close the perceived window of vulnerability and they wanted to use 
an arms race as an instrument of technological superiority- to strain and bankrupt the 
Soviet economy. The Reagan strategy toward the Soviet Union amounted to what a 
senior White House official called "a full-court press. " 74 Instead of assisting the 
Soviet Union in maintaining an inefficient economic system with US trade and credits, 
the Reagan administration intended to disrupt the Soviet economy by denying it critical 
resources, hard currency earnings from oil and natural gas exports and access to 
Western high technology. Moreover, the Reagan administration's military build-up and 
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economic squeeze undoubtedly increased the strain on the Soviet economy and thereby 
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist idoology. 175 
3-2. The Reagan Doctrine 
The Reagan administration considered the Soviet Union as a major cause of tensions in 
the Third World and was determined to prevent its influence by all means. Reagan 
wished to adopt a hard-line, consistent policy with the Soviet Union that combined 
deterrence, competition and negotiation. He also expanded America's military forces to 
counter the Soviets' global "game of dominoes. "176 In July 1982, the Reagan 
administration responded to a Soviet-backed Ethiopian incursion into Somalia by 
airlifting military aid to Somalia to shore up the regime of Siad Barre. '77 The CIA 
Director, William Casey, persuaded Saudi Arabia to cooperate with the US in lowering 
oil prices on the world market. This move helped to slash Soviet hard currency 
earnings, which relied heavily on energy exports-178 Then, in October 1983, the US 
troops invaded Grenada and overthrew the Marxist-Leninist regime. Moreover, the 
Reagan administration reinvigorated the CIA and provided it with expanded military 
and financial means directly or indirectly to subvert the Soviet Union. The CIA also 
extended covert aid to Solidarity in Poland against martial law and anti-Communist 
guerrillas movements in a number of Third World countries, such as Nicaragua, 
Angola and Cambodia, as well as Afghanistan. 179 
The Reagan administration had a propensity for acting covertly to deal with 
Communist regimes by arming right wing anti-Communist guerrilla movements 
against Communist expansionism. 18' Reagan said that Marxism-Leninism would be 
left on the "ash heap of history" and predicted that Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
173 Yevgenmy Novikov (a former Soviet KGB General) admitted during interview with Peter Schweizer 
that Reagan policies were the major factor in the demise of the Soviet Union. See Peter Schweizer, 
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177 Robert G. Patman, The Soviet Union In the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and 
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Union itself would experience "repeated explosions against repression. ""' In his most 
celebrated statement, on 8 March 1983, Reagan called the Soviet Union an "evil 
empire" and he made no apologies for this anti-Soviet message. 11c also proclaimed, "I 
believe that Communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last 
pages even now are being written. "' 82 This tone was linked to the imperative of 
negotiating from strength. The harsh language also made clear to the Soviets the 
resilience and strength of the West: it made them understand the lack of illusions on 
the Western part about them or their system. Reagan told to Casey "We learned long 
ago that the Soviets get down to serious negotiations only after they arc convinced that 
their counterparts are determined to stand firm"193 
A second major feature of Reagan's strategy was a sustained ideological offensive 
against the Soviet Union. From the outset, the Reagan administration attacked the 
USSR with the same rhetorical fervour that Moscow had always reserved for its own 
attacks on the West. President Reagan accused the Soviet leadership of reserving "the 
right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" in order to attain "a one-world Socialist or 
Communist state. ""' Such strong language signalled that the administration rejected in 
principle the perception of the possible co-existence of a free world and a Communist 
world. Reagan made it clear that his opposition was not confined to aspects of 
Moscow's external behaviour but centred on the Soviet system itself. 
t" In the 1985 
State of the Union address, Reagan overwhelmingly supported the anti-Communist 
liberation movements in the world and announced that arms exports were the linchpin 
of his administration's global anti-Communist crusade. He claimed that "the US had a 
moral responsibility to assist groups and movements fighting for freedom and 
democracy. "186 President Reagan proclaimed US support for the Afghan people "in 
111 Reagan Address to the Dame University students in 5 May 1981. See details New York Times, (6 
May 1981). 
11= Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy, p. xiv. 
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their historic struggle in the cause of liberty. "187 He also declared the policy and 
asserted that: 
You are not alone freedom fighters. America will support with moral 
and material assistance - your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win frccdom - in Afghanistan, Angola, 
Combodia and Nicaragua. We must not break faith with those who arc 
risking their lives - on every continent, from Afghanistan to 
Nicaragua - to defy Soviet-sup, ortcd aggression and secure rights 
which have been ours from birth. ' ° 
A third feature of Reagan's strategy was a policy of support to anti-Sovict rebels. Anti- 
government insurgencies were in progress against Soviet clients in Angola, Ethiopia, 
Nicaragua, Mozambique, and Cambodia as well as Afghanistan. Most of these rcbcl 
movements combined fierce internal resistance with growing military aid from the 
United States or regional actors to disrupt severely the Soviets client rcgimcs. 
'89 
Interestingly, in Reagan's time, US arms control, defence and foreign policies also 
underwent important and long-term changes after the Soviet invasion. The Reagan 
administration's massive defence build up under the "Reagan Doctrine, " its increased 
aid to insurgencies against Soviet clients in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and later Angola 
and Cambodia, its uncompromising arms control policies on strategic and 
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), and a demonstrably greater willingness to 
use US military forces in regional conflicts such as those in Lcbnon and Grenada, all 
put considerable pressure on the Soviets. 
The Reagan doctrine developed as the basis not only for taking a harder line on global 
containment, but going further than ever before toward rolling-back communism. 
Where John Foster Dulles failed to deliver on rollback against the 1956 Soviet invasion 
of Hungary, the Reagan administration provided extensive military aid, weapons, and 
"President Reagan, "Statement on Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan, " Department of State Bulletin, 
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covert action for Nicaragua and the Afghan muJahldccn to fight against the Sovict 
Union. Reagan's tough stance in support of anti-Communist "freedom fighters" was 
quickly labelled the "Reagan Doctrine" by the conservative observer Charles 
Krauthammer, and the term stuck. 19° Brands claimed that Reagan Doctrine of "support 
for freedom fighters was based on self-defencc. '191 Afghanistan, Nicaragua and 
Angola represented visible manifestations of the Reagan Doctrine where covert and 
overt assistance was being provided to resistance groups or freedom fighters seeking to 
oust Marxist-Leninist govcmmcnts. Critics called Reagan a "reckless cowboy" who 
might steer the US to the nuclear brink. 192 The determination and commitment to the 
containment of communism in the Reagan period led to an aggressive policy of rolling 
back communism in areas of the Third World where nominally socialist governments 
had come to power with assistance from the Soviet Union. Thus, the Reagan 
administration was committed to arming the Afghan mujahideen with the purpose that 
Afghanistan should be the Soviet Vietnam. The Reagan Doctrine was a major 
instrument to contain communism and oppose tyrannical Communist regimes. It 
provided the stage for the death of Communist ideology and the demise of Soviet 
Union. 
The Reagan administration picked up the gauntlet and adopted a comprehensive 
strategy to compete with the Soviet Union. It was decided by the Reagan 
administration that the US must compete with the Kremlin not only within the Soviet 
bloc but also across the board. For this purpose, the administration used new 
communication technologies to exploit the Soviet internal weaknesses and put up a 
satellite capable of beaming television programmes throughout the Soviet Union 
against the violation of human rights, Communist ideology and the brutal Soviet 
system. Reagan gave the green light to the CIA to use all means "to Finlandisc the 
countries of Eastern Europe and to push for incremental increase in their freedom or 
190 When Reagan amplified this point in a mid 1970's interview with US News and World Report he 
asserted that "this nation should have a master plan, if you want to call it that, based on what we 
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independence from the Soviet Union. " 193 Thus, it was the commitment of the Reagan 
doctrine that the US must treat the Soviet-Afghan war, not as a peripheral conflict in a 
faraway place, but as a crucial battle with Moscow. 
4. The Washington-Islamabad Axis 
The Reagan doctrine asserted that the United States had a right to intervene against 
Marxist-Leninist governments because they had been brought to power by illegitimate 
methods. The Reagan administration added decisively to the difficulties of the USSR 
in Afghanistan with its arms supplies to the mu]ahideen and Afghanistan became one 
of the most successful covert operations centre since the Second World War. The 
avowed objectives of the US articulated in public statements were the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, restoration of the right of self-determination of the 
Afghan people, repatriation of Afghan refugees to their homeland and restoration of 
the non-aligned status of Afghanistan. The actual thrust of the US strategy was to 
escalate the costs of occupation by rendering military assistance to the resistance 
groups and to inflict the greatest possible damage to the credibility of the Soviet Union 
by keeping the tragedy in the international limelight. The Afghan operation, though far 
from flawless, was run by experienced CIA professionals. 
In 1983, the CIA was facing logistical problems to supply arms to the mujahideen. 
They needed a direct supply route and help from the Pakistan army and its agencies for 
the success of the Afghan war. For this purpose, Casey approached Zia ul-Ilaq who 
allowed Washington to use facilities in Pakistan as the logistical supply line to the 
Afghan resistance. After Zia's "green signal" to Casey, the support of the Reagan 
administration for the Afghan resistance gathered momentum. In October 1984, Casey 
secretly arrived in a specially equipped C-141 Star-lifter transport plane at a military 
airbase (Chaklala) south of Islamabad, to plan the strategy for the war against the 
Soviet forces. Zia warmly welcomed Casey when he entered the Presidential office. 
Casey showed some satellite pictures to Zia about the Soviet military deployments in 
Afghanistan and the placement of troops by Zia's arch-enemy, India. After the three 
hours long meeting, Casey assured Zia of the US's growing concern over the 
193 Richard Nixon, Victory Without War 1999, p. 151. 
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possibility of a Soviet thrust into Pakistan. Casey also passed on the president's 
reassurances that the US was fully behind him. 194 
In Islamabad, Casey also met General Akhtar Abdur Rchman, head of the Inter- 
Services Intelligence (ISI) and effectively, chief of the Afghan resistance movement. 
Casey discussed the battlefield situation with General Akhtar and both decided on the 
training programme which was essential in making the muJahldccn more effective. 
Both felt that professional military training for the mujahldccn was important because, 
without proper knowledge of war tactics and weapons, the war would not be made 
sufficiently costly for the Soviet Union. Moreover, General Akhtar provided 
information to Casey about the resistance, Soviet casualties, arms shipments and the 
requirements for weapons. Casey absorbed it all and began analysing ways to make the 
war more costly for the Soviet Union. 193 General Akhtar and Casey decided to give 
heavier weapons to mujahideen, including 122-mm rocket launchers and artillery 
batteries. General Akhtar demanded better quality surface to air missiles (SAMs) 
instead of SAM-7 to counter the Soviet airpowcr advantage. Casey promised to 
provide long range weapons to improve the quality of the war effort and to ensure that 
the mujahideen could more effectively "bleed" Moscow. Casey directed the CIA's 
officers to provide satellite intelligence data to the muJahldccn to target the Soviet 
installations and facilities in Afghanistan. The CIA took pictures by the satellite and 
sent them by courier to the CIA office in Pakistan and this intelligence data played a 
vital role against the Soviet-Kabul forces. ' % 
Casey offered CIA specialists in explosives and electronic devices to consult the ISI on 
special operations. For this purpose, the CIA trained Pakistani army personnel for the 
Afghan mujahideen to target Soviet sensitive installations deep inside Afghanistan. 
According to the New York limes report "in the mid 1983 the CIA and the ISI together 
launched secret operations to sabotage the Soviet military bases and instruments in 
Afghanistan. General Akhtar provided hundreds of ISI volunteers (Pakistani army 
soldiers) to carry out critical tasks-blowing up fuel depots, bridges, roads, and ammo 
dumps »197 In 1984 Casey and General Akhtar decided to provide artillery and rockets 
training to the Afghan mujahideen on professional military lines. It was necessary to 
1" Peter Schweizer, Victory, p. IS 1. 195 Ibid., p. 63. 1% Ibid., p. 118. 
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sec more effective results in the battlefield and to reduce the quantity of mujahideen 
casualties. For this purpose, the CIA and Pakistan army trained thousands of Afghan 
mujahideen within a year and sent them to the different battle areas inside Afghanistan. 
In March 1985, Reagan offered Pakistan a considerably expanded military and 
economic aid package and gave vague assurances of security for Pakistan against 
India. 198 The administration provided economic and military aid to Pakistan with the 
objective of reducing the potential for political instability and enabling Islamabad to 
resist Soviet military intimidation on the issue of Afghanistan. The US's overt position 
was that Pakistan's non-aligned status would not be affected and that the US would 
have no interest in establishing any military bases in Pakistan)" There was, however, 
evidence that the US undertook secret negotiations with Pakistan to arrange naval and 
air facilities on the Makran coastline in Baluchistan and near Karachi, for CENTCOM. 
In November 1986 General George Crist, the Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM, 
visited Pakistan with a high military delegation, amid conjectures that President Zia 
had agreed to give the United States the requested facilities 200 The speculation was 
fuelled by reports that the US Agency for International Development (USAID) had 
funded the construction of major highways and airfields, as well as other infrastructural 
development works on the coast. 
5. Reagan's Support to Afghan hfujahideen 
Reagan took power and appointed William J. Casey Director of the CIA in late 1981 to 
contain communism in the world. For Casey, Soviet communism was not a new threat 
but part and parcel of the totalitarian menace previously posed by Nazi Gcrmany. 
201 In 
mid 1981, the US and Saudi Arabia spent millions to get arms for the mi fahidecn to 
counter Soviet adventurism in the region. The Saudi government agreed to match 
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dollar for dollar202 the US total expenditure for Afghan war, because the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan was also widely interpreted in Saudi ruling circles as a move 
toward the Persian Gulf to capture rich oil fields on the Arab peninsula. 203 
In fact, Afghanistan was the major target of the Reagan doctrine and it was one of the 
most extensive and sophisticated covert operations in American history. In early 1982 
the CIA planned a comprehensive covert programme to support the Afghan 
mu]ahideen. Casey had ordered the Directorate of Operations to seek out and recruit 
Afghans living abroad to help run the international conduit of arms to the rebels. By 
the spring of 1982, the CIA had trained more than one hundred Afghans in the art of 
international arms shipping and after a short time they were coordinating the purchase 
of arms and arranging shipment to the mu jahideen under the guidance of CIA 
officials. 204 The CIA purchased arms from the international market with Saudi Arabian 
money and transferred them to the ISI for the Afghan mujahidecn. The CIA went to 
great lengths to keep the Afghan project secret; only six agency officials on the ground 
handled the entire operation. Rifles, ammunition and rockets were supplied through 
crates marked "television sets" and "appliances. " The ISI officials were put to work 
carrying the equipment by unmarked trucks to the muJahldccn staging areas? os 
The CIA provided funds, weapons and general supervision of support for the 
mujahideen, but day-to-day operations and direct contact relied on the ISi 206 The CIA 
supplied the mujahideen with extensive satellite reconnaissance data of Soviet targets 
on the Afghan battlefield, plans for military operations based on satellite intelligence, 
intercepts of Soviet communications, tons of C-4 explosive material for urban sabotage 
and guerrilla attacks and anti-tank missiles. The CIA also purchased arms on the 
international market with Saudi money and flew them from Dhahran to Islamabad. The 
CIA paid an advance for weapons that could hurt the Soviets--AK - 47s, grenade 
launchers and mines. 207 
202 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981.1987 (London: Simon Schuster, 1987), p. 
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Casey succeeded in upgrading appropriations for the Afghan aid programme to $80 
million for the 1981-82 fiscal year, and he was to play an increasingly active role in 
administration policy debates on Afghanistan as he consolidated his power during the 
years thereafter. The US and Saudi Arabia agreed to enhanced military cooperation 
under a general package that included favourable American reviews of Saudi requests 
for arms purchases and Saudi support for Afghan refugees, muJahideen and for 
Pakistan. 208 The Saudis also began to discuss an $8.5 billion weapons deal with the 
United States and ultimately the Reagan administration approved the sale of extra-fuel 
tanks and bomb racks for their F-15s, four KC-135 tankers, an unspecified number of 
AWACS and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. 209 In this regard, Casey helped to push 
through the AWACS sale in return for Saudi agreement to give large-scale support to 
anti-Communist covert action programmes, especially in Afghanistan. 21° The CIA was 
also taking weapons and ammunition from China and flying over sensitive areas of 
Kashmir. A variety of states-China, Egypt, Israel and Britain-were chipping in and the 
contributions were being brought to the port of Karachi. The Pakistani ISI then loaded 
the cargo on heavily guarded trains, which carried it to Islamabad and to the 
Baluchistan coast. 2 
One of the great supporters of the Afghan mujahtdecn was Congressman Charles 
Wilson. He argued that "the Afghan war is the right war at the right time and $30 
million is peanuts for this good war. " lie wanted revenge for the 58,000 American 
killed in Vietnam by Russian weapons. During the House Appropriations Committee 
meeting for the Defence Department budget, Wilson said he wanted only one thing - 
garbage. We want to bleed the Soviet and with your low standard of weapons, the Soviet cannot pay a 
price. " On the other hand, the Saudis were also unhappy to learn how Cairo was spending their money, 
since the Saudi government was providing substantial funds to support Sadat's government. Sec Peter 
Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy, p. 10; we also The Washington 
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more money for the Afghan rebels? 12 Wilson was successful in providing the extra $40 
million for the Afghan operation in July 1980 and an additional $50 million in July 
1981. Thus, under the Reagan doctrine, US military aid to the Afghan mujahidecn rose 
from $80 million in 1983 to $120 million in 1984, $250 million in 1985, $470 million 
in 1986 and $630 million in 1987.213 The Washington Post estimated that the US and 
Saudi Arabia contributed about $1 billion per annum to the Afghan mujahtdecn and 
Saudi Arabia alone provided $250 million annually. 214 Western sources indicated that 
the US indirectly supplied non-US bazookas, mortars, grenade launches, mines, 
Kalashnikovs (AK-47) a few anti-aircraft missiles, and money to the Afghan 
mujahideen through Pakistan. '" Western sources estimated that approximately $5 
billion in weapons was supplied to the mujahideen during 1982-1989 and a 
conservative estimate of $5.7 billion worth was sent to the mujahideen through 
Pakistan216 There were 50,000 tons in all, arriving annually for the mujahidecn. 
However, the number of arms in the pipeline had jumped sharply: 10,000 rocket- 
propelled grenades and 200,000 rockets arrived for the me jahldeen in 1985 217 
According to one estimate, the US humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees reached 
$45 million per year during the 1980s but covert aid to the resistance ran at nearly $600 
million annually. 218 Thus, the Afghan war became a cash and carry for the CIA-the 
Americans provided the tens of millions and the Pakistanis ran the war. 
At this time, the Reagan administration was divided between two factions, each 
advocating its distinct policy approach to the crisis. The "negotiation" led by under 
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Secretary of State Michael H. Armacost with support from the National Security 
Council pressed for an early negotiated settlement of the Afghan crisis. The main 
actors, among them Congressmen Gordon Humphrey and Charles Wilson, opposed a 
negotiated settlement. In view of the heavy investment by the Reagan administration in 
the Afghan crisis [$2.6 billion] an unconditional settlement was considered detrimental 
to the US interests. On the other side, the hawks advocated strongly for the greatest 
possible damage to the Soviet Union. Charles Wilson opposed the cessation of aid to 
Afghan resistance groups and he gained a significant vote in the Congress to continue 
support to the Afghan mujahidecn groups219 In April 1985, the president signed 
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166 which outlined a strategy to drive 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available. "220 The Reagan directive used 
bold language to authorise stepped-up covert military aid to the mujahldeen and it 
made clear that the Afghan war had a clear goal of defeating Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan through covert action. 
Thus, Casey and the Reagan administration were satisfied that the mujahidcen were 
running sophisticated and large-scale operations, more effective as compared to the 
past. MuJahideen units once equipped with bolt-action rifles now marched into 
Afghanistan searching for sofft targets using high-technological weapons and hitting 
Soviet air bases. New radio communications systems with effective ranges of up to 600 
miles were now being used. Moreover, the United States Congress continued to be 
active in supporting the struggle of the Afghan muJahtdccn struggle against the Soviet 
Union. In 1987 Congress appropriated as much as $660 million for the mu]ahldccn, 
and in 1988 they received an average of $100 million a month worth of arms. 221 By 
mid-1989, the United States and Saudi Arabia had agreed to supply $600 million each 
to the mujahideen by the end of 1989; an additional $100 million from the United 
States brought the total to $1.3 billion u2 It is interesting to note that most of the 
215 Richard P. Cronin, "Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: US Foreign Policy Considerations, " Issue Brief, 
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financial aid and military equipment went to Gulbuddin ückmatyar and other Saudi 
affiliated groups extensively enjoyed the US, Pakistan and Arab assistancc. 223 
5-1. US Stingers for Afujahldeer: ', 
The Mujahideen air defence was ineffective and confined to heavy machine guns and a 
small quantity of unreliable, Soviet-designed SA-7 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), 
obtained from defecting Afghan army troops or supplied covertly. The Soviet SA-7 
also had proved largely ineffective, especially after Soviet and Afghan aircraft were 
equipped with flares to distract such heat-seeking missiles us The CIA supplied 
Blowpipe, a British-designed SAM to maintain plausible deniability but it was not a 
"fire-and-forget" weapon, so that the mujahidecn would be vulnerable to attack as they 
stood in the open to guide the missile onto its target with a joystick. The Swiss-made 
Ocrlikon anti-aircraft gun was supplied to the mujahideen to counter Soviet air attacks. 
Reports surfaced that British missiles were being used in Afghanistan 226 British 
secrecy laws worked effectively to ensure that the details of British covert aid would 
remain unknown, but there was "sufficient evidence" to indicate that Britain provided 
sophisticated missiles to the mujahldcen, probably the Blowpipes. 7 
By early 1985, the CIA and Reagan administration were both compelled to reassess 
their approach to the mujahidecn because the Soviet forces had sharply escalated 
but Saudi Arabia and Kuwait continued to provide about $535 million to $1 billion in 1990 before 
Saddam Hussain invaded Kuwait on August 2,1991. Under the Reagan administration, Saudi arms 
lifts to the rebels increased to an estimated value of S 1.5 billion. Sec details in Muhammad Yousaf and 
Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (London: Mark Cooper, 1992), pp. 102, 
106, and 117. 223 Gulbuddin Ilekmatyar also received $10 million from Libya and Iraq to use for weapons purchases 
from China. See Muhammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, 
p. 40. 
ýý The Sanger is a thirty-four-pound, five foot, anti-aircraft laser-guided, shoulder-mounted portable 
missile. The US Congress appropriated $65 million for Stinger, twice their original cost. At the end of 
war a few were recovered, but about 200 to 400 were not found. On June 6,1985, Pakistani leaders 
also asked the US government for Stingers and Sidewinders for Pakistani forces. Later on the United 
States provided twenty Stingers and a larger number of Sidewinders only for use by Pakistan's own 
forces to counter Soviet air attacks on Pakistan territory. See more detailed analysis about this issue in 
Weiner, Black Check, pp. 150-71; and Selig S. Harrison and Diego Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, 
223 pp. 
194-201. 
Alan J. Kuperman, 'The Stinger Missile and US Intervention in Afghanistan, " Political Science 
Quarterly Vol. 114, No. 2 (1999), p. 226. 
Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981.87, p. 316; and Selig S. I larrison and Diego 
Cordovez, Out of Afghanistan, pp. 158-159. 227 As Payne notes, the Soviet lodged a official protest in July 1987, accusing the British of providing the 
resistance with the "newest weapons, including the Blowpipe anti-aircraft systems. ". See Richard J. 
Payne, The West European Allies, The Third World and US Foreign Policy: Post. Cold War 
Challenges (Westport, Connecticut City.: 1991), p. 116. 
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attacks against the mujahldeen and their weapons pipeline on the Pakistan border, 
putting the mujahideen in an indefensible position and the whole course of the war at 
risk. 28 On the other hand, US officials received news that the Soviets were prepared to 
invade Pakistan 229 In the circumstance, the US aid was no longer limited to enabling 
the mu]ahideen to "harass" the Soviets and also to protect the security of Pakistan. As 
well as satellite reconnaissance and other US intelligence to assist the mujahideen and 
Pakistani special forces for targeting the Soviet and Afghan army installations, 
demolition expertise and secure communications technology were supplied? 30 
Secretary of State George Shultz reported that both he and the CIA's Casey "fully 
supported the measures" to protect the basis of mujahideen and Pakistan security. 21 
In mid 1985, Zia ul-Naq asked Casey for effective weapons to protect the border area 
of Pakistan from Soviet aircraft incursions. The CIA took seriously the request for 
high-technology weapons such as Stinger surface-to-air missiles. 
232 Congress 
reportedly authorised more than $65 millions in secret funds for the purchase of 
Stingers and the CIA ultimately supplied these missiles for an estimated $200,000 
each. The 35-pound Stinger missile, considered at the time the world's most advanced 
portable missile, was designed to hit low-flying aircraft at a distance of about three 
miles. It had a sensitive infrared guidance system that homed in on heat emitted from 
the aircraft engine or exhaust. It also had a system that identified aircraft as friend or 
foe. The ISI trained hundreds of mujahidcen to operate Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. 
The supplying of the mujahideen with hand-held Stinger heat-seeking missiles, never 
previously used in combat, was a major turning point in the Afghan war. 
233 The 
Reagan administration supplied Stinger to the Afghan mujahidecn, the first time that an 
ultrasophisticated weapon not shared with some NATO allies had been distributed to 
any rebel group. The US Defence Department allotted only three hundred Stingers, by 
the approval of Congress, for both the Afghan resistance and for use in Angola. 
234 In 
September 1986 the US supplied 250 launchers, 1,000 missiles and hundreds of 
us The New York Times (19 June 1986). 
229 Alan J. Kuperman, "The Stinger Missile and US Intervention in Afghanistan, " p. 227. 230 Washington Post (19 July 1992 and 20 July 1992). 231 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 1087. 232 The New York Times (12 July 1985). 
233 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York* Charless 
Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp. 692 and 1087; Mohammad Youwf and Mark Adkin, Bear Trap: 
Afghanistan's Untold Story (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), p. 182. Brigadier Yousaf, head of the 
Afghan Bureau of Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from 1983.1987, cooperated with the CIA 
in supplying the Mujahideen with Stingers. 234 Alan J. Kuperman, "The Stinger Missile and US Intervention in Afghanistan, " pp. 226-234. 
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Stingers to the mujahideen 235 This was a most effective weapon in Afghan conditions 
and it was also a most damaging instrument against Soviet aircraft. Stingers were first 
used on 25 September by three mujahideen concealed near Jclalabad airfield, not far 
from the Khyber Pass. As a group of Soviet Hind helicopter gunships approached the 
airfield, each mujahideen selected a target and waited until a pinging noise from the 
launcher indicated that the missile was locked onto its target. To shouts of "Allah-o- 
336 Akbarl" (God is Great), five missiles were fired and three Hinds were shot down 
With the arrival of the Stingers, the Soviet forces lost most of their ability to use 
helicopters and low-level aircraft against muJahldccn positions. The tide of the war 
began to turn because of the Soviet loss of air supremacy. The Stingers forced Moscow 
to reduce its reliance on airpower and turned the tide of the war, forcing the Soviets to 
withdraw from Afghanistan. This weapon gave the resistance increased confidence and 
mobility against Soviet forces and enabled rebel forces to shoot down an average of 
more than one Soviet aircraft or helicopter per day. Thus, Stinger was a "silver bullet" 
against the Soviet-Afghan aircraft which began to fall from the skies as never before 
and within two months the Soviet Politburo had set a deadline for withdrawal of its 
troops. It is hard to imagine that the Soviet Union would have withdrawn at all, much 
less withdrawn unconditionally, if the mujahideen had lacked the military strength that 
foreign aid helped provide. 
By early 1987 there were already signs that the Soviet Union was planning a 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. After a visit to Moscow at the end of 1986, the Afghan 
leader, Mohammad Najibullah, reported to the Communist Central Committee in 
Kabul that Soviet troops were to be withdrawn in one and a half to two years time. This 
was a reflection of how the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985, 
followed by his summit meetings with Reagan at Geneva in November 1985 and 
Reykjavik in October 1986, had changed the atmosphere of East-West relations. On 8 
February 1988 Gorbachev announced that Soviet forces would withdraw from 
Afghanistan by mid-May 1988 and would complete their departure within ten months. 
Thus, by the time Reagan arrived in Moscow for his fourth summit on 29 May 1988, 
235 Selig I iarrison, "A Break Through in Afghanistan, " Foreign Policy (October 1983), p. 472. 2M A video of the attack was rushed to Washington and shown to Reagan in die Oval Office. Its quality 
was disappointing. The Mujahideen cameraman had become so excited during the attack that he had 
been unable to stand still. Much of the video thus consisted of blurred images of sky, scrub and 
ground. The cameraman steadied himself aller the shoot-down. and the president was able to see black 
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Soviet troops had begun to leave Afghanistan. As Reagan strolled across Red Square 
with Gorbachev, one reporter asked him whether he still thought the Soviet Union was 
an "evil empire, " "No, " replied the president. "I was talking about another time, 
another era. , 237 One of Gorbachev's predecessors, Reagan was convinced, "had vowed 
to pursue the Marxist commitment to a one-world Communist state. " Gorbachev was 
"the first not to push Soviet expansionism, " and Reagan believed that he marked a 
break with the past 238 On 20 January 1989, Reagan's presidency came to a peaceful 
conclusion and he said to General Colin Powell, that "the world is quiet today. "239 
According to Kissinger, this was the triumph of Reagan's foreign policy, because the 
Cold War ended with the dawn of a new American cra. 21O The Soviet empire collapsed 
even more suddenly than it had erupted beyond its borders and the US reversed its 
attitude toward the new Russia, from hostility to friendship. 
smoke billowing from the wrecks of three helicopter gunships. See Mohammad Yousaf and Mark 
Adkin, Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story, pp. 174-76. 237 Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, p. $00. 23ý Ronald Reagan, An American Life, paperback od. (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), p. 707. 
Don Obcrdorfer, The Turn: Ilow the Cold War Came to an End (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992). p. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The US-Pakistan Strategic Partnership 
An alliance is not a love affair, but it cannot stand without a basis of 
mutual trust and respect. ' 
-Dr. Wilhelm G. Grcwc, 1961 
The major function of this chapter is to demonstrate the motives which have, for nearly a 
decade, guided the behaviour of the United States and Pakistan in the international 
environment. Both countries' strategic and political alignment was motivated by mutual 
strategic interests in the defence of South Asia and the Middle East. The United States 
was concerned for the defence of these regions and declared a policy of checking the 
expansion of Communist aggression and influence in areas considered vital to the 
security interests of the United States. To Pakistan, there was only one contingency 
involving external attack to which a reasonably high probability could be assigned: an 
attack by Kabul and New Delhi. However, Pakistan gained importance to the United 
States in view of its strategic location and pro-Western orientation. The interests of the 
two states overlapped significantly, giving them powerful motives for cooperation. The 
following discussion will include the major factors that helped shape these motives and 
the initial steps that the two countries took to achieve strategic partnership. 
Alignment has long been associated with the balance of power. In political terms, an 
alliance's objectives are to maximize gains and share liabilities. The decision to align (or 
not to align) in what form, and with whom is made with reference to national interests. 
Security is the chief interest governing alignment between two unequal states. Weak 
states with security fears rely on a stronger power as a reaction against the threat from 
another strong power. ' In theory, the relation of alliances to the balance of power is 
simple enough but actually, states enter into alliances with one another in order to 
supplement each other's capability. Thus, alliance is a means of reducing the impact of 
Dr. Wilhelm G. Grewc, the German Ambassador to the United States. in an address before the Ford 
Ilall Forum in Boston in 1961. Quoted from Deane and David heiler, The Ilcrlin Crisis: Prelude to 
World War Ill? (Derby: Monarch hooks, 1961), p. 21. 
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antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which threatens one's independence. The 
objective is to check or divert pressure with counter pressure, applied at the point of the 
adversary's initiative or at his weakest point; the art is to achieve the best possible results 
within the limits of existing resources. Moreover, associations of alliance between equal 
and unequal states depend on the existence of identical interests. The interests may be 
identical from the outset; or they may be capable of becoming identical in and through 
the association, or capable of merging in a higher, more inclusive, common interest. 
International actors select their goals before entering in a crisis arena and they will use all 
possible means to achieve their objectives. In the wake of the Afghanistan crisis the 
United States adopted a multi-pronged approach involving actions at several levels. They 
also worked out unilateral and multilateral strategies to counter the Soviet aggression. 
1. Revival of US - Pakistan Relations 
In the 1970s Pakistan was internationally isolated and relations with the United States 
were at their lowest ebb. The country was not a priority area for the US administration 
because of its undemocratic system, violations of human rights, and its efforts to acquire 
a nuclear weapons capability. In fact, the US administration always treated Iran and Saudi 
Arabia as the principal allies of the United States in the Persian Gulf region. But the 
Afghan crisis dramatically altered the administration's policy toward Pakistan and it 
became a most important country, in the changed circumstances. The United States, 
which had followed a low profile policy towards the region since 1971, overnight 
changed its policy and began to plan a major role in the area. 
Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US administration took a hard line with 
Pakistan's nuclear programme. Pakistan perceived that the Carter administration had 
adopted an ambitious countcr-prolifcration policy. In the 1970s, through policies of 
denial, control, persuasion and cooperation, France was forced unilaterally to cancel the 
fully IAEA safeguarded 1976 Chashma reprocessing plant deal with Pakistan! One year 
2 George Liska, Nations In Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: The John IIopkins 
Press, 1962), p. 13. 
Ibid. 
4 President Jimmy Carter (1977.1981) who assigned a high priority to the cause of non-proliferation, 
vigorously worked for the annulment of the Francd-Pakistan nuclear deal. The US efforts to stall 
Pakistan's attempts to procure a reprocessing plant succeeded when in August 1978, France accepted 
the American suggestion to cancel the deal. See more details in P. 1. Checma, "Pakistan's Quest for 
Nuclear Technology, " Australian Outlook Vol. 34 (August 1980), pp. 188.90; and ilasan Askari 
Rizvi, Pakistan and the Geostrategie Environment (London: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 92. 
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later, President Carter had lifted the ban to India, in June 1977, on shipments of highly 
enriched uranium for Tarapur nuclear plant. 5 On the other hand, Carter, in spite of events 
in Iran in 1978 and in Afghanistan in 1978, invoking the Symington-Glenn Amendment, ' 
cut off all economic and military assistance to Pakistan and this action was considered by 
Pakistan as "moral relativism, " which politicised the nuclear issue and created almost a 
national consensus within Pakistan. For the United States, the nonproliferation policy 
linked the issue of nuclear exports to the acceptance of full-scope safeguards by all 
recipients, whether or not they were signatories to the NPT. 7 The United States initiated 
the formation of the London Suppliers Group (LSG) to control the supply of sensitive 
nuclear items to potential proliferators. Its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (1978) had 
imposed moral norms on nuclear commerce. Pakistan regarded US nuclear diplomacy as 
selective and discriminatory toward the Third World in general and Pakistan in particular. 
In the Pakistani view, there was a touch of irony to the whole nuclear issue. The United 
States had never censured India for its nuclear programme, which, despite its peaceful 
appearance, was actually close to nuclear weapons production. The US administration 
was, however, very concerned about Pakistan's nuclear programme. ` The Pakistanis 
asserted that the US concern was premature, since there had been no official decision 
either to carry out a nuclear test or carry out any nuclear weapons research, and they 
argued that no test was likely in the near future. But the US did not want Pakistan to 
undertake a nuclear weapons research programme, or to export or import nuclear 
technology likely to help in any weapons research. 9 
The US Congress imposed a ban on Pakistan's aid programme in April 1979 because of 
the country's refusal to halt its nuclear programme. The Congressional order to cut off 
Pakistan's economic and military assistance had further convinced Pakistan of American 
bias. The Carter administration cut off aid all development assistance as well as 
Shafqat All Shah, "Pakistan's Perceptions of US Domestic Politics, " in Leo C. Rose and Noor A. I lusain 
(ed. )., United States-Pakistan Relations (Berkeley: University of California. 1985), p. 101. 
Under the Symington and Glenn amendment, in order to continue aid, the President had to certify 
annually that the country did not possess 'a nuclear explosive device' and called for a cutoff of 
economic assistance to any country which did not accept safeguards on dangerous nuclear technology. 
Moreover, the Symington Amendment forbade US assistance to countries that pursued nuclear 
enrichment technology and refused to give assurances that they were not developing nuclear weapons. 
See Keesing's Contemporary Archives (6 July 1979), p. 29701; (11 September 1981), p. 31074; and 
(17 September 1982), p. 31707. 
Sec sections 699 and 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in Legislation on Foreign 
Relations Through 1981 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 177.81. 
Shirin Tahir-Kheli, The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship 
(New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 124. 
Far East Economic Review (23 November 1979), p. 23. 
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commodity loans, except those covering food under PL-480 (a long-standing US aid 
instrument which provides surplus American food grains to developing countries). This 
law directly affected Pakistan's military aid, which for the last few years had been 
running at a level of around $45 million in development assistance and grants for military 
training. 10 On the other hand, military sales worth $25 million and more were already 
subject to prior Congressional approval. US laws also prevented international agencies to 
provide development aid to Pakistan. 
In reply to Pakistan's protestations, it was proposed that research facilities be opened to 
inspection to ensure that no weapons-grade plutonium or other fissionable material was 
being stockpiled. But the Carter administration considered that Pakistan's programme 
was well advanced and there were apprehensions of possible weapons production. His 
administration thought that Pakistan had to be made a test case to demonstrate the 
seriousness of their nonproliferation objectives. It was also believed that since the 
Pakistani nuclear programme was financed by Saudi Arabia and Libya, Islamabad might 
be obliged to provide the "bomb" to one of these two countries and it would be injected 
into the Arab-Israel conflict" By contrast, the Carter administration's benign attitude 
toward the Indian nuclear programme had puzzled Pakistanis. In September 1980 the 
Carter administration managed to push through Congress the sale of some thirty-eight 
tons of enriched uranium to India. '2 Pakistan believed that, despite the official IAEA 
safeguard in this material the transfer had been carried out "with full knowledge of the 
evident fact that the building and stock-piling of nuclear weapons had continued in India. 
... [Moreover] the seriousness of Carter's commitment to nonproliferation was ... suspect 
because of serious and illogical discrepancies between treatment meted out to India and 
Pakistan. "13 
The other event which badly affected US-Pakistan relations was the burning of the US 
embassy in Islamabad on 21 November 1979 in which two Americans-a marine guard 
and an army warrant officer-were killed, together with four Pakistanis. '4 Morc than 40 
Americans and 76 Pakistani embassy staff were jammed in stifling heat in the embassy's 
10 For East Economic Review (23 November 1979), p. 23. tt Shafqat All Shah, "Pakistan's Perceptions of US Domestic Politics, " in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. 
Husain (ed)., United States-PakIstan Relations (Berkeley. Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985), p. 
101. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Tahir-Kheli, United States and Pakistan, pp. 129.130. 14 Dawn (22 November 1979). 
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vault in the burning chancery for nearly six hours waiting for Pakistani troops to clear the 
mob from the building. In fact, Pakistani forces reacted very slowly, responding only five 
hours after the beginning of the incidcnt. 's This was a reaction to an armed assault on the 
Grand Mosque, Islam's holiest of places, which whipped up a great deal of Islamic 
indignation in the Muslim world, particularly in Pakistan. The Pakistani demonstrators 
believed that the attack on the Grand Mosque at Mecca in Saudi Arabia was mounted by 
US and Israeli agents. In retaliation Pakistani mobs destroyed the US embassy in 
Islamabad as well as the American Cultural Centres in Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi. 16 
It was believed that there was certainly a large measure of organisation behind the 
violence and most of this was attributed to the Islam-i-Jamiat Tulcba, the youth wing of 
the highly-disciplined Muslim party, the Jamat-c-Islami. One commonly held theory was 
that a Radio Pakistan broadcast on the morning of 21 November 1979, giving details of 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's charge that Western imperialists and Zionists were 
behind the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by armed fanatics, was responsible. 
But it seems certain from the degree of organisation behind the demonstration, and its 
coordination with similar action elsewhere in Pakistan, that a move against the Americans 
in the name of Islam had already been planned. '7 
The attack on the Grand Mosque which houses the Kaaba and its sacred black stone, took 
place on the first day of Muharram, the beginning of the Muslim calendar. In that year, 
Muslims throughout the world had also begun a thrcc-ycar celebration to mark the turn of 
the 15th Muslim century. It was believed that the attackers chose the date deliberately to 
protest against the exclusion of Iran from the Islamic summit which was being held in 
Tunis. The Iranian aim was to show the strength of Muslims to the United States, to 
secure the cause of Iran. In this regard, Khomeini apparently had a large measure of 
support in the Muslim world, particularly in Pakistan, even though the majority of people 
are Sunni Muslims as opposed to the Shiite sect which predominates in Iran. 
Zia ul"Haq expressed deep regret and embarrassment about the US embassy incident and 
assured foreign missions in general and minority religious communities that they would 
be adequately protected in future. He also offered to build a new embassy for the United 
tr The situation was like a "black hole, " as the Americans ruefully recall; they had to squeeze to safety 
through an air vent, probably only a matter of minutes before they would have begun to be roasted 
alive. See Far East Economic Review (7 December 1979), p. 27; and Christopher Van h ollen, 
"leaning on Pakistan, " Foreign Policy, No. 38 (Spring 1980), p. 37. 
16 See Far East Economic Review (7 December 1979), p. 27. 
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States, a gesture which the Americans gratefully accepted, even though they doubted 
whether the Pakistan government could afford it, because the destroyed buildings in the 
31-acre compound had cost more than $30 million to build and at current prices new 
construction would cost at least $40 million. " These events hurt US-Pakistan relations, 
but the Soviet military invasion brought the West promptly to Pakistan's rescue with 
promises of renewed economic and military assistance: it also suddenly boosted 
Pakistan's declining prestige. Carter felt strongly about the Soviet intervention and 
viewed Afghanistan as a watershed in East-West relations. Moreover, the Afghan crisis 
provided an opportunity to both Pakistan and the US to come closer to contain Soviet 
expansionism. This being the case, Washington immediately revived its military 
relationship with Pakistan and thrust Pakistan into the role of a "front-line state. " 
Brzezinski (President Carter's National Security Advisor) dashed to Islamabad with the 
US military offer to Pakistan but Zia surprisingly gave it a cool reception and was 
reluctant to get involved with the US aid offcr. 19 General Fazal Ilaq, Zia's strong-man 
and the Governor of the NWFP, told Brzczinski, "You screwed up in Vietnam and Korea. 
You'd better get it right this time. "20 After Brzezinski's meeting with Fazal Ilaq, he had 
publicly affirmed that Washington would support Pakistan with military force if 
ncccssary. 2 
2. The New US-Pakistan Strategic Partnership 
After the Afghan crisis, the United States adopted multilateral measures to contain Soviet 
aggression and they believed that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan constituted a serious 
threat to Pakistan's security. For the United States, the task of repairing relations with 
Pakistan was formidable. Pakistan shared with the United States limited but important 
regional and global policy interests, especially a healthy concern for Soviet 
expansionism. In addition, Pakistan recognised that only the United States could 
potentially counter a threat from the Soviet Union. The task for Islamabad, then, was to 
maintain its access to US security assistance. Pakistan had no alternative means to 
minimise the intensity of the threats it faced. 
Ibid. 
Far East Economic Review (7 December 1979), p. 26. 19 Ibid. p. 100. m Christina Lamb, Waiting For Allah: Pakistan's Struggle For Democracy (London: ilamish 
I lamilton, 1991), p. 222. 
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The US administration reversed its earlier policy toward Pakistan because the country 
was intrinsically important in a location where the United States needed friends. Congress 
lifted the ban on its military and economic assistance and both countries established a 
partnership for the sole purpose of expanding the scope of America's policy of containing 
communism. According to Henry Kissinger. "Pakistan had never found the sympathy in 
the United States that India enjoyed, at least among opinion-making groups. "" The US 
always interpreted the arrangement to mean that it would assist Pakistan if the country 
were being attacked by the Soviet Union or a country or countries acting on behalf of 
Soviet policy. Thus, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan emphasised the common 
interests in the US-Pakistan relationship as it created the greatest threat since partition to 
Pakistan's northern border. The Carter administration's stand on non-proliferation was set 
aside, and it was argued that America's national interests demanded open support for 
Islamabad. The shift in US opinion, particularly in the media and in academic circles, in 
favour of Pakistan was phenomenal. The significant shift in Washington's official 
attitude toward Pakistan was reflected in the following statement: 
Pakistan's strategic location at the Eastern flank of the Pcrsian Gulf, 
makes it very important that we and US allies undertake a major effort 
to help Pakistan against the Soviet pressures and to become stronger 
and more self-confident. It is therefore necessary to help Pakistan to 
maintain a military force capable of meeting the emerging threat, to 
maintain levels of economic activity and standards of living capable of 
supporting US interests in the part of South Asia. At the same time, 
US strategy for the Persian Gulf was being outlined and Pakistan and 
other countries friendly to the United States were seen as being 
important to Washington in this context. 23 
US policy makcrs wcrc awarc that Pakistan occupied an important position in the rcgion 
and the Islamic nature of the people madc them a dependable bulwark against 
communism. In fact, the Sovict invasion of Afghanistan was a long-lasting turning point 
21 Ibid. 
u Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 849. 13 General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, spoke before a Senate subcommittee on 
March 17,1981. Ile pointed out: "We need to improve our linkages with the countries of South and 
Southwest Asia both to increase their confidence in our commitment and to facilitate our entry into the 
region if the threat dictates. We are particularly interested in improving certain facilities in a number of 
places in Southwest Asia that we could use as transit and staging or support areas rather quickly if a 
conflict were to erupt. We would prefer to maintain multiple facilities arrangements than to have a few 
large fixed bases for operations primarily because of the size of the area and the uncertainty of where 
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with lasting consequences, because the US revived its relations with Pakistan and 
strengthened the country's ability to defend its borders against Soviet incursions from 
Afghanistan. For the United States, Southwest Asia had acquired a critical importance 
and it was a region where the US policy and posture remained vulnerable. The Eurasian 
continent represented the vortex of global power and it was the US perspective that 
whoever dominated in the Gulf region would determine the outcome of the US-Soviet 
competition and would emerge as the preponderant world power. Therefore, it had been, 
and it remained, United States policy to ensure that no single hegcmon emerged as the 
dominant force over that enormous landmass. 
President Carter referred to Pakistan as a "front-line" state in the battle between the "free 
world" and the Communist empire. He also declared that the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan threatened the Persian Gulf - Indian Ocean oil supply line, and asserted that 
the United States would act alone if necessary to protect Middle East oil from a Soviet 
take-over. 24 The security threat to Pakistan's western border and US vital interests in the 
Persian Gulf forced both counties to narrow the differences between them. Moreover, the 
Afghan issue offered a fertile basis for a bilateral relationship that reflected mutual 
sensitivity to new realities and a more realistic assessment of what each had to offer. 
Pakistan wished to live in a secure environment where its continued survival would be 
ensured. The varied threats along Pakistan's borders were one of the major causes for 
Pakistan's search for outside balances and to come closer to the United States. The US 
also showed willingness to strengthen Pakistan as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, 
promote prospects for democracy, ensure the territorial integrity of the states in the 
region, and protect Western strategic and economic interests. In this regard, the US 
invoked the hitherto dormant 1959 Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation=s to reaffirm its 
conflict might occur. We would also like to increase participation by our Southwest Asian friends in 
regional security and exercises. " Sec Department of State Bulletin, April 1981, pp. 121.134. 24 Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years S%ar: The United States and the Soviet Union In World Polities 
1941.1991 (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 286-288. 2$ On S March 1959 the United States and Pakistan entered into the Bilateral Agreement of Cooperation 
whereby the US declared that "it regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace, the 
preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan. " After the Soviet intervention, these 
agreements were invoked by Washington to provide military aid to Pakistan. For details we, Council 
on Foreign Relations, Documents in American Foreign Relations, 1934 (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1955), pp. 373-383; In this regard, Article 11 assured the continuation of US military and 
economic aid to Pakistan and Article I of the agreement with Pakistan states that: In case of 
aggression against Pakistan, die Government of the United States, in accordance with the Constitution 
of the United States, will take such appropriate action. Including the use of armed forces, as may be 
mutually agreed upon and is envisioned in the Joint Resolution to promote peace and stability in the 
Middle least, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request. See US Department of State, 
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 10, pt. 1, (1939). p. 318. 
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commitment to Pakistan's security vis-A-vis the Soviet Union, and, as a gesture of 
solidarity, the National Security Adviser, Zbignicw Brzczinski declared that "the free 
world was to be protected from communism, whether it be of the Soviet Union, or some 
other variety, and Pakistan was an integral part of the denial plans. "26 
In Carter's 4th January 1980 sanctions speech, the President announced his intention to 
provide economic and military aid to Pakistan. 27 The United States wanted Pakistan to 
stay helpful rather than become irritatingly "neutralist, " like India. On the other hand, 
Pakistan was considering some form of accommodation with the Soviet Union, in case 
the West did not meet Pakistan's full demands, because of the feeling that Pakistan could 
not confront a neighbouring superpower. On 11th to 13th January 1980 Foreign Minister 
Agha Shahi visited Washington and Carter offered a modest two-year $400 million 
package of economic and military assistance, in roughly equal amounts. The offer, 
however, did not satisfy Pakistan. 
On 17 January, President Zia spoke bravely and vagucly of a rclationship "not of outright 
hostility, not of a camp follower, but as partners with equal rights" He peremptorily 
rejected Carter's offer as insufficient, calling it "peanuts" and "not even a drop in the 
occan. "28 He said: "You take Pakistan out of the region, and you will find that you have 
not one inch of soil where America can have inf ucnco-fight from Turkey down to 
Victnam. "29 Washington contemplated the sale of late model jet fighter-bombers to 
Pakistan but Zia added that the US offer was too small and the duration of the 
relationship too uncertain to attract Pakistan. In a rejoinder to the offer, he suggested that 
Pakistan's needs were roughly comparable to those of Egypt, a recipient of $3 billion in 
US aid 3° Zia declared heatedly that Pakistan was entitled to "no less, and in terms of the 
threat that we face, even more. "31 
Forcign Ministcr Agha Shahi complaincd: "Acccptancc of the US offer would have 
dctractcd from, rathcr than enhanced our sccurity. Also, we could not ignorc that US 
26 See Department of State Bulletin (Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, 1981), P. M. 27 "By jingo, help us to be men of peace, " The Economist (26 January 1980), pp. 4446. 28 lbid., p. 46; See also Prithvi Ram Mudiam, India and the Middle East (London: 1.11. Tavris, 1994), p. 
124; and William J. Barcds, 'The United States and South Asia: Policy and Process, " in Stephen P. 
Cohen, (ed. )., The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives (Illinois: University of 
Illinois Press, 1987), p. 157. 29 The New York Times (18 January 1980), p. 1. 30 Stephen P. Cohen, The Security of South Asia, p. 157. 31 See Independent (20 June 1987). 
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sensitivity to Indian reactions appeared to be determining the size and nature of the aid 
package. "32 In the same way, Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan criticised the value of 
US aid to Pakistan and stated, the acceptance of the small aid package means "Pakistan 
must cam the ire of the Soviet Union. America has no option in the region to check 
Soviet expansionism except Pakistan, thus, America must treat us fairly. "" Pakistani 
spokesmen also expressed serious doubts about US constancy and reliability. They 
further argued that if the United States were not more forthcoming, Pakistan would 
pursue understanding with the United States, but would also move toward 
accommodation with Moscow. Thus, there was genuine anxiety and concern about US 
reliability. 
Zia's government had also complained repeatedly about what it saw as the Carter 
administration's "ostrich syndrome, " and its "implacable lack of concern" over 
Moscow's growing influence in Afghanistan and the region more generally. 34 Zia also 
demanded that a formal security treaty replace the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement 
of 1954, an executive agreement. The government of Pakistan wanted to be assured that 
the US move was a part of a lasting policy and not an act of expediency intended to meet 
an isolated situation. In Washington, the issue of Pakistan was taken up at an NSC 
meeting on 28 December 1979 and a decision was made to offer reassurances to Pakistan 
and to send Warren Christopher there for consultations. 35 On a Sunday morning public 
affairs programme on 30th December 1979, Brzezinski affirmed that the United States 
stood behind the assurance extended to Pakistan in 1959 and he specifically stated that 
President Carter had authorised him to assure the Pakistani leadership that the United 
States would stand behind Pakistan to preserve its indepcndcnce. 36 On 1 February 1980, 
National Security Adviser Zbignicw Brzczinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher arrived in Islamabad to begin talks that would lead to a US aid offer to 
Pakistan, but Zia felt that the US "wanted to give a little aid, let Pakistan burn its bridges 
32 Quoted in ßhabani Sen Gupta, The Afghan Syndrome: Ilow to the Hhh Soßtet Power (New Delhi: 
Vikas, 1982), p. 150. 33 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With ZIA: Pakistan's Tower Politics 1977.1988 (Karachi: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), p. 334. N Ibid., pp. 73-75. 35 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle, p. 429. 36 Ibid., p. 448. 
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to the Soviet Union for ever, and then leave it in the lurch. "" Zia bluntly expressed his 
concerns: 
If the US is going to help Pakistan, let it come whole hog. If i accept 
such a meaningless level of aid, I will only provoke the Russians 
without really getting a defence against them. I will bum my bridges: 
Do you really want me to do that?. 8 
Carter reiterated the American commitment to Pakistan's security in his State of the 
Union address. The Brzezinski-Christopher mission was helpful in reducing friction with 
Pakistan. It acceded to Pakistan's request for support in the event of an Indian attack on 
Pakistan and promised that "the United States would prevent India from becoming a full- 
fledged ally of the Soviet Union. "39 According to Thomas Thornton, "Pakistan was 
aggressively preoccupied with the historic threat from the cast [India] to the detriment of 
common effort vis-i -vis the more real Soviet danger. "40 Zia was not satisfied with 
Brzezinski's oral assurances that India could not attack Pakistan. fie mentioned to 
Brzczinski that during the 1971 crisis, Mrs. Indira Gandhi had given assurances to the 
Nixon administration that India had no aggressive designs against Pakistan but India and 
the Soviet Union both dismembered Pakistan-41 Brzezinski replied that the problem of 
Afghanistan was strategic and global in nature. Ne argued that the USSR should not be 
allowed to consolidate in Afghanistan and expressed American unhappiness over the 
ambivalent stand taken by India on Afghanistan. 42 lie explained that "the US 
administration would be not willing to upgrade the 1959 executive agreement (which 
37 Noor A. Husain, "Pakistan-US Security Relations: Arms Sales, Bases, and Nuclear Issues, " in Leo C. 
Rose and Noor A. Ilusain, United States-Pakistan Relations (Berkeley: California University Press, 
1985), p. 6. ;s Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Sovict 
Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 57. 
79 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988, p. 333. 
40 Thomas P. Thornton, "Between the Stools?: US Policy Towards Pakistan During the Carter 
Administration, " Asian Survey Vol. 22, No. 10 (October 1982), p. 97 1. 
41 President Zia was on official visit to the United States on 3 October 1980 and former President Richard 
Nixon called on him. During an hour-long conversation. Nixon displayed a penetrating grasp of the 
international geopolitical situation, lie appreciated Pakistan's stance on the Afghanistan crisis and 
recalled with gratitude the assistance given by Pakistan in arranging Ifenry Kissinger's secret visit to 
China on 9.11 July 1971. Ile also talked about Pakistan's nuclear programme and told to General Zia 
"I do not know the details of your nuclear effort. If you have weapons capability, personally I would 
not mind if you get over with it. " During the conversations Zia informed Nixon that Pakistan wanted 
cordial relations with India and Indira Gandhi had assured him that India had no aggressive designs 
against it. Nixon retorted: "I hope you did not believe her. You don't know that during 1971 Indo. 
Pakistan war Indira had given similar assurances to the United States but what she did, you know 
better than me" See Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With 71a: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977- 
1988, pp. 337-338. 43 Ibid., p. 333. 
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technically only required consultations in the event of an attack) to the level of a trcaty. 43 
In fact, Zia desired unambiguous guarantees and a treaty commitment, ratified by 
Congress, since the 1959 executive agreement embodicd no prior congressional 
commitment. However, the State Department felt it to be a totally inappropriate request on 
Zia's part . 
44 In fact, Pakistan perceived that the bilateral agreement contained too many 
loopholes in the definition of the "threat" and Islamabad continued to be uneasy with 
India because of the fact that major issues between India and Pakistan remained 
unresolved. 45 The reason behind such a move was the realisation that Pakistan had 
suffered from the personalised nature of its relationship with the United States and that 
congressional commitment would provide much-needed continuity. 
The United States perceived a Soviet Communist threat to the whole international system 
and made Pakistan one of its allies in the region in order to have access to Pakistani bases 
so as to expand the scope of its policy of containment. The US provided political stability 
to Zia's regime, to enable it to follow a pro-Western policy in international affairs, to 
restrain itself from developing warm and friendly relations with the Soviet Union and to 
be a faithful partner in the struggle with communism. It can, therefore, be said that the US 
military and economic assistance to Pakistan' was primarily motivated by a belief that 
Pakistan would contribute to the security of the United States to institute and maintain the 
type of world order in which American interests and expectations would be secure. 
Further, the US expressed interest in the protection of Pakistan's security and its 
territorial integrity against foreign aggression. For Pakistan, the search for security had 
become, for all practical purposes, a search for moral and material assistance against 
Afghanistan and India. Pakistani leaders were convinced that the interests of the country 
in the realm of foreign policy could best be served by seeking a greater friend for the 
protection of its security. Thus, this was the first time that there had been a significant 
mutual understanding between the US and Pakistan on the question of the threats to be 
faced. However, the whole situation was changed when President Reagan came to power. 
Pakistan expressed satisfaction with Reagan's military and economic offer and its policy 
makers believed in the Reagan administration's determination to give strong support to 
Pakistan's independence. At that time, Pakistan played a key role by providing a haven 
for Afghan refugees and a channel for aid to the Afghan resistance. 
43 Ibid., pp. 333-334. N Ibid., p. 101. 45 Shirin Tahir-Khcli, The United States and Pakistan, p. 102. 
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3. Rules of the Garne Between the USA and the Soviet Union 
Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, had been warning him for some time that 
earlier failures to respond with sufficient vigour to Soviet transgressions would lead to 
more of the same. In particular, Brzezinski interpreted the invasion as a vindication of his 
concern that the Soviets would be emboldened by US lack of response over Ethiopia. 
Carter indicated that he shared Brzczinski's view, at least to the point of believing that 
the Soviets had failed to receive the correct message. Thus, he offered his opinion that the 
Soviets had "underestimated the adverse reaction from around the world and some 
multilateral responses involving Western allies, as well as regional initiatives designed to 
minimise the intimidating impact of the Soviet action. "46 Similarly, Brzczinski averred 
that the Soviets "had seriously misjudged our own nation's strength and resolve and unity 
and ....... 
47 Carter asserted that the mistake would not be repeated; if the 
Soviets had gone into Afghanistan expecting a minimal response from the United States, 
they had made a "tragic miscalculation. " His determination to impress that fact upon 
them (and upon allies, states in the Gulf region and his domestic critics as well) was all 
the greater since he was obviously stung by criticisms from the right, which held that the 
weakness of his policies had encouraged the Soviets in the belief that they could "act with 
impunity. " The following remarks by Carter speak volumes regarding his definition of 
the situation, a definition that derived from his role as US president as much as it did 
from his personal assessment: 
It became my responsibility to represent our great nation, to take 
action against the Soviet aggression. The Soviets had to suffer the 
consequences. In my judgement our own Nation's security was 
directly threatened. Thcrc is no doubt that the Soviets' move into 
Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences, would have 
resulted in the temptation to move again and again until they reached 
warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion 
of the world's oil supplies. " 
There were several factors not directly related to immediate threats that hclpcd shape the 
Carter administration's assessment of Afghanistan. These centered on broader concerns 
'e I3rzezincki, Power and Principle, p. 430; and ace Department of State Bulletin, No. 80 (March 
1980), p. 34. 48 See Department of State Bulletin, No. 80, p. 30. '8 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam, 1982), p. 472. '9 Sec Department of State Bulletin (DSB), No. 80 (March 1980), p. 34. 
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about the implications of the Soviet action, the precedent it set, and its significance in 
terms of the "rules of the game" of the superpower relationship. For one thing, it occurred 
against the backdrop of earlier events and developments of the Soviet defence build-up, 
Third World gains and more assertive and confident formulations of doctrine and public 
statements about the changing correlation of forces. As Henry I3radsher observes, many in 
Washington explained the intensity of the US reaction by reference to a "trigger theory. " 
Afghanistan merely triggered existing frustrations and alarm over Soviet conduct. 5° 
Moreover, the administration's trigger response was not just an exercise in venting 
frustration. Rather, it was genuine conccm over an escalating pattern of Soviet global 
activism and what appeared to be signs of new muscularity, even aggressiveness in Soviet 
behaviour. For Washington, Afghanistan was merely the straw that broke the camel's 
back. It was the culminating event in what many considered a broad and sustained Soviet 
geopolitical offensive. 
As Raymond Cohen noted, an actor's perception of threat is often related to his 
understanding of the "rules of the game" that operate between himself and another actor. 5' 
The unwritten rules of the superpower relationship differed from those that operated 
between the small state and the great power. For the Carter administration, the US-Soviet 
game was a global one, and Soviet activism in the Third World was an infringement of the 
unwritten rules. Some within the administration also emphasized the extent to which such 
activism violated the written ones of the 1972 Agreement on Basic Principles. 32 In this 
regard, Afghanistan undoubtedly constituted a "brutal infringement" of those rules. Somc 
Carter officials explicitly invoked the 1972 Agrccmcnt on Basic Principles, arguing that 
Afghanistan was only the most egregious in a series of Soviet violations of the accord. 53 
Afghanistan was also ominous bccausc it was consistent with a definition of the rules of 
the game Soviet spokesmen had been playing since Gromyko's 1971 boast that there was 
"no question of any significance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in 
opposition to it. " It was consistent with Moscow's definition of itself not only as a 
superpower equal to the United States, but also as an equal global powcr, entitled to use 
S0 Iienry S. Brads-her. Afghanistan and the So%-Ict Union (Durham: Duke University Press. 1985), pp. 
191-93. 
st Raymond Cohen, International Politics: The Rules of the Came (New York Longman, 1981), p. 
141. 
i3 See Time (14 January 1980), p. 12. ss "My Opinion of the Russian Has Changed Most Drastically, " Time (14 January 1980), p. 12. 
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force globally and entitled to a role in regional affairs and disputes the world ovcr. 54 As 
Vernon Aspaturian wrote, Afghanistan was the culmination of a trend in which Moscow 
acted "as if it were ready to supersede the US as the paramount power in the interstate 
system, with its behaviour assuming increasingly interventionist and expansionist 
55 dimensions, ,. Western observers claimed that Carter was not a geopolitician, like his 
adviser Brzezinski, but he instinctively resisted Moscow's claim to equal status with the 
United States as a global power, for both strategic and moral reasons. But Carter, like 
Nixon before him, sought to "domesticate and contain Soviet power, not unleash it. "46 
The Soviets' lack of restraint in Afghanistan contrasted starkly with the US action in Iran, 
where the US had acquiesced to the emergence of a revolutionary regime that was 
profoundly hostile to the United States. During the Vienna summit in June 1979, Carter 
had urged Brezhnev to acknowledge the need for mutual restraint in the Third world, 
especially in the Persian Gulf. Carter reminded Brczhncv that: 
There are many problems in Iran and Afghanistan but the United 
States has not interfered in the internal affairs of those two nations. 
We expect the Soviet Union to do the same. " 
Despite the United States' restraint and Carter's personal expression of concern to the 
Soviet leaders, and in spite of Brczhnev's willingness in November 1978 to demand 
American restraint in Iran, the Soviets continued to conduct a large-scale intervention in 
Afghanistan. The US had long remarked at the Soviet tendency to say, in effect, "what's 
mine is mine" (Afghanistan), "what's yours is negotiable or up for grabs" (Iran? ). To a 
disturbing extent, that vague attitude seemed to be an operational objective of Soviet 
policy at a time when the Soviet Union had a greater capacity to act on it than ever 
before. At least some in the Carter administration saw the Soviet action as fraught with 
yet graver risks, as Warren Christopher said that it was the "very audacity of the move" 
that caused the administration to be "taken a back. " Ile then added that the administration 
did not think the Soviet Union would take such a great risk .... "5 Ambassador Watson 
expressed similar surprise, saying he thought the Soviets would not take such an action 
S4 Vernon V. Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Force, " Problems of 
Communism, No. 29 (May-June 1980), pp. 1.18. 55 Ibid., p. 3. 36 Ibid., p. 4. $7 Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 254. S' DSI3, No. 80 (February 1980), p. 7. 
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because they had a better appreciation of the risks of nuclear confrontation. S9 Objectively, 
these assertions were clearly mistaken, as there was no chance that Carter would have 
reacted militarily, in Afghanistan or elsewhere. It is virtually certain that the Soviets 
moved as they did only because they were absolutely certain that intervention carried 
very low risks- or that the risks were worth the obligations. 
Many US officials acknowledged that Moscow underestimated the political costs of 
invasion in Afghanistan but the Soviets knew that, with or without specific warnings, the 
United States would react very strongly to the use of force in Afghanistan. Moscow's 
willingness to pay those costs at least called into question the long-standing assumption 
that Soviet political interests served to constrain the more aggressive impulses in the 
Kremlin. Soviet willingness to pay those costs was even more disturbing because the 
Soviet leaders assumed that a non-Communist Afghanistan would have been injurious to 
Soviet vital interests. However, Carter called the invasion "a quantum jump in the nature 
of Soviet behaviour. i60 Thus, the combination of direct threat and precedent was 
especially potent. Brzczinski had this to say about the invasion: 
The Soviet military action in Afghanistan marks a new stage in Soviet 
assertiveness. It is a watershed cvcnt"the first time since 1945 that 
Soviet armed forces have been used to impose direct Soviet will on a 
foreign country not previously under Soviet control. The imposition of 
Soviet control over Afghanistan, if it is accomplished, poses a direct 
security threat to Iran and Pakistan, countries in a region of vital 
importance to the US. 61 
Similarly, Carter rcfcrcd to the invasion as "a direct threat because Afghanistan, formerly 
a buffer state between the Soviet Union and Iran and the world's oil supplies and the 
Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf, has become kind of an arrow aiming at the toes of 
crucially strategic regions of the world"62 tic described the Soviet action as a "radical 
departure" from behaviour that had been characteristic of the Soviet Union since World 
War 11. tic also charactcriscd the move as a "sharp escalation in the aggressive history of 
39 Watson is quoted in Thomas T. 1lammond, Rcd Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, The 
Soviet Invasion and the Consequences (Boulder. Westview Press. 1984), p. 131. At the political 
level, the Afghan venture was risky and the Soviets did miscalculate the political costs. But in the 
military sense meant by Christopher and Waston, it was unquestionably a very low-risk venture. Given 
the balance of commitment and stakes, there was not the slightest chance of a direct US military 
response. The fact that high-level US officials thought otherwise could not inspire confidence in the 
acumen of US policy. 60 Time (14 January 1980), p. 11. 61 Ibid., p. 18. 63 DSB, No. 80 (March 1980). p. 30. 
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the Soviet Union. "63 In this regard, the above statements show that the perception of 
threat was very much influenced by the perceived novelty of the Soviet action, and by the 
fact that it was a large-scale operation, prepared in secrecy, swiftly conducted and 
shrouded in deception. Moreover, the Soviet challenge seemed to combine serious direct 
threats with assaults on the psychological underpinnings of the global political 
equilibrium. Carter considered Afghanistan unacceptable and was willing to suspend 
"business as usual" until the Soviets departed. However, he was not faced with a need to 
compel the Soviets to reverse course earlier and, like Kennedy in the Cuban missile 
crisis, he felt the need to draw the line and deter future challenges. In his sanctions 
speech, Carter stated this more baldly, implicitly drawing on the "lesson" of Munich, just 
as all of his post-War predecessors had done: "History teaches, perhaps, very few clear 
lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression, 
unopposed, becomes a contagious discasc. "M 
Moreover, the Soviet move came hard on the heels of the Iranian revolution, which had 
drastically altered the regional balance of power. Carter reacted to the direct intrusion of 
Soviet power into the southwest Asian region in which a vacuum of power had developed 
in much the same way a Truman reacted in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1947 when the 
announced British departure left a similar vacuum in prospect. It was quite logical, then, 
that Brzezinski would urge Carter to fashion his response after Truman's. The direct 
Soviet move into Afghanistan seemed every bit as threatening as the challenge posed by 
what appeared to be Stalin's meddling in the Greek Civil War. It was also natural that 
Carter and Brzezinski treated Truman as a model, since their assessments of the Soviet 
Union in 1980 were very similar to Truman's in 1946 and 1947. Carter's post- 
Afghanistan remarks were very much the same as Truman's in the case of the Soviet 
unwillingness to vacate Iran in March 1946. Carter spoke of the security of neighbouring 
states and of oil supplies, principles of international order and the dangers of unopposed 
aggression. 
4. Soviet Views About Invasion In Afghanistan 
By the end of the 1970s the Soviets publicly stated that anti-imperialist forces growing 
stronger in the client states such as Angola, Laos, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua 
e7 Ibid., p. 33. 61 "Grain Becomes a Weapon, " see details in Time (21 January 1980). 
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and Afghanistan. Soviet leaders interpreted events in these countries as confirming 
their views on the imperialist sources of regional conflicts, the ripeness of developing 
countries for socialism, the possibility of Soviet support for national liberation 
movements and the inevitable triumph of Soviet-supported national liberation 
movements. In this regard, the Soviet leaders were concerned to the growing 
rapprochement between the United States and China. They attributed this development 
not to increased Soviet assertiveness, but to the aggressive ambitions of the United 
States and China. This interpretation argued for toughening Soviet policies, rather than 
assuaging US and Chinese security concerns. 
The most important source of lesson concerned with Afghanistan internal development 
where the 1978 coup contributed to Soviet optimism. Subsequent developments, 
however, made Soviet leaders more circumspect about using force to protect 
revolution. On April 1979, the twenty Soviet advisers killed in Berat (Afghanistan), 
and the Soviet response was that "only one thing is clear- we cannot surrender 
Afghanistan to the enemy. "63 Alcxci Kosygin, who was together with Andrei 
Kirilenko, the Politburo member most reluctant to use Soviet troops in Afghanistan, 
replied, "Our troops would not resolve any of the problems in Afghanistan. "" In this 
context, Gromyko, Kosygin and other Politburo members pointed out numerous 
drawbacks to the use of force in Afghanistan and rejected the Afghan request for 
Soviet troops, with the advice that Afghan forces should light themselves 67 Ilowever, 
throughout internal Soviet deliberations on Afghanistan in 1979, as far as the available 
evidence shows, the most consistent argument raised in favour of Soviet intervention 
was the concern that the United States would be able to take advantage of conflict in 
Afghanistan. 
The Soviet officials were concerned about possible US involvement in Afghanistan. 
General Valentin Varcnnikov, a top official on the Soviet General Staff in 1979, 
recalled that Soviet leaders were concerned that the CIA was making Pakistan a base 
for the rebels (mujahideen), and that the United States was looking to replace listening 
posts lost in Iran and make Afghanistan a "base of operations" against the Soviet 
°f Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise ' Fall. and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism 1973-1996 (Cambridge: MIT Press. 1999), p. 172. 66 "The Soviet Policies in Afghanistan, " Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project, No. 4 
(Fall 1970), p. 70; and Diego Cordovez and Selig llarrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of 
the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 46. 
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Union. 68 A secret report to the Politburo in April 1980 acknowledged the local sources 
of the Afghan conflict but analysed them in class terms and accused Pakistan and the 
United States of exacerbating local tensions and supplying money and weapons to the 
rebels. 9 In fact, the victory in Angola (1976), Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua 
(1979) and coup in Afghanistan (1978) had further boosted Soviet optimism and 
confidence. The Soviet leader Mikhail Suslov remarked that "the defeats of imperialist 
and neocolonialist forces in Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and 
Afghanistan provided "striking evidence" of the chief trend of the modern timo-the 
growth of the strength and might of real socialism and the steady development of 
revolutionary processes in the world. "70 
In the early 1980s the Soviet Union perceived that socialist successes would cause the 
imperialists to try harder, but that socialism would inevitably triumph as victories in 
the developing world gave it increased resources and momentum. This was a time 
when Brezhnev remarked that capitalists would respond to their losses by "feverishly 
unfolding military preparation "7' Moreover, Soviet leaders acknowledged balancing 
dynamics even more sharply in their secret discussions on Afghanistan, noting that the 
use of Soviet troops there would "widen the scope of the counter-revolution both 
domestically and internationally, bringing the attack of anti-govcmmcntal forces to a 
much higher level. "72 
The Soviets insisted that their aid to national liberation movements should have no 
effect on the US-Soviet relations. Publicly, Soviet leaders asserted that national 
liberation revolutions were indigenous and that Soviet support for these revolutions 
could be separated from d6tcntc. At the same time, Soviets tried to persuade Third 
World revolutionaries that detente would help rather than hinder the national liberation 
process. At the 35th Party Congress in Fcbruary 1980, soon after the Sovict invasion in 
Afghanistan, Brczhnev argued about detente that: 
67 Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow: 25 Decmbcr 1983 and 1992), p. 3. 
David A. Welch and Odd Arne Westad (ed., ) "The Intervention in Afghanistan and Ole Fall of 
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Detente has become a reality, both in the international workers 
movement and among its opponents the question often arises as to 
how it will affect the class struggle .... detcnte and peaceful coexistence 
are concerned with interstate relations .... 
detcnte does not in the 
slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the 
class struggle.... we do not conceal the fact that we sec detente as a 
way to create more favourable conditions for peaceful socialist and 
Communist construction. 73 
Brezhnev discussed these points with President Carter and publicly affirmed the Soviet 
Union's "solidarity with the liberation struggles of the peoples" and rejected assertions 
that these struggles were "Moscow's intrigues and plots. " Brezhnev also questioned 
why the US should, "pin on the Soviet Union the responsibility for the objective course 
of history, and, what is more, use this as a pretext for worsening relations between the 
US and the Soviet Union? "74 Other Soviet leaders, including Yuri Andropov, Anatoli 
Gromyko, Ponomarev and Gcorgi Arbatov also rejected any linkage between Soviet 
support for national liberation movements and US-Soviet relations 75 This was 
consistent with the Soviet view that it was US weakness that had forced it to pursue 
detente. Soviet leaders and commentators continued to argue for separating detente from 
other issues and suggested that detente would help to resolve regional conflicts or that 
regional peace agreements would contribute to it. 
Gromyko and other Politburo members were against the use of Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan and they warned that this action could damage rcaltions with the Wcst. 
Gromyko argued in private meetings that "we would be throwing away everything we 
achieved with such difficulty, particularly detente (and) the SALT 11 negotiation .... there 
would be no meeting of Brczhcnv with Carter .... and our relations with Western 
countries, particularly with Germany, would be spoiled. "76 The statements of the Soviet 
leaders suggested that they greatly underestimated the US response to their invasion of 
Afghanistan. Anatoli Dobrynin wamcd Brczhncv in January 1980 that Afghanistan 
might lead to a "total disruption" in relations with the United States, Brczhncv replied, 
"Do not worry, Anatoly, we will end this war in three or four tvccks. 7 "7 
73 Brczhncv's speech at the 35th CPSU Congress, p. 27. 74 FBIS, 18 June 1980, p. AA7. 
7S See Kommunist, No. 14 (September 1979), p. 27; and Andropov's speech, FBIS, 5 April 1979, p. R8. 76 Zasenaniye Politburo TSK KPSS, 7 March 1979, p. 71. 
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In fact, the Soviet leaders claimed that the invasion was inevitable and it was in the 
Soviet's regional interest. Pravda accused Pakistan, China and the United States of 
fomenting unrest in Afghanistan. 78 The Soviets made repeated charges interference by 
Pakistan, China and claimed that the US itself was interfering in Afghanistan through 
the CIA. 79 As early as August 1980, the Soviet officials accused the United States, 
China, Saudi Arabia, and, implicitly, Pakistan of supporting the "Muslim 
Brotherhood! '" In March 1983, Andropov stated in a Politburo meeting on 
Afghanistan that "we are dealing here with a struggle against American 
imperialism.... for this reason we cannot retreat. "" Thus, the Soviet overemphasis on 
the external dimension of the conflict was entirely consistent with Soviet views on 
regional issues and it was likely that the Soviet leadership believed that external aid to 
the mujahideen was more substantial and significant to destabilise socialist revolution 
in Afghanistan. 
S. US Policy of Containment 
The basic and, indeed, dominant foreign policy objective of the United States was to 
prevent the spread of communism. This objective found a concrete form shortly after 
World War II in response to the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism, initially 
manifested by Communist subversive activities from the Atlantic to Southwest Asia. The 
United States' policy planners took a serious view of the Communist threat and 
consequently, they became increasingly convinced that, unless they acted quickly, the 
Soviet Union could soon overrun many vulnerable countries and place the independence 
and security of the United States itself in grave jeopardy. The realities of the post-war era 
made the Communist threat seem more menacing and the need for American action more 
urgent. Europe, Asia and Africa-all were economically and militarily weak and politically 
unstable. Britain was no longer strong enough to assume its traditional role of 
maintaining the European balance of power and defending the continent. Indeed, it now 
relied on the United States for its own protection. Only the United States was powerful 
enough to challenge the Soviet Union in the bipolar international structure that had 
emerged after the Second World War. In the light of these realities, the US abandoned its 
" Welch and Westad, "Intervention in Afghanistan, " p. 95. n Pravda (23 March 1979 and 18 August 1980). 79 See A. Petrov in Pravda (25 August 1980), p. 6. g0 Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: A Study In the Use of Force In Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Lexington: MA: Lexington Books, 1986), p. 56. 
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traditional policy of isolationism and assuming the leadcrship of the "frcc world, " 
embarked upon a global strategy of containment of communism. 
In this regard, the Persian Gulf was now seen as part of a single strategic theatre with 
Western Europe: thus Brzezinski's repeated references to it as America's "third strategic 
zone. " In his memoirs, Brzezinski says that in the initial briefings for President Carter 
after the invasion, the most serious matter was that the Sovict military presence was so 
close to the Persian Gulf. 82 Secretary of State Vance, in a interview with the New York 
Times, declined to "psychoanalyse" the Soviets' motives or combination of motives. 
Independent of Soviet intentions, the move into Afghanistan adversely affected the naval 
balance in the northwest Indian Ocean. Thus, US naval supremacy in the region was 
necessary as a partial counter to the advantages the Soviets held on the ground as a result 
of simple geographic propinquity. The American ability to conduct carrier-based air 
operations was especially critical. In testimony to Congress five weeks after the invasion, 
Vance described the Soviet motives as "unclear" and in a prepared statement before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 27 March 1980, Vance expressed the view that: 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increases and dramatises the 
potential threat to the security of nations there and to the world's free 
access to natural resources and shipping routes. That is the fact 
whatever we may speculate about Soviet aims. For intentions can 
change. Our response must be based upon Soviet capabilities and 
Soviet behaviour. 83 
In his 4 January 1980 sanctions speech, President Carter made all these points, and 
reminded the allies that they, too, had vital interests in developments in Southwest Asia: 
A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is 
a steppingstone to possible control over much of the world's oil 
supplies .... If the Soviets arc encouraged 
in this invasion by eventual 
success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and 
then extend their control to adjacent countries, the stable, strategic and 
peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed. This would 
threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United 
States, our allies and our fricnds. 84 
01 Sec Politburo documents of 10 March 1983, p. 3. 12 IIrzezinskI, Power and Principle, p. 430. 
Cyrus Vance, (lard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1983), p. 505. 14 WCPD, No. 16 (14 January 1980), p. 26. 
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Secretary of Defence Brown also warned that if the Soviets consolidated their position in 
Afghanistan, they would be "severely tempted" to push on to the oil regions and if the 
West were deprived of access to Gulf oil `there would almost certainly be a worldwide 
economic collapse of the kind that has not been seen for almost fifty years, probably 
worse. In the event of such a cut-off, nothing could save the NATO allies from 
"irreversible catastrophe. " If the Soviets gained control of Gulf oil, Brown added, the 
Europeans and Japanese would become "economic vassals" of the Soviet Union. 85 While 
the worst-case threat was certainly unlikely, Brown's dire assessment of the potential 
consequences was not overdrawn. According to estimates by the Congressional Budget 
Office, Department of Energy and private analysts, the loss of Persian Gulf oil would 
have produced a 13 percent decline in US GNP and monstrous GNP declines of 22 
percent in the case of Western Europe and 25 percent in Japan. 
86 Of course, it was not 
necessary for the Soviets to make actual moves in the Gulf for the oil threat to have 
serious political consequences. In fact, the Soviet invasion posed new dangers for 
Southwest Asia as the Soviets encountered opportunities or self-defined military 
imperatives, such as the need to deal with Pakistan, the primary sanctuary for Afghan 
guerrillas. At worst, it was part of the apparent strategic encirclement or pincer movement 
aimed at the Persian Gulf region. This crisis called for a firm and collective response, 
especially from the United States and its Western partners. 
5-1. US Revenge for Vietnam War 
Casey thought that Afghanistan was the best battle ground to punish the Soviets and the 
longer the US kept them engaged in Afghanistan, the more they would suffer. 
17 
Moreover, "the general mood was that as long as the Russians were bleeding and hurting 
we were doing fine. "88 Charles Wilson (the US Congressman) advised the Congress and 
Reagan Administration to use all possible means to punish the Soviets with maximum 
loss because this was the appropriate time to take revenge for the Vietnam humiliation. 
13 Richard Halloran, "Brown Warns That a Persian Gulf War Could Spread, " New York Times (15 
February 1980), p. A. 3. 96 Joseph S. Nye, "Energy and Security, in David Deese and Joseph Nye (ed)., Import Management 
and Oil Emergencies (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishers, 1981), p. 4. 17 Interview, Boston (1S April 1984). 
Yaqub All Khan on 24 May 1980, facing hostile questions at a press briefing, he held out hopes for an 
early breakthrough but said that Pakistan had "no intention of being the suckers to bleed the Soviets 
white in Afghanistan. " See Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, pp. 104 and 
106. 
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He suggested the complete defeat of the Soviet Union by the Afghan resistance as 
compared to a long war. 89 Reagan's hawks' core purpose in providing covert aid to 
mujahideen was that it was both strategically desirable and psychologically satisfying to 
use covert aid to make the Soviet operation "long, bloody and expensive, " as Beecher 
reported, so that , we can help make this Russia's Victnam. "90 During the Vietnam war 
three million US military personnel served, approximately 50,000 to 58,000 personnel 
died and at the peak of the war, over 500,000 soldiers were dcploycd. 91 In Afghanistan, 
the Soviet Union only used approximately 2.1 percent of its force, compared to 21 
percent in the US case. In the Soviet case, half a million military personnel served, 
approximately 13,833 to 25,000 were killed (over $40 billion had been spent on the war, 
and expenses were running at over $10 billion annually) 92 35,478 to 49,985 were 
wounded and 50,000 surrendcred. 93 They also lost 118 jets, 333 helicopters, 147 to 800 
tanks, 882 guns and mortars, 1314 armoured personnel carriers and 11,369 military 
trucks 94 Reagan's colleagues were not satisfied with the Soviet losses and they wanted to 
raise the cost and penalties to the point at which the Soviets should face complete and 
disastrous humiliation. The evidence shows that the United States wanted to prolong the 
war to increase the Soviet casualties to a level comparable with those of the Americans in 
the Vietnam war. For this reason, in 1983 the United States was strongly averse to the 
19 Alexander Alexiev, "Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, " R-3627.1 (Santa Monica. Calif.: RAND, 
May 1988), p. 7 90 On 5 January 1980 William Beecher of the Boston Globe reported a coordinated supply programme 
with China and Egypt aimed at doing "everything possible to ship weapons to the Muslim insurgents" 
in Afghanistan. A few days later, the chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Birch I3ayh, 
stated in a television interview that the United States had taken "certain steps" to help the rebels, 
reportedly with prior approval from the White House. It seems quite plausible that political sell- 
interest might have accounted for the leaks. See more details in Jay Pctcrzell, Iteagan's Secret Wars, 
CNSS Report, No. 108 (Washington, D. C.: Centre for National Security Studies, 1984), pp. 9-11. 91 The Soviet Union was less engaged in Afghanistan than, the United States in Vietnam but die aftermath 
of Afghanistan was even more dramatic. However, comparison of the Soviet war in Afghanistan with 
the US war in Vietnam must make clear the different levels of engagement. See Bruce D. Porter, "The 
Military Abroad: Internal Consequences of External Expansion, " in Timothy J. Colton and Thane 
Gustafson (ed. )., Soldiers and the State: Civil-Military Relations Front itrezhnev to Gorbachev 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 293-294; Alexander Alexiev, "The War in 
Afghanistan: Soviet Strategic and the State of the Resistance, " P-7038 (Santa Monica. Calif: RAND, 
November 1984), p. 2; and Sarah E. Mendelson, Changing Course: Ideas, Politics and the Soviet 
Withdrawal From Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. xii. 
93 See Richard Nixon, Victory Without War 1999 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988), p. 36. 91 Yevgenia Albats, The State Within a State: The KGB and its Ilold on Russia Past, Present and Future 
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1994), p. 35; William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet 
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No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 114.115; Boston Globe (26 May 1988), p. 3; and Theodore L. Eliot, Jr, 
Gorbachev's Afghan Cambit, National Security papers, No. 9 (Cambridge: Institute for Foreign 
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UN approach to settle the Afghanistan crisis under the pressure of the Soviet Union who 
needed earlier negotiations and a time frame for withdrawal of its forces from 
Afghanistan. The driving force behind this factor was CIA director William Casey who 
focused single-mindedly to provide weapons to the Afghan mujahideen before the Soviet 
request for negotiations for the settlement of the Afghanistan crisis. 
5-2. US Desire to Continue to Bleed the Soviets 
In mid 1983, Reagan addressed Congress members to gain more support for the Afghan 
mujahideen and asserted that "an increase in aid to the Afghans is in the interest of the 
United States and Pakistan because raising the military and political cost of the war is the 
only way to pressure the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan! '" He further stated that 
"we have the leverage to succeed. Moscow can win if Kremlin leaders arc willing to pay 
the prico--but we can raise that price. "96 Casey made a similar assessment in 1984 when 
he talked to the Afghan commanders in Peshawar (Pakistan) and argued, that "it is in the 
interest of the Afghan people that they should continue to increase pressure on the Soviet 
Union to liberate their country. This is the best chance of success because their pressure 
has been a direct correlation between the flexibility of the Soviets at the negotiating table 
and the intensity of the fighting on the battlefield. It is not coincidental that Moscow's 
willingness to reduce its withdrawal timetable from six years to one year came after the 
incredible fighting and resistance. "97 Nixon also stated that Reagan ought to scrap the UN 
talks on Afghanistan and make the Soviet Union realise that Afghanistan was a 
nonaligned country. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other country had a right to 
determine the nature of Afghanistan's political system. e 
Senator Humphrey and the CIA Director Casey believed that withdrawal of Soviet troops 
was a diplomatic move to strengthen its covert operations, as well as to destabilise the 
resistance movement or psychologically demoralise the resistance supporter, Pakistan. 
They also feared that if the US cut off aid to the resistance, the Soviet Union might 
continue to support the Kabul regimc. 99 Congressmen and CIA reports saw an 
intensification of Soviet efforts to intimidate Pakistan into cutting off aid to the resistance 
°t Ronald Reagan, address to the Republican Congress members, Washington, D. C.. (13 July 1983), 
printed in the New York Times (14 July 1983). % Ibid. 
97 New York Times (7 October 1984), p. A2; and Dawn (13 October 1984), p. 1. °t Richard Nixon, Victory Without War 1999 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988), p. 141. 
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by destabilisation, terror and subversion as likely. All these dangers convinced Reagan's 
advisers that cutting off aid to the resistance and a badly negotiated agreement would be a 
severe, even fatal, blow. At that time, Reagan administration officials, in cooperation with 
Congress members, were working hard to sustain the resistance. He advised the National 
Security Advisor Robert McFarlane "to give Afghanistan high priority. " lie also said, "On 
the diplomatic front, we must not allow Moscow to win at the ncgotiating table as it has 
failed to win on the battleßeld. 100 Afghanistan is not a minor issue and it will not end as 
Moscow desired. Moscow's goal is to withdraw after a Communist government is firmly 
entrenched and this is not acceptable for the United States. "°' 
In fact, Gorbachev's proposal for a protracted withdrawal period was designed to enable 
Soviet forces to crush a resistance starved of ammunition and supplies before packing up 
to leave. This was a time when Reagan declared that "we will not cut off American aid to 
the resistance until the Soviet Union has removed all its forces from Afghanistan. "102 He 
also asserted that "we will protect Pakistan from Soviet intimidation and help the Afghan 
to increase the cost of the Soviet occupation. " 103 In January 1988, the White House 
reportedly instructed the State Department that US policy was not to cut off aid until all 
Soviet troops had left. 104 Secretary of State George Shultz also stressed that the Soviet 
troop withdrawal must be "front-end loaded" and acquire a "certain inevitability" before 
the US would end aid to the resistanco-which in any case would be gradual, not all at 
once. 103 Nixon advised Reagan that he should handle the Geneva negotiations carefully 
because Moscow needed time to decimate the resistance before its forces would have to 
depart. He emphasised that America must pursue two goals in Afghanistan-a pullout of 
Soviet forces and self-determination for the Afghan people. Ncithcr US interests nor those 
of Pakistan and the Afghan resistance would be served if the US settled for the first 
without the second. To achieve its objectives, the US had to work on both the military and 
Washington Post (14 December 1987). 
10° Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994). p. 206. 101 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, p. 253 1°2 Ibid., pp. 261.262. 107 New York Times (8 March 1982), p. A2. 
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diplomatic fronts. It had to aid the resistance, protect Pakistan and ncgotiatc with Moscow 
under its own conditions. 106 
On the other hand, Casey admitted that Moscow had failed to win the war in the 
battlefield and at the conference table. Thus, US aid to the Afghan mujahidccn also made 
an eventual and unconditional Soviet withdrawal more likely by convincing the Soviet 
leaders that a military solution was not possible. The whole edifice of Soviet tactical 
beliefs on military intervention had failed to resolve the bleeding wound of Afghanistan. 
The only way out, conceptually, was to change the core belief about the inherent 
antagonism of the US, even though at the time US bahaviour appeared to demonstrate 
such antagonism. The Soviet leaders realised that without building US trust, they could 
not achieve progress on arms control and economic relations, and the best way to 
establish trust was to get out of Afghanistan. 
In this regard, the Soviet Union reacted by criticising the United States policy on a peace 
settlement in Afghanistan. The Soviets claimed -with some truth - that the US was not 
sincere about settling the Afghan problem and only wanted to keep Soviet forces pinned 
down in Afghanistan and that neither the United States nor Pakistan was genuinely 
seeking a political settlement. 107 In fact, after 1983, the Soviet military, diplomatic and 
political strategies on Afghanistan was to resist military escalation in Afghanistan in an 
attempt to limit its casualties. For this purpose, the Soviet troops reduced the scale of their 
offensive operations and concentrated on controlling Afghan roads. 
'° On the diplomatic 
front, Andropov initiated the first serious efforts toward a negotiated settlement in 
Afghanistan. According to one report, Andropov was willing to withdraw Soviet forces if 
the UN-sponsored talks provided suitable protection of Soviet and PDPA interests in 
Afghanistan. 109 Moreover, Andropov frankly expressed his desire to withdraw from 
Afghanistan during an hour-long meeting with UN negotiators Diego Cordovcz and Perez 
de Cuellar on 28 March 1983, just before the April round of UN negotiations on 
Afghanistan. According to Cordovcz, Andropov maintained that the Soviet Union had no 
intention of keeping troops in Afghanistan idcnßnitely. 
110 In one meeting, Andropov was 
talking to Poltiburo members and stated that the deployment was expensive, it was 
106 Richard Nixon, Victory Without War 1999, p. 139. 107 Diego Cordovez and selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, pp. 247.260. 108 Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition?, p. 239. 
109 Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, p. 98. 110 Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition?, p. 240. 
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causing loss of life and it was damaging the Soviet Union's status in the world. Andropov 
added, however, that Soviet troops would leave Afghanistan provided the PDPA remained 
in power and in control of the army and security services. 111 Moreover, Andropov did not 
propose any timetable for a Soviet withdrawal, and the two sides remained at odds over 
whether a Pakistani guarantee to end arms supplies to the Afghan mteahfdeen should 
precede or be linked to a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. 
In mid 1983, the Soviet negotiator Stanislav Gavrilov promised to provide a proposal for 
an eighteen-month time frame for a Soviet withdrawal and Cordovcz publically 
announced that an agreement was "95 percent completed" but Islamabad and Washington 
both opposed this agreement and called it unfair. 112 As a result, a meeting between 
Gromyko and Yaqub in 1983 proved to be the end of any hope for a settlement. The two 
sides retreated to their earlier incompatible position on whether a Pakistani guarantee of 
noninterference should be linked to a Soviet withdrawal timetable and the Soviet side did 
not propose an eighteen-month timetable as Gavrilov had promised. Thus, after the 
disappointing outcome of the negotiations on Afghanistan in June 1983, the Soviet Union 
made no significant new diplomatic proposals and there was no progress in the Geneva 
talks, which did not take place from August 1983 until June 1985. During this time, the 
Soviet Union increased its military escalation in Afghanistan and also increased its strikes 
across the border into Pakistan. 
After 1986, the USSR adopted a policy of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, but the 
US preferred to continue the war in Afghanistan and rejected any hint of Soviet 
capitulation. The Soviet leaders also believed that the United States was dominated by 
"bleeders" who sought Soviet capitulation in Afghanistan and preferred an ongoing war 
to a negotiated settlement. ' 13 The Soviet officials blamed the US for the "undeclared war 
in Afghanistan, " and "bloody orgies" and claimed that the US wanted to engage Soviet 
111 Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, p. 98- 112 In this agreement the Soviet maintain its stand that the PDPA should remain in power and that the 
internal structure of the PDPA regime could not be explicitly linked to any international settlement. 
See Barnett R. Rubin, Search for Peace In Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 61; Riaz M. Khan. Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating 
Soviet Withdrawal (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 115.118; and Cordovez and l larrison, 
Out of Afghanistan, pp. 91 and 98-102. 113 First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kornicnko told Diego Cordovez in 1982 that some Soviet 
leaders thought the United States just wanted to "bleed" the Soviets in Afghanistan, while others 
thought that the United States was ready to cut a deal if the Soviet Union was more forthcoming in the 
negotiations. See Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the 
Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 102-103. 
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troops in Afghanistan in retaliation for the Vietnam war. t14 Gorbachev initiated 
diplomatic moves and declared that troops would be withdrawn within seven to twelve 
months, provided an international agreement was signed and "no other state 
interferes. U5 The meaning was clear: aid to the resistance would have to be terminated at 
the beginning of the withdrawal. At the same time, Dr. Najibullah stated that Soviet 
troops would leave Afghanistan and the US and Pakistan should cut off aid to the 
resistance. On the other hand, the UN mediator held indirect meetings in Geneva with 
Afghan and Pakistan diplomats in an effort to break the deadlock. These developments 
were a great surprise for the US and Pakistan who wanted to continue the war to "bleed" 
the Soviet Union more and more. At the US-Soviet summit in December 1987 at 
Washington (D. C. ), Gorbachev offered to withdraw Soviet troops in twelve months or 
less but refused to announce a fixed timetable. In the same vein, President Reagan held 
his position that the PDPA government in Afghanistan was patently unacceptable to the 
United States and the date and duration of a Soviet withdrawal must be set with no link to 
any preconditions! 16 On the other hand, the Soviet view that there was no common 
ground between their position and that of the United States was not unrealistic, as the 
United States provided an estimated $80 million in aid to the Afghan mujahldecn in 1987. 
Also, by one account, the United States worked to undercut Pakistani officials who 
favoured a settlement in Afghanistan. 117 
In fact, the Soviet military officials also emphasised a political solution of the problem 
over military means. For example, Defence Minister Yazov endorsed political over 
military means and Chief of the General Staff Akhromcyev noted that "security was a 
political objective requiring political means. ""' Akhromcycv further argued that the 
danger was not simply that the United States might unleash a war, but that it might use 
superior military forces for political purposes, such as putting pressure on the Soviet 
Union. ' 19 Moreover, military officers who had served in Afghanistan insisted that there 
would be no military victory except to admitted political realities. In this context, General 
Gromov stated that "peace cannot be achieved by military means alone. It also needs the 
corresponding political preconditions. however, if one.... looks at this war only in terms 
114 See Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov in Izvestia, FBIS (12 May 1983), p. VS; and Dmitri Ustinov in Pravda, 
FBIS (27 July 1986), p. AA2. 115 Washington Times (17 November 1987). 
116 Washington Post (10 December 1987). 
117 Ibid., pp. 6 and 53. "' Yazov in Pravda, FBIS (10 May 1988), p. 71 
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of the military aspect, it would not have been a great problem to leave the country as 
winners. However, "we did not have this goal. 99120 
Given the momentous changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies that Gorbachev 
eventually set in motion he viewed Afghanistan as one of his most important policy 
problems. In the beginning of spring 1986, Soviet leaders reduced the combat roles of 
their troops. Gorbachev announced in a speech in Vladivostok on 29 July 1986 that six 
Soviet regiments would be withdrawan from Afghanistan, and Afghan President 
Najibullah declared a unilateral cease-fire starting on 15 January 1987. However, the US 
and Pakistan continued their aid to the mujahideen but the Soviet forces limited their use 
of force to operations directly impinging upon their withdrawal. At that time. Gorbachev 
stated that the Soviets would announce a timetable for withdrawal, but the US must agree 
to a "beginning of the end to arms and financial supplies" to the resistance. Reagan 
explicitly rejected Gorbachev's condition and even a temporary cutoff of aid to the 
resistance before a complete Soviet withdrawal. He gave a clear statement that aid to the 
resistance must continue until all Soviet troops were out and an independent, non- 
Communist government was in place. 121 
6. Pakistan's Motives 
The Soviet presence in Afghanistan created a serious threat to Pakistan's northwest 
borders vis-ä-vis the enemy to the cast India. Pakistan had never faced such a 
multidimensional external threat and it felt incomparably weaker, sandwiched between 
the hostile Soviet Union and unfriendly India. In these years Pakistan had been, in 
political geographical terms, a most unhappily constructed state. New geopolitical 
developments in the region, however, encouraged Pakistan's policy makers to reevaluate 
old policies and strengthen its political, economic and strategic options with reference to 
the new regional realities. The strategic environment was also marked by conditions of 
strategic asymmetry, dependence, and ambivalence, all presenting major obstacles to 
Pakistan's policy ingenuity. Pakistan as a minor power with regional interests, seized 
119 See Sergei Akhromeyev on Moscow radio, FI3IS, (10 May 1988). p. 75; and Sands and Philips, 
"Reasonable Sufficiency, " pp. 164.178. 120 Gromov in Der Spiegel, p. 38; and see Sovetskaya Rossig, p. 105. 121 Constantine C. Menges, The Twilight Struggle: The Soviet Union-v. The United States Today 
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upon the opportunity offered by the United States search for anti-Communist allies in 
South Asia in order to achieve political, economic and strategic objectives: 
6-1. Protection of State Ideology, System and Structure 
For Pakistan to oppose the Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan was a titanic struggle 
between two different value systems. Pakistani elites considered only alliance with the 
US could protect its feudal structure, capitalist values and religious oligarchy. In fact, 
Pakistan's socio-political system and its state structure arc derived from its feudal 
heritage. Thus, the elites of the country (feudal landlords, capitalists, religious leaders, 
military and bureaucracy) and majority of population were worried about the Soviet 
invasion and feeling a potential threat to their existence and survival of the country. This 
was the reason when people hesitated to oppose Zia's Martial law; rather, they 
cooperated to legitimise his regime to prevent Soviet expansionism. They forced Zia ul- 
Haq to compromise with the United States for the protection of the existing structure of 
society and traditional values. 122 In the circumstances, Pakistan considered itself as a 
bulwark against an atheist force bent on establishing its hegcmonic presence in the 
region. Zia defended his policy against Soviet aggression and argued, "Pakistan was 
morally bound to support the mujahideen because it was an Islamic state and had 
provided shelter to Afghan refugees on humanitarian grounds in keeping with the Islamic 
spirit of brotherhood. "123 The military and religious leadership in Pakistan called the 
Afghanistan crisis an assault on the Islamic Umma (brotherhood). They indicated that 
"the Afghan mujahIdeen were not only waging Jihad (holy war) for the liberation of their 
homeland but also fighting for the cause of Pakistan and the entire Muslim world. "24 On 
the other hand, a small number of leftist elements supported the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and called for the destruction of the feudal order of Pakistani politics and 
society. The Communist Party of Pakistan (CCP) stated that "communism is a victory of 
proletarian class and Pakistan's political and social ills are greatly accentuated by its 
feudal culture which have no relevance to the common people, who feel like slaves under 
tu Mushtaq Ahmad, "Is it a new beginning" Dawn (8 June 1993); and see Ashfaq Sakem Mims, 
"Colonialism in the Present Context of Pakistan, " (Islamabad: Cultural Forum, 19 May 1998), pp. 3- 
13. 
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feudal authoritarianism. 12s These elements also argued that democracy and martial law 
could not change Pakistan's class composition and the only solution was a Communist 
revolution. 126 
6-2. Desire to Counter Indo-Soviet Alignment 
In the wake of the Soviet invasion, Pakistan adopted a coercive strategy to deal with the 
Moscow-Kabul and New Delhi axis. Pakistan was determined to support the mi Jahideen 
against Najibullah's government to get them to recognise the Durand Line as a border 
between the two states. Moreover, Pakistan remembered Soviet encouragement and 
support for India's detaching East Pakistan in 1971 and setting it up as independent 
Bangladesh, as well as Soviet collusion with Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan through 
ethnic disturbance and internal subversion by Pakhtuns and Baluch separatist elements 
who sought more autonomy or even independence. In the circumstances, Pakistan was 
also willing "to bleed the Russians white" in order to take revenge against the Soviets. 
The military leaders of Pakistan, including Zia, were content to see in the Afghan war an 
opportunity to damage the Soviet Union through US assistance and mufahldeen iron will. 
Zia had made clear the Pakistan policy and he was enthusiastic about the idea of a 
"whole-hog" commitment to play the role of "front-line= if the price was right. Zia 
referred to the Soviets as "bullies" who wanted to force Pakistan into a position where it 
would be in conflict with everybody else and totally isolated. 
127 Moreover, Pakistan 
wanted secure northern borders and supported the Afghan mujahtdcen for the 
establishment of a friendly and stable government in Kabul. Zulfikar All Bhutto's and 
Zia's regimes both supported Islamists in Afghanistan because they always served 
Pakistan's security interests, as they were the only group in Afghanistan that had opposed 
the breakup of Pakistan in 1971 and always supported that country against India. 
123 At 
one time Zia told Selig Harrison that "we have earned the right to have a friendly regime 
in Afghanistan. " He declared, "we took a risk as a front line state, and we would not 
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1980), p. 11; Iqbal Jafar, "People Revolution in Pakistan, " Evening News (27 October 1982); and 
Dawn (5 December 1983). 
126 M. A. Majid, "Communist Revolution in Afghanistan and Hopes for Pakistan, " VleHpolnt, VOL 7, 
No. 2 (Summer 1982), pp. 17-23; see also Mushtaq Ahmad, "Republic of the Landlords, " Dahn (3 
December 1995). 
127 See Dawn (19 October 1982). 
u Barnett It Rubin, The Search for Peace In Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New 
I iaven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 27. 
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permit it to be like it was before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims on our 
territory. " 129 
6-3. Modernisation of the Defence System 
Pakistan's alignment with the United States was motivated by its desire to improve its 
defence capacity of Pakistan against India. Zia-ul-Iiaq, one of the architects of Pakistan's 
alignment with the US, explained Pakistan's motives for joining the US club in these 
words: "Our main and only purpose was to safeguard the safety and security of Pakistan 
and we need support from like-minded and peace-loving nations. There is no doubt that 
we apprehend a threat to our security from India. "130 Many officials privately expressed 
that Pakistan was more inclined to build its military strength as a bargaining factor in 
dealing with India on the Kashmir issue than as a defence against other countries, 
including the Soviet Union. 131 The fear of aggression by India had always been a cause of 
great concern to the policy makers, defence planners and political leaders of Pakistan. It 
was generally felt that the problem of Pakistan's defence was the problem of defence 
against India. Pakistan had therefore, constantly sought protection against a possible 
attack from India. The real fear of Indian aggression was a major factor in Pakistan's 
desire to gain US military and economic assistance. Moreover, Pakistan's concern for 
India rather than Communist aggression was evident because Zia's regime induced the 
United States to commit itself to the defence of Pakistan against all types of aggression, 
irrespective of the label. Zia emphasised in a meeting with Casey and George Shultz that 
aggression from a non-Communist side is as great an evil as aggression from Communist 
quarters. He said, "there are no varieties of evil, no varieties of aggression and it is 
necessary to resist it wherever it comes from. "' 32 In this regard, Pakistan's strategic 
motives were to receive the US military equipment and bolster its defence against the 
perceived threat of India. It was very clear that Pakistan used United States fears of 
Communist expansion and its support to contain communism for its own purposes to 
strengthen itself vis-ä-vis India, to neutralize Indian superiority in the South Asian region 
and enlist US support for its case on Kashmir. Through the increased military power and 
'29 Charles Wilson recalled a map that Zia had also shown to him in which overlay indicated the goal of a 
confederation embracing first Pakistan and Afghanistan and eventually Central Asia and Kashnnir. Zia 
further explained about the Pakistan-Afghanistan confederation in which Pakistanis and Afghans could 
travel freely back and forth without passports. See Diego Cordovez and Selig Ilarrison. Out of 
Afghanistan, p. 92. 130 See Dawn (18 April 1983). 131 The New York Times (22 November 1986). p. S. 
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the political support of the US, Pakistan hoped that military power would strengthen its 
bargaining position vis-ä-vis Afghanistan and India. Zia ul-Ilaq was quite explicit in 
explaining the Indian factor as a reason for partnership with the the US and stated that 
"Pakistan's interest was exclusively in terms of the defence of the country and to take 
maximum advantage from the US cooperation to build up the defence forces of 
Pakistan"133 In many ways, the real and immediate problem before Pakistani policy 
makers was the defence of Pakistan against India and their primary motivation for 
alignment with the United States was the need for arms and economic assistance. 
6-4. Zia's Intention to Prolong the Afghan War 
Zia created an impression that the Soviet invasion was irreversable and "it would be a 
miracle of the twentieth century if the Soviets depart from Afghanistan"134 His senior 
army officers believed that "the Soviets would never leave Afghanistan and that the 
Geneva talks were "only a sideshow. "135 General Akhtar Abdur Rahman (Director ISI) 
and Casey also felt strongly that the Russians would not leave. ' 36 Former US Ambassador 
to Pakistan Ronald I. Spiers added "that he did not believe the Russians had any intention 
of leaving and that any withdrawal agreement could be trusted. " In a conversation on 8 
May 1983 Charles Cogan, Director of Covert Operations in the Near East and South Asia 
in 1983, confidently asserted to Spicrs that Pakistan would not conclude the projected 
settlement in June "or ever. " He went on to say that Zia "knows how we feel about it. Ile 
recognises that this will be a long, long war, and he is committed all the way. " Iie added, 
after a long discussion, "Zia and General Akhtar fully accept our view that Pakistan's 
security is best assured by keeping the Russians tied down there. " 
37 However, Akhtar 
regarded Geneva as a potential sellout because it did not include the mu]ahtdeen as 
participants who would emerge in control of the follow-on government. tie thought it 
was just a facade, while the 'struggle' was the rcality. '3 In fact, Zia and his colleagues 
13= The Washington Post (9 September 1983), p. 4. 
133 Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, Pakistan Under the Military: EIcven 'ears of Zia-ul Ilaq 
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(London: Westview Press, 1991), p. 2448. 
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133 George Shultz and I loward Schaffer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South 
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and Casey desired to prolong Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in order to serve 
complementary interests. 
By all accounts, Zia and its colleagues perceived that the Soviets used Geneva talks as a 
shield to prepare for final strikes against the mujahideen and Pakistan. This idea was 
realised when Chernenko took office in 1984 and the Soviet military escalation increased 
in Afghanistan. The Soviet started a major offensive in Panjshcr, with a force of about 
15,000 and 5,000 DRA troops in the spring of 1984. This was the largest Soviet operation 
up to that time, and it was the first operation in which Soviet forces used massive high- 
altitude carpet bombing and large-scale helicopter assaults against the mujahideen. The 
Soviet also raised the risks of regional escalation by increasing military strikes into 
Pakistan. By Pakistan's estimate, these strikes grew from the sporadic forays of around 
88 border violations between 1984-1985 and a similar number in the first half of 1986.139 
These strikes were not limited in scale and territory and Soviet-Kabul forces on many 
occasions undertook a concerted campaign of air strikes against mujahideen sanctuaries 
and Pakistan's military instalations. During 1986, the Soviets pursued a "bomb and 
negotiatei140 strategy and launched a major offensive in involving an estimated 10,000 
Soviet and 8,000 Afghan troops, to curtail mujahideen attacks on the highway to Kabul. 
Soviet attacks also at times appeared to be timed to exert pressure on Pakistan to finalise 
the Geneva talks for the settlement of Afghanistan crisis. 
At that time, Najibullah intensified the PDPA's attempts at national reconciliation, calling 
in May 1986 for greater unity in the party and a broadening of its social base to include 
all social strata and ethnic groups. In December 1986, Najibullah visited Moscow and 
Gorbachev emphasised the importance of national reconciliation and warned that Soviet 
troops would be withdrawn by the end of 1988.141 In the same month, Yuli Vorontsov 
stated talks with a Pakistani diplomat over the possibility that some representatives of the 
Afghan refugees and mujahideen could be brought into the Afghan government under the 
policy of national reconciliation. 142 In 1987, ' Soviet military efforts diminished as the 
Soviet Union increased its efforts to "Afghanise" the war, and put pressure on the PDPA 
government for domestic reforms and international concessions as part of a deal that 
139 Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, p. 275. 140 Andrew Bennett used this term as a Gorbachev's strategy in Afghanistan for peace. See Condemned 
to Repetition?, p. 247. 141 Najibullah's interview in CDSP, 10 January 1990, pp. 16-17. 
142 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, pp. 181.182. 
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would include withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. Moreover, the Soviet-Afghan 
position in the Geneva talks hardened in March 1987 on the issue of the PDPA's leading 
role in Afghanistan. 143 On 20 July, Gorbachev brought Najibullah and Dabrak Karmal to 
Moscow to clarify Soviet policy and warned that Najibullah had to strengthen his 
political base because Soviet forces would be withdrawn in twelve months. '44 According 
to Pravda, Gobachev officially offered US leaders a twelve-month time frame at the 
December 1987 Washington summit, and on 8 February 1988, he announced that he had 
agreed with the Afghan government that a "front-loaded" Soviet withdrawal would start 
on 15 May 1988. Gorbachev's promise of front-loading was later codified in a 
commitment that 50 percent of Soviet forces would be withdrawn within the first three 
months. 145 
As the Soviets moved toward the final timetable, however, Soviet officials continued to 
insist that a withdrawal could take place only if outside aid to the rebels ended or the 
PDPA government was able to achieve stability on its own)46 The Soviet also linked 
withdrawal to guarantees against international intervention and stated that the PDPA 
revolution was irreversible. 147 On the other hand, Najibullah had announced several 
reforms, including an offer of twenty posts to the opposition (exiled Afghan political 
figures), including those of vice-president and deputy prime minister. Najibullah also 
indicated that the office of prime minister would be negotiable. None of the proffered 
posts, however, was in the key areas of foreign affairs, defence and internal security. 
Najibullah would have remained in control of a strong presidency, the PDPA would still 
have a leading role and there was no guarantee that rebels (nmu]ahidcen) would be 
included in the future broad based coalition government. The USSR provided sufficient 
time to Najibullah government to gain firm control of domestic politics. In February 
1987, Shevardnadze continued to link any Afghan agreement to guarantees of a leading 
role for the PDPA but after July 1987, the Soviet Union changed its traditional policy and 
stated that it would withdraw its troops regardless of whether Njibullah government was 
stable or national reconciliation succeeded. '4' At that time, Najibullah threatened not to 
143 Ibid., pp. 199-210. 144 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, p. 214; and Rubin, Search for Peace, p. 84. 143 Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, pp. 233-234; and Gorbachev in Pravda, MIS (8 February 
1988), pp. 34-36. 146 Primakov, FI3IS, 7 October 1986, pp. CCI-CC14; and Riaz Khan. Untying the Afghan Knot, p. 152. 
148 
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sign the Geneva accords without additional arms and greater assurances from Moscaw. 149 
The Soviets provided a guarantee to the Najibullah government and he agreed to sign the 
accords. It was then possible to withdraw Sovict troops from Afghanistan. 
However, the US and Pakistan both rejected the Soviets' condition that the aid to the 
Afghan mujahideen be ended. 150 At that time, Gorbachev and Shcvardnadze believed 
they had assurances from the United States and Pakistan that they would cut off aid to 
the Afghan rebels once Soviet troops were withdrawn. "' Many Soviet leaders argued that 
the escalation of US arms aid and Pakistan support to the Afghan mujahldcen empowered 
Soviet conservatives and were therefore a major cause of retarded progress toward a 
settlement. In either view, the Soviet leaders were convinced that Pakistan and the United 
States were more concerned to impose a high military cost on the Soviet Union than to 
seek a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan. 152 Moreover, Gorbachev and Shcvardnadze 
thus felt they had been misled when President Reagan rejected any cutoff of US aid to the 
Afghan rebels in spontaneous remarks in a television interview in December 1987. 
George Shultz communicated Reagan's position to Shcvardnadzc in January 1988, 
leading to a tense series of meetings between Shultz and Shcvardnadzc between 21-23 
March when Shultz offered a proposal for negative symmetry, but Shevardnadze rejected 
this as inconsistent with Soviet treaty commitments to Afghanistan. The failure to reach 
agreement by 23 March led Shcvardnadzc to suggest that Moscow could solve the 
Afghan problem without the United States as a guarantor, and the Soviet Union raised 
this possibility with Pakistan in the UN talks. ' S3 In fact, neither the US nor Pakistan gave 
a guarantee in Geneva that they wanted cut off aid to the mujahideen. Pakistan rejected 
any agreement without the United States, however, and on 31 March, the United States 
proposed positive symmetry, even though US and Pakistani aid would be inconsistent 
with the language already negotiated in the Geneva accords. 
149 Barnett Rubin, Search for Peace, p. 90. tso Riaz Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, pp. 233-234. 151 According to the Soviet officials the US Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead gave assurance to 
cutoff aid to the Afghan'nuJahidecn provided the Soviet announce timetable of withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. See more details in Cordovcz and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, p. 193. 152 Barnett R. Rubin uses the term "Bleeder" for those in the United States who sought Soviet capitulation 
in Afghanistan and preferred continued war there over a settlement at Geneva that would allow the 
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The Soviets complained publicly about the US and Pakistani arms transfers to the Afghan 
rebels. Najibullah, concerned over the continuation of arms supplies to the Afghan rebels, 
threatened not to sign the Geneva accords, leading to his sudden meeting with Gorbachev 
in early April 1987 and his acquiescence in the accords after Gorbachev's promises of 
additional aid. 154 Thus, the US and Soviet negotiations did not reach agreement on a 
mutual cutoff of arms supplies until September 1988 and this situation affected the Soviet 
Union because the Soviet strategy, tactically and politically, failed miserably. At that 
time, the Soviets used Indian channels to pressurise Pakistan for accommodation in the 
Geneva peace process, but the US warned the Indian government that interference in 
Pakistan would be considered a threat to US strategic interests in the rcgion. 1 
However, the Soviets put tremendous pressure on Pakistan to agree to a settlement in 
Geneva over Afghanistan. As a part of the pressure tactics, they kept accusing Pakistan of 
adopting a negative approach towards concluding a peaceful settlement of the issue. The 
Soviet lobby was successful in mobilising Pakistan's public opinion and media against 
the Zia regime. According to Peter Schweizer, Pakistani intelligence had evidence of 
Soviet-sponsored subversion directed against the mufahldecn and Zia government. The 
Pakistan Progressive Party (PPP), factions of the Movement for the Restoration of 
Democracy (MRD), the Baluch Students Organisation (BSO) and the Pakistan National 
Party (PNA) were all receiving Soviet funds to encourage disscnt. 
156 As a consequence, 
the majority of the National Assembly members in Mohammad Khan Junejo (prime 
minister nominated by the Zia) government advocated an early settlement, a demand 
which irritated Zia, who desired to continue the war to bleed the Soviet as much as 
possible and gain more benefits for the country. 
'" According to the Washington 11ost 
"the Soviet successfully polarised Pakistan's domestic politics and seized the opportunity 
to demoralise Zia's position as part of the pressure for a peace settlement in Geneva. "'$' 
In this situation, the USSR dropped the idea of formation of an interim transitional 
government in Afghanistan from the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Later, 
the US also changed its position about "broad-based transitional government in Kabul" 
and consulted Zia to give reasons for the United States agreeing to the withdrawal of 
1S4 Barnett Rubin, Search for Peace. p. 90. 135 The New York Times (8 April 1989); Washington Post (12 August 1989); and Dawn (17 October 
1990). 
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Soviet troops without simultaneously demanding the formation of a transitional 
government. Zia stated that the Soviet Union had initially been keen to negotiate on both 
the issues together, but the two superpowers could not reach an agreement on the 
modalities. At that time, Shultz had suggested to Shcvardnadzc that they should dclink 
the two issues and settle the question of withdrawal once and for cvcr. 159 
In fact, Pakistan was informed about this situation aller the US and the Soviet Union had 
already reached an agreement on the point of withdrawal of forces. Pakistan was faced 
with a fait accompli. 160 Zia's desire that the Soviet should include as a core point in the 
agreement the formation of a broad-based transitional government in Kabul was not 
accepted by either the US or the Soviet Union. Shultz told Sahabzada Yaqub Khan, who 
was then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, that the Soviet Union, for reasons of its own had 
delinked the point of an interim transitional government with the withdrawal of forces 
and therefore, it would be difficult for the US to go back to the Soviets and argue with 
them. 16' However, Zia told Lally Weymouth, the Washington Post correspondent, that he 
would not sign the Geneva Accord with the Soviet-backed president Najibullah. He 
frequently made statements that "he could not shake hands with the man who had come 
riding into Kabul on a Soviet tank. "' 62 Zia said he would sign the accords with a coalition 
government formed of and by Afghans and controlled by the mujahidcen and Afghan 
exiles. 163 Pakistan increased pressure on US officials to continue armed aid to the 
resistance until all Soviet troops had left. Zia asserted that he would never sign a 
settlement with Najibullah or any other Kabul government dominated by the 
Communists. The Soviets and Kabul both increased pressure on Pakistan with air, 
artillery and terrorist assaults-most carried out through KGB and K! lAD agcnts. "4 
The Soviets started a high-intensity terrorist campaign against Pakistan and targeted its 
urban population centres, transport and communication facilities, not only to cause 
maximum loss of life and public property but to generate fear and create widespread 
panic to demoralise the government for the Geneva settlement. But these tactics were 
tss Washington Post (21 February 1988), p. 7A. 139 Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With Zia: Pakistan's Power Politics 1977.1988, pp. 32S. 160 Ibid., p. 326. 161 Washington Post (13 July 1986); and Dawn (5 September 1987). 162 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan. p. 98. 163 See Lally Weymouth, "Does Moscow Really Plan on [. caving Afghanistan?, " Washington Post (21 
February 1988). 
164 US Department of State, Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupation, Special Reports, No. 173 
(December 1987), p. 21. 
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unsuccessful in shaking Zia's stand and he declared his continued support for the Afghan 
mujahideen. The resistance leader, Younis Khalis, reportedly said, "We will never accept 
any Communist element in a future government of Afghanistan. "' 65 lt was not possible 
for Pakistan to accept UN negotiations without alienating the United States, conservative 
Arab patrons and the Afghan mujahidccn groups. This was a clear indication that 
Pakistan and the United States were in no mood to bargain and both deeply distrusted 
Soviet motives in the UN negotiations and regarded it as desirable, in any case, to keep 
Soviet forces pinned down in a no-win situation. 
In early 1988, Zia had gone along with the US in opposing the Soviet policy of linking 
the withdrawal to US and Pakistani acceptance of a coalition government. Zia's military 
regime gradually reversed course and declared that Pakistan would not sign the Geneva 
accords unless Moscow removed Najibullah and agreed to an interim government to be 
chosen through processes dominated by the Pakistan-based muJahldecn groups. 
'" 'Thus, 
the serious prospect of a settlement of the Afghan crisis in the April 1988 round of the 
UN Geneva talks forced a showdown in Islamabad. In fact, the Zia regime deliberately 
delayed settlement because Zia regarded the war as the key to Pakistan's American 
support and was content to sec it continue indcfinitcly. 167 It was also perceived that a 
settlement in Afghanistan "would mean that Pakistan would slip back in the queue for US 
military and economic aid"168 In contrast, Pakistani public opinion was overwhelmingly 
favourable to the settlement, reflecting concern over the refugee influx and fears of 
Soviet border pressures. Mohammad Khan Juncjo's government supported the Geneva 
accord and Soviet withdrawal but Zia and the military officers strongly opposed signing 
an accord. 169 After the approval of the Geneva accord in April 1988, Zia claimed that '`the 
US and the Soviet Union have made a secret agreement on the Afghan issue and they arc 
attempting to smear Pakistan in the bargain as an obstacle to peace. " The US, Zia said, "is 
interested in the withdrawal of Soviet troops and it does not care what happens to the 
Afghans aflcrward. "170 He also reaffirmed his belief that the accord was a setback for 
las Quoted in Weymouth, "Does Moscow Really Plan on Leaving Afghanistan?, " (21 February 1988). 
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Pakistan and he declared that the Soviet Union "would have come back sooner or 
later. ""' 
In compliance with the Geneva accords, signed on 14 April 1988, the Soviet Union began 
to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in the spring of 1988. Zia was determined to 
continue support the mujahideen against Najibullah's rule in Kabul. On the other hand, 
the PDPA requested for ground forces and Soviet air strikes in support of PDPA forces 
which were turned down by Moscow. 172 The Politburo followed Gorbachev's adamant 
refusal to allow a continuing Soviet military role, however, and it reaffirmed that all 
Soviet forces were to be withdrawn. Soviet Defence Minister Yazov visited Kabul in 
June 1988 to convey a message that the Soviet decision to pullout was unchangeable. ' 73 
In May 1988, when the mujahtdccn increased their pressure over Kabul government, 
Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister and Vladimir Kryuchkov, the KGB Chairman, 
requested air strikes out of Soviet territory in support of the Afghan army, but Gorbachev 
rejected this idea as "unnecessary and premature, " and he approved the Politburo decision 
to continue "demonstration" flights near the Afghan bonicr. '74 Thus, the Geneva accord 
helped the United States to achieve its strategic objective of securing the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan. By and large Moscow had been humiliated but not as Zia 
wished because it was not of vital concern to the United States. 
6-5. Economic Motives 
A major objective for Pakistan was to secure financial assistance from multinational 
agencies and individual countries. The great influx of Afghan refugees from Afghanistan 
to Pakistan created a grave burden on the economy. Thus, the country needed outside 
economic aid to address the complex problems that emanated from the flood of Afghan 
refugees. Pakistan facilitated and supplemented the massive international aid programme 
that sustained the refugees, and a broad consensus held that the Afghans should be 
allowed to stay until they could return with a sense of security. in fact, it was quite 
difficult to manage the burden of refugees and Pakistan was dependent on the continued 
assistance of the international community. 
171 Washington Post (30 June 1988), p. 2; and see Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of 
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For this purpose, a primary objective of Pakistan was to receive massive US economic 
aid to manage the economic dislocations resulting from the influx of Afghan refugees 
and for the purpose of rapid economic development. President Zia warmly approved 
the America's efforts to bring others into a military aid consortium for Pakistan: 
I think the United States has been very wise in taking that step. The 
threat that has been created is not only a threat to American interests, 
it is a threat to sea lanes, to oil, to Western European economic 
requirements. Therefore the United States is right in feeling that 
everybody should chip in ... We expect the 
EEC will play its role at 
least in helping Pakistan economically and also sharing a bit of the 
burden of the Afghan refugees. 175 
It was a major objective of foreign policy to gain substantial economic and technical 
assistance to deal with such problems as mass poverty, illiteracy, lack of adequate raw 
materials and technical skills and to improve the country's low industrial capability. 
Foreign aid in the form of grants, loans, and technical assistance was the primary means 
through which the United States contributed to the economic development of Pakistan. 
Zia's administration, through pragmatic developmental planning and more effective 
utilization of available resources, established an impressive record of economic progress 
during 1980 to 1988. One of the most outstanding achievements of Zia's time was the 
high growth rate of agriculture and developments in the field of communication and 
transportation, particularly in the borderlands of North West Frontier Province and 
Baluchistan. The Pakistani government increased the economic opportunities and also 
improved the standard of living for the people of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier, 
to counter Soviet propaganda and subversive tactics in the region. For this purpose, US 
aid was designed to assist Pakistan in achieving its developmental goals by enabling it "to 
accomplish the improvement of the low level of agricultural efficiency and production, 
rural development and assistance to lay the basis for industrial expansion". 
176 The main 
objective of the development of the badly neglected areas of NWFP and Baluchistan was 
to create political stability in Pakistan. The level of development was linked to the level 
of internal insecurity and external threat perceived by the Pakistani leaders. 
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Baluchistan, finally, received attention from the federal government and the US and the 
area was exposed to the currents of national life, the improvements in economic 
infrastructure, transport and in extractive technologies, an increase in political linkages, 
and the modest reduction of social barriers to increased contact between the Baluch and 
the rest of Pakistan. For the development of Baluchistan, the US provided $1.6 billion for 
the economic progress of the province and US also allocated $250 million for the 
development of Baluchistan. The improvement of physical infrastructure along the 
Makran coast was a feature of the US aid programme, and more than $100 million were 
allocated to the coastal areas. $70 million were set aside for large-scale projects such as 
water reclamation plant. Millions of dollars were awarded to build and improve roads 
linking the towns along the Makran coast. 177 In 1985, $40 million of US aid was spent on 
a road project linking Bela to Turbat. In 1987 US aid also reportedly funded a five- 
hundred mile long highway connected with Karachi to Makran coast, and terminated at 
the Iranian border. The US officials agreed to provide 80 percent of the estimated $70 
million required to construct a five-mile road and tunnel across the 10,000 feet high 
Lowari Pass near the border with Pakistan. That amount was allocated from the 1987 US 
aid package of $4.02 billion but after the Soviet forces withdrawal from Afghanistan US 
aid to Pakistan suspended and the Lowari pass tunnel project was abandoned. 17S 
6-6. Strategic Motives 
Pakistan is situated in an area of great geopolitical importance whether seen from a 
regional, continental, or global standpoint. In this context, Pakistan was viewed by the 
policy-makers in Washington as a major base of the area adjoining to the Middle East and 
the Persian Gulf. Moreover, Pakistan's ability to play a significant role in the defence 
strategy of the United States arose from the peculiar position which Pakistan occupies in 
Asia, largely due to its geographic and strategic location. It has common borders with 
Iran, Afghanistan and China and is separated from Central Asia by intervening Afghan 
territory which is nowhere more than fifty miles in width. From this point of view, 
Pakistan gained an opportunity to improve its south-western port facilities and air strips at 
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Karachi, Gwadar, Jiwani, Pasni and Peshawar with US economic and technical 
assistance. The US continued to back Pakistan by extending economic and military 
assistance and this support and commitment from its superpower patron served as a 
morale booster for Pakistan. 
The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan had upset the balance of power in the 
Persian Gulf region where both Pakistan and the United States had vital political, 
strategic, and economic interests. Both needed oil, but any disruption of Gulf oil supply 
was likely to hurt Pakistan more, because it had very limited alternative sources of energy 
and sources of supply abroad. The Gulf countries were important markets for goods and 
services for both Pakistan and the United States. In addition, Pakistan earned about $3 
billion annually through its migrant workers in the Gulf-on amount that was crucial to 
Pakistan's balance-of-payment situation. Furthermore, Pakistan had common religious, 
cultural, and historical tics with the Gulf countries and would look adversely upon any 
trend that was likely to weaken these tics. however, Gulf countries were also important 
to Pakistan for military and strategic reasons. Pakistan had a weak defence capability, so 
it must rely on the support of Gulf Muslim countries to overcome this deficiency. Further, 
Pakistan also had military links of varying size and significance with most countries of 
the Gulf which was vital for its economy and defence. 
1' Ibid. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Afghan Crisis and Its Consequences for Pakistan 
Asia is but a body of mud and water. Its throbbing heart is the Afghan 
nation. The Afghan nation's relief gives relief to Asia and its 
corruption corrupts Asia. ' 
-Mohammad lgbal, 1920 
The US-Pakistan alipiment during the Afghan crisis was an excellent example of an 
opportunistic partnership between two unequal powers. Nations often join formal and 
informal alliances with specific objectives and the primary objectives of almost all 
participating states are to secure their interests and minimise their liabilities by sharing 
them with others. Normally, nations join an alliance or alliances for potential gains but 
costs are equally obvious. Thus, it is a calculated response to a peculiar set of 
circumstances that influences policy makers to join a partnership to seek security or the 
protection of others. 3 Moreover, the initiative for an alliance could come from either a 
weaker state or a great power, depending upon the force of the factors experienced by the 
statcs involvcd. 
The United States, as a great power with global responsibilities and commitments, took 
advantage of Pakistan's desperate need for military and economic assistance and its 
search for powerful friends in order to have access to Pakistani bases and other vital 
facilities so as to expand the scope of its policy to contain communism. On the other hand, 
Pakistan, as a weak state with regional interests, seized upon the opportunity offered by 
the United States search for anti-Communist allies in South Asia in order to achieve 
economic and military assistance and to strengthen its bargaining position vis-3-vis India. 
Indeed, this was the first time the United States had provided an unequivocal guarantee of 
protection against a possible attack by India and its Communist allies, primarily the Soviet 
Union. Thus, Pakistan built up its defence capabilities which, in turn, removed the 
existing sense of insecurity and replaced it with the much-desired sense of security 
Mohammad Iqbal is a national poet, philosopher and scholar of Pakistan. I [is philosophical contribution 
is available in Urdu and Persian poetry books. The prescht comment is a translation of one of his 
couplet in Persian poetry book Javed Noma Verse No. I (Lahore: Shiekh Ghulam All and Sons, 
1983), pp. 177-178; and see Kulyat-e-lgbal Persian version (Labore: lgbal Academy Pakistan, 1990). = Perviaz lqbal Cheema, Defence Policy of Pakistan (London: Macmillan. 1993). p. 145. 
J. W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridage University Press. 1967), p. 
171. 
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deemed so necessary for a satisfactory pace of development. Moreover, Pakistan's policy 
makers fully calculated the probable gains and most likely losses, of which most small or 
weak states are well aware and can accept in respect of the alignment. It would be useful 
here, to discuss the costs incurred and benefits attained by Pakistan as a result of the 
temporary alignment with the United States. These can be classified into political, 
military, economic, social and strategic categories. 
I. Political Benefits 
The Soviet adventurism in Afghanistan posed a serious challenge to Pakistan's cxtcmal 
security, its national survival and territorial integrity. In these circumstances, Zia made 
excellent use of the opportunities arising from changes in the geopolitical environment, as 
a result of the revolution in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, to legitimise 
his regime, make personal gains, and obtain a renewed US commitment to Pakistan's 
security, funds from Islamic countries and a continuing supply of weapons from the US 
and China. The American moral, military and economic support generated a variety of 
political benefits for Pakistan in general and for Zia ul"IIaq's regime in particular, helping 
the ruling elites to deal with the situation effectively and maintain internal security, which 
in turn secured their considerable power position in the country. 
1-1. Success of Pakistan's Afghan Policy 
Pakistan's Afghan policy brought a fundamental change in the regional scenario. The 
mujahideen resistance, hitherto directed against the Kabul Communist rulers, turned into 
an Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union. According to General K. M. Arif, "die new 
threat posed to Pakistan's national security was too serious to ignore and the choices 
available were uneasy. "4 Pakistan was too small, weak and vulnerable a country to take up 
cudgels with the Soviet Union. The existing options were limited for Pakistan because it 
was perceived that Pakistan could be the next victim, which caused great anxicty. 
s 
Pakistan condemned the Soviet intervention. It was obvious that Pakistan could not afford 
continuing instability on its Western borders and would have to resist foreign invasion by 
all means, including by the mujahidccn. It was believed that the subjugation of a Muslim 
country was an insult to Islam and it was incumbent on all the faithful to wage a Jihad 
4 See General K. M. Arif, "Success of Afghan Policy, " Dawn (Karachi: 19 May 1992). 5 Ibid. 
208 
(war) against the atheist Soviets. In the 1980s Zia operated a highly cf icacious Afghan 
policy. 6 At this time, Pakistan strongly opposed the Soviet support to the Kabul 
government and its intervention. The Soviet Union exerted relentless pressure on Pakistan 
in all conceivable ways and threatened Pakistan with "unpredictable consequences" if it 
continued "hurting its interests"' However, during the Zia cra, Afghanistan was deemed 
to be the central point of Pakistan's foreign policy and this brought Pakistan to the fore in 
international affairs. Zia's Afghan policy rolled back the Soviet military adventure in 
Afghanistan. 
1-2. Nuclear Capability 
Pakistan's nuclear programme and doctrine have been based on fairly clear and 
straightforward means to forge a credible deterrent to counter India's threat. Throughout 
its history, Pakistan's foreign policy has been formed by the perceived threat from India, 
defined in terms of Kashmir and the integration of the Pakistani state. Moreover, defence 
planning in Pakistan is almost wholly directed at achieving some kind of parity with India, 
since Pakistan is unwilling to accept the role of an Indian satellite and sees military 
developments in India as potential threats. $ In 1974, India conducted a nuclear explosion 
and changed the character of the South Asian strategic environment. India emerged as the 
undisputed power of the region which was unacceptable to Pakistan because it was a weak 
and subservient country. 
In the circumstances, Pakistan was not prepared to accept India's preeminent position and 
regarded India's nuclear explosion as evidence of its imperialistic designs in the region. 
Thus, Pakistan was understandably cynical and fett that unless it obtained its own nuclear 
bomb, it could be blackmailed into accepting the dominant position of its rival. Moreover, 
Pakistan was unwilling to accept the role of an Indian satellite and was therefore pushing 
forward to acquire a nuclear capability. Zulfikar All Bhutto expressed determination that 
the Pakistanis would "cat grass" if necessary to match the Indian nuclear capability. 
9 In 
1976 Bhutto signed an agreement with France to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant. 
His contract with France was interpreted in America as Pakistan's move to becoming a 
6 Khalid Mahmud, "Is There a Foreign Policy?, " The Nation (Lahore: 13 September 1992). 7 Ibid. 
$ Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi, South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 
1996), p. 119. 
Brahma Chellaney, "The Challenge of Nuclear Arms Control in South Asia. " Survival. Vol. 35, No. 3, 
Autumn 1993, p. 122; and see Z. A. Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated (New Delhi: Vikat, 1979), p. 137. 
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nuclear power. 1° Secretary of State Henry Kissinger bluntly warned Bhutto in August 
1976, "we can destabilise your government and make a horrible example out of you. "" In 
1977, Jimmy Carter came into power and from the very first days publicly dedicated 
himself and spent an enormous amount of time to halt nuclear proliferation. He perceived 
that the destructive potential of nuclear technology posed an immediate threat to 
international peace and stability. Carter announced his nuclear policy on 7 April 1977, 
asserting his determination to discourage the development and spread of dangerous 
nuclear technologies and to minimise worldwide accumulation of potential nuclear 
explosives in peaceful power programmes. In July 1977 Bhutto's democratic government 
was overthrown by declaration of Zia martial law; continued the nuclear programme. In 
particular, Zia encouraged the country's nuclear scientists to speed up their work. Pakistan 
also showed much resentment over the American stance on the nuclear issue. In 1978 
Carter took action against Pakistan to neutralise its nuclear programme and he used 
pressure on France and Pakistan to cancel the reprocessing plant deal. 
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan was informed that the Carter 
administration was prepared to send a team to Islamabad to discuss the emerging security 
problems in the region. The US also expressed its willingness conditionally to lift its 
embargo on economic aid to Pakistan. In fact, the Carter administration realised the 
importance of Pakistan and emphasised that an enduring friendship with Pakistan was in 
the vital interest of the United States. Carter offered to seek legislation allowing him to 
waive the requirement of the Symington amendment. At that time, Senator Glenn felt that 
nonproliferation had to be subordinated to meet the challenge involved in the Soviet 
invasion and was willing to support a waiver for Pakistan-12 Brzezinski also contacted Zia, 
but "his response was very cold and hardly accommodative because of the US tough stand 
against Pakistan's dubious record on human rights and on its nuclear programme. "" 
10 See Perviaz Igbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Quest for Nuclear Technology, " Australian Outlook. No. 34 
(August 1980), pp. 188-190. 11 Benazir Bhutto, Daughter of the East (London: Ilamish Hamilton. 1988), p. 86; Christina Lamb, 
Waiting For Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy (London: Ilamish Hamilton, 1991), pp. 38 
and 82; and see also Anthony Hyman & M. Ghayur and Nasresh Kaushik. Pakistan: Zia and After 
(London: Asia Publishing House, 1988), P. 23. ý= William J. Barnds, "The United States and South Asia: Policy and Process, " in Stephen Philip Cohen 
(cd., ). The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1987), p. 157. 13 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981 
(New York: Farrar, 1983), p. 448. 
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However, in 1981, the Reagan administration believed that Pakistan faced a serious 
security threat due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and deserved economic and 
military aid to protect its sovereignty. Pakistan fully cooperated with the United States 
for the containment of communism and provided all necessary facilities to the US and 
Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union. As a result, Reagan gave the necessary 
clearance certificate to Congress about Pakistan's nuclear programme. In January 1982 
efforts in Congress to reduce military assistance to Pakistan were beaten back by the 
Reagan administration which kept the Afghan pipeline open for aid for Pakistan to 
continue. The Reagan administration also asked Congress to waive the Symington 
amendment14 and make an exception regarding Islamabad's nuclear programme, to 
allow a military and economic aid package for Pakistan. Nixon also strongly supported 
Pakistan and urged that "the US must help Pakistan in the event of a Communist 
attack. " He stated that "Congress must not cut military and economic assistance 
package to Pakistan, notwithstanding its concerns about whether Islamabad is 
developing the capability to build nuclear weapons. " He further mentioned that "the US 
must recognise that if we cannot secure Pakistan against Soviet intimidation we cannot 
secure a just settlement of the war in Afghanistan. "' 5 
In the circumstances, the waiver of the Symington amendment in favour of Pakistan 
provided an opportunity to the Zia government for acquisition of a nuclear weapons 
capability. Pakistan had produced weapons-grade uranium and it had achieved its goal 
-the production of deliverable weapons-by 1986-1987.16 Thus, Zia's regime was 
completely successful in its clandestine efforts to secure classified designs of a 
centrifuge - based uranium enrichment plant and in obtaining a number of critical sub- 
systems, components and materials. Emma Duncan quotes Stephen Cohen as saying 
that there were rumours that the Fauji Foundation (Pakistan's military based industrial 
project) and many private investors were involved in importing equipment for the 
14 The Reagan administration urged the Congress to act favourably on their request to extend the duration 
of the follow-up aid package the authorisation provided in section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act 
to waive the Symington amendment sanction that would otherwise apply to Pakistan. See details 
Robert A. Peck, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, Testifying 
to a House Sub-Committee hearing on aid to Pakistan, S March 1987. See Keesing`s Contemporary 
Archives (6 July 1979), p. 29701; (11 September 1981), p. 31074; and (17 September 1982). p. 
31707. 
15 Richard Nixon, Victory Without War 1999 (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988). p. 140. 16 David Albright and Mark llibbs, "Pakistan's Bomb: Out of the Closet. " Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists (July/August 1992), pp. 38-43. 
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nuclear WC, ºi)uns pfl granrºnc. 1 Morrovcr. /. ia strongly suppor1cd Pakistan's nuclear 
hrugrantmc and refused to accept gull-scope safeguards. I Ir said. "We shall cat crumbs 
hut Will not allow our national interest to be compromised in any manner \%hat-so- 
ever. "Ix /. la admitted that "Pakistan can build a (nuclear) hunt, whenever ºt mihrs. 
()nee you have acquired the technology, which Pakistan has, you can do whatever you 
like. ''' lie deliberately took calculated risks, and skilfully exploited the international 
environment in the wake of' the Afghan crisis, to enable Pakistan to obtain significant 
sensitive Western materials and technology from black-market sources for its uranium 
enrichment plant (Kahuta). Pakistan also obtained specialised containers for the 
handling 01' uranium hexafluoridc. along with 130 metric tons of aluminum fier use as 
'n centrifuge housings. ' 
llo% cvcr, nuclc; ur ambiguity ended when India look the initiative to iunduct five 
nuclear tests on II May and 13 May 1998 and suhscyuentl. \ Pakistan also conducted 
nuclear tests in May and . 
tune I9Qx. Ions: ; rlicr both rouritries initiated their military- 
nuclear efforts. (faulrar Avuh, the Foreign Minister. declared that: "India'; r actions, 
which hose an ijmne(liate a11,1 grave threat to Pakistan's security, will not go 
unanswered ''''' Pakistan had to go fier its own nuclear test, as the credibility of 
Pakistan's deterrent had been called into question by India's hrha'iour. Thus. military 
durtrinc in Pakistan was coýnecrnrri about its survival and to deter India's cum cutiunal 
military superiority as \veII as to counter Hinre subtle terms of' Indian dominance in 
regional affairs. In addition. Pakistan's nuclear weapons programnu was more punitive 
than acquisitive; possession of such wealpons was seen . is the only option to 
defend the 
state. 
3. International Support 
Pakistan niaºIc \ igOi 1ºS usr of all ihr aCCC. %ihl(" nrultrl; rtrr; ºI tor. ' Io )!: un ýul, l, ý, rt : ºt.; un`t 
the tiorvirt invasion ººt' A hanistan and it was gully backed by the nialonty of the 
international community. (Table-4) Ihr annual resolutions passed by the I 'N Getier l 
Ouutcºi by I mma I )unr; ºn. RI-caking '1 he Political Iuurnc) I hruukh I'akktnn 11 ondtirt 
Mich, uI It'. chh. I OV) I, 1), IX I 
I he Pakistan finºcs (I ; iIi i ). 8 luly I'1ýu. Iý I 
V1 IIIi; iin I(. I )ocrncr. "klit trkin}t at I lie Nui Irºr I)t, ur. " 1 imr. Iatk h I9S .h 42 
I c(n; ud tilicrt(t Nuclea AIII) iIium (Iloll ItIci West \ ic t% , 
101)UI. hl, 14 QI 
inaºncial'fillies (I oink n1. I"I May I')`)K. h. 1. 
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Assembly called for immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops. The 
Afghanistan problem become a hot issue for the UN's sixth emergency special session in 
1980.22 Moreover, in the annual sessions, the resolutions on Afghanistan succeeded in 
mustering an increased number of votes calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from 
Afghanistan, political settlement of the dispute and the creation of such conditions as 
would enable the Afghan refugees camped in Pakistan and Iran to return in security. 
The Soviet Union came under severe diplomatic pressure from other international fora 
such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC). The NAM ministerial meeting at New York also made 
reference to the on-going Afghanistan problem, issuing a call for political settlement 
based on the withdrawal of foreign troops. 3 In the emergency conference of thirty-six 
Islamic Foreign Ministers, Ayatollah Khomeini pledged "unconditional support" for 
Muslim insurgents fighting the Soviet-backed government. 24 The second Islamic 
Conference of Foreign Ministers in Pakistan also gave support and demanded the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops and restoration of the Islamic and non-aligned status of 
Afghanistan. 25 The European Union issued a joint statement calling for Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan "without delay" while Yugoslavia condemned the Soviet move at a 
UNESCO conference hosted by it 26 Thus, the Afghan war increasingly isolated Soviet 
Union from the world community because its action was legally untenable and morally 
unjustified. 
1.4. Decline of Pakhtun Radical Nationalism 
The paramount objectives of Pakistan's policy makers in supporting the Afghan war wcrc 
to block the revival of Afghan nationalism and to persuade a friendly government in 
Kabul to recognise the current "Durand Line" as an international border. In 1985 the 
22 The New York Times (15 January 1980), p. S. The UN (General Assembly) resolutions neither 
mention the Soviet Union as the aggressor, nor comment on the light of the refugees who were forced 
to flee their homeland because of the state of upheaval within Afghanistan. See more details UN 
Chronicle, No. 24 (February 1987), p. 69. _3 Dawn (9 October 1987); and see Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 19871" 
Current History, No. 86 (October 1987), p. 335. 
24 Ibid. (30 January 1980), p. 1. 25 Pakistan Times (Lahore: 9 April 1988). 
26 Ibid. (6 February 1980), p. 1; see also The New York Times (26 October 1980), p. 1. 
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Communist government in Kabul summoned tribal chiefs in both countries to call for 
Pakhtun unity under Afghan sovereignty. They also claimed self-determination for the 
creation of Pakhtunistan on Pakistan's territory (NWFP and some parts of Baluchistan) to 
upset the Islamabad government, which provided sanctuary to anti-Communist 
elements. 27 However, Pakistan tended to favour the Afghan Islamists' resistance factions 
over the pro-western traditionalists, mainly because they reject the secular idea of 
Pakhtunistan28 
In 1989 the Pakistani delegation in Geneva tried to obtain a dcfinitivc statement on the 
border from the Afghans, but the only reference to the border was contained in the 
agreement dealing with mutual assurances of non-interference between Pakistan and the 
Kabul regime. It called on both parties "to refrain from the threat or use of force in any 
form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other. "29 During the Geneva 
talks, the Pakistan government claimed that the peace agrcement, which banned 
interference across Afghanistan's "internationally recognised border, " implies Afghan 
acceptance that the frontier lies on the old Durand line. The Kabul government tried at the 
last minute to have those words struck out, but failed. 
30 It was thought that the influx of 
Afghan refugees in the NWFP and Baluchistan would increase Pakhtun nationalism but 
this was not the case. Despite their cultural and linguistic affinity with the local people, 
the Afghan refugees were hardly popular in NWFP and Baluchistan. 
1 As a consequence, 
the Afghan refugees reduced the strength of Pakhtun nationalism and may have dispelled 
once and for all the myth of Pakhtunistan 32 
1-5. The End of Pakhtunistan Problem 
The Government in Kabul had always had friendlier relations with India and the Soviet 
Union than Pakistan. However, the decade long Afghan war changed the previous 
political status of the country because its major ally, the Soviet Union, collapsed and left 
behind Afghan mujahideen contending for power. It appeared that even the long-standing 
27 The Economist (14 May 1988), p. 72. 21 Marvin G. Weinbaum, "War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role, " Middle East Journal, 
Vol. 45, No. 1, (Winter 1991), p. 77; and see The Economist (14 May 1988), p. 72. 29 Theodore L. Eliot, Jr, Gorbachev's Afghan Gambit (Washington, D. C.: Institute For Foreign Policy 
Analysis, Inc, 1988), p. 14. 30 See The Economist (14 May 1988), p. 72. 31 Grant M. Farr, , "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: 
Definitions, Repatriation and Ethnicity, " in Ewan W. 
Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (ed. ).. The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism (New York: 
Pinter Publishers, 1990), p. 141. 
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dispute over Pakhtunistan might become a thing of the past, and Zia envisioned a friendly 
Afghanistan providing Pakistan with strategic depth. Zia's regime, from the beginning of 
the war, was committed to destroying the Communsit infrastructure in Afghanistan, 
installing a client regime and bringing about a "strategic realignment" in South Asia. Zia 
told Selig Harrison, "We have earned the right to have a friendly regime in Afghanistan. " 
He declared, "We took risks as a frontline state and we will not permit it to be like it was 
before, with Indian and Soviet influence there and claims on our territory. It will be a real 
Islamic state, part of a pan-Islamic revival that will one day win over the Muslims in the 
Soviet Union, the world will see. "33 In fact, Zia and the ISI were more concerned about 
what they called "strategic realignment" and about establishing a pan-Islamic 
confederation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Zia declared that if Diego Cordovcz 
(The Special Advisor of the UN Secretary General for Afgahnistan, 1986-1988) did not 
succeed in establishing an interim government in Kabul, then the muJahideen would either 
throw Dr. Najibullah out of Kabul or form a provisional government inside Afghanistan. 
Zia declared that Pakistan and Afghanistan would establish a confederation in which 
Pakistanis and Afghans could travel freely back and forth without passports. 34 Policy 
makers felt that after ten years Pakistan was entitled to run its own show in Kabul. They 
did not want Afghanistan with 25,000 Soviet and 1500 Indian advisors and technicians. 3S 
Actually, Pakistan perceived that this situation would serve as a shield to Pakistan's 
security and it gave comfort to the defence planners of Pakistan, who wanted peace on its 
northern border. From a cynical perspective, Zia's regime opted for a disunifed and 
decentralised Afghan state as the best insurance that no government antagonistic to 
Pakistan would emerge in the future. 36 Thus, after the fall of the Najibullah government, 
the Islamists established control in Kabul. In 1992, the President of Afghanistan, 
Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, visited Pakistan and declared that "the Durand Line is the 
official border between Pakistan and Afghanistan but unofficially there is no border 
between the two countries. 37 The Afghan Charge d'Affairs in Pakistan, Karamatullah 
Mossa Qazi, also said that "the Pakhtunistan issue would never be raised with Pakistan 
because nation and country played an important role in the Afghan jihad. "31 
32 Ibid. 
33 Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soßtet 
Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 92. 34 Ibid., p. 260. ss Ibid., p. 259. M Marvin G. Weinbaum, "War and Peace in Afghanistan, " p. 84. 37 See The News (Rawalpindi - 28 May 1992). 38 See Dawn (15 October 1992). 
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2. Military Benefits 
Pakistan's effort to modernise its armed forces and defence posture provided justification 
to Pakistan's policy makers to become a party with the United States to strengthen 
defence capabilities. In fact, Pakistan's forces dcpendend on US weapons systems and 
they wanted to modernise their weapons to compete with India's conventional superiority. 
During the Afghan crisis, Pakistan eventually succeeded in obtaining modern 
sophisticated weapons from the United States. 
2-1. US Military Aid to Pakistan 
Unlike Carter, President Reagan was determined to challenge the Sovicts anywhere in the 
world and Afghanistan emerged as a major trump card in the containment of Soviet power 
and influence. Arms transfers to the Third World became an important policy instrument 
for the Reagan administration in its programme to revive the military power of the US and 
its allies around the world. As James Buckley explained "anus transfers properly 
considered and employed represent an indispensable instrument of the US policy that both 
complements and supplements the role of our own military forces. "39 The partnership 
between US and Pakistan was one of many contemporary instances of cooperation serving 
complementary interests. For the United States it served the primary purpose of expanding 
the scope of the policy of containment; for Pakistan it served primarily the purpose of 
increasing its political, military and economic potential vis-A-vis its neighbour i. e., India 
and the Soviet-backed Kabul government. President Zia ul-Ilaq, who was the architect of 
the new alignment, explained Pakistan's motives in cooperating with the US in these 
words: "Our main and prime objectives arc to keep out the Soviet Union and Afghanistan 
in the north and to safeguard the safety and security of Pakistan from India in the cast. "' 
William Casey analysed Pakistan's fear of the Indian threat and explained "I talked to 
President Zia and General Akhtar that who is number one enemy India or the Soviet 
Union. Both replied India but according to the situation both were determined to defeat 
the Sovicts. "4' It was very clear to the US that Pakistan lacked the requisite capabilities to 
39 James L. Buckley, "Conventional Arms Transfers. " statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (28 July 1981), reprinted in Current Policy, No. 301, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department 
of State, Washington, 1981, p. 3. 40 Dawn (23 March 1983). 
41 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 63. 
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colic with the Indian threat, the Soviet-hacked Afghan threat, or a joint Inci0-Soýviet- 
AIghan threat. In tact, the capabilities ofhoth India and the Soviet I'mon were beyond the 
42 reach oI Pakistan. 
I'OIicv makers, political Icadrrs and military planncrs in Pakistan have almost 
unaninxOusly believed that the problem of Pakistan's delloicc is a problem of defence 
against India. -I hcy have, therctorc, ronstantIy sought protection against a possible attack 
Gone India. In this regard. Pakistan's concern tier India rather than Communist aggression 
was evident and their primary motivation tier entering inter partnership with the I'ti was 
the need tier arms. Ilo ever, the Pakistan-I IS arms relationship was advocated by IIS 
analysts and policy makers on the grounds that: 
f soviet control ur influence over Pakistan would har %crºoýu. eticrts on IJS 
Commcrcial and strategic interests in the ('crsian (pult region; 
f I'; ikititan COUI(1 he used as a channel t()r tS assistance too the Afghan resistance grtulps: 
f Pakistan territory could he used as it base for further eontingrncles inwIv ing the 
Ramd I)cpIoymcnt I orcr (RI)I: ),, 
"A rre(IihIc (Icfcncc of' Pakistan %%oulri incrrasc t 'S I)resli} c among the \1rddIc I ; rarrn 
Countries and ('hing: 
f Pakistani t1CIC Cc hlanncrs nCCLlcti t(, nuulernisc the st; rtc'S delcn c Im cc-, with a view 
toi reducing the existing disparity between India and Pakistan and oh%uimIy this was 
unly possible with the help of-the I'nited States. 
Pakistan's military deficiencies were significantly rrctresSe4I and /ras go%crnmcnt 
uhtainccl sophisticated wwcapons to satcguard its security interests. Thus. the I'aki taro 
army was hotter equipped and its security %% its improved %%ith I's assistant-c (Table-5) it 
included improved warning and communication systems. anti-tank missiles. 1,10un, i attack 
aircraft. tanks and arnu, urrcl personnel carriers. In 1910. the Reagan administration 
provided $3? pillion in iuilitar : ºnci ecº, nom is aici : uui ýý ithiri this package S 341 million 
I'cn,: ui IyhaI l'liccmm, "I lie : \tglianistan ('psis and I'akIstan'. Security I)ºlcnna. '% iººn Sur %c). \ ýýI 
XXIII. N. I (Mauch 1). 240. 
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were allocated to buy 40 General Dynamics F-16 Hornet fighter/interceptors, Sparrow and 
Sidewinder missiles. 3 The F-16 fighter planes are modem advanced aircraft and it was 
widely believed that the F-16s would provide a credible deterrent and strategic edge to 
Pakistan in the region. Pakistan's success in convincing the administration of the need for 
a deep penetration aircraft like the F-16 in place of the initially proposed but less 
advanced F-5G aircraft demonstrated the leverage that a dependent nation could exert on 
the US. 44 The aircraft were initially supposed to have been equipped with the ALR-46 
electronic counter-measure system rather than the more sophisticated ALR-69 version 
used by NATO and eventually, the US provided F-16s with the advanced version, as 
requested by Islamabad 45 Additionally, Pakistan obtained the AIM 9L version of the 
Sidewinder missile. It also received Harpoon anti-ship missiles, upgraded M-48 tanks, 
tank recovery vehicles, towed and self-propelled field artillery, armed helicopters, and 
second-hand destroyers. Radar equipment purchased from US companies was used to 
provide aircraft warning systems on the western border. 46 The US provided necessary 
equipment for infantry divisions, armoured divisions, air force squadrons and assistance to 
build new air force bases in NWFP and Baluchistan. They also provided special assistance 
to build sea ports in Gwadar and Karachi harbours and to provide ancillary equipment. 
3. Economic Benefits 
The war in Afghanistan attracted international assistance to Zia's government, especially 
from the United States. The US assistance committed to Pakistan's military and economic 
budgets through the 1980s totalled more than $7.2 billion. 47 Thus, foreign economic 
assistance in the years of 1981-88 enabled Pakistan to enter the ranks of middle-income 
countries, establishing moderate industrial sectors, a vibrant urban economy, a large 
middle class and a rapidly growing service sector. Overall, the Zia years saw an 
43 International Herald Tribune (7 April 1988). 
44 See W. Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan, " 
Pacific Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Summer 1984), pp. 284-303. 11 The US provided the first batch of six F-l6s immediately from US and European stocks within 12 
months after signing of the acceptance offer between the US and Pakistan. The remaining 36 were to 
be delivered at a rate of five per quarter beginning 27 months After the signing of the agreement. See T. 
V. Paul, "Influence Through Arms Transfers: Lessons From the US-Pakistani Relationship, " Arian 
Survey, Vol. XXXII, No. 12, (December 1992), p. 1086; Robert O. Wirsing, "The Arms Race in South 
Asia: Implication for the United States, " Asian Survey, Vol. 25. No. 3 (March 1983), pp. 265-290; 
and Aid and Proposed Arms Sales of F-16s to Pakistan, Congress, 97th Session, Hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 12-17 November 1981. 46 Rodney W. Jones, "The Military and Security in Pakistan, " in Craig Baxter (od. )., 7Ja'a Pakistan: 
Politics and Stability In a Frontline State (Boulder. Westview, 1985), p. 83. 
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imhressivc growth rate of* 6.3 percent, nearly two points higher than in the %ultikar All 
13huttrr period and growth in the manufacturing sector was almost six points higher. '" 
Pakistan also finally put behind it the douhlc-dis, it inflation that had dogged the ec(ono)my 
since the 1970s and reduced the rate Ot' inflation to around O percent. ftc successes 
registered in Pakistan's balance ref' payment over much of' the 1980x. nurstly from 
externally generated inflows (firrcign ai(l, investment and remittance), enabled the 
government to avoid addressing more fundamental structural problems irr the economy. 
Remittances from workers abroad, totaling over $25 billion in tlir I (M(1., helped greatly. 
In August I (M I the l )III tcrl Stales provide(l a five year (I Q` 1-45) aid package to Pakistan 
in the amount of' $3.2 billion divided equally between military and economic assistance 
(Chart-1). 'I'bis sizable aid agreement catapulted Pakistan into third place among major 
IS aicl recipients, after Israel, Egypt and Turkey 'Ihr agreement confirmed the 
determination of, the (is government to maintain close political ties with Pakistan in the 
face Of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This package was halt economic, half 
military. The h1.6 billion in economic assistance ýý: ºs oriented toward dc clolmunl. 
focusing can the Pakistani government's development priority senors 01' agriculIure. 
energy and social services and emllhasiicci balance of payment suhhºýrt. The programme 
had a considerable Colllr11odity Corllhone lt PI. 480 edible oil, phosphatic fertilizer, 
agricultural equipment, insecticides and contraceptives and ;º large clement of local 
currency financing tiºrdit, icrcnt pprojects. 
I)uring I982-8K I ISAII) pruvicicd $9541 2 million in (IC\clulmient ail toi I'; rkistan Mid $205 
Million tirr the dcvclolmirrit of' irrigation, energy and farm \kaler management Plolcrt.., 
4 
With the sharp curtailment of, clunicstic absorption that this required. the balance of' 
ha1'nrents wert also strengthened, although pressure emerged in 1')1+4 because tit poor 
agricultural conditions in 1983 -84. Pakistan rccci' cd approximately 
SI. O billion in foreign 
mumIitar' salts credits and ß+I. 7 hillion in economic assistance over .+ five-. \'ear period 
crrninirnring in fiscal year 19, 
`" During the first three years of' the aid progranrnrr, 
Pakistan Fiscal fears (I'I l' 1I ß)`, 2- I ß)X4 around N50 million of'tltr annual appropriation 
4 Mars In (i. Wcinhaunt. "\4'; tr an I Tract, in . Af}'hailiaart I hi" Pakistani I Ic. '" Ir ?: ah t1: t vin (.. Weinbaum. "Pakistan: Misplace( I'runiur.. ! ýliý. ctl OppoIttnnltc'. " in selig S Il; urº. -Oll. 
Paul 11. Kicitihcrg and I)cnn, s Elul Icd, India and I'Oki'-lan: 
Its" I'ir. l fish l cnr+ (Nc%% )ork. 
("anibridl-c I)iti\cr. ity Press. IOQt))" h. 1) 
Ibid. 
I he major purchases by the Pakislani g- rrnnunt UIIi ing these credits . lent on 40 IIn atri Intl See 
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was used for I'I. 4X0 financing of cciihle oil imports. 11w non-PI. 4X0 component of'the 
programme rust thorn S100 million in I'I 'V 1982 to S2(N) million in 11I-\ 198.1 and , 225 
million in I'FY 1984. Terms of the assistance were two-thirds grants and one-third 
concessional loans. Economic , rid helped to improve the economic condition of hack ward 
provinces of NWI I' and IHaluchistan and it also worked to stabilise Pakistan as a whole. 
In 1985 the I IS approved a further package art' S4.02 billion (WO million annual) in 
Military and economic aid fier the next six 'ears (1QXh-1`)'ßt1). on generally concessional 
terms, and Pakistan emerged as the second largest recipient of' the ITS aid. afire Israel. 
"I he I IS ail package materially improved the fighting capabilities of Pakistan's defence 
fiºrccs, contributed to the Country's economic gru%%th (Table-6) and helped bridge a major 
hard currency deficit. 'I he I IS also played a rule in promoting hadl. N needed credits horn 
the International Monetary Fund] and development loans from the \\'orld Hank. The 
Inited States Aicncy for International Uc\clohnºcnt (I 'SAID) was the largest donor to 
Pakistan, f6llowed by Japan. the World Bank and the Asian I)e elolmrcnt Hank in 
financing projects and setting the conditions attached to projects. Ihr IS also initiated 
some projects and fiuncled the improvement of the health, energy and agriculture sectors. 
'I'hc United States provided finances to the extent of' S 12 million during I OX -X7 tier the 
proposed) I. akhra coal-fired electric generation project at Jamshoro in Sindh, the first 
(arge-scale exploitation of Pakistan's Substantial Iignite coal reserves tot power 
generation. In the same 'car the L'S also allocated SIN million to rural rlr\clprnrrtt 
projects in the north West I rntier I'rý, ý ince 11ý1'I I'1. including Ihr ! ý1: r{. r: rn ýliý ran ý, 1' 
Halurhistan and the tribal arras ut the 
4. Afghan ('niloral Influence on I'al. islan 
IIIstu iýalI 
. South Asia 
Is jI\vavs been intlurnrrtl by Afghanistan, Southwest Asia and 
('cntral Asia, because of its traditions, civilisation and culture. Afghanistan has been both 
a mccting place and the Inciting pol of cultural ºnfluruces from which has evokcd 
throughout history its own highly distincti\ e cultural contribution to rn ºIº.: ºtum. In the 
t he post 198 7 I, crrkaitr con IIIf i. rj ý, ,' . 
'S I1illIt ,n in cýn, 1rni, 11 Id \I '"I III IIlo t in fill lrlar aIt I Src (i 
\1' c hnuilluu\, Pa kistfill: I rrrnsition Isom \11Iiiar) In ( I%iliill I4u1c (I ngland Scoi1 i. I'idd, hing 
"1.1, and it. I htmra. I' I li, )int, 'n. "I1ic N -% I'll, I- in 
1 Pak Wan Rclatit 1 Of 61: n 
ýffairf (tiuntinct I'ty'tl_ h ISI. 
: 1nh: IJ /: Imvt. "I (orn, nn, Relations I3cl v cn I'aktaan and IL, I mild ýt. rtt. \i, l. I r. n1r Mid rn fIll 
tiýýuth Issue,. " In I ri, I (Rose and Noor A. Ilu%ain (i", I I oiled stat(. % I'srkiktxn ItrlsrtiuIi 
Ilirrkclcy: Uniýcrsily ut l : rlitürnra, I985)" h 6(1. 
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Table-6 
Agreed Schedule of US Economic Assistance (S million) 
US Fiscal Year Loan Grant Total 
1982 84 66 150 
1983 117 133 250 
1984 125 ISO 275 
1985 133 167 300 
1986 142 183 325 
1987 142 183 325 
Total 743 882 1.625 
Source: Arshad Zaman, "Economic Relations Between 
Pakistan and the United States: Aid, Trade and North-South 
Issues, " in Leo E. Rose and Noor A. Husain (ed. )., United 
States- Pakistan Relations (Berkeley: University of California, 
1985), p. 61. 
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1980s an influx of Afghan refugees to Pakistan took place and during their stay of more 
than a decade they influenced the local society through their culture, social behaviour and 
pattern of life and by their intellectual contribution. In this regard, Afghan refugees 
socially and culturally influenced Pakistani society in myriad ways, perceptible and 
imperceptible. The influence of Afghan culture over Pakistani society can easily be seen 
in languages, customs, morality, types of economy and modes of entertainment. Many 
values were already common between Afghans and Pakistani people and the refugees' 
decade-long stay provided an opportunity for both communities to come closer through 
social values and commercial activities. The Afghans influenced Pakistani society through 
their language, dress, food, music and songs. 53 This influence can easily be seen in 
NWFP, Baluchistan and major urban cities (Lahore, Karachi, Multan, Islamabad ctc) of 
Pakistan. In the same vein, the Afghan (Pakhtu) language influenced national and local 
languages and it also helped to modernise the Pakistani Pakhtu language. 34 Interestingly, 
Pakistani and Afghan intellectuals have created a common alphabet for Pakhtu, which is a 
great achievement and contribution to the Pakhtu language. " Such commonality in the 
Pakhtu language was necessary to understand each other's literature and common values. 
On the other hand, the Afghan new generation, who were born in Pakistan, arc greatly 
influenced by Western culture and movies. They have adopted Western dress such as 
jeans and shirts and learnt and speak English. They were traditionally fans of football, but 
now they love cricket and hockey also. 
5. Afghan Refugees' Burden on Pakistan 
For Pakistan, the ten year war in Afghanistan has had same painful consequences. When 
Soviet troops marched into Kabul in 1979, refugees poured over the border. Muslim 
resistance fighters, the mujahideen, set up supply bases inside Pakistan. 771c Sovict-Kabul 
commandos escalated their offensive, sending aircraft and shells into Pakistan territory, 
killing and maiming civilians. It is also estimated that within the Afghan total population 
of 16.4 million, more than 1.5 million (mrujahideen and citizens) were killed, 3 million 
maimed or wounded (majority citizens), 1.2 million disabled (mujahidccn and citizens) 
$s Sec Interview Dr. Ashrif Adeel (Professor of Philosophy at the University of Peshawar), Special 
Edition, Urdu daily Jang (Rawalpindi), (24 June 1995). 
Ibid. 
ss Interview of Dr. Nawaz, Chairman of Pakhtu Academy, Peshawar, in Daily Jana (24 June 1995). 
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and 4 million became refugees in Pakistan. S6 A Swiss study indicated that the war's death 
rate ranked among the highest in history, exceeding even the estimated 8.6 percent death 
rate experienced by the Soviet Union in World War 11 and the country still has more than 
40 million land mines. 57 Half of the disabled population is constituted by those hit by 
sensory disabilities; the majority of them suffer from blindness, deafness and mental 
retardation. 58 According to a UNHCR report, since 1979 more than 2.7 million Afghan 
people have been displaced in Pakistan and more than 1.2 million displaced to exile in 
Australia, Europe and United States. 59 Many refugees fled to Pakistan and as a result, the 
country suffered literally hundreds of air and ground attacks on its border areas as well as 
almost daily terrorist bombings by the KHAD and KGB against civilian targets. It was 
difficult, even impossible, to ignore the war and domestically, its grave consequences 
were obvious for Pakistan. The situation forced the government to deal with a gamut of 
problems ranging from possible ethnic unrest to economic costs. Pakistan's championship 
of the Afghan resistance struggle and its embrace of refugees were motivated by 
geostrategic and domestic imperatives which placed Pakistan in a grave position during 
the course of the war. The consequences of the Afghan crisis for Pakistan could be seen in 
the provocative slogans on the walls of Peshawar and Quetta, in the proliferation of 
weapons, in the heroin trade, in sectarianism, in ethnic conflict, in the bombings and acts 
of sabotage that afflicted the NWFP and Baluchistan particularly, in the atmosphere of 
political tension and emerging conflicts over local economic assets between Afghans and 
Pakistanis. 
The migration of refugees to Pakistan started in the wake of the Saur Revolution in 1978 
as a result of repressive reform measures introduced by the Communist regime. The 
largest influx took place soon after the Soviet invasion in 1979 and Pakistan provided 
asylum for approximately 3.45 million-almost 3.5 percent of Pakistan's entire 
population and one fourth of the entire Afghan population. Pakistan paid $500,000 a day 
in refugee relief. 60 They were settled in 386 camps, most of them in rural areas of the two 
See The Nation (18 October 1986); Dawn (31 December 1991); The News (20 December 1994); 
Amin Saikal and William Maley, Regime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the 
Politics of Legitimacy (Boulder. Westview Press, 1991). P. 135; and Wayne C. McWilliams and 
Barry Piotrowski, The World Since 1945: A History of International Relations (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 421. 3' Marek Sliwinsid, "Afghanistan: The Decimation of a People, " Orbis, Vol. 33, No. I (Winter 1989), pp. 
39-56. 
St See report of the Comprehensive Disabled Afghans Programme (CDAP), Peshawar, 1999, pp. 18-23. 39 See Refugees, UNCIIR Magazine, Vol. 4, No. 117 (1999), pp. 16-17. 60 Of the 3.27 million refugees around 44.99% were children, 29.06% female and 25.95% were male. See details South (London: October 1982), p. 24; Arabia (October 1982), pp. 27.28; Afghan Refugees in 
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Pakistani provinces-thc NWI P and Baluchistan-addjooining the border with At': hanistan 
with which they had cultural, religious and linguistic ties. The presence of 'a large number 
of* Atghan refugees had the potential to generate disruptive consequences in Pakistan's 
domestic politics. The threat to domestic security could not he ruled out, particularly 
given the precarious nature rat Pakistan's political warm. which already had separatism 
and disparities among the tcdcrating units. The possibility of' a shill-over rtlect oI' file 
crisis situation on (k)nlestic politics became a significant fleeter in the considerations of 
Pakistan's decision makers. During I980-8I, the refugee problem that confronted 
Pakistan and its implications fi- the security of* the state shaped the perceptions of* the 
crisis-situation. The Afghan refugee migration to Pakistan can he easily understand by 
Chart-I which shows that from 1980 to 1988 more than 5.9 million At'ghan left Ihr 
country, the highest number in world history. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 
198) provided an opportunity to the refugees to go back to their country"' Hills, from 
1992 the percentage gradually decreased. I %en no%%", hooww ever, thousands of refugees 
remain in Pakistan and Iran. However, in many areas of' NW1: 1) and Baluchistan, the 
presence of refugees destroyed the ecological balance, causing desert ih eat ion and 
consequent soil erosion. In fact, tier a number of'reasons. the Afghan refugees. in general, 
have given birth to many complex problems which are perhaps less obvious but quite 
disturbing. 
5-I. Refugee Burden on NEVI P 
he MLhan tear hit the NWFI' pro\ in 'r hardest because it \\a', tlºr principal rý1nhluil tier 
foreign-supplied military aluihmcnt to the mnjuhideen resistance fiorccs as well as the 
main staging ground 1i0r guerrilla operations inside Afghanistan. Its refugee camps were 
the backbone for mrmja/, 1d 'en military strength and in many cases served as training 
facilities for the rebel guerrillas fighting Soviet-Afghan hirer.. 'I'hr violence created 
by 
the Afghan refugees raised tension in the lionticr region and the 
frequency and savagery 
of'thc KItAI) and K(il; explosions were high, averaging a 
bomb a week in the Noillmest 
Pakistan (ICI; Im; lh; ul: ('ummissioner Afghan Rctir}ces. I9901. {'h 8-I1; 
/nlar Malik. "Afghan Influx 
\1t Increase lribwlc (2 May ION()). I, "1. Nank\ Hatch I)uprcr. Ihc I)cIIwj. f: yph\ of 
Refugees in Pakistan", in IIatrcr Malik (cd SoNict-: %mcrikin Relations i%ith I'MkIsIM11, Irma and 
Afghanistan (Nc%\ York: St. N1; Irllrt', pp irr, '). I. , 1111 
I nnr 'I I rrr, r " 1c ýýýýýei Ic 
(1) little 198o), pp. 8-1 1. 
Aceiodiup to it g ivcrnmcnt report, around two nullion rrlugccs duting 19Q4 had kimc 
h; i, k to 
their homes, leaving 1.7 million Afghan refit pees remaining in I akiaan. I ormcr Mrm. tcr for Kashmrr 
Allairs, Nurthcrn Areas and I ronlicr Re pn'n.. Majid Malik told tu Scnatc on I Scplcrnhcr IQQX ahcwt 
the repatriation of AIghan rct"ugees. See 1)H%%n (-' September IINS). 
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Frontier Province. Moreover, the refugee influx was clearly heaviest in the NWI. T. This 
province held 267 (76 percent) cif the 386 refugee camps in Pakistan (Tab1Qrö) and about 
2.5 million (68 percent) of the total refugee population. The province was packed with 
refugees but the majority were in settled districts of the provinces as well as in `even of' 
the eight Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the tribal belt. In Peshawar, the 
refugees nearly equalled in number the indigenous lxºrulation. In huºTam Agency. half of 
the population consisted of refugees. According to one of the survey in the NWIFP. 
roughly every seventh person was a ref gee; in the tribal belt, in particular, the proportion 
was closer to one in three or Jour. "' Tile tiºIlowiný table gives some indication of the ratio 
between refugees and total local population. 
Ratio of Refugee and Local Population in Specific Areas 
I) Iii l Ilcri, lrirl I etutr. l', Iwl: ui n I.,. ii I', I ul un It. iu, ' \It I.,. ii 
Ahtxxtahad 142,801 I, 128,250 19 
Kuhat 228,781 913,240 14 
('ulistan I h4, ItI 87,780 1 11 5 
Source: Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (Peshawar: Afghan Refugee ('onimi. siom, IUMR) 
The presence of- re ugees was a major cause 01' trouble in the NW'FI' province. The 
rct-ogees had settled with mixed results but most ot- the local population hesitated to mix 
with them. The local inhabitants hcl(l the alien residents responsible fier the escalating 
level of violence and the deteriorating law and order situation in the province. The 
resentment exploded into anti-rctugcc demonstrations and people demanded the expulsion 
of rcf'ugees from the major areas of' the province. Public opinion surveys conducted 
between 1982-19 86 indicated a decline in }public support tour the rctugees and registered a 
high degree of' antagonistic feeling among the local huhulation., 'a According to a (iallu}p 
report, "Pakhtuns basal on Pakistan keep distance from the Afghan rctugces because they 
are perceived as superior to the Afghans and due to their better %ociºº-rwnumic status. 
'"' Nancy I latch I)uprcc, 'I he I)rtnugrapliv r, f Afghan Refugee in I'; tkistnn. "" It), ZhwQ4 
In l chru; try Nf{7, a bomb hLtst in the City of Peýha tr 
left ;t nutnhct ., I hoof rhildrrn deut \c"c 
detail, in 7 ht" I'runticr Post (I'r. h; nc; tr: 22 1 chru; u\ I Oti"l 
JO/ S( ii1ani, Afghanistan: :% stud) of Pakistan-Afghfni%t811 
Rehllions  nd [heir Impact ern 
foreign I'ulit")' (IkIantah; ul: Pakistan Institute of Public ()pinion- (iallu)p 
Political Weather Rclxtrt, 
198 7), 1). 51. 
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political influence in the bureaucracy, army and administration. "' The common value 
system, culture, religion and language did not influence the local population; rather, 
tensions and conflicts arose immediately after the refugees' arrival. " Pakhtuns from 
South Waziristan and other tribal areas were among the first to complain about the 
privileges accorded the refugees which, they claimed, enabled the Afghans to live better 
than they did. Specifically, they criticised the wide array of services available in the 
camps as compared with far less access to education, housing and health services 
available to the border area people of Pakistan. Local people also believed that domestic 
expenditures on the refugees meant that assistance was at the expense of development 
programmes for their impoverished areas. 67 Privately, the NWFP government officials 
admitted that Pakistan's hospitality to the refugees was being stretched to its limits. A 
senior Pakhtun bureaucrat asserted that "99 percent of the province people arc sick of the 
refugees. I have never met anyone in the province who wanted the refugees to stay in 
Pakistan. In truth, there was no deep sense of community between the refugees and the 
locals. 9968 However, local people also showed almost incredible tolerance towards the 
refugees because of tribal, cultural and social familiarity. The evidence seems to indicate 
that the refugees, while not exactly front-runners in popularity, generally provoked 
ambivalent-and often quite positive-feelings among the people of the NWFP. Even the 
strongest antagonists of the government's refugee policy, including ANP leader Khan 
Abdul Wall Khan, conceded that the refugees were decent and industrious people and that 
there had been almost no serious dispute among the local population and the refugees 
69 
5-2. Refugee Burden on Baluchistan 
The province of Baluchistan equally bore the enormous pressure of Afghan refugees from 
the war in Afghanistan. The refugee influx into Baluchistan has been estimated at over 
65 Gallup Reports 1984-1988 (Islamabad: Gallup Political Weather Report, 1985,1986 and 1989), pp. 
54-78,38-42,18-28 and 13-25; see also "Afghanistan: Many Unhappy Return, " The Economist 
(16 
October 1993), p. 40; and Robert Adams, "Abandoned in Afghanistan, " World Press Rel1ew, 
No. 38, 
(May 1991), p. 41. 66 Inger W. Boesen, "honour in Exile: Continuity and Change Among Afghan Refugees. " In Ev. in W. 
Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (ed. )., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism (London: 
Pinter Publisher, 1990), pp. 166.167; and Robert Mandel, "Perceived Security Threat and the Global 
Refugee Crisis, " Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 24, No. 1, (Fall 1997), p. 89. 
67 Marvin G. Weinbaum, "The Impact and Legacy of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, " in J. henry 
Korsen (ed. )., Contemporary Problems of Pakistan (Oxford: Westview Press. 1993), p. 133; and 
"Afghanistan: Biting the Hand that Feeds Them, " Economist (12 May 1990), pp. 35-36. 69 The Frontier Post, (18 April 1986). 
69 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia 1977-88: The Policy Imperatives of a Peripheral 
Asian State (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 48. 
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800,00070, and one out of every four inhabitants of Baluchistan was an Afghan refugee. 
This massive influx disturbed the province's resources such as wood fuel, pasture land 
and water supply, and placed undue pressure on the natural environment. The refugees 
also provoked overt unrest among the native population, who felt that the quality of their 
own lifestyle was threatened. Popular feeling against the refugees was stronger in 
Baluchistan than in the NWFP and their leaders openly expressed in the strongest 
sentiments the call to push back the refugees to their own country. 
The influx of Pakhtun speaking Afghan refugees in Baluchistan disturbed the delicate 
ethnic balance in the province by strengthening the ranks of the Pakhtuns, thereby 
reducing the Baluchis to a minority in their own province. 7' The refugees not only 
increased the ratio of Pakhtun population by 10% to 15%, but were instrumental in rapidly 
reducing Baluchi predominance. 7' The Baluch had long resented the domination of the 
Pakhtun tribes in their area. Quetta (the provincial capital) is heavily Pakhtun, and with 
the influx of mostly Pakhtun refugees the province appeared likely to develop a Pakhtun 
majority and Baluchi-speakers were very likely a minority in their own province. 73 For the 
sake of their basic rights, Baluch nationalists had already fought an insurgency against 
central government in the 1970s which they suffered heavy casualties and material 
losses-74 However, after the Baluch defeat in 1977, Baluch guerrillas found refuge under 
the PDPA regime in Kabul but this alliance collapsed when the Afghan mujahideen 
struggle gained momentum against the Marxist regime in Afghanistan. Thus, in contrast 
with the NWFP situation where socio-cultural and ideological similarities promoted 
solidarity between the refugees and the indigenous population, such harmony did not exist 
in Baluchistan. The reason for this was that the Afghan refugees in Baluchistan, unlike the 
NWFP, were concentrated in camps located almost entirely in one part of the 
province-the northern and Pakhtun-settled tier of districts close to Afghanistan-thus 
'° Grant M. Farr, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Definitions, Repatriation and Ethnicity, " in Ewan W. 
Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (ed. )., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, p. 135; and 
Akbar S. Ahmad, Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 171. 71 Hafeez Malik, "The Afghan Crisis and its impact on Pakistan, " Journal of South Asian and 
Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Spring 1982), pp. 40-45. 
n See South, (London: October 1982), p. 24. 73 According to the 1981 census, the Baluch accounted for only 36 percent (Baluch-speaking 
Brahuis 
were included 57 percent) of provincial households. See Government of Pakistan. 
Population Census 
Organisation, 1981 Census Report of Pakistan (Islamabad: Statistics Division, December 
1984), p. 
186. 
74 See Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations 
(Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981), p. 3; and Tahir Amin, Ethno- 
National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors (Islamabad: 
Institute of 
Policy Studies, 1988), pp. 23-56. 
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effectively isolating them from the Baluch, who were numerically dominant in the 
sprawling province's more southern districts. 75 The other reason was that the "Pakhtun 
belt" of the province, built up over the years by a steady stream of Pakhtu-speaking 
migrants heading south in search of opportunity, lay between the Baluch and their would- 
be political supporters in Afghanistan. Pakhtuns in this area had a traditional cthno- 
ideological rivalry with Baluch tribesmen. Selig S. Harrison argued that the refugees 
provoked Baluch leaders but their presence also neutralised Baluch nationalists' dream of 
creating a Greater Baluchistan. 76 
5-3. Refugee Burden on Punjab 
Punjab is one of the biggest fertile province in terms of population and resources. In 
general, this province is one of the most moderate and open-minded areas in Pakistan, but 
the Afghan refugee influx led to religious extremism, weapons proliferation, and drug 
trafficking, generating a serious law and order situation. In late 1985 the Afghan refugees 
moved to other parts of Punjab, in particular to the major urban and industrial areas of the 
province (Islamabad/Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Gujranwala, Faisalabad and Sargodaha) 
for a better business and commercial environment. 77 The Punjab is ethnically the most 
homogeneous of Pakistan's provinces and the refugees did not meet the same resentment 
towards their establishing permanent localities in Lahore, Islamabad, Multan and other 
cities of the province as that they faced in the NWFP and Baluchistan. 78 There were, 
according to an official estimate, about 175,00079 registered refugees in the province in 
1987. These refugees were in the twelve camps of Isakhel subdistrict of Mianwali district 
(west bank of Indus river) in western Punjab which is the southern end of the NWFP. The 
people of Mianwali district are Punjabi and Pakhtu-spcaking but politically and 
religiously the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam party (JUI) has great influence in this region. 
7s The Baluch were barely represented in the heavily Pakhtun-speaking districts of Quetta division in the 
northern part of the province, where only 9 percent of households were reported Baluchi by birth or 
mother tongue in 1981. See Census Report of Baluchistan 1981 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 
Statistics Division, December 1984), p. 107. 76 See Selig S. Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan, '' Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall 1978), pp. 136- 160. n Dawn (4 March 1986). ?s Rashid Ahmad, "Afghan Refugees and Punjab's Hospitality, " The Nation (8 October 1986), p. 4; and 
see Gallup Political Weather Report 1985-86 (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1987), pp. 67. 
89. 
79 Grant M. Farr, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Definitions, Repatriation and Ethnicity, " p. 135. Albar 
S. Ahmad, Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia, p. 171. 
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Some observers argued that the Punjabis showed generosity because the military and 
bureaucracy were dominated by Punjabis and they were thinking that the mujahideen had 
fought a war for Pakistan and thus, the Afghan war itself was not a major political issue in 
the Punjab. It was brought up for discussion on the floor of the Punjab provincial 
assembly or no more than five occasions during 1988-95.80 There had been only a few 
incidents of terrorist bombing in the province and they did not lead to public debate or 
even any change in attitude toward the refugees. Public opinion seemed to support this 
argument because many more Punjabi politicians and representatives expressed their view 
in favour of Afghan mujahideen than were opposed. 81 However, opponents of the 
government suggested that the Punjab's relatively benign view of the refugees stemmed 
from the huge economic and political benefits that had come to the province by virtue of 
Pakistan's "front-line" role against the Soviet Union. The ANP leader, Khan Abdul Wali 
Khan, described the Afghanistan war as a giant cow, the Frontier having hold of its horns 
and the Punjab of its teats. 82 
5-4. Refugee Burden on Sindh 
The influx of Afghan refugees had less impact on the Sindh province because the 
province is geographically further from the country's border with Afghanistan, than those 
of either NWFP or Baluchistan. The impact of the Afghan refugees on the Sindh was 
more political and social than anything else. In 1985 when the ethno-linguistic riots 
erupted in urban centres in the Sindh between Urdu-speaking Afohajirs and Sindhis, it had 
little effect on Pakhtun migrants from the NWFP, who numbered 1.2 million in Karachi. 
However, there were increasing allegations in the Western and Pakistani press that the 
Afghan refugees, widely seen as the political allies of the migrant Pakhtun population, 
were mainly responsible for the drugs and weapons smuggling in the province. 13 In 
December 1986, Karachi police by order of the Sindh government took action in Sohrab 
Goth and captured arms and narcotics and they accused the Afghan refugees of direct 
involvement in the rioting. 94 The local Sindhis also accused the refugees of openly 
carrying weapons, wandering aimlessly, causing traffic problems, and generating 
'° Robert G. Wirsing, Pakista's Security Under Zia 1977-88, p. 52. 
Gallup Political Weather Report, p. 51. t2 See Khan Abdul Wali Khan interview with the Urdu Daily Jang (Lahore) (13 November 1987). 13 The Guardian (7 April 1986), p. 6; and see The New York Timet (25 May 1988), p. Al. 84 The New York Times (16 December 1986), p. A2; and (17 December 1986), p. A6. 
235 
apprehensions for law and order agencies. 85 There were complaints against the refugee 
migration toward Karachi and Hyderabad and people demanded their expulsion from the 
province. The unfriendly environment for refugees in Sindh, however, seemed far more a 
by-product of ethno-regionalist rivalries and anti-federal government sentiment than a 
direct result of the refugee influx itself. The province was without any refugee camps and 
its refugee population was relatively small and concentrated mainly in Karachi. According 
to government figures, registered refugees in the Sindh in 1988 numbered fewer than 
23,000, mostly based on Karachi; there were no statistics available about the other parts of 
Sindh. 86 Nevertheless, it can be concluded that Afghan refugees were clearly problematic 
for Pakistan's internal politics and their consequences were harmful for Pakistan. 
5-5. NWFP and Baluchistan Under Soviet Threat 
The Soviet Union launched its campaign against a background of adverse reaction to 
Pakistan cooperation with the Afghan mujahideen. The Soviet offensive against Pakistan 
was conducted at three levels: military pressure on the border, diplomatic pressure and 
pressure from a combination of New Delhi and Kabul. The Soviets claimed that Pakistan 
had established 30 bases and 50 centres in Pakistan which trained nearly 15,000 terrorists 
for armed insurgency within Afghanistan-87 The Soviet leaders categorically declared, 
"Pakistan is completely wrong to carry out a hostile policy towards Afghanistan and is 
thereby undermining Soviet-Pak relations. i88 Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on 
his 1980 visit to India, was highly critical of Pakistan's role in supporting the insurgency 
in Afghanistan. He also drew the attention of his hosts to the rearmament of Pakistan by 
the United States, a move that was calculated to exploit the historic Indo-Pakistani 
divide. 89 Moreover, the Geneva negotiations under the United Nations were aiming for a 
solution leading to a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. For the Soviet Union, the 
negotiations provided a means of trying to separate the Islamabad government from the 
mujahideen. They used every opportunity to point out that support for the resistance was 
costly for Pakistan's security. 
'5 Perviaz Iqbal Cheema, 'The Afghanistan Crisis and Pakistan's Security Dilenuna, " Asian Survey, Vol, 
XXIII, No. 3, (March 1983), p. 235. 86 Dawn (23 February 1989). 
87 
$$ 
See The Times (5 February 1980), p. 1. 
During Zia's visit to Moscow in November 1982, the Soviet leadership warned Pakistan about its 
support to Afghan mujahideen. See Andrei Gromyko, Memories (London: Century Hutchinson Ltd, 
1989), p. 247. 19 "Soviet-Indian Talks, " Pravda (4 February 1980), p. 4; reported in The Current Digest of the Soviet 
Press, No. 32 (19 March 1980), p. 14. 
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The Soviets were determined to discredit the Zia regime and to make Pakistan 
ungovernable through exploitation of regional and enthnolinguistic differences by 
dissident elements of turbulent provinces of the NWFP and Baluchistan. They planned to 
incite discord or accentuate secessionism in Sindh through India to distabilise Pakistan. 
For this purpose, the Moscow and Kabul governments provided material support to ethnic 
separatist elements. As Arthur Ross indicated, the Soviets had already carefully cultivated 
support among the Baluchis to increase their leverage against the regime in Islamabad 90 
The Soviets used Baluch nationalist elements and some Baluch leaders expressed their 
desire for Moscow to intervene in their affairs to establish an "independent 
Baluchistan. s91 Baluchistan had long been a test of the modus operandi between the 
regional countries. It has been often reported that the Baluchi felt that "they never had a 
fair chance and are still not getting one. , 92 The separatist elements were also active in 
Sindh and the NWFP but the central government and bureaucracy was unable to 
understand the gravity of problems. 3 However, when the Soviets tried to use discontented 
Baluchi groups as proxies, they faced traditional Baluch resentment because the Baluchi 
nation disliked superpower imperialism and they saw the Soviets in their true colours in 
Afghanistan. 94 
5-6. Soviet Air Attacks and Terrorist Activities 
The Soviet and Afghan intelligence made deep inroads into Pakistan, particularly in areas 
close to the Durand Line. The primary objective of their subversive activities were to 
create anarchy and destabilise the Zia government, while the border and air space 
violations caused panic. There were over 200 violations of Pakistani airspace in 1985 and 
90 Arthur Ross, "In Afghanistan's Shadow, " Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1982); am also Soviet 
Ambassador Smirnove's speech to the press Club in Karachi on 18 November 1984, The Muslim (19 
November 1984); and Times of India (13 April 1984). 91 For a broader discussion of the IIaluch movement during 1980-90, see Yosef Dodanaky, 'The Bear on 
the Chessboard: Soviet Military Gains in Afghanistan, " World Affairs (Winter 1982.83), pp. 293-95. 
92 Selig S. Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: IIaluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981). pp. 161.168. 
97 Perviaz Iqbal Cheema, "Impact of the Afghan War on Pakistan. " Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XU, 
No. U 
(January 1988), p. 38. 94 S. A. Yetiv, "How the Soviet Military Intervention in Afghanistan Improved the US Strategic Position 
in the Persian Gulf, " Asian Affairs (Summer 1990), p. 75. 
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the total violations in 1980 exceeded 700. ` In 1986 the NWIT experienced 143 fatalities 
or nearly 95 percent of a countrywide total cif- 15I deaths in such hornhings. "" According 
to aI JS Defence I)cpartmcnt report, roughly 90 percent of the estimated 777 acts of 
international terrorism committal worldwide in 1987 occurred in Pakistan. 
"ý "Ihr I IS 
Department cif State estimated that in the first ten mantis of 1987 there were 574 air and 
517 artillery attacks on Pakistan from across the Afghan horder and 54(I terrorist incidents 
launched from Afghanistan against targets in Pakistan. Between 1980-1988, there were 
almost daily violations of Pakistani territory by Soviet and Afghan aircraft, which 
frequently bombed targets inside Pakistan. Such actions were designed tu stir up 
animosity against the Afghan refugees and the »nujahideen and to weaken Pakistan's 
military positions across the border. Hy 1988 the tribal arras and major population centres 
of Pakistan were under the target of K(; 13 and Khad subversive Icti\. ities, leading to 
civilian casualties and attacks on inuiahidt'en sanctuaries and guerrilla hases. 
""' 
Thus, during 1')X0-I988 Pakistan's air space was subjected to intrusion by the Afghan and 
Soviet Air Force on 2,730 occasions, killing or wounding 1,355 civilians. In the same 
period, Pakistan's territory was violated by artillery lire 2,591) times In which over 1.000 
1ý ' (Table-9). 'Hic major urban centers (Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi. Person were killc(iý, ý' 
Quetta and Peshawar) and government property in the NW1'P and Baluchistan were the 
main targets of Soviet-Kabul agents. According to Richard Nixon, the Soviet extended 
their campaign to Pakistan, eventually killing 5.000 aria ilians in 4,500 bombings. In 
addition, strong circumstantial evidence implicated Moscow-Kabul in the August 1988 
assassination of Zia ul-I laq WI because the Soviets perceive) that ha wanted to at1cct the 
(icncva process adversely. A senior Am rican diplomat in Moscow had been told by 
Soviet officials that the Kremlin intcnde(1 to "teach Zia a lesson- fol "Upporting the 
9" Jttschh 
. 
I. Collins, "War in Afghanistan: Ihr Strategic Military (Tontext, " ui Iwan \, " Anderson and 
Nancy (latch I)uº)rrr (111. )., "I"hc ('ultur'; 11 Basis of Afghan NIIIIOnalisrtl (I ondon I'tntcr 
I'uhliOhcts. 
1090), 1) I S5. 
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M, , ºrtrc 1m 7011 rr; t, u ns in NS(,. tier ". (uncle \1'vn, it As non it 
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SA's 87-005 (! i Januar It)87), 1). II 
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resistance. 102 
6. Economic Cost of the Afghan Refugees 
The large majority of Afghan refugees were dependent on relief assistance from Pakistan 
and the government provided necessary food items and a small amount of cash to 
shelterless and homeless people. The government provided a wide variety of goods and 
services to the refugee population, despite the burden on the economy. Pakistan had more 
than 3.27 million registered refugees and it is estimated that there were a further 540,000 
unregistered refugees. 103 The majority of refugees camps were in the front-line provinces 
of NWFP and Baluchistan. These camps, which encompassed about 10,000 inhabitants, 
were divided into refugee villages, each serving about 1,200 to 1,300 families. The 
refugees were treated generously by the government of Pakistan, which allocated its own 
resources to care for the refugees, paying subsistence allowances to hundreds of 
thousands. 
By the mid-1980s, the government of Pakistan was officially responsible for 45 percent of 
the cost of maintaining the refugees, the UNIICR for 25 percent, the World Food 
Programme (WFP) for 25 percent and others, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as well 
as the Red Cross, for the remaining five percent104 Pakistan assumed the costs of the 
internal transport of refugee aid, a figure estimated at $70 million yearly in the mid-1980s, 
along with its responsibility for the administration and security of commodities. 105 Later, 
the world community provided one of the world's largest refugee relief aid programmes 
estimated at $1 million per year. 106 However, the government of Pakistan spent more than 
$1 million a day from its own resources, a considerable drain on the national budget. 107 
The total refugee budget for the 1984-85 fiscal year was $419 million. 108 
102 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 253. 103 Grant M. Farr, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Definitions, Repatriation and Ethnicity, " p. 135. Akbar 
S. Ahmad, Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership In South Asla, p. 171. 104 Ilasan Askari Rizvi, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Humanitarian Assistance and 
Implications, " Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 36, No. 1(1987), p. 49. tos Nancy Dupree, "Demographic Reporting on Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, " Modern Allan Studies, 
Vol. 25, No. 2 (1988), p. 244. 106 Said Azhar, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: The Pakistani View, " in Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy 
IIatch Dupree (ed. )., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, p. 105. 107 The administrative cost of 2.4 million registered refugees was put at around one million dollars a day in 
1985. The flow of refugees continued and it was also difficult to manage unregistered refugees. It is 
quite safe to assume that the cost of maintaining those refugees was more than a million dollars a day. 
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6-1. Afghan Livestock 
The refugees brought with them more than 2.5 million head of livestock (i. e., herds of 
sheep, goats, camels, cattle and yaks) which had a detrimental effect on the environment 
because of grazing on the scarce pasture land and fragile soil. In this regard, the provision 
of grazing grounds and water for Afghani livestock was a cause of constant problems for 
Pakistani officials. The UNHCR estimates that the Afghans brought with them 45,000 
camels and 25,000 donkeys for commercial purposes. 109 The UNHCR also launched a 
comprehensive programme for veterinary services for these animals. More than 20 mobile 
veterinary units were set up in NWFP and Baluchistan, to provide medical care for 
animals affected by disease, as well as to check the outbreak of epidemics in the herds of 
these animals, with the objective of minimising losses for the refugees and to save the 
animals of the local population from being affected by diseases or epidcmics. 
110 Refugees 
used to work as labourers in agricultural fields, or relied on the income from their 
domestic animals. 
6-2. Problem of Green Grazing 
The refugees caused some resentment amongst the local people, particularly in relation to 
the control and use of grazing fields. Indiscriminate and uncontrolled grazing ruined the 
sparse grazing grounds and extensively damaged the ecology of the green areas. In NWFP 
and Baluchistan provinces, the green grazing land, which was already limited, was 
captured by the Afghan refugees. In NWFP, most of the land belongs to private 
landowners, but in Baluchistan, part of the land is owned by the government and there arc 
not many grazing areas, and inadequate forests. 111 The private owners guarded their land 
with all the care they could muster, while the government land was not sufficient to 
See details in Dabra Benker, "Along Afghanistan's War Tom Frontier, " " National Geographic, (June 
1985), p. 788; and Marvin G. Weinbaum, `"The Impact and Legacy of the Afghan Refugees in 
Pakistan, " in J. Henry Korsen (ed. )., Contemporary Problems of Pakistan (Oxford Westview Press, 
1993), p. 128. 
106 See Azmat 11. Khan, "The Afghanistan problem: Its Impact on Pakistan, " Journal of Central Asia, 
No. 24 (Summer 1989), p. 144. 109 Grant M. Farr, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Definitions, Repatriation and Ethnicity, " in Ewan W. 
Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (ed. )., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, p. 139. 110 Ekber Menemencioglu, "From Tents to Katchas; ' Refugee Magazine (UN11CR), No. 1, September 
1982, pp. 39-40. 
Beverly Male, "A Tiger by the Tail: Pakistan and the Afghan Refugees, " in Ewan W. Anderson and 
Nancy Hatch Dupree (ed. )., The Cultural Basis of Afghan Nationalism, p. 57 
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accommodate all the cattle. Thus, these resources became scarce as the grazing fields 
were overcrowded by the refugee livestock. 
6-3. Ecological Problems and Deforestation 
Environmental despoliation reached crisis proportions due to influx of the Afghan 
refugees in NWFP and Baluchistan. Deforestation and overgrazing of livestock caused 
erosion of valleys. ' 12 Serious deforestation in Pakistan's Chitral, Dir and Hazara division 
could easily be traced to refugees seeking firewood for cooking and heating. 113 'me 
Afghan refugees had a hand in using the free forest resources of the NWFP-Baluchistan 
and virtually changed the landscape of the provinces. According to one report, they not 
only felled trees but also dug up roots, leaving hollows in the ground) 14 The result of the 
reckless cutting of forests was that land erosion took place upstream in the mountainous 
areas of Pakistan, causing land slides and large-scale havoc and disruption of 
communications. 
It also inevitably led to piling up of earth in dams, thereby reducing considerably the 
usefulness of existing dams and of those to be built in the future. Arab Mohammad 
Jahangir (the former Chief Minister of the NWFP) drew attention to the problems 
spawned by the refugee burden by noting that: "we arc facing a very odd situation in the 
wake of the losses of our forest wealth and more burden on vital departments such as 
health, education etc. "115 In the face of the inadvertent damage being done to the 
environment and ecological resources in NWFP, Baluchistan and some parts of Punjab 
and Sindh, the local governments took many measures to supply potable water, such as 
digging of tube wells and open surface wells, but due to the rapid movement of refugees 
from one area to another, the government measures did not produce a positive impact. 
112 Congress. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs. 
Afghanistan: Peace and Repatriation. A staff Report Prepared for the use of the of the US Senate, 
100th cong., 2nd seas, (14 May 1988), p. 30. 113 Zafar Samdani, "The Afghan Refugees: The Human Aspect, " Pakistan and Gulf Economist (9-13 
October 1982), pp. 24-25; and Said Azhar, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: The Pakistani View, " in 
Ewan W. Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree (ed. ).. The Cultural Ilasls of Afghan Nationalism, p. 
105. 
114 Zafar Samdani, "Pakistan's Forest Resources: hazards of Depiction, " Dawn (11.17 June 1994). 113 Pakistan Times (2 January 1987), p. 1. 
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6-4. Afghans as Low Cost Labour 
The arrival of many skilled and unskilled Afghan refugees looking for jobs and willing to 
work for low wages escalated the unemployment problem in NWFP and Baluchistan. 
Many Afghans managed to secure employment, mainly in agriculture and the construction 
industry. They were a powerful stimulus to the growth of markets in backward areas of 
the province and an abundant source of cheap labour in a labour-scarce environment. 
Moreover, their influx also produced a bonanza for local propertied classes and 
shopkeepers, especially in the urban areas, as well as for the medical, legal and teaching 
professions. In addition, they secured a reasonable proportion of odd jobs in urban centres 
and worked as a vendors, salesmen, waiters, shocblacks, and construction workers, etc. 116 
They often agreed to work at rates much below the wages normally demanded by local 
labourers and the employers naturally preferred the refugees over the local population. 
6-5. Control of Local Business and Transportation 
Many wealthier Afghan refugees invested capital in various types of commercial pursuits 
including real estate, transport and commercial properties. The purchase of immovable 
property and inexpensive small retail shops caused a boom in real estate business, 
especially in NWFP, Baluchistan, urban centres of Punjab and Sindh and along major 
highways. ' 17 A significant number of Afghans were able to pay higher rents and rates in 
commercial areas of NWFP and Baluchistan and open food restaurants. They introduced 
their food and culture which immediately became popular in the country. In Peshawar, it 
is possible to find almost everything that was to be found in Kabul: Afghan restaurants, 
tailors, jewellery, lcathcrwork, fruitshops, food stores and music cassettes. 
However, the wealthier class generated tension with the local business class because rents 
were pushed beyond the reach of the small commercial class. Although by law Afghan 
refugees were not allowed to purchase immovable property, Zia's govcnnment's flexibility 
provided an opportunity to wealthy Afghans to evade the operative rules either through 
utilizing loopholes within the existing rules or through employing illegal means. 
Moreover, refugees were also involved in the transport business of NWFP and 
116 Ingcr W. ßocscn, I lonour in Exile: Continuity and Change Among Afghan Refugees" In Ewan W. 
Anderson and Nancy Hatch Dupree The Cultural Basis of Afghan Natlonallsm. p. 165. 
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Baluchistan. It was estimated that more than 6,000 Afghan vehicles were on `temporary 
registration licences' and many without registration were plying the roads. 118 In NWFP 
alone there were over 893 heavy trucks, 55 large buses, 173 minibuses, 152 tractors, 411 
cars, cabs, jeeps and pick-ups and 21 motorcycles or rickshaws -a total of 1705 vehicles 
registered to refugees 119 and there were at least as many more unregistered. It was 
estimated that 60,000 Afghan refugee families were supported by the motorised transport 
business in NWFP and in the rest of Pakistan. 120 
6-6. Property Ownership and Legalisation 
Hundreds of refugees were accused of settling on private property and required to give 
compensation to the landowner. Many better-off refugees managed to get around the 
restrictions through legal means and purchase real estate in Punjab, NWFP, Baluchistan 
and Karachi (Sindh). 121 This practice of buying land to build houses on it, and buying 
already constructed houses by the local people persisted, which caused a boom in the real 
estate business. The wealthy Afghan refugees found a way to get around the law that 
restricted their right to purchase property by obtaining National Identity Cards, domiciles 
and even passports through `agents' who charged handsome fees for such 
Procurements. 122 Accommodation was difficult to find and competition for cultivated land 
heightened local tension. As a result prices, in particular house rents, were inflated, and 
soared in urban areas mainly, because city dwelling Afghans were willing to pay higher 
rent which, in turn, pushed the rent ceiling beyond the capacity of local residents. 
6-7. Smuggling 
The Afghan refugees also brought a boom in illegal cross-border trade by Afghan 
vehicles, bringing cherished items to the Pakistani market such as fruit, vegetables, nuts, 
dried fruit, cloth, timber, etc. Shortages of wheat and rice in the Pakistani market were 
blamed on the smuggling of these commodities to higher priced markets in Afghanistan as 
117 South (October 1982), p. 24. 111 Ibid. p. 166. 119 Grant M. Parr, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Definitions, Repatriation and Ethnicity. " in Ewan W. 
Anderson and Nancy Iiatch Dupree (ed. )., The Cultural Baals of Afghan Nationalism. p. 139. 
120 Marcel Ackerman, "Self-Reliance/Income Generating of Afghan Refugees In NWFP. " Memo to Chief 
Police Office (Peshawar: September 1982). pp. 18-23. 12' Non-Pakistanis are prohibited from purchasing immovable property, but Afghan refugees evaded the 
operating rules and used unfair mean. to gain land. See details South (October 1982). p. 24. 
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well as India123 Despite Pakistan's bumper wheat crop in 1986-90, the country was forced 
to import 1.8 million tons of wheat. The real problem started due to Afghan tax free 
imports via Pakistan. The trade turned around at the border and returned right back into 
the country, causing considerable loss in state revenues. The local business community 
was worried over the growing smuggling under the guise of the Afghan Transit Trade 
(ATT) which was being misused and has demanded appropriate action for the protection 
of local industries. 124 By the 1990s there was hardly any major city in the country that did 
not have a market for selling smuggled goods. They offered all kinds of foreign goods, 
ranging from crockery to household appliances and from clothes to petroleum products. 
Peshawar's "I3ara Market" was full of smuggled items such as air conditioners, 
refrigerators, TV sets and all other types of electrical goods. Tea was also one of the 
major items being smuggled under the cover of the Afghan transit trade, causing a huge 
financial loss to the exchequer, estimated at Rs. 400 million annually. 
12S A tyre 
manufacturer and a Sony TV assembling factory had to be closed down after going into 
huge losses. Pakistan has a population of 140 million and Afghanistan of 15 million with 
much lower per capita income and a war-ravaged economy. There was, thus, no sense in 
import values being Rs. 0.83 billion for Pakistan and Rs. 1.1 billion for Afghanistan in TV 
sets, Rs. 0.10 billion for Pakistan and Rs. 0.2 billion for Afghanistan in soap and 
shampoo, Rs. 0.7 billion for Pakistan and Rs. 1.4 billion for Afghanistan in art silk 
fabrics. 126 It has hurt the government's finances hard in the form of lost revenues, around 
Rs. 4.7 billion annually, that it would have earned in custom duties and other levies had 
those goods come in through formal channels. 127 
6-8. Decline of the Tourism Industry 
The Afghan war and its fall-out not only jolted NWFP's infrastructure and its economy 
but in its wake brought immense sufferings to the local tourist industry since the 1980s. 
The inflow of foreign tourists, chiefly from the Western countries, went down because of 
the war in Afghanistan. The major tourist centres such as Kaghan, Chitral, Swat valley, 
122 Hassan Askari Rizvi, "Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Influx, Iiwnanitarian Assistance and 
Implications, " Pakistan Horizon, XXXVII: 1(I st Quarter 1984), p. 54. 
123 Marvin G. Weinbaum, "The impact and Legacy of the Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, " p. 135. 124 See Dawn (17 November 1993). 
us Ibid; and Sultan Ahmad, "Rs. 100 billion worth smuggling Subverts the Economy, " Dawn (5 
November 1993). 
126 See R. M. U. Suleman, "Problems Posed by Afghan Transit Trade, " Dawn, Economic & Business 
Edition (18-24 March 1995). 
127 The News (19 March 1994); and see The Frontier Post (5 November 1999). 
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Naran, Hazara division, Dir, Kohistan and the Northern areas were seriously hit, with 
devastating impact on their economy and commercial activities. Before the Afghan war, 
Peshawar served as gateway to Kabul for foreign tourists and visitors. The traditional 
bazaars, cafes and hotels were flooded with foreign tourists. Those were the days when 
there were no bomb blasts, acts of sabotage, fear of rockets, missiles, nor were there any 
Kalashnikovs or Afghan refugees. This flourishing tourist activity came to a halt and the 
entire area became out of bounds to visitors and foreign tourists. 
7. Political and Social Costs 
Pakistan and the Afghan mujahideen won the war against the Soviet Union but Pakistan's 
involvement in Afghanistan exacted a fearful price. The political and social impacts were 
grave and devastating for Pakistan. Drugs, corruption and armed violence became 
ubiquitous, reaching previously unheard-of levels. The impact of the Afghan advanturo on 
the Pakistani social fabric was severe. Thus, the social impacts of the Afghan refugees on 
Pakistan were far greater than those of any other immigrant group. 
7-1. Legitimacy of Zia's Rule 
Zia ul-Ilaq, whose domestic political position had been weak at the beginning of the 
Afghan war, was able to consolidate and maintain power in ways that were ultimately 
damaging to Pakistan's political system. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan might well 
have seemed to some in Islamabad to contain a silver lining. 123 The Afghan war enabled 
Zia to continue martial law and , Icgitimise' his military rule. Zia ordered the execution of 
his deposed predecessor, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and he further aggravated the US concerns 
by postponing elections indefinitely, tightening martial law and adopting a number of 
orthodox Islamic edicts into government. At one stroke, the US was distracted from 
Pakistan's internal situation and turned a Nelson's eye to human rights violations, 
allowing the dictatorship to run amok and trample the democratic aspirations of the 
people. 129 In this regard, the CIA was running several programmes to help keep Zia in 
power. He was receiving plenty of intelligence reports, including highly prized satellite 
121 Robert G. Wirsing, "Pakistan and the War in Afghanistan, " Asian Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 
1987), pp. 57.75. 129 See Newsweek (9 July 1984), p. 39. 
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pictures and electronic communications intercepts about opposition. 130 Thus, Zia was able 
to transform his image in the West from "bad guy to good guy, " since Pakistan was a vital 
bulwark against Soviet expansionism. Zia was thus able to suppress opposition parties and 
postpone elections, indefinitely. The Afghan crisis had turned Zia in the eyes of the West 
from a hangman into a defender of the frontier of the free world. There were reports that 
the CIA was running several programmes to keep Zia in power. For this purpose, strong 
contingents of CIA agents were stationed in Pakistan to protect the Zia regime and for 
monitoring its government activities. 131 They also used electronic communications 
intercepts on Zia's political opponents. 132 
Thus, after getting legitimacy in the eyes of the US, Zia succeeded in destroying the status 
of national institutions (parliament, judiciary and media) and their high reputation. 
According to Emma Duncan, "Zia held absolute power and had no need to bother with 
appearances, yet he did - not just in his deference to visitors, but also 
in legal matters. His 
constitutional amendments sewed up every possible loophole, down to the point where all 
the actions of the martial law government were not only unchallcngcable in any court, but 
also where all orders made, proceedings taken, acts done or purporting to be made, taken 
or done by any authority or person would be deemed to have been made, taken or done in 
good faith and for the purpose intended to be served thereby. " 
33 Moreover, Zia 
encouraged many local, regional and religious parties, as part of his divide and rule 
strategy to keep tensions high and justify continued army rule. For this purpose, Zia's 
regime through the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) encouraged ethnic groups and 
religious parties on sectarian lines and ultimately many Sunni and Sha'ia groups emerged 
which divided society and undermined the raison d'ctre of Pakistan. 
Many Pakistanis had no doubt that the US arms for Zia would be used for internal 
repression. The Baluch community seemed rather ambivalent about the threat of Russian 
aggression or even the invasion of Afghanistan. They recalled how in the mid-1970s, the 
US helicopter gunships supplied via the Shah of Iran were used by the Pakistani army 
134 against Baluch separatists and their villages. The Guardian observed editorially. "More 
130 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy that Hastened the 
Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994), p. 229. 131 Ibid. 
132 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 198147 (London: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 
311; and Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy, p. 229. 
133 Emma Duncan, Breaking The Curfew: A 1'olltlcal Journey Through Pakistan, p. 72. 
114 Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got 
There (London: Sinclair Browne, 1982), p. 197. 
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American helicopter gunships blasting Baluchis; the finest Russian propaganda in the 
world.... The West will be in an appalling dilemma, reviled in Baluchistan, the NWFP and 
Sindh as the succourer of the oppressor, "135 and reviled as well by other Pakistanis, who 
might have turned to the Russians for support against their tormentor, "defending" them 
with US aid. According to a Baluch chief , "If the West props up Zia and the Russians 
move south, there will be no civil resistance as I see it. Some might even be prepared to 
aid them. " As one politician added: "This American aid is not to the people. It is aid to the 
army junta. They will perhaps use it on the wrong people-on the Pakistanis for internal 
repression or to the Baluchis. "136 However, American support secured Zia's unrestricted 
authority and his moves restored the pre-emincnce of the military in Pakistan's politics. 
Zia also used various methods to attain legitimacy domestically. fie exploited religion and 
started an Islamisation compaign to legitimist and prolong his own rule. Charles H. 
Kennedy analysed this situation and argued that Zia successfully exploited the political 
utility of Islam and promised to implement Nizam-i-Mustapha (Islamic reforms) just to 
gain popularity among the common people. His major concern was his own survival and 
the stability of his government, not the propagation of Islam. lie only paid lip service to 
the Islam as far as it could legitimise his rule. Thus, he used religion as one of the main 
weapons to pressurise the opposition and to justify the holding of non-party based 
elections. He used non-ballot techniques and introduced a partylcss National Assembly 
and Senate under the Islamic banner "Majlis-i-Shura. " IIe used "referendum" to regularise 
his govcrnmcnt but all these tactics failed to attain legitimacy. In this situation, Zia kept 
on playing with politicians and offered the prime ministership of the country to Ghulam 
Mustafa Jatoi, Wali Khan, Pir of Pagara and to retired air marshal Asghar Khan as well, 
Jatoi and Wali Khan are known to have refused and the others adopted less openly 
negative approaches. 137 
7-2. Corruption In Distribution of US Weapons 
In mid-1985, the CIA and the US officials accused the Pcshawar-bascd Afghan leaders of 
massive corruption and involvement in the weapons and equipment black market. The 
CIA complained about the gross mismanagement and corruption in the arms supply to the 
mujahideen and indicated that more than 40 percent of the total arms aid was siphoned off 
'35 Guardian (18 July 1975), p. 3. IM Dawn (28 November 1980). 
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along the way by local administration, military officials and Afghan mujahldeen to parties 
outside the conflict. 138 The CIA shared responsibility for running the Afghan war with 
Pakistan Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and each year (1981-88) they provided $640 
million for Afghan covert operations. It was estimated 40 percent of the weapons destined 
for the war effort `leaked' into Pakistan. Army officers and mujahideen were reported as 
selling weapons on the open market in Pakistan, while some Afghan mujahideen 
commanders also traded their weapons to raise funds for the transport of medical and food 
supplies into Afghanistan. According to a CIA report, "during the Afghan war some 
Pakistani army officers, civilian and leaders of mujahldeen groups were much more 
concerned with confiscating weapons destined for the resistance as with supplying them 
to the actual purpose. "19 Smuggling across Afghanistan's borders was one of the routes 
to receive weapons for Afghan mujahideen shipments which were later 
institutional ised. 140 The most serious criticism was directed at Pakistanis for diverting to 
their own use shipments of supplies meant for the Afghan mujahideen. The survival of the 
resistance movement and the supply of sophisticated weapons to the m: jahideen 
depended on Pakistani officials and they were reluctant to act too openly as an arms 
conduit. A US Senator made accusations of "serious mismanagement in the US aid 
programme, perhaps of scandalous proportions"141 According to one report, "extensive 
corruption wastes much of the growing US assistance ........ 
112 Published material 
estimates that "between one-third and one half of the aid was diverted by Pakistan or sold 
by corrupt Afghan mujahiddcn groups. "143 Edward It. Girardct (a Western journalist) 
argues that the American Military aid that was "seeping through.... tended to be of poor 
quality or insufficient quantity.... "44 He also indicated that weapons that came for 
Afghan mujahideen through Karachi port, including machine guns, disappeared and 
reappeared for sale in the weapons bazaars. 145 
t" Anthony I lyman and M. Ghayur and Nasresh Kaushik, Pakistan: Zia and After, p. 51. 13s The extravagant lifestyles of some of the Peshawar leaders, reminiscent of the Contra leaders in 
Miami, with their many homes and cars, investments in businesses in Pakistan and abroad and secret 
Swiss bank accounts, have disillusioned many commanders. Sec details in The Nation (31 July 1987); 
Edward Girardct, Christian Science Monitor (7 September 1988); and Marvin 0. Weinbaum, "War 
and Peace in Afghanistan, " p. 76. 139 Tara Kaetha, "The Weaponisation of Afghanistan, " Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIX, No. 10-11 
(January-February 1997), pp. 1396.1398; and Herald (October 1995), pp. 25-35. 110 Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under ZIa 1977.1988, p. 55. 
141 Washington Post (27 December 1984), p. A6. 112 Wall Street Journal (27 December 1984), p. 16. 143 The Sunday Times (London: 10 March 1985), p. 23; and The Economist (8 December 1984), p. 12. 14s Christian Science 1 1onitor, back page (26 September 1984). 
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In 1987 American magazine Newsweek mentioned that Pakistani high officials, both 
military and civilian, were skimming off 30 percent or more of covert US aid to the 
mujahideen. 146 However, there was bound to be leakage both in Pakistan and Afghanistan; 
indeed, as it turned out 20-30 percent and perhaps as much as 50 percent of the weaponry 
was stolen or sold. 147 Fears that aid would fall into unfriendly hands1t8 constituted a major 
part of the reason for the reluctance of both Carter and Reagan to send sophisticated 
weapons to the rebels. The Stinger anti-aircraft missile was the key system in this 
connection. While it was exactly what the Afghan muJahldeen needed to counter the 
Soviets' deadly use of advanced MiGs and Hind helicopter gunships, it was also a 
fearsome weapon for terrorists. Many within the CIA opposed transfer of Stingers. In fact, 
a dozen or more did fall into Iranian hands. 149 After the conclusion of the 1988 Geneva 
accords that paved the way for Soviet withdrawal, it was congressional pressure that led 
the Reagan Administration to abandon its approach of discontinuing aid to the mujahideen 
as a quid pro quo for Soviet withdrawal in favour of a policy of "symmetry" that linked 
the US military aid to the mujahideen groups to comparable Soviet aid for the Kabul 
regime. 
The blast on 10 April 1988, at the Ojhri camp arms dump in Rawalpindi, which was 
reportedly used as a transit centre or an arms depot of US arms for the Afghan 
mujahideen, brought the reputation of the army to an all-time low. In this camp, around 
7,000 tons of arms and explosives, including a rockets and missiles store which were 
worth almost $100 million intended for the mujahideen rained down on the twin cities of 
Ralwalpindi and Islamabad, causing thousands of casualties. 'SO Rumours were spread that 
146 See Newsweek (23 March 1987), pp. 32-33; and Jan Goodwin, Caught In the Crossfire (London: 
Macdonald, 1987), p. 45-46. 147 See the discussion in Tim Weiner, Blank Check: Pentagon's Black Budget (New York: Warner 
Brothers, Inc, 1990), pp. 152-53. tos Selig Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, p. 316. 119 See more detailed analysis in Weiner, Blank Check, pp. 130.171. See Rosanne Klass, "Afghanistan: 
The Accords, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66 (Summer 1988), pp. 929-30 and 934-36; and Jay Peterzell, 
Reagan's Secret Wars, CNSS Report No. 108 (Washington, D. C.: Centre for National Security 
Studies, 1984), p. 12. ISO The Inter-Services Intelligence (IS! ) Directorate, dealing with the covert military support, selected 
Ojhri Camp to serve as an arms depot. This Camp received armament from the US, the lethal cargo by 
train from the port city of Karachi, storing it for short periods, and then sending it in batches to its 
destination by trucks. The supply started as a trickle, for which the Camp had adequate storing facility. 
As the intensity of operations inside Afghanistan increased, so did the requirement of arms and 
ammunition for fighting against the Soviet Union also increased. Thus, the existing accommodation 
became inadequate. Some additional sheds were built to increase the storage capacity but it was also 
inadequate for keeping the further ammunition and explosives. The loading work was performed by a 
untrained and unsuspecting labour. On 10 April 1988 when the loading work was performed some of 
the boxes fell down and then at about 9.30 am the site of Ojhri Camp started burning and the sheds 
were set ablaze. See full details in Khalid Mahmud Arif, Working With 2la: Pakistan's Power 
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the dump had been blown up deliberately by a conspiracy of senior army officers just 
before the arrival of a US defence audit team, '5' to cover up the fact that "a significant 
number of Stinger missiles had been sold off to Iran, where they could have been put to 
use against the US forces. 152 Actually, the US covert arms supplies to the Afghan 
mujahideen, all of which were distributed through the ISI with no paperwork involved, 
and thus extraordinarily little accountability, enabled many government bureaucrats, army 
officers and Afghan leaders to get financial benefits. 's3 Moreover, the Afghan muJahideen 
leaders were unconcerned about corruption charges because they themselves were among 
those who profited. Many Afghan mujahideen and Pakistan army ofYiciers were also 
involved in arms corruption and both never felt resentment against each other. 
7-3. Drugs Trade 
The Islamic revolution in Iran closed the old traffic routes to the West and the Afghan war 
led many Afghan poppy growers not only to shift production of poppy and heroin across 
the border into Pakistan's hospitable tribal areas (especially the Khyber Agency where 
heroin laboratories flourish), but also to use Pakistan as the main trans-shipment point for 
heroin travelling westwards. 154 In the late 1980s, the US's Cold War strategies in 
Afghanistan, combined with the Pakistani perception of a threat to its territorial integrity 
in NWFP and Baluchistan, led the intelligence agencies in Pakistan and the US to deflect 
money from heroin trafficking to support the war in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, the ISI, was 
alleged to have been involved in the strategic use of drug money in insurgency wars in 
Afghanistan. Similar allegations were made about the CIA's underhand connection with 
the promoters of the heroin trade in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the Cold War era. )" 
In an attempt to promote security interests in Southwest Asia, the US turned a blind eye to 
Politics 1977-1988, pp. 386-390; and see also Salamat Ali, "Soldiers and Spooks, " Far Eastern Economic Review (10 November 1988), p. 36. , s, Christina Lamb, Waiting For Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy, pp. 42 and 223. , s= William D. Harting, And Weapons For All (New York: llarper Collins Publishers, 1994), p. 126; and 
see also Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan, p. 316. 134 Christina Lamb, Waiting For Allah: Pakistan's Struggle for Democracy, p. 94. 154 M. Emded-ul Ilaq, Drugs in South Asia: From the Opium Trade to the Present Day (London: 
Macmillan, 2000), p. 5. iss There is general perception that the ISI and CIA encourged poppy cultivation in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan to collect money for the Afghan war. Some shady links are exposed, but normally they 
remain concealed. In fact, it was difficult to get evidence from primary sources about the alleged 
activities of the leading secret agencies of CIA and ISI due to the sensitivities of the issue. It is also 
equally difficult to collect some official and rare documents from overseas sources. I Iowever, there are 
some evidence about CIA and drugs trade in Afghanistan, Central America and South west Asia. See 
for more details in Alfred W. McCoy's book on The Politics of Heroin In Southeast Asia (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1991), pp. 19 and 447. 
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strategic use of drug money by some army personnel in Pakistan and by bosses of the 
Afghan mujahideen. 
As a result, the Afghan and Pakistani Pakhtun cultivators produced around 70 percent of 
the world's high-grade heroin and its largest supplier, 156 overseen by an estimated 40 drug 
`cartels' (or sub-cartels). '57 Thus, with the introduction of heroin technology to finance 
the Afghan war in the 1980s, Pakistan eventually emerged as the world's largest 
consumer and supplier of illicit heroin in the world market. The Afghan war and the 
clandestine trafficking of arms offered a natural lucrative pairing with drugs and this 
business handsomely rewarded individual Afghans and Pakistanis. The mujahideen 
increased the opium harvest to 575 tons between 1982-83 and they sold it to Pakistani 
heroin refiners who operated under the protection of (Rctd) General Fazal -ul Haq, 
governor of the NWFP. 158 For his likely links in underground drug trade, General Fazal 
llaq was described as the "notorious Pakistani" by International Intelligence during his 
official visit to Washington in April 1982.1591lis drug connections became an open secret 
when at a tribal caucus at Wana in South Waziristan, Governor Fazal ilaq declared heroin 
a Pakistani "mincral. "160 Thus, beside the army personnel, the drug trade was lucrative to 
many influential people who became beneficiaries of the underground heroin trade. This 
business also created a powerful arms and drugs Mafia in Pakistan which was one of the 
major causes of expansion of the heroin and arms trade throughout the country. 161 
The drug trade increased the financial potential of the mujahldcen, so that during 1983-86 
they became self-sufficient and established strong private armies and bought arms in the 
clandestine markets. 162 The Washington Post in 1983 reported that Afghan militants were 
156 The Economist (20 December 1987). 
'" Jonathan Beatty and S. C. Gwynnc, The Outlaw Law Bank (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 
259, 
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remained in the good books of General Zia. Ills son had been convicted of charges of drug trafficking 
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"financing their battle" to some extent through the sale of drugs to the Wcst. 163 Some 
reports hinted that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) officials stationed in Pakistan 
were privately involved in the drug trade to secure Cold War objectives. '" The Ilindustan 
Times claimed that with the rise of the Afghan crisis "a foreign trained adviser" had 
suggested to General Zia that he use drug money to the military chalienge. 'bs The ISI 
tacitly ignored the involvement of the tribal Pakhtun and the mufahidccn leaders, 
especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Iiezb-i-Islami), who drew money from the drug trade to 
support his insurgency in Afghanistan. However, the US policy in Afghanistan backfired 
when a substantial amount of Pakistani heroin started to arrive in the US and other 
Western countries. A report by the US Committee on Foreign Affairs indicated that the 
smuggling of Southwest Asian heroin into the country accounted for only 3 percent in 
1978 while this figure rose to 51 percent by 1983.166 In the same vein, The ? limes of 
London in 1983 argued that 80 percent of heroin sold on the streets of UK came from 
Pakistan. 167 
Moreover, the whole business was inextricably involved with the movement of drugs into 
the country in an operation controlled by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and 
Pakistani army. Alfred W. McCoy pointed out the links between the CIA and ISI and 
argued that "in the wake of Afghan crisis the Pakistani secret agency had become 
involved in drug trafficking. Trafficking was conducted via channels which normally 
carried arms and goods to Afghan refugee camps. Under the CIA's auspices, arms were 
collected from different countries and mainly carried from Karachi to Peshawar by the 
National Logistic Cell (NLC), the largest army transport organisation, handling the 
shipment of arms to the border areas. The NLC armoured vehicles were beyond the 
inspection of the police or customs authorities. With this advantage, the NLC trucks 
carried heroin from Peshawar to Karachi. 169 Some reports indicated that after the end of 
163 Washington Post (17 December 1983), p. A32. 164 Kalim I3ahadur, "Opium Racket in Pakistan, " Link (4 January 1981), p. 26. 165 The unnamed adviser was presumably General Fazal llaq, the Governor of NWFP and the most 
powerful general in Pakistan army. See The Hindustan Times (1 October 1994), p. 14; and M. 
Cmdcd-u1 Iiaq, Drugs In South Asia, p. 187. 166 Review of United States Narcotics Control (Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 1986). P. 17 167 The Tines (6 May 1983), p. 7. 1b1 The Washington Post (13 May 1990); Tara Kar ha, "The Diffusion of Light Weapons in Pakistan, " 
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253 
war the CIA overlooked Afghan militants who helped receive weapons in exchange for 
drug money. 169 
According to the US State Department report, between 1985 and 1988 Afghan opium 
production rose from 400-500 metric tons to 700-800 metric tons: the country also 
produced 200-400 metric tons of hashish. In the same time, Pakistan's opium production 
rose from 40-70 metric tons in 1985 to 205 metric tons in 1988.170 As a result, by 1980 
Pakistan had no reported heroin addicts; in 1983 there were 30,000 and in late 1988 there 
were more than one million heroin addicts. 171 By 1985-86 Pakistan had emerged as a 
major refiner of Southwest Asian opium into heroin and a principal channel for heroin 
destined for US markets. 172 By 1987-1988 drugs were bringing in at least S4 billion a year 
-more foreign exchange than all Pakistan's legal exports combined. '73 Thus, despite an 
increase in the drug trade from Pakistan, the US officials were reluctant to review its 
strategic relationship with Pakistan. In fact, this was a great social cost to the US from the 
ideological battle that eventually evicted the Soviets from Afghanistan. 
The Afghan official media accused Iiekmatyar and other anti-Communist Afghan leaders 
of procuring money from the drug trade. 174 On 13 May 1990, the Washington Post 
indicated that "Hckmatyar commanders close to ISI run laboratories in southwest Pakistan 
and the United States had failed to take action against Pakistan's heroin dealers because of 
its desire not to offend a strategic ally, Pakistan's military establishment. " 175 During this 
time, Dera Adam Khcl (a small town between Peshawar and Kohat) emerged as a centre 
for heroin processing as well as gun manufacturing. 176 The Ilckmatyar lieutenants 
operated some of the heroin laboratories at Rabat, a small town at the meeting point of 
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. A large number of mujahldecn camps and heroin 
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1989/90), p. 26. 1n Narcotics Control Digest Vol. 15, No. 14 (10 July 1983), p. S. 
173 See report Melvyn Levitsky, US Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics, on Drug 
Trafficking to House Committee (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Ofrce, 8 January 1989). 
174 Kabul Radio (28 January 1986); and SWB: Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 3, Monitoring 
Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation (30 January 1986). 173 See detail in The Washington Post (13 May 1990), p. 1. 176 Dawn (11 July 1996), p. 7. 
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laboratories were located in the Koh-i-Sultan region, an area under ISI control. After the 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1990, the ISI helped Iickmatyar to control Kabul's 
`multi-billion dollar opium trade, " which had emerged as "a key factor" in the Afghan 
power struggle. 177 
7-4. Kalashnikov178 Culture 
The "Kalashnikov culture" flourished when the United States sent huge supplies of 
weapons through Pakistan to arm the Afghan mujahideen. The Afghan war provided 
enormous opportunities for business in illegal arms in the NWFP and the culture of the 
AK-47 Kalashnikov took firm roots in Pakistan. Darra Adam Khcl, a tribal village deep in 
one of the steep valleys of Pakistan's federally administered areas within NWFP, has 
thrived as one of the world's largest unofficial arms markets. 
'79 There are more than 3,000 
technicians and skilled labourers working in 2,600 arms shops and five gun factories that 
jointly have the capacity to make about 100 AK-47s per day. 
' 80 This area is dominated by 
Afridi tribes and has developed into a big centre for the manufacture of indigenous 
wcapons. 18' On sale are Chinese and Soviet style Kalaslmikov automatic rifles hand 
grenades and antiaircraft guns. 182 This weapons market is full of a variety of arms, from 
Japanese pen pistols to rapid fire guns and communications equipment, missiles, anti. 
aircraft weapons, hand grenades, rocket launchers and anti-tank ammunition. 
ta, As the 
Afghan war wound down in the early 1990s, Pakistan was mired in what one Hall Street 
Journal article described as "the worst outbreak of lawlessness in its history, " and "the 
US, it turns out, inadvertently helped supply the firepower. " The article went on to 
describe gangs of criminals and terrorists roaming the streets of major Pakistani towns 
virtually unchecked, fending off police with machine guns, grenade launchers, and other 
tr Emded-ul llaq, Drugs In South Asia, p. 189. 
to Mikhail Timofeyvich Kalaslutikov design (Kalashnikov) AK-47. This gun is a status symbol in 
Pakistan. During the Afghan war many Russian soldiers and mujahideen sold them to people. Data 
Adamkhcl (NWFP) produces Russian and Chinese model Kalaslmikova within twenty days. The 
Soviet Kalashnikov costs Ra. 30,000 and the Data Adamkhel made Pakistani version costs only Ra. 
10,000. See details in P. L. Bhola, Benazir Bhutto: Opportunities and Challenges (Jaipur. Yuvraj 
Publishers, 1989), pp. 90-99. "The Guardian (15 December 2000), p. 17. 110 This calculation does not include the production capacity of units based in other parts of the NWFP. 
See more details in Ayesha Siddiqa Agha. "De-Wcaponising South Asian Socitics" Dawn (13 July 
2000); and Newsweek (27 March 2000), p. 16; and see't'he Guardian (IS December 2000), p. 17. tst Sankar Sen, "Heroin Trafficking in the Golden Crescent. " The Police Journal (July 1992), p. 254. 112 Newsweek (27 March 2000), p. 16. 
These weapons are cheaper than in the international market and the trend of "let within Pakistan 
seems to have tilted towards smaller weapons like pistols and multi-barrel guns. for which there Is 
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sophisticated armaments procured in the nation's scores of weapons markets. Most of this 
weaponary was siphoned off from US aid supplies to the Afghan muJahldeen, rerouted 
into what many Pakistanis have come to call a "Kalashnikov culture" of armed street 
violence. 184 
Moreover, it offered a slightly more down-to-earth echo of the rationales offered by US 
government bureaucrats and corporate officials involved in the arms trade; a Pakistani 
arms dealer proudly displayed his wares saying: "this is a market. we buy and sell. We do 
not care who comes as long as he has money .... We are experts 
in weapons. "85 William 
Hartung also indicated that the outbreak of violence and corruption in Pakistan was an 
unintended byproduct of the Reagan doctrine because the US used the country more than 
a decade as a conduit for an estimated $8.7 billion (1986-90) of weapon aid for Afghan 
mujahideen-weapons which have now diffused across the border, into the hands of 
militants, criminals, ethnic and sectarian groups, challenging state forces and encouraging 
secessionist forces within the country. 186 
7.5. Law and Order Problems 
The Afghan war left the area awash with arms - both sophisticated and heavy, which 
undermined the security of Pakistan's citizens, deprived the state of its control over the 
means of violence, and promoted the criminalisation of politics. '87 Disruptive internal 
forces became more acute and the state appeared less and less capable of protecting its 
citizens against threats posed by political, religious and criminal elements in all major 
parts of the country. 188 Sunni and Shiite Muslim sects were always at each other's 
throats, as were various matia gangs and tribal warlords, who killed one another over 
property or revenge. Political disputes often ended in bloodshed. Ordinary citizens, who 
might have settled a grievance in the past with a punch or insult, now pulled out guns. 
Thousands of people died violently in Karachi alone in the late 1980s-and Pakistan's 
rising demand from rich people and politicians. See Tara Kanha, "The Diffusion of Light Weapons in 
Pakistan, " Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No. I (Spring 1997), p. 80. 
John Bussey, "To the Feuds, Malaise and Guns of Pakistan Comes the Free Market, " Wall Street 
Journal (31 July 19991). 
Ibid. 
tab William D. Hartung, And Weapons For All (New York: I larper Collins Publishers, 1994), p. 123. 117 See Shahzada Zulfikar, "Contentious Count, " Newsline (October 1994), p. 62; and Rahimullah 
Yusufrai, "The Frontier Connection. " New"cllne (October 1989), pp. 23-26. Ile Malecha Lodhi, Pakistan's Encounter %lth Democracy (Lahore: Vanguard Book Publishers, 1994), 
pp. 310.302; Mohammad Iianif, 'The Anatomy of Violence. " Newillne (October 1989), pp. 15-16; 
The Economist (17 October 1998), p. 89; and Time (3 October 1994). 
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overall crime rate continued to rise. The largest city (population 10 million) in Pakistan 
and principal sea port fell into wretched turmoil. Drugs, racketeering and outright political 
warfare ruled in the place of civil authority. The country's Human Rights Commission 
said crime increased since the 1980s in many categories-murder, kidnapping, robberies, 
sniper victims, bomb blasts. 189 It will not be easy to wipe out Pakistan's deeply 
entrenched gun culture. Feudal landowners and tribal chiefs have their own private 
armies. Sectarian groups possess sophisticated arsenals. In rural Sindh, bandits with light 
machine guns rob and kill people randomly. 19° The Tribal Areas, a quasi-autonomous 
strip of territory straddling the NWFP and Baluchistan, cannnot be disarmed. According 
to one 1990 report, NWFP and the Tribal Areas had roughly 2.1 million 
Kalashnikovs-one for every grown person-19' Analysts were of the view that Punjab alone 
had 700,000 AK-47s and Karachi alone contains 15,000 AK-47s. 192 In the same vein, 
millions of unlicensed automatic weapons, including Kalashnikovs, arc being used 
throughout the country in a rising tide of lawlessness. Many political, social and religious 
elements are free from law and have illegal weapons, while law-abiding citizens arc 
unarmed. 193 
7-6. Galcmjam Culture" 
During 1984-1986 the KRAD used socio-cultural means to dcstabilisc Pakistan. Ilundreds 
of prostitutes from Central Asia and Russia entered Peshawar (NWFP) and Quetta 
(Baluchistan) to morally corrupt socicty. 195 The BBC Urdu programme "Sarbeen" 
reported the influx of more than 8,000 prostitutes of various ethnic origins (Afghani, 
Uzbek, Tajik, Turkomani, Russian and Ukrainian ). 196 These prostitutes extended their 
business to affluent areas in the major urban centres (Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, 
119 Zahid Hussain and Ismail Khan, "Pakistan: We All Fear for our Lives" Newsweek (27 March 2000), 
p. 16; and Time (17 April 1995), pp. 12-16. 190 Ibid. 
191 Salamat Ali, "Kalashnikov Culture, " Far Eastern Economic Review (22 February 1990), pp. 29-30. 192 Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, "De-Weaponising South Asian Socities, " Dav n (13 July 2000), p. 8. 193 Salamat All, "Kalashnikov Culture, " Far Eastern Economic Review (22 February 1990), pp. 29-30. 194 Galcmjam is a Persian word meaning "Carpctfolding, " but in the frontier region people normally use 
this word for prostitutes. General Abdul Rashid Dostom'a forces during the Afghan war, whenever 
they captured towns, looted and seized valuable material (jewellery, money, food and antiques) and ran 
away and people called them GalcnV&m (to fold or steal things and run). 193 Zaheer Ahrnad, "Social Corruption in Pashtun Society, " Asian Society No. 2, Vol. 5 (1986), pp. 8.11; 
"Golden Gift for Pakistani Muslims, " Gulf News (1987); and Newsline No. 1, Vol. 10 (1987), pp. 13. - 
14. 
196 BBC-Montoring. Summary of World Broadcasts Part. 3 Asia-Pacific. Third Series FG2005 23 
November 1986; MAG (Weckely 5 September 1987), p. 24; and Asif Rasul, "The Social Dimension of 
Afghanistan Crisis, " Dawn, Friday Magazine (May 1989), p. 6. 
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Karachi, Faisalabad, Multan and Quetta) of the country and they were accessible to people 
from all walks of life at cheap prices and working under a well-planned organisation. 197 In 
NWFP prostitutes were mostly Persian or Dari speaking and people called them 
"galemjum. " These prostitutes established a sophisticated communication network 
throughout the country's hotel industry, for providing entertainment to customers. 
According to Asia Week, "most of the prostitutes were connected to the Khad agents and 
their targets were high government officials and Pakistan army ofTicers. i198 The flood of 
prostitutes was seen as a means of psychological warfare against Pakistan because the 
girls worked secretly and voluntarily to gain popularity in Pakistani society and later they 
captured the professional red light areas of Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad. 
'" They 
attracted the local commercial class, frustrated youth and the elites of society. In 1986-87 
the federal and provincial governments started major operations against the prostitute' 
business and they succeeded to some extent in controlling this virus in society, but the 
dream of elimination has not been realised. 
7.7. Sectarianism 
Sectarianism is one of the biggest challenges and gravest threats to Pakistan's domestic 
security horizon. It is an inevitable outcome of Zia's "Islamisation" programme and the 
United States encouragement of religion to stop the flood of Communism. During the 
Afghan war the US deliberately promoted religion as a weapon against the Soviet Union 
and spent million of dollars for the establishment of religious institutions and Islamic 
literature. 200 Zia also took advantage of the situation to introduce selective Shariah laws 
which divided society and also negated the cardinal Islamic principles of democracy, 
freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice. Thus, the net-work of religious institutions 
(mosques and madressaha) were out of state control and held considerable autonomy and 
street power pushing Pakistan into total anarchy and disorder. The Iranian revolution 
(1979) had already injected the even more insidious poisons of religious sectarianism, 
Herald 197(September 1992), pp. 23-25; and The Nation (30 November 1987). 19t Asia Week (13 July 1985), pp. 9-11; Dawn (9 June 1986); and Newsllne (18 June 1986), p. 29. 199 In Islamabad the G-9 & G-10 sectors are full of Afghan refugees and most of the illicit business of 
Galemjam (prostitution) is run in these areas. Asif Rasul, The Social Dimension of Afghanistan 
Crisis, p. 53; and The Muslim (13 August 1989). 200 The Afghan war became a big ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
US spent approximately $250 million to establish religious institutions inside Afghanistan and Pakistan 
to counter Communist propaganda. In the same way, Saudi Arabia contributed $140 million to publish 
Islamic literature and the holy book, the Quran. Kuwait and UU also provided $80 million to support 
religious scholars and students. See "Islam and Afghan War, " The New York Times (28 February 
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fanaticism and bigotry, pitting sect against sect and region against region. 
'()] In this 
regard, the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia also fuelled sectarian conflict III 
Pakistan. Many Sunni organisations had long been receiving funds from Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq, Libya and Kuwait in order to counter Iranian influence and to set Lip nwch"essuhu. s in 
Baluchistan, Punjab and NWFP. These institutions were converted into well-established 
Political pressure groups by the support of petro-dollar countries and they have an 
ettcctivc organisation structure. The religious elements used the At'; han war as a training 
centre and they began to tight gun battles to achieve dominance. l3loody sectarian clashes 
between Shi'a and Sunni organisations became a regular Icaturc in various areas of 
Pakistan. 202 'I'bis situation created a new security threat because such clashes made 
Pakistan more vulnerable to external intervention. 
The increased sectarianism in Pakistan can easily be understood by the number of 
religious institutions established. In the 1950s. besides a few Shi'a ma(lrrssuhu there were 
137 traditional Sunni rna(L"essa/uss in Pakistan. By 1971 there were close to 
9110 
'flwJres's(, /z(Jc with about 3000 teachers and more than 3(1,11(10 regular students. 
In 1 `)`lOs. 
the number OI' inndr('. s"suh(js boomed to 45, (1(10 to 50,1100 instead of the 
4, (1(10 officially 
registerc(l""` (Tables-10 & 11). In Punjab, the number of' murlr('SSah(S were around 
26,00O, with sonrc", 11at less than that number in the rest ofthe country. 
Southern Punjab 
has the highest number of rnn(Iressaha. s (Table-12), around 
5.000 in(] this region has the 
lowest level of' literacy, a significant percentage of' the population 
Iiving On or below the 
poverty line and the feudal arrangement still to a considerable 
degree intact. In Punjah 
alone, 7050 mw/r's. s'(r/ru. s were imparting military training to their student. % 
l he NWI. I' 
has around 10,000 religious institutions. Peshawar alone has more than 
50 muih('s. cuhu. % 
and this city was reported to be a hub of' sectarian activities. The number of -Students and 
teachers increased from a Ic". hundred to thousands within one 
decade. In this regard, 
linreign students from Fgypt, Sudan, Algeria, the Philippines. China and 
Saudi Arabia 
were given training by a bewildering number of factions 
in the name of In the 
199Os, the worst hit was Punjab, where an estimated more than 
2000 persons were killed 
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Table -12 
Growth of (Sunni & Shi'a) AZadrasas in the Punjab 1979-94 
Division 1979 1980 1985 1990 1994 
Bahawalpur 278 417 598 1795 2883 
D. G. Khan 153 217 297 1363 2411 
Multan 045 102 179 812 1325 
Rahim Yar Khan 126 187 756 1562 1756 
Lahore 075 120 170 932 1323 
Rawalpindi 058 085 219 571 869 
Sargodha 075 098 310 841 941 
Gu'ranwala 052 066 996 1440 1340 
Faisalabad 047 098 378 410 530 
Jang 026 065 280 320 586 
Mianwali 018 034 365 425 530 
Total 953 1489 4548 10471 14694 
Sources: Zindagi (Lahore: 17 February 1995), p. 3Y; The News 
(Islamabad: 7 March 1995), p. 11; The Herald (Karachi: July 
1994), pp. 34-36; The Nwesllne (Karachi: November 1996), pp. 
18-24. 
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and 561 injured in 234 sectarian incidents. 205 The sectarian wave extended to the Northern 
Areas, Karachi and the NWFP, where 529 people were killed and hundreds injured in 864 
separate incidents. Bomb attacks on each other's mosques and imambargahs (Shi'a 
community gathering places) became common. The tragic reality was that all extremist 
elements had no will of tolerance and turned religion into a source of conflict. They were 
determined to settle their differences through the barrel of a gun. 
8. Rejection of Soviet Economic and Technical offers 
The Soviet government, in an effort to show good will towards Pakistan, continued to 
offer trade and development assistance. While trade between the two countries was 
curtailed at the beginning of 1980, the Soviets, for their part, proposed building several 
industrial and energy-generating facilities as well as expanding commercial, economic 
and scientific cooperation. 206 In addition, they suggested that economic assistance and 
cooperation would open the way to linking into a larger South Asian economic and trade 
network. In 1984, the Soviet Union had proposed to Zia that if Pakistan put an end to 
Afghan rebel bases in Pakistan, Moscow-Kabul would recognise the Durand Line as a 
international boundary. The Soviet also promised to denounce the Pakhtunistan issue and 
the Baluch nationalists movement from Pakistan's internal politics207 In the same vein, 
the Soviets offered a nuclear power plant and peaceful nuclear cooperation to Pakistan208 
but Islamabad was not willing to offend China, its principal nuclear benefactor, and the 
United States, its main supplier of economic and military assistance. 
9. Economic Deficiencies 
The Zia regime received sufficient foreign economic assistance but they spent it on 
imports of consumer goods rather than on education, health and rural development. From 
1973 to 1980 gross national savings in Pakistan averaged only 6.4 percent of the gross 
tos Dawn (1 January 1998); and Zahid Hussain, "Pakistan: Hostage to the Mullahs, " Newrllne (May 
1992), pp. 28-32. 206 The Muslim (13 May 1985). 207 W. IIoward Wriggins, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy After Afghanistan, " In Stephen P. Cohen (ed.. ) The 
Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1987), p. 74. 
20$ Paul L. Leventhal, "Plugging the Leaks in Nuclear Export Controls: Why Bothers, " ORuIS (Spring 
1992), p. 170. 
263 
national product 209 The average for 1980-86 declined by 18 percent to 4.6 percent. 
Moreover, gross domestic investment remained only 17.5 percent of the gross national 
income. The shortfall had to be met by capital flows from the outside. Pakistan ended the 
Zia period with publicly guaranteed long-term debt of over $16 billion, equivalent to 
nearly one-half of its gross domestic product and two and one-half times the total value of 
exports. Reliance on short-term debt increased; in 1987, there were $2.3 billion in 
outstanding short-term obligations. In the same vain, debt servicing was more than one- 
sixth the value of exports of goods and services. Average interest carried by outstanding 
debt increased nearly two-fold, from 2.3 to 5.8 percent a ycar. 210 Similarly, there was no 
significant improvement in social, education and health development. According to Omar 
Noman, between 1982-88 the share of expenditure on education and health fell from 2.1 
per cent of GNP to 1.5 per cent. 211 Defence continued to take the lion's share (due to the 
severe security problem with India) in successive budgets, at the expense of expenditure 
on development. For instance, in June 1988 the government provided Rs. 48.31 billion for 
defence, whereas the total money provided for all development projects was Rs. 47.14 
billion. 12 However, with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan had 
lost its importance in the superpower battle and was receiving severely declining funds for 
future development. Remittances from the Gulf standing at $1.88 billion were on the 
decline. Servicing of the foreign debt of $14.4 billion and the internal debt of $15.5 
billion, along with defence and non-development expenditure, were eating up 80 per cent 
of current expenditure, leaving the government with little room for manoeuvre. 
10. Economic Corruption 
In the Zia era, the scale of financial corruption exacerbated Pakistan's economic 
shortcomings, which forced its dependence on external sources of economic assistance 
and funds, and endangered efforts at democratisation. During its long period of martial 
law, many high ranking army officers were involved in drug peddling, weapon sales and 
irregular housing and land sales. In 1986, the Newsweek magazine mentioned that "live 
Pakistani generals (General Fazal-c-Ilaq, General Akhtcr Abdur Rchman, General 
Ghulam Galiani, General Abdur Rahim and Air Marshal Anwar Shmccm) had become the 
209 V. A. Jaffarey, "Pakistan Economy Under Zia Era, " The Muslim (18 April 1989). 
210 The World Bank - World Debt Tables: External Debt of Devcloping Countries, 
Vol. 11: Country 
Tables, 1989 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 290-293. 
211 Omar Noman, Political Economy of Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 35.36. 21= See The Military Balance (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987-88), pp. 78- 
175. 
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richest men in the world due to drug business and weapon sales in the local or 
international market. s413 Moreover, in 1987 according to Dr. Mahbub-ul 1! aq, the Minister 
of Planning and Commerce, bureaucratic corruption alone was estimated to amount to 
about $1 billion a year (Rs. 20 billion). 214 The same year, the National Taxation Reform 
Commission estimated that black money (unaccounted for tax purposes) was $9 billion 
(Rs. 180 billion), that corruption absorbed $2.4 billion in development funds, and that 
public sector employees were implicated in $3.5 billion of black money. Another $1.2 
billion (about Rs. 24 billion) worth of smuggled goods were thought to enter Pakistan 
each year and economists estimated that unaccounted moneys could comprise up to 50 
percent of GNP. 215 Zia used the Afghanistan crisis to increase national solvency and 
received billions of dollars from the US and from migrants to the Middle East. But the 
billion of dollars were not used appropriately for developmental projects. Instead, the 
military-civil bureaucracy and influential people readily accommodated their interests and 
compromised social and economic welfare to achieve their own ambitions. 
213 Newsweek (13 June 1986), pp. 8.11. 214 The Muslim (22 April 1987); Mahnas Ispahani, "Pakistan: Dimensions of Insecurity, " p. 28. 215 Clarence Maloney, "Pakistan: Social Basis of the Economy, " Universities Field Sta1Y' International 
(UFSI) Reports, Asia Series, No. 8 (Indianapolis IN: UPSI, 1987), pp. 2.3. 
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Conclusion 
The preceding pages have examined the transformation of the partnership between the 
United States and Pakistan from 1979 to 1988. From its inception in 1979 it was beset 
by considerable strains, increasing in intensity throughout the remainder of the 1980s; 
from 1988, first the United States and then Pakistan began gradually to disengage 
themselves from the alignment with the result of the Geneva accord (1988) and the 
Afghan war ended, foreshadowing the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan could be interpreted as the first step in a sweep toward the 
warm-water ports and a threat to the oil flows of the Persian Gulf. The invasion was also 
viewed as a menacing strategic manoeuvre against the West and proof of ideological 
expansion. Moreover, it has been shown that geopolitical realities and strategic 
compulsions tended to bring the two countries together primarily for the containment of 
communism, but that divergences of perceptions and policies disrupted the partnership, 
since neither party fully understood the implications and consequences of an alliance 
between unequal partners. 
The strains in the partnership stemmed basically from the two allies' conflicting 
demands and policies, emanating from their divergent reasons for entering the 
partnership. The United States, perceiving an imminent Communist threat to the whole 
international system, made Pakistan one of its allies in Asia in order to have access to 
Pakistani bases so as to expand the scope of its policy of containment. But Pakistan, 
regarding the Communist threat as extremely dangerous, was interested in achieving 
three objectives: first, to receive American arms and protection against Soviet backed 
Afghanistan and India; second, to deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength 
in the Afghan war; third to attract large-scale American economic assistance. 
Thus, both Pakistan and the United States had entered into partnership largely for self- 
serving reasons rather than mutually congruent objectives. The US looked at the 
relationship from the global perspective of the East-West conflict and as one of many 
other peripheral vital interests, whereas Pakistan looked at it from the regional 
perspective of its disputes with Afghanistan and India and as the anchor of its security, 
stability and economic development. Thus, this was a unique partnership between the 
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US and Pakistan because the United States as a superpower with global responsibilities 
and commitments, took advantage of Pakistan to expand the scope of its policy of 
containment of communism and Pakistan aligned itself with the United States in order 
to achieve military and economic assistance for protection against the perceived threat 
from Afghanistan and its non-Communist neighbour, India. Pakistan also hoped that the 
United States, in return for Pakistan's cooperation with the American Cold War effort, 
would bestow upon Pakistan preferential treatment over non-aligned India and would 
compensate Pakistan in terms of economic and military assistance. The Reagan 
administration seems to have been more sympathetically disposed toward Pakistan's 
security than previous US administrations and Pakistan enjoyed favourable treatment as 
long as US strategic and political interests were involved in the Persian Gulf region. 
Pakistan and the United States both were united for a common cause to counter the 
Soviet military expansionism. The US provided arms and economic aid to Pakistan with 
the objective of bolstering Pakistan's operational capabilities for its northern or western 
and eastern fronts. During this time, moreover, the Pakistani leadership, showed greater 
diplomatic skill than in the 1950s. Pakistan successfully used the Afghanistan 
developments to warm its relations with the West and make the United States reassess 
its position and review their mutual relationship, although the issues of nuclear 
technology and human rights the problematic areas of the Pakistan-US relationship, 
such that the two countries virtually became antagonists. The United States also 
reaffirmed the validity of the 1959 bilateral agreement and it became the basis of a new 
relationship. In this sense, the new partnership was a revival or reinvigoration of their 
past ties. The new relationship was an "aid-cum-sales relationship. " Although the 1959 
bilateral agreement between Pakistan and the United States was still in force, it was not 
an alliance relationship as this agreement was not binding on American Congress and 
was hostage to public mood in the United States. Moreover, the new relationship was 
more informal and flexible because it was based on a greater commonality of 
perceptions and interests. Pakistan was also able to consolidate relations with the 
Islamic world and, being assured of American assistance, to strengthen further its 
friendship with China, without offending or provoking the Soviet Union. 
Pakistan had thus far followed an adroit and multifaceted policy. As a front"linc state, it 
had faced unavoidable risks, but it had minimised these risks by broadening its 
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international support and diplomatic dealing with both the Soviet Union and India 
(which had a more sophisticated arsenal on the eastern border) with subtlety and 
minimum provocation. It had received substantial commitments of economic assistance 
and military equipment from the United States. By calling on its Saudi Arabian and 
other Gulf friends, it had been able to obtain these armaments on terms that minimised 
both the reality and the appearance of the US leverage on its freedom of action. 
Thus, the United States and Pakistan both were aware of each other's true reasons for 
establishing a partnership because the Soviet expansionism created a challenge to 
regional security and also a direct threat to the security of Pakistan, which emerged as a 
"front-line" state and found herself uncomfortably placed in a two front threat scenario 
such as no other South Asian state had ever experienced. In the circumstance, the US 
played a very active role and also restored relations with Pakistan to direct its attention 
to the anti-Communist crusade. Pakistan was the major player in the game and was the 
principal channel through which assistance was provided to Afghan freedom lighters. It 
provided support for the partisans and allowed the Afghan resistance's military 
capabilities to grow. It followed this policy cautiously in the hope of avoiding increased 
Soviet pressures across the Pakistan-Afghan border. The Soviets, in return, increased 
their pressures on Pakistan to bring about its abandonment of the resistance. Soviet 
commentaries on Pakistan became more hostile, and the war was brought closer to the 
Pakistan border. Thus, the US-Pakistan combined strategies limited Soviet military 
options and increased their costs. 
As we have seen, the United States and Pakistan were actively involved to counter the 
Soviet military advcnturism. Both countries were more and more preoccupied in 
combined planning and actions against the common enemy of the Soviet Union. In fact, 
the fall of Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan raised the political stakes and 
the United States returned to its policy of strong support for Pakistan. This was a time 
when the United States developed serious strategic relations with Pakistan for the 
containment of communism. For this purpose, the United States did indeed provide a 
substantial amount of economic and military assistance to Pakistan, and provided 
unequivocal support and a guarantee of its security against a possible attack by the 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the United States administration found a 
way of rewarding Pakistan and mobilised public opinion to support a policy of assertive 
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competition with the Soviet Union; coercive diplomacy against Pakistan temporarily 
gave way to empathy and Pakistan appeared as an essential anchor of the entire 
Southwest Asian region. 
In spite of some setbacks and disappointments, Pakistan committed itself to the United 
States policy of containment, resisting overtures by the Soviet Union with its enticing 
offers of economic and military assistance. After 1988, the situation changed and 
Pakistan began to suffer a profound disillusionment with the United States policies. For 
its part, Pakistan closed down American bases within its territory and banned CIA 
activities. By 1990, after one decade, the partnership reached a state of total disruption. 
One of the key factors in the disengagement between the United States and Pakistan was 
the end of the Afghan war and the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Thus, the long US-Pakistan partnership ended under the American presidency of George 
Bush (1989-1993). In October 1990 the nuclear issue resurfaced and the Bush 
administration reestablished the linkage between arms aid and nuclear nonproliferation 
in South Asia. All US aid, training and transfer of weapons and technology were 
suspended. The president's unwillingness to certify, as per the Pressler Amendment to 
the Foreign Assistance Act, that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons resulted in 
the suspension of arms and economic aid worth $600 million for fiscal year 1991-92. 
However, Pakistan shrewdly maintained an ambivalent stance on the nuclear issue and 
gradually achieved uranium enrichment capability which destroyed, for all practical 
purposes, the last fabric of the US-Pakistan partnership. In fact, Pakistan lost its 
strategic importance in the region and the United States normaliscd its relations with 
India and Russia. This was a critical time for Pakistan because the US chose to disregard 
Pakistan's deepest apprehensions, extending large scale economic assistance to India, 
which transformed India into a virtual American ally against China. This act alienated 
and enraged Pakistan, leaving it with little choice but total dcpcndcncc on China and the 
Middle Eastern countries. 
The stoppage of weapons and arms spare parts was certainly unfair to Pakistan. The US 
Congress banned outflow of all development assistance for Pakistan because of the 
country's refusal to halt its nuclear programme. The Reagan administration had, in fact, 
modernised Pakistan's defence system and provided advanced sophisticated weapons, 
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not only to increase its defence capability and confidence but to prevent it from pursuing 
its nuclear programme. For Pakistan, the US economic and military aid was a drop in 
the ocean and not enough to reduce the perceived threat from India. Eventually, Pakistan 
saw the acquisition of nuclear weapons not as a choice but as a necessity for its survival. 
In fact, Pakistan's decision to go nuclear reflected a lack of confidence in America's 
support; it viewed the US as an unreliable friend who always turned out to be a paper 
tiger in times of crisis. 
As one surveys the vista of the US-Pakistan partnership, various demands and policies 
on the part of both allies emerge as having played key roles in the gradual disintegration 
of their relationship. The United States-Pakistan partnership, from the American point 
of view, was meant to be a limited purpose association, designed to provide bases for 
the United States in return for military hardware and large-scale economic assistance. 
Although Pakistan must have been aware of the legitimate boundaries of its 
opportunistic partnership, it nevertheless strove to have a more comprehensive 
relationship. This oriental concept of friendship, which was radically different from the 
United States' more business-like attitude, led Pakistan to demand total American 
support (like Israel, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan) against the Moscow-New Delhi 
and Kabul axis. Pakistan also suggested that the US should extend its security assistance 
to settle the Kashmir dispute but for the United States, this Pakistani demand was 
unreasonable and it was, moreover, detrimental to the United States' global interests. 
I have been concerned mainly to discuss the major factors causing the disruption of the 
partnership. Three main questions remain: (1). What were the important gains and 
liabilities of the two nations in the partnership? (2). What will be the possible course of 
the future US-Pakistan relations? (3). What generalisations can be drawn from the study 
of the United States-Pakistan partnership? 
After the Afghan war, America left Pakistan alone. This action was rcgardcd in Pakistan 
as unfriendly but in the United States' estimation, Pakistan was more a liability than a 
gain. As a great power, the United States found itself in an increasingly grave dilemma 
in trying to keep the friendship with Pakistan. Indeed, the partnership was severely 
strained when after the end of the Cold War the United States changed its strategic 
interests and the US aid policy was being increasingly refocused on countries of global 
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strategic importance to the United States, a shift that benefited India and almost 
excluded Pakistan. The US partnership with the Afghan mujahidccn also became 
complicated because the policy makers perceived that the mujahidcen activities were no 
longer in the interests of the United States. 
However, Pakistan, too, suffered heavy liabilities from the partnership. Pakistan 
incurred the animosity of the Soviet Union when it aligned with the United States to 
support the mujahideen against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the Soviet Union 
encouraged separatist elements in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan and 
supported their right of self-determination. The Soviets not only abandoned their neutral 
position on the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan, they also gave full support to PDPA 
government in Afghanistan in its border dispute with Pakistan. They also adopted a 
stricter position on Kashmir in favour of India and gave full support to its stand inside 
and outside the United Nations. At the time, Moscow's preference for New Delhi and 
threats of retaliation against Pakistan raised the level of tension in the area. One should 
also take into account that Pakistan, by granting bases to the United States, took upon 
itself the dangerous role of being a prime target for Soviet attack. Domestically, the 
consequences of the Afghan war were grave for Pakistan because the influx of refugees 
created political, economic, social and environmental problems but they also posed an 
alarming threat to Pakistan's security. More specifically, the Afghan refugees also 
introduced a drug and gun culture, which created a serious law and order situation in the 
country. 
An important gain for the United States from the partnership was its utilisation of 
Pakistani bases and other specific privileges from Pakistan, such as facilities for 
launching high altitude reconnaissance aircraft over Afghanistan and Soviet Central 
Asia. The US also used Pakistan as a platform for electronic intelligence gathering to 
watch Soviet military activities in the region. For many years, these facilities enabled the 
United States to monitor strategic activities inside Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. 
Thus, Pakistan rendered a valuable service to the United States in its policy of 
containment. In return, of course, Pakistan gained a number of benefits from its 
association with the United States. The association not only yielded much dcsircd 
economic and military assistance but also infused confidence and psychological security 
against the perceived Soviet and Indian threat. More significantly, Pakistan also 
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received modem sophisticated US weapons including F-16 aircraft, which greatly 
strengthened Pakistan's defence. The partnership enabled Pakistan to modernise its 
defence system and improve the economic situation. With the support of the United 
States, Pakistan dealt with Afghanistan and India from a position of strength. The 
partnership provided Pakistan with a guarantee of protection against an attack by India. 
Then, too, Pakistan gained some sort of parity with India in military strength. The most 
important benefit which Pakistan gained from the Afghan war was the death of its 
ethno-nationalist movements. 
But did the United States and Pakistan achieve their objectives in contracting the 
partnership? One can see from the foregoing account that the United States achieved its 
objectives; that is, to punish the Soviets by their defeat at the hands of the Afghan 
mujahideen and to take revenge for the Vietnam humiliation. The US used Pakistan as a 
pipeline for arms supplies to the mujahideen, even at the risk of possible Soviet 
retaliation. Its refusal to agree to initial Soviet proposals on a timetable for a troop 
withdrawal may be attributed to the US structural influence arising from substantial 
economic and military assistance. Moreover, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan yielded 
great benefits to the United States and its Western allies. 
But the gains cannot be so easily estimated for the smaller ally. Pakistan achieved its 
objective of attracting large-scale American economic and military aid as a quid pro quo 
for supporting the mujahldeen against the Soviet and Kabul forces. Pakistan also gained 
benefits from reducing the potential political and military threat from its north-western 
border. The Afghan war left a weak and unstable Afghanistan that could better serve the 
interests of Pakistan. However, General Zia used the Soviet invasion and Afghan 
refugees to rule Pakistan under martial law and to justify the declaration of emergency 
laws. In this way, he managed to perpetuate the imposition of a military dictatorship on 
Pakistan for more than a decade. Zia established close association with the Reagan 
administration and the CIA and during the Afghan crisis the ISI had a frcc hand in the 
distribution of the billions of dollars in weapons, food, and military installations that 
Washington had shipped to Pakistan to use against the Soviet Union. The US allowed 
Pakistan to control strictly the structure, organisation, movements, activities and 
supplies of the Afghan resistance. Tluy also supported Pakistan's idea to appoint itself 
the spokesman for the Afghan people and the Afghan resistance. However, the 
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partnership did not enable Pakistan to deal with India from a position of strength on the 
Kashmir dispute. The partnership commitment was only for a limited time and ended 
with the demise of the Soviet Union. Then too, Pakistan slipped more and more behind 
its traditional enemy in military strength. 
Assessment 
The Afghan crisis was the finest hour of US-Pakistan cooperation and understanding 
because the strength of the US-Pakistan partnership weakened Soviet power and 
Afghanistan became a "bleeding wound" for the Soviet Union. The Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan dramatically transformed Pakistan's geostratcgic situation. Instead of being 
buffered by the mountains, deserts, and ravines of Afghanistan-which for so long had 
separated Russia from the South Asia-Pakistan faced the spectre of Soviet troops 
virtually everywhere along the Durand Line. However, concerns about Pakistani security 
were well grounded and the United States agreed to protect Pakistan's territorial 
boundaries in case of the Soviet direct attack. The US gave unequivocal support to 
Pakistan and the country devoted its full attention to the anti-Communist crusade. Thus, 
the United States and Pakistan both successfully stopped the flood of communism. 
Despite many reservations in intellectual circles, Pakistan acted courageously and 
pragmatically. It was pragmatic in seeking assistance from the United States and 
working in coordination with the west on the Afghan issue, at a time when it was facing 
tremendous internal and external impulses to relieve itself of its past political and 
economic penetration by the west. Pakistan also acted rationally in reversing its stance 
toward India by adopting a more friendly position. Moreover, Pakistan through its 
partnership with the United States achieved its objective of safeguarding its security 
against the threat of Soviet-Afghan aggression. The US provided a substantial amount of 
economic and military assistance to Pakistan as assurance for a guarantee of protection 
against a possible attack by the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The substantial US 
foreign aid to Pakistan proceeded from the view of American policy-makers that 
economic and military assistance was a convenient and desirable instrument for erecting 
an anti-Communist partnership and for winning friends to support US tong-tcrnt 
interests and views in international controversies. 
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The Reagan administration established a formal partnership with Pakistan to oppose the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. Pakistan was also exclusively committed to the West, 
resisting the Soviet pressure and refusing its enticing offers of economic assistance. 
Pakistan was the major channel of supply arms to the mujahideen and the Reagan 
administration was committed to arming them until Moscow stopped arming Kabul. 
There were strains in the partnership, stemming basically from the two allies' 
conflicting demands and policies, emanating from their divergent reasons for entering in 
the partnership. The United States showed its commitment to contain Soviet 
expansionism and engaged with Pakistan as one of its close allies in the region in order 
to have access to its strategic locations to use for the containment of communism. The 
Soviet intervention had occurred in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf, a region whose vital 
importance to the Western allies was beyond dispute. Pakistan used this partnership to 
prevent Communist advancement which was a potential threat to its state ideology, 
system and state structure. 
However, the geostrategic dimensions of the Cold War, which enormously helped 
Pakistan in Washington, no longer prevail. There was no longer need for a pipeline of 
weapon supplies to the Afghan resistance groups. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
brought into existence fundamental gcostrategic changes at the global and regional level. 
Pakistan, in the eyes of the United States, has lost its gcostrategic significance as the 
Soviet "threat" has disappeared. The special relationship between the United States and 
Pakistan which started in the early 1980s ended with the new global realities. The US 
reduced its support for Pakistan in the region and in the international arena. This marked 
the beginning of a major shift from the strategic partnership to isolation and the two 
countries could no longer take each other for granted. The special relationship between 
the US and Pakistan once a cornerstone of the US foreign policy, was shattered and 
India emerge as a counterweight to China. The United States also changed its Policy 
about Kashmir and argued that the Kashmir issue could be resolved if both parties 
engaged with a willingness to address their concerns in mutually acceptable ways. This 
US policy is unfavourable to Pakistan. It supports India's stand against foreign powers' 
presence and their intervention in the domestic affairs of South Asian nations. I lowcv cr, 
the US needs India's support to contain any possible future challenge from China and 
for this reason, the United States has initiated the policy of strengthening India. 
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Moreover, the end of the Cold War changed the strategic environment of South Asia. 
Pakistan's significance for the US as a strategic partner declined considerably. In the 
changing international climate, the nuclear issue once again arose to trouble Pakistan's 
relations with the United States. The Bush administration offered a deal to cap 
Pakistan's nuclear programme in return for which the US would release 38 F-16A 
fighter planes to Pakistan. Islamabad rejected the linkage and the US refused to release 
the F-16s for which Pakistan had already paid $368 million. Moreover, the US's future 
agenda of interests in the region seems increasingly destined to focus on India as the 
centerpiece on which policy-makers will have to devote their prime attention in all 
realms-political, security, economic, technological and strategic. The logic of the 
direction in which US policy-makers had been moving continues to be over-taken by the 
nostalgia of the old friendship with Pakistan in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan. This situation also makes it possible, in principle, for the United 
States gradually to reduce its vastly inflated military and economic assistance 
programme to Pakistan. 
However, Pakistan remained a country in which the United States has residual interests. 
After I1 September 2001, Pakistan became once more a key regional player and vital 
strategic ally of the US led war against terrorism. Once again Islamabad emerged as a 
frontline state for US and offered its military bases, airfields, logistic support and 
intelligence information to America in the planned counter terrorist campaign against 
Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network and the Taliban. 
Pakistan was facing isolation and financial doldrums but the timely decision of its 
leadership bounced back into the centre of the international stream. The military 
leadership offered its country's "unstinted cooperation" to the United States in its efforts 
to curb terrorism, its supporters and their network. Pakistan's alignment with the US 
was rewarded and President George W. Bush waived military and economic sanctions 
on Pakistan which were imposed when Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests (May-June 
1998) and the coup that brought General Pcrvaz Musharraf to power in 1999. By 
enlisting Islamabad as its ally in the war on terror, the US has raised hopes among 
Pakistanis that their sick economy will receive transfusions of aid and investment. In 
this regard, Pakistan expected that the US would forgive old loans, provide debt relict 
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(similar to that which it offered Egypt of around $7 billion during the Gulf War in 
1991), give fresh aid and boost its import allotment for Pakistani textiles and garments. 
Other major concerns for Pakistani policy makers are exports and tax revenues because 
Pakistan has incurred losses of $1.1 billion and $1.4 billion from the US and the 
European Union, due to suspended or cancelled orders. About 66 percent of total 
Pakistani exports consist of cotton and textiles, of which rcadymade garments account 
for almost 45 percent. Moreover, Pakistan competes in 14 categories available under the 
textile quota regime. The removal of sanctions will allow Pakistan access to the US 
markets for exports of cotton products. However, the United States and Western 
countries have the responsibility of stabilising Pakistan, lest it fall apart. Regional 
separatism in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan might gain 
momentum, which could challenge the viability of the state. Regional separatism and 
the post-Taliban situation can be managed only through economic development and 
secular education. Pakistan's allies have to provide significant economic aid, investment 
and technical assistance. This is the only way to protect Pakistan from further instability 
and to curb continued Islamic radicalism in the region. 
Nevertheless, the United States-Pakistan alliance in the past and present is by no means 
a unique case of a partnership besieged by conflict and ending in disappointment. All 
associations are subject to corrosion. As the present study has tried to demonstrate, 
partnerships that are based on incongruent objectives arc vulnerable to heavy friction 
and eventual disruption. Moreover, the examination of the US-Pakistan partnership 
suggests that in a partnership involving unequal powers, the stronger actor will probably 
determine the partnership strategy. This means that the stronger ally's policies and 
interests will prevail, even to the extent that the vital interests of the smaller will be 
sacrificed. Such an event is not new in world history. History has witnessed nations 
acting, not out of a moral imperative, but out of expediency and a desire for self- 
aggrandiscment. Thus, a great power has a good chance to have its way with a weak ally 
as concerns benefits and policies, and it is for this reason that Machiavelli spoke wisely 
when he warned weak princes against alliances with strong ones. 
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